LANCASTER UNIVERSITY
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT

Greek National Identity in Talk:
The rhetorical articulation of an ideological dilemma

by

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This thesis records research undertaken at the Department of Psychology of the University of Lancaster. The work contained herein is wholly original, excepting when due reference is made.
Για τους γονείς μου.....
"The question is", said Alice,
"whether you can make words mean so many different things".
"The question is", said Humpty Dumpty,
"which is to be master -that's all".

Lewis Carroll
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ABSTRACT

Accounts from a range of disciplines across the social sciences have described an essential ambivalence in modern Greek national identity. Modern Greek national identity is shown to encompass an ideological tension between oriental and occidental cultural stereotypes. Critical ethnographers have described the ways in which this symbolic ambivalence is casually reproduced within everyday discourse in Greece. Recent developments in critical social psychology also draw attention to the ideological dilemmas manifested within lay argumentative practices. Moreover, the discursive turn within social psychology offers a range of analytic concepts and tools for disentangling the identity work accomplished within talk in interaction. Drawing upon evidence from ethnographic analyses, the present research offers a social psychological account of the rhetorical reiteration of the ideological ambivalence of modern Greek national identity within talk. To that end, two empirical studies were conducted. The first involved Greek students in Lancaster University and the second Greek employees in the European Commission in Brussels. In both studies, the research participants were asked to account for their living experiences in their adopted countries of residence. Their accounts were audio recorded and excerpts of their talk discourse analysed. The analyses highlighted the flexible discursive uses of cultural stereotypes of modern Greek national identity. It is shown that the rhetorical deployment of these stereotypes is designed to ward off negative identity inferences about the speakers. In particular, the identity inferences sought to be disavowed are the one of prejudice (as xenophobia) and the one of xenomania. The latter refers to a culturally specific ideological charge within the context of modern Greece, which targets unwarranted pro-Western attitudes. Overall, the analyses conducted highlight the reiteration of the cultural ambivalence of modern Greek national identity within talk and outline the grounds for a convergence of ethnographic arguments about the symbolic uses of stereotypes with social psychological arguments about their interactional uses.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

In contemporary popular and academic literature, modern Greece and modern Greeks are often depicted as culturally ambivalent. Modern Greece is often represented as a crossroad between the West and the East. Its Western credentials often appear to be undisputable. Greece is part of the European Union and of other Western European international organisations; politically it has a Western type of Parliamentary Democracy; and religiously is a predominantly Christian society. Most importantly, it has been historically credited with a classical ancestry which constitutes the origin myth of European civilisation. At times though, geography and history are invoked as determinant factors accounting for modern Greece's cultural affinities with the East. Situated as it is in the South Eastern part of Europe, Greece neighbours the Orient of the Near East. Moreover, until the late 1820s the lands that were to become the territory of the modern Greek nation State were under oriental political rule, as they were parts of the Ottoman Empire. As ethnographic accounts highlight, contemporary Greeks themselves appear to be quite ambivalent as to whether they are "Europeans" or not.

Modern Greece's cultural ambivalence is attested to within a wide range of contemporary social theoretical literature. Historians (e.g. Liakos, 1994) have documented its historical underpinnings. Literary theorists (e.g. Tziovas, 1994) have accounted for the genealogical provenance of the modern Greek cultural dualism, tracing its roots to the colonial European thinking. Sociologists have described phenomena of modern Greek society that attest to the tensions resulting from the imposition of Western State structures and institutions on a traditional, premodern society (e.g. Mouzelis, 1978; Tsoucalas, 1987). And, ethnographers (e.g. Faubion, 1993; Stewart, 1991) have documented the interplay of oriental and occidental features in cultural phenomena of a wide variety.

According to critical ethnographic accounts (e.g. Herzfeld, 1987), the cultural ambivalence of modern Greek society is mundanely reproduced at a symbolic level through the life practices of Greek social actors. Herzfeld's analyses have shown that occidental and oriental cultural stereotypes are juxtaposed within discursive uses of a wide variety within modern Greece. As he argues, this juxtaposition is symbolically consequential. In the context of modern Greek culture, for historical and political reasons, "the occidental" has been endowed with a superior symbolic value, whereas "the oriental" is usually under-evaluated. For Herzfeld, modern Greeks reproduce the ideological ambivalence of modern Greek cultural or national identity through their symbolic uses
of cultural stereotypes. Often in their discourse, Greece and Greek Others are orientalised and criticised from an occidental perspective, with the criticism conferring symbolic credentials to an occidental identity for the persons doing the criticism.

Critical social psychologists have also attested to the dilemmatic qualities of ideologies more generally (e.g. Billig et al., 1988). As it has been shown, the dilemmatic qualities of ideological frameworks inform the thinking and casual argumentation of social actors. In this way, it is argued, ideological assumptions are mundanely reproduced, while social actors deliberate over the contradictory moral postulates prescribed within specific ideological frameworks. Recently, Billig (1995), in his outline of the thesis of Banal Nationalism, has argued that national ideology is reproduced within everyday talk by providing the underlying assumptions for casual argumentation. Its introvert (or national) and extrovert (or international) outlooks provide the seeds for thought and argument and in so doing, the ideological assumption of the "natural" national division of the world is reiterated. As it has been shown, the talk of modern citizens about national Others manifests the seeds of dilemmatic thinking. National Others may be criticised and xenophobic views expressed but speakers usually exhibit a rhetorical / ideological concern not to appear to be prejudiced. Critical social psychological work on the discursive uses of cultural stereotypes (e.g. Condor, 1996) has also attested to the thoughtful nature of stereotypical ascriptions.

These briefly outlined ethnographic and critical social psychological strands of work provide for the theoretical background to my project. In their light, I shall set to elucidate the reproduction of the dilemmatic ideological assumptions of Greek national identity within talk. The argument that I shall seek to support is that in Greek talk on Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others can be traced analytically the ideological assumptions that have historically constituted modern Greece and Greeks as ambivalent in culture. As I shall seek to highlight, these assumptions inform the identity practices and concerns that can be analytically attested to by a close examination of the unfolding of talk in interaction.

The discursive material that I shall consider analytically comes from two empirical studies that I conducted. In the first, Greek students studying in the Lancaster University were requested to discuss in focus groups sessions their living experiences in Lancaster and in England more generally. The second study was conducted in Brussels and involved interviews with Greek employees working for the European Commission on their living and working experiences. Both
the focus group discussions and the interviews were audio recorded and, subsequently, fully transcribed. These transcripts constitute the empirical material that I shall base my analyses on.

For my analyses, I draw my analytic tools and concepts from the discursive turn in social psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). During the last ten years or so, the turn to language in social psychology has dramatically altered the landscape of the discipline. Phenomena that had been hitherto treated as aspects of cognition or perception have been recast and approached analytically as aspects of discourse. Social psychologists who espouse a discourse analytic perspective broadly acknowledge the already (historically and ideologically) constituted dimensions of discourse as well as its constitutive force within contexts of contemporary usage. Nevertheless, the analytic emphasis is typically put on either one of these two dimensions and the resulting analyses tend to be rather one sided. For my analysis, I shall opt for a balanced analytic treatment of both discourse dimensions. In order to do so, my recourse to the armoury of tools and concepts provided by the discursive turn in social psychology shall be heavily eclectic.

In Chapter 1 of my thesis, I set to establish the necessary background frame of reference for a social psychological / discourse analytic study of modern Greek national identity. In so doing, I draw extensively on social theoretical treatments of modern Greek politics and culture, ranging from political history to critical ethnography. My first aim is to illustrate the political, historical and ideological processes that underlined the emergence of the Greek cultural dualism. Second, I attempt to highlight the evaluatively loaded profiles of modern Greek national / cultural identity that the ideological constitution of Greece as an ambivalent culture has resulted in. And third, drawing upon ethnographic accounts, I try to highlight the ways in which this cultural ambivalence is mundanely reproduced within cultural practices in modern Greece. More specifically, I draw attention to Herzfeld's (1987) argument that the cultural stereotypes of the ambivalent Greek national identity are actively used by Greek social actors in their pursuit of social accountability. This leads, towards the end of the chapter, to an interrogation of the extent to which recent development in critical social psychology can be used to further substantiate ethnographic analyses on the symbolic identity work that cultural stereotypes accomplish in their discursive deployment.

In chapter 2, I turn to consider the second main theoretical resource that my work draws upon, namely Michael Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism. Reviewing his work, I draw attention to his
argument that the introvert (national) and extrovert (international) themes of nationalism (in their discursive invocation) work towards the naturalisation of the ideological assumptions of national ideology. This leads me to consider Billig et al.'s (1988) elaboration on the ideological dilemma of prejudice. As Billig and his colleagues have shown, the rhetorical disavowal of a prejudiced identity involves rhetorical moves by means of which, on the one hand, the moral high ground of international sentiments is acknowledged but, on the other, xenophobic views are justified in the name of the nation. Since my project aims to highlight specifically the reiteration of the assumptions of Greek national identity within talk, I suggest that an expansion to the thesis of Banal Nationalism may be in order. First, I argue for the need to consider analytically the specific cultural stereotypes mobilised by speakers when talking about Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others. Second, I suggest that the processes of the ideological constitution of modern Greek national identity may have given rise to a particular form of an ideological dilemma.

In the light of my literature review on Greek national identity in Chapter 1, in Chapter 3, I elaborate on the relevance of the ideological charge of xenomania within the context of modern Greek culture. This ideological charge stems from modern Greece's ideological predicament to be both included in and excluded from the community of the nations of the West and it refers to ideologically problematised pro-Western sentiments. As I suggest, in addition to the rhetorical concern to disavow a prejudiced (xenophobic) identity, a rhetorical concern to disavow the ideological charge of xenomania may be analytically attested to in the talk of my research participants, as long as they are talking about European national Others.

In Chapter 4, I consider the discursive turn in social psychology. Reviewing the main strands of discourse analysis and assessing the relevance of each for my project, particular attention is drawn to the ways in which each of these modes of discourse analysis deals with the fundamental duality of discourse, namely its already constituted dimension, and its constitutive interactional force. My suggestion will be that an eclectic recourse to the analytic concepts and tools proposed by these different types of discourse analysis is the best way to tackle my research question.

The first empirical study is reported in Chapter 5. The analysis focuses on participants' recurrent references to "organisation" as a differentiating characteristic between England / English and Greece / Greeks. In the light of the literature review of Greek cultural stereotypes unfolded in Chapter 1, and of social psychological work on Greek (auto-) stereotypes, the recurrent mobilisation of that theme in the participants' talk is hardly surprising. In comparison to Europeans
"proper", Greece and Greeks are allegedly notorious for their lack of organisation. In my analysis, though I highlight the flexible interactional uses of that cultural stereotype. As it will become apparent, England and the English are not necessarily and invariably praised for their organisation and Greece and the Greeks are not necessarily and invariably criticised for their disorganisation. The analysis highlights how evaluative ascriptions of the stereotype of organisation / disorganisation are finely tuned to address certain rhetorical / ideological identity concerns: the disavowal of hearable inferences of prejudice (xenophobia) and xenomania. The main analytic emphasis will be put on the elucidation of the rhetorical devices and procedures by means of which such negative identity inferences are disavowed. Insofar as the participants orient to the relevance of this cultural stereotype in describing and differentiating Greece and Greeks from certain European Others (England and the English), the argument will be that the dilemma of modern Greek national identity is thoughtfully reproduced in my participants' talk. Their rhetorical concern to ward off the culturally specific ideological charge of xenomania will be treated as an additional analytic warrant for my analytic claim. At the end of the chapter, in the light of Herzfeld's account of the symbolic implications of evaluative Greek talk about Greece / Greeks and Europe / Europeans, I shall also contemplate on the potential symbolic (identity) implications of my participants' talk.

The second empirical study is presented in Chapter 6. In the analysis presented in the previous chapter, my participants were shown to normatively mobilise virtuous constructions of Greek national character in order to counter-balance negative appraisals of Greek institutional disorganisation or positive appraisals of English institutional organisation. Picking up upon that finding, in this study, I focus on the participants' evaluative elaborations on Greek national character. As before, my main analytic aim will be the elucidation of the flexible ways in which my participants mobilise cultural stereotypes of Greek national identity and the ways in which the rhetorical design of their talk wards off inferences about xenophobia and xenomania. Taking a further analytic step though, I also incorporate in my analysis some thoughts about the potential symbolic implications of Greek evaluative talk about Greek national character. Although, my analytic claims are unavoidably provisional, I suggest that a consideration of the symbolic implications of the rhetorical identity work accomplished within talk may be both theoretically and analytically sustainable. In this way, both the analytic focus of discourse analysis may be expanded and the analytic claims of ethnographic analyses may be further empirically grounded.
Chapter One

MODERN GREECE AND THE WEST:
OVERVIEW OF AN AMBIVALENT AFFAIR

1. Modern Greece and the West: Political dependency and discontent
   1.1. From the war of independence (1821-27) to the treaty of Lausanne (1923)
   1.2. From the Greek civil war (1945-49) to the rise of the Macedonian question

2. Modern Greek nationalism and nation building
   2.1. The rise of modern Greek nationalism: An Enlightened project
   2.2. Greek nation building: The doctrine of national unity

3. Modern Greece: In the margins of the West and East
   3.1. Inconsummate Westernisation and the missionary aspect of the Great Idea
   3.2. The language question and the ideological construct of Greekness

4. Modern Greece in the looking glass: The politics of ambivalence
   4.1. The politics of binary oppositions: The "Hellenic ideal" vs. the "modern Greek"
   4.2. The ambivalence of modern Greek national identity: The Hellenic / Romeic dilemma
   4.3. The Hellenic / Romeic dilemma and the cultural reproduction of Western hegemony
   4.4. From symbolic to conversational pragmatics and back again
1. Modern Greece and the West: Political dependency and discontent

Despite differences in theoretical orientation, historians and political scientists documenting the political history of the modern Greek nation State from its establishment in the 1830s to the mid 1970s seem to share a minimum of agreement: the political life of modern Greece over that period has been marked by continuous foreign (Western) interference. Indeed, the developments in Greek political history over that period have been viewed in terms of two wider Western (European / American) political projects. Namely, the "Eastern question" and the division of central and eastern Europe in the post second world war years into spheres of NATO and Warsaw Pact "influence".

1.1. From the war of independence (1821-1827) to the treaty of Lausanne (1923)

In historical accounts of nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe, the political constitution of the modern Greek nation State and its subsequent external policy are often represented as nothing but an aspect of the wider Eastern question that tantalised the diplomacy of European powers for more than a century and a half (Macfie, 1989; Dakin, 1972; Papacosma, 1983; Schroeder, 1994; Skopetea, 1992; Svoronos, 1994). Since the mid eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire ceased to be the major military threat for Western Europe, a role that it had consistently played since the mid fifteenth century. After consolidating its domination in the region of Eastern Mediterranean with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 (and even threatening the European mainland with invasion when sieged Vienna in 1683), during the course of the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire turned to be the "big patient" of Europe. From the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74 to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, its limp state provided an open ground for exploitation for the rising European imperial powers. The imminent possibility of the Ottoman Empire's dislocation regulated the latter's conflicting regional politics. England, Russia and France came to be involved in long and historically notorious series of shifting allegiances and diplomatic manoeuvres in order to protect their invested interests in the region. Within this wider political context, the revolt of Greek speaking Orthodox subjects of the Empire against the Ottoman rule in 1821, and the subsequent establishment of the Greek nation State in the early 1830s, added a new field for interventionist European politics within the overall context of the Eastern question.

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1 Extended guides to the relevant literature can be found in Asdrahas (1994) and Kitroeff (1990).
The Greek War of Independence broke out at a rather ill-fated for nationalist uprisings time. For one thing, it broke out six only years after the Congress of Vienna where -following the end of the Napoleonic Wars- the map of Europe was redrawn in an attempt to restore the Old Order. In that political climate, the Greek revolt was met with initial circumspection -if not overt hostility- by the Great European Powers. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the initial successes and the endurance of the Greek revolt and on the other, the growing philhellenic movement that sprang out in major European cities (St Clair, 1972) gradually turned European public opinion in favour of the Greeks. It proved more difficult to persuade the governments of Britain, France and Russia though. The decisive factor in their eventual intervention was their antagonistic external policies and the Greek leadership's diplomacy which capitalised on these antagonisms. At the end, each one of the Great Powers was led to intervene in order to prevent the others from gaining exclusive influence and control over liberated Greece (Couloumbis et al., 1976; Maefie, 1989; Svoronos, 1994).

The extent to which Greek politics at the time of the revolution (and beyond that) were entrenched on European interests is clearly manifested in the type of the political parties that emerged at the time. The three political parties that dominated Greek politics for the largest part of the nineteenth century were not representative of different political principles. Instead, they bore the names "English", "French" and "Russian" and they came to represent the preferences of their leadership concerning the European patronage to be sought and the political interests of their respective patrons. Couloumbis et al. (1976) summarised the Greek diplomacy in luring European intervention in three strategies. The first, was to secure foreign (private) loans from European money markets. In this way, vested financial interests came to be established in Greece. The second was to offer the throne of the (to be) liberated Greece to various European royal houses. In this way it was hoped that a race of dynastic ambitions would be induced in Europe that would result in an active support of the Greek struggle. The third, and most effective, was to formally and exclusively petition Britain to assume the protection of the Greek cause. This move had a double rationale. On the one hand, it was becoming clear that this would be the most effective political patronage as the British naval ascendency in eastern Mediterranean was unparalleled, and as the British had the biggest political influence on the Porte. On the other hand, it was felt that an exclusive bid for help to Britain would drag Russia and France to take diplomatic steps to prevent British control over Greece. This latter strategy pretty soon worked out. In the most crucial moment (1827) for the War of Independence, the joint naval forces the three Great Powers sank the Ottoman fleet in the bay of Navarino and paved the way for the Greek independence.
The historical period starting with the establishment of an independent Greek State in the early 1830s and ending (more or less) with the end of the nineteenth century is aptly characterised by Couloumbis et al. (1976) as a period of manipulative foreign interference (and of occasional military interventions) into Greek political affairs. The ruling principle that guided the politics of Britain, France and Russia towards Greece was quite simple: despite the fact that it was recognised that this newly born independent Christian State could (under their joint tutelage) serve their regional interests, it should be guaranteed that the new State would not become a major threat to the political and territorial status quo in the region, which they wished to maintain as intact as possible (see, inter alia, Campbell & Sherrard, 1968; Cogg, 1992; Couloumbis et al., 1976; Papacosma, 1983; Svoronos, 1994).

In stark contrast to the European powers' aim to preserve the Ottoman Empire in its limp state for as long as possible, the Greek political leadership were dissatisfied with the territorial boundaries of their State. The independent Greek State was tiny, confined to the southern part of the Greek peninsula and to some of the islands in the Aegean. Most importantly, its inhabitants constituted less than a third of the Greek speaking populations that were still living within the confines of the Ottoman Empire and in the islands of the Aegean and Ionian Seas that were under European colonial rule. The national liberation of these territories and their incorporation to Greece was the proclaimed aim of successive Greek governments and royals during the nineteenth century. This irredentist nationalist project that dominated Greek politics up to 1922 came to be termed "Great Idea". Evidently, the Greek Great Idea clashed with the regional plans and interests of Russia, France and, mostly, Britain. During the rest of the nineteenth century, the politics of the Great Powers with regard to Greece centred around the prevention of Greece's irredentist aspirations. The politics of prevention took the form of indirect diplomatic manoeuvres, direct political pressures, military interventions and exercise of strict fiscal control over the Greek State.

Already from the first decades of the new State's life the term "xenokratia" (literally, "foreign rule") was coined in the Greek political discourse and everyday parlance to designate both what Greeks saw as being the state of the affairs in their political situation as well as their discontent with that state of affairs (Svoronos, 1994). Interestingly, "xenokratia" was used to refer to something more than merely the Great European Power's interference in Greek external policy. It was also used to refer to the actual rulers of the Greek State. After a short period immediately after

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2 As opposed to "Turkokratia" (Turkish rule) which was used to designate the four centuries of Ottoman rule.
the end of the war of independence (when as governor of Greece was appointed a Greek in origin diplomat of the Tsar), in 1833 the Great powers appointed as an absolute monarch of Greece the son of the king of Bavaria. Otto's installation in the Greek throne was accompanied by a European loan and a treaty in which the three Great Powers confirmed their guaranteeing status and set down the rules of monarchical governance and succession with the agreement and participation of all the involved parts apart from the Greeks (Svoronos, 1994). The new monarch and his regency ruled Greece as a country under foreign occupation, excluding Greeks from politics, public administration and the army, which were exclusively filled by Bavarian functionaries and mercenaries.

During the course of the nineteenth century, the ties of absolute monarchy were gradually loosened after a series of republican unrests, constitutional reforms and the pressures exerted both from the Greek upper classes which were excluded from the administration of the country and the rise of a new generation of liberal politicians that came to replace the aging leaders of the French, Russian and English political parties. Notably, republican reformations were encouraged by the British who gradually became disillusioned with Otto's irredentist programmatic aspirations. After the Crimean war (1853-1856), when the joint naval forces of Britain and France blockaded Greek ports in order to prevent a Greek alignment with Russia in its war against Ottoman Turkey, Otto was eventually overthrown by a revolt and, naturally, the British opted to find a substitute king. The new king came from the Danish royal family and during his reign (1863-1913) the Great Power's direct involvement in Greek domestic politics was significantly diminished and gave its place to structural interference especially in the economic sector (Couloumbis et al., 1976). The Greek State's poor economic standing as exemplified in its dependency on European loans, in its two official bankruptcies during the course of the nineteenth century and in the tight fiscal control imposed on its finances by the European Powers, kept Greece tied in the European powers' politics on the Eastern question and away from attempting to embark on the realisation of the Great Idea.

During the first two decades of the twentieth century though, the terms in which the Eastern question was politically played out altered significantly. Germany's increasing influence in the Ottoman Empire generated a novel polarisation within the European camp and resulted in the

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3 A notable exception to that pattern was a short lived war with Turkey in 1897 provoked by a Greek invasion to Ottoman territories in its northern borders, where the Greek armed forces suffered a humiliating defeat and the Great Powers had to intervene in order to prevent a full scale occupation of Greece.
abolition of the political dogma of the sustenance of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the establishment of a series of new Balkan States (mainly Serbia and Bulgaria) which, along with Greece, sustained territorial claims in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire created a new front where European interference and shifting political alliances came to be played out within the latest phase of the Eastern question.

The details of Greece's involvement in the two Balkan Wars (1912-13), in the First World War (1914-18) and in the turbulent period that followed that up to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 are too complicated to be documented here. Nevertheless, what should be pointed out is that during this period, due to the changes that occurred in the international political scene, the irredentist aspirations of the Great Idea came close to be fulfilled. By the end of the Balkan Wars, the borders of Greece were expanded to include the major part of Macedonia, southern Epirus, numerous Aegean islands and Crete. Greece's territory and population was doubled. As Couloumbis et al. (1976) maintain, for the first time since independence, Greece was territorially expanded as a result of its own efforts rather that through the benevolence of the Great Powers. Most importantly, Greece -along with its newly acquired Balkan neighbours- for the first time came to be considered as sufficiently important to be seriously considered in the calculations of the Europeans.

Nevertheless, while the Balkan Wars were a triumph for Greek irredentist aspirations, in the aftermath of the First World War, the Great Idea was shattered. The end of the First World War saw Greece on the winning side of the Entente. The prospects for further Greek territorial expansion against Bulgaria and Turkey that had aligned themselves with Germany were visible and realistic. The treaty of Sevres (1920) had accorded to Greece further territories in its northern borders with Bulgaria, more islands in the Aegean, hitherto territories of the Ottoman Empire and, most importantly for Greek irredentism, it allowed Greece to dispatch armed forces to a restricted area in Asia Minor around the predominately Greek inhabited port of Smyrna. According to the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres, Greece would retain the administration of this region for five years and after that by means of a referendum its union with Greece would be decided. Nevertheless, the realisation of the Treaty of SŠvres practically entailed for Greece the continuation of war in Asia Minor. Not this time with the Ottoman Empire, but with the republican nationalist armed forces of Turkey that emerged out of the disintegration of the Empire.

Despite the fact that the Greek military expedition to Smyrna was designed to have a very restricted mission and operational field, in a Great Idea paroxysm, it turned out to be an imperialist
enterprise. With the blessings of the British, the Greek army soon embarked on an "opportunistic" (Svoronos, 1994) march towards Ankara with the intention of completely defeating the Turkish national army. The sheer extravagance of this military enterprise, together with the conflicting politics of Britain and France and a governmental change in Athens that brought to power a pro-German (and anti-British) government, had as result what has come to be known as "the Asia Minor Catastrophe". The Greek army was soon smashed and fled in disorder from Asia Minor; thousands of Greeks from Smyrna had also to flee with them; thousands of others were slaughtered and the city of Smyrna was burnt down. The Great Idea came violently to an end, and back in the Greek State,"the bitterness and chaos of the defeat were compounded by the feeling that Greece had been abandoned in her hour of greatest need by traditional friends" (Clogg, 1992: 100). Up to the present day, Greek high school students learn from State commissioned history textbooks that the reasons for the national "Catastrophe" were the stubborn rage of the Turkish national army and the double dealing and betrayal by the Great Powers (Frangoudaki, 1997a).

The interwar years marked a prolonged period of political instability within Greece, with a series of democratically elected governments and military coups rapidly succeeding one another. It was a rather peaceful period though. With the treaty of Lausanne (1923) the Greek - Turkish borders were drawn in their contemporary form\(^4\), a rapprochement with Turkey was achieved and foreign interference into Greek politics reached its lowest level ever (Couloumbis et al. 1976). Nevertheless, the 1922 "Catastrophe" predicated developments that altered drastically both the ethnic composition and the class structure of the Greek State. The treaty of Lausanne was preambled by a convention providing for the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. Some 400,000 Muslims were transferred from Greek territories to Anatolia and correspondingly 1,500,000 Christian Orthodox from Asia Minor to Greece. Many of the incoming refugees were transferred to the Greek part of Macedonia resulting in an almost total domination of the Greek element in the region. The bulk of the refugees, though, were to remain in the district of Athens and other major cities and for the first time a numerous urban proletariat was created in Greece (Tsoucalas, 1969).

\(^4\) With the exception of the Dodecanese which were still under Italian rule and were annexed to Greece after the end of the second world war.
1.2. From the Greek civil war (1946-49) to the rise of the Macedonian question

If the constitution of the modern Greek State and its subsequent political developments have been enmeshed within the European Powers' politics on the Eastern question, Greece in the post Second World War years fell within the orbit of another major issue for international and European politics: the division of central and eastern Europe into spheres of British / American and USSR "influence". In the words of Couloumbis et al. (1976: 150), "the period 1944-1958 represents the time of the greatest and sustained penetration and interference since Greek independence", while from 1958 since the restoration of parliamentary democracy in the mid 1970s Greece was rendered to become a "Praetorian" State (Couloumbis et al., 1976: 142) with its internal political developments designed in the corridors of the US Departments of State and Defence (cf. Tsoucalas, 1969).

The eve of the Second World War saw Greece under a fascist regime. Nevertheless, pro-British royal pressures and the country's economic dependency on Britain made an open alignment with the Axis practically impossible for the Greek dictatorship (Tsoucalas, 1969). After a successful counter attack on the Italian forces that invaded the country in 1940, in April 1941 Greece was occupied by Germany. The king, the government and part of the army fled to Cairo and remained there completely cut off from the country. Meanwhile, in the occupied Greece a massive popular resistance was gradually organised in the mountains of the mainland with the most important resistance organisation (EAM) and its army (ELAS) being under communist leadership.

Despite the ideological orientation of its leadership though, the political platform of EAM as expressed in its foundation statute was liberal / patriotic (Tsoucalas, 1969). Its aims were to resist the occupation and to foreground a new democratic regime that would follow the liberation of the country and that would be secured by elections for a national parliament and by a referendum on the future of monarchy in Greece. The broad popular appeal of EAM-ELAS was soon to come to fruition. By 1943 it had acquired military control of almost the whole of the country except from the urban centres (Woodhouse, 1948). Most importantly, a Free State was organised in the mountainous areas of the mainland with schools, local governments, law courts, factories and public works run by the local population. This unprecedented democratic organisation of public life gave rise to a new political consciousness to the populations of rural Greece, for whom for the first time democracy came to mean something more than voting in elections (Svoronos, 1994; Tsoucalas, 1969).
EAM's social reformation policies, its vast popular base and military power, its anti-monarchical political platform as well as the fact that it was under predominantly communist leadership account for the British government's determination to dispense with it (Tsoucalas, 1969; Svoronos, 1994; see also contributions in Iatrides, 1981). In the relevant literature it is argued that the British government's fear that EAM may attempt to seize power after the liberation was rather unfounded. In 1944, Stalin had already agreed with Churchill that Greece would remain under British "influence". Moreover, EAM had already agreed with the British government to abstain from entering Athens after the withdrawal of the German army and to wait for the arrival of the British forces. Nevertheless, the British government was not persuaded. When the British forces arrived in Athens - and before the country was fully liberated - an ultimatum was given to EAM to disarm ELAS immediately. EAM's unwillingness to comply and provocations from Greek royalist groups resulted in armed battles in the streets of Athens in December 1944. Nevertheless, even at this moment the civil war that was about to follow was still by no means unavoidable.

Under pressures from Stalin, EAM agreed to disarm (February 1945). What followed, with the tolerance if not the encouragement of the British armed forces, was a regime of terror (Svoronos, 1994; Tsoucalas, 1969). Communists and suspected sympathisers all over the country were persecuted by paramilitary groups of the far right and by the royalist army. In October 1946 the civil war had practically begun. In March 1947, the British government announced its financial inability to continue their support of the Greek government and the United States were invited to take over. Under the Truman Doctrine, the sovereign rights of the Greek government were diminished (Couloumbis et al., 1976) and the U.S. - initiating in Greece a policy of foreign intervention that in the years to come was also deployed in countries such as Guatemala, Cuba and Vietnam - undertook the task of "protecting" the "democratic" regime of Greece from the alleged danger of an imminent communist take over (Tsoucalas, 1969). With no support from the Soviet Union and with the popularity of their cause rapidly diminishing, the army of the left was defeated in 1949.

The consequences of the civil war were far reaching. The communist party was outlawed; thousands of left wingers remained imprisoned for decades and an unprecedented political, ideological and cultural cleavage was created "between what was labelled 'the national attitude' [...] and the remnants of the progressive forces" (Tsoucalas, 1969:114). From 1949 to 1967 Greece
remained nominally a "royal parliamentary democracy". Nevertheless, in the words of Svoronos (1994: 144-145; my translation),

"[…] in reality the power was in the hands of extra-parliamentary forces which ended up constituting a real parallel government that overshadowed any official one: the king and his environment; the army which since 1952 was directly dependent on the N.A.T.O, therefore, also on the United States and which was practically ruled by a secret organisation (I.D.E.A.), […]; moreover, the [Greek] intelligence service (K.U.P.) where C.I.A. had installed its own people; finally the police and the paramilitary forces […] all the aforementioned [forces] constituted the main axes of the parallel State."

In 1963, growing anti-American sentiments and popular dissatisfaction with the rule of the Right brought to power a liberal (Central Union) government which attempted to reform the political scenery of the country. The machinations of the king, though, destabilised the government and eventually paved the way for the military coup of 1967. The Colonels' regime with American backing (Clogg, 1992; Couloumbis et al., 1976; Tsoucalas, 1969; Svoronos, 1994) and with the self-proclaimed mission to defend the traditional values of "Helleno-Christian civilisation" allegedly under threat from western and secular influences remained in power until 1974. Their fall came partly as a result of a growing anti-dictatorship struggle and of the international outcry to the atrocities committed. What precipitated their fall, though, was their instigation of a coup d'état to overthrow the Cypriot government, with the eventual aim to annex Cyprus to Greece. This latter move had as a result Turkey to invade the island and occupy its northern part ever since.

With the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1974, the long period of overt foreign interference into Greek politics came to an end (Couloumbis et al., 1976). The "xenokratia" (foreign rule) was discarded and, on the one hand, under the pressure of the prevailing anti-imperialist / anti-American sentiments of the time and, on the other, as a consequence of the American stance in the Turkish invasion to Cyprus, the conservative governments of 1974 and 1977 renegotiated the terms of the Greek participation to NATO and accomplished the admission of Greece to the European Community. In the domestic front, political life was democratised. This practically entailed the political recognition of the left. Along with that came the lifting of the (semi-)institutional barriers that the parallel State for decades had imposed and which excluded significant strata of the Greek society from public administration or upwards social mobility of any kind (cf. Diamandouros, 1994).

While the pro-European orientation of the conservative governments of the late 1970s is summed up in the catch phrase (and 1977 election campaign motto) "Greece belongs to the West", the socialist party (PASOK) came to power in 1981 with a ticket of fierce populist and patriotic
rhetoric: "Greece belongs to the Greeks" and "national independence, popular sovereignty" (Clogg, 1992; Panagiotopoulou, 1993). Despite PASOK's proclaimed programmatic intentions to withdraw Greece from NATO, to expel the American military bases from Greek soil and to hold a referendum on the issue of the Greek participation in the EEC, once in power all that was more or less forgotten. Even the "hard line" in Greek-Turkish relations fiercely propagated by PASOK in the 1970s was abandoned for the sake of rapprochement policies that never came to full fruition despite spells of improved bilateral relations. PASOK's self-styled "nationally proud" external policy was consumed in the 1980s by a series of pro-Third World and anti-American moves that broke rank with both EEC and NATO (Clogg, 1992; cf. Diamandouros, 1994)\(^5\).

Despite the prolonged crisis with Turkey over the occupation of northern Cyprus (an issue which in Greek political terminology is labelled a "national" one) and the fierce but gradually fading PASOK's patriotic/anti-American rhetoric, at no point during the late 1970s and 1980s was there any outbreak of fervour nationalism in Greece to compare with the early 1990s (Liakos, 1993). The memories of the civil war and the long cleavage between the right of "the national attitude" and the "national traitors" of the left were still fresh, and "nationalism" as a political designation and charge threatened the commonly adopted principle of "national reconciliation".

The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the creation of a State in the northern Greek borders bearing the name Macedonia in 1992 altered drastically the situation. All the political parties of the parliament (with the exception of the communist KKE) outrightly condemned that political move and the Greek government started an intensive lobbying of international organisations to prevent the recognition of that republic under this name (cf. Pettifer, 1992; Veremis, 1995). It was argued that the Macedonians were one of the ancient Greek people; the designation Macedonia is a historical and not a geographical one; it belongs to Greek national history; and the existence of a nation State with that name northern of the Greek province of Macedonia is a political provocation that sustains territorial claims\(^6\) against the Greek State\(^7\).

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\(^5\) Clogg (1992) gives the following examples: Greece's refusal to join in sanctions against the military dictatorship in Poland, the presence in the 1984 PASOK's party congress of Sandinista representatives, PASOK's consistent supported of Yasser Arafat and the PLO, Greece's condemnation of the 1982 invasion to Lebanon by Israel and the opening to the Warsaw Pact spectacularly executed during a crisis in the Greek-Turkish crisis that broke out in 1987.

\(^6\) References to a clause in the constitution of the new State that alluded to irredentist aspirations and to the circulation of a bank note that featured prominently a historical building - emblem of Thessaloniki (capital of the Greek province of Macedonia) were made to substantiate this argument.

\(^7\) The historical background to the "Macedonian question" is too complicated to be documented here in detail. A few notes should be made though. The geographical region of Macedonia was part of the Ottoman Empire until the Balkan
The conservative party (Nea Dimokratia), PASOK, individual cadres of theirs, local MPs and mayors, the press and TV channels, media celebrities and the Orthodox Church embarked on frenzied rhetorical displays of their national(-ist) credentials. In 1992 and again in 1994 two massive demonstrations were held in the streets of Thessaloniki gathering together hundreds of thousands of people proclaiming the "Greekness of Macedonia". Within a couple of years, the previously rather neglected ancient Macedonian emblem -that was "appropriated" in the flag of the Macedonian State- came to decorate public buildings and private enterprises as well as -in the form of badges- the collars of "nationally conscientious" citizens. The few politicians, intellectuals and small political organisations that attempted to resist the climate of nationalist fervour came to be publicly castigated by the majority of the press and, occasionally, legally persecuted⁸ (cf. Liakos et al., 1993). Most importantly, what both politicians and the media mostly complained about was the "insensitivity" of Greece's partners in the E.U. who "failed" -once again- "to understand us" and "betrayed Greece" at a moment when their diplomatic assistance was mostly needed.

According to Liakos (1993), in the relevant political and public debates, the emergent issue that was raised was the one of the alleged "national aponeurosis [de-sensitization]" of Greek intellectuals -historians primarily amongst them- after the "national Catastrophe" of the 1922. The question that was repeatedly discussed was why Greek intellectuals did not react and did not urge the governments to react when at the time that Yugoslavia was organised into a federal republic, the name Macedonia was used to designate its southern State that fifty years later came to proclaim

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 Wars (1912-13). It was inhabited by a mixture of ethnicities: Greeks, Turks, Slavs and so on living in close proximity and within the same towns. After the Balkan Wars this region was divided between Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria but up to the Second World War there was always a tension over this division. In the part of Macedonia that was annexed to the Greek State and up to 1922, the ethnic Greek population was not by any means the majority. Nevertheless, with the exchange of populations after 1922 the ethnic Greek element came to be the prevailing one. Even after that though, there was still a considerable minority of Slavs that did not identify themselves nationally neither with the Serbs nor with the Bulgarians. A big proportion of these people fought in the latest phase of the Greek civil war in the side of the left and a declared position of the Greek communist party at the time was the creation of a Macedonian state of the Aegean that would include Greek territories after the -presumed- victorious ending of the war. Of course that was only very convenient for the propaganda of the right, which baptised the communists as national traitors and turned out to be catastrophic for the recruitment of volunteers for the left guerrillas. At the end of the civil war the vast majority of Macedonian Slavs was pushed behind the Greek northern borders and only a tiny minority was left in Greece. This minority was never officially recognised by the Greek State as an ethnic one and it has been systematically but covertly repressed. Notably, a legislation that passed the Greek parliament in the early 1980s under PASOK's rule and that allowed for the repatriations of political refugees from countries of the Eastern block to Greece had a clause that restricted the right of repatriation only to refugees of Greek origin (for an elaborate account on the treatment of the Macedonian Slavs in Greece see, Karakasidou, 1993; 1997).

⁸ The case of a young anti-nationalist activist who was condemned in a court of law for distributing leaflets where it was argued that Alexander the Great was an imperialist although exceptional is quite characteristic.
its national independence\textsuperscript{9}. For contemporary Greek proponents of "national reawakening", and depending on their political affiliation, the reasons for the "national aponeurosis" are either the fact that Greek intelligentsia has been beguiled by cosmopolitan liberalism and / or the internationalism of Marxism or that the reason why intellectuals were reluctant to espouse a "nationally dignified" stance were the atrocities committed by the far right during the civil war and the dictatorship in the name of the "nation".

Opting to defend the contemporary Greek historians (and colleagues of his), Liakos points out that such a charge is only sustainable within the conceptual parameters of nineteenth century nationalist historiography that, in the case of Greece, posits the uninterrupted historical continuity of the Greek nation for three thousand years in a broad geographical latitude. As Liakos argues, with the "Catastrophe" of 1922 and the official abandonment of irredentist politics of expansion, in the discourse of political circles and of segments of the Greek intelligentsia the assumption of "national contraction" emerged. For Liakos, the disciples of contemporary Greek national reawakening who lament the Greek "national contraction", castigate the contemporary Greek "national aponeurosis / de-senistization" and argue for the new betrayal that Greece suffers from its European partners should consider the historical constitution of the modern Greek nation State and modern Greek nationalism in the light of contemporary social theoretical approaches. The contemporary political rhetoric of "national reawakening" makes only sense against a theoretically unquestioned acceptance of the primordialist thesis of the "national awakening" of the Greeks during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and overlooks -the politically competing to the Greek- other "national awakenings" in the region.

\textsuperscript{9} Ignoring, as Liakos points out, that the adjective Macedonian was repeatedly used in Treaty documents that Greece had signed during and after the Balkan Wars to designate the Slavic populations of the region, something that also the Greek hero of the early twentieth century Macedonian guerrilla struggle used to do.
2. Modern Greek nationalism and nation building

2.1. The rise of modern Greek nationalism: An Enlightened project

During its last three centuries, the Byzantine Empire was engaged in constant confrontations with two external foes. On the one hand, its Eastern territories were gradually lost to the rising regional power of the Ottoman Turks. In the West, on the other hand, the ascendency of the political status of the Catholic Church was threatening the Byzantine understanding that they were the "God's chosen people" and that the patriarchate of Constantinople was the primus inter pares within the Christian world. Despite Byzantium's strong theocratic character and the temporary sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204, during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries it was becoming apparent that military aid from the Latin West was necessary if the remnants of the Empire were to salvaged from the Ottoman Turks' military threat. Unavoidably, that entailed the Byzantine recognition of Rome's religious / political supremacy which precipitated the strong reaction of the Orthodox Church.

Despite the fact that shortly before the fall of Constantinople the official split between the two Churches was lifted, neither any Latin military aid arrived on time nor the Orthodox Church's views changed. Up to the last moment, the conviction of the Church was that occupation by the "infidel" Turks was to be preferred to submission to the "heretic" West. According to the Church's apocalyptic credo, the end of the world was only a few decades away and the subjection to "infidel" Turks was seen simultaneously as a punishment for "God's chosen people's" sins and as a temporary accommodation to protect them from being assimilated by the "heretics". After all, the Orthodox Church was aware that the Christians (as one of the Bible's people) would be respected under the Ottoman Islamic rule. Of course, the animosity between the two Churches was very convenient politically for the Ottoman conquerors of Constantinople and was further encouraged by the Sultan immediately after 1453 when he appointed as Patriarch a fierce opponent of the Catholic - Orthodox reunion. This animosity between the two Churches remained alive throughout the coming centuries of Ottoman rule (cf. Campbell & Sherrard, 1968; Clogg, 1992; Mango, 1965).

During the four centuries of Ottoman rule over the territories of the Byzantine Empire, the Eastern Orthodox Church not only retained its religious authority over its flock but its power was also extended to the sphere of public administration. The Ottoman Empire was divided administratively in religiously defined units (millets) which enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. The
patriarch of Constantinople was the head of the Christian Orthodox millet -millet-i Rum, as the Turks called it (Clogg, 1992)- and was ultimately responsible for the loyalty of his flock to the Ottoman State. Despite the fact that the patriarch as well as the higher ranks of the Orthodox hierarchy were invariably Greek and the official language of the Church was also Greek, his subjects were all the Christian Orthodox people of the Empire irrespectively of ethnic origin. Due to the ecumenical weltanschaung of the Orthodox Church and -undoubtedly due to the Church's political accountability to the Porte- revolts against the Ottoman rule were strongly condemned as opposing the divine will that provided for the Orthodox Christian people to be captive to the Ottomans.

In both historical accounts as well as in social theoretical work, what has been pinpointed as the decisive factor for the rise of modern Greek nationalism is the encounter of a number of Greek speaking Christian intellectuals with the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment in the second half of the eighteenth century (see, inter alia, Anderson, 1983; Campbell & Sherrard, 1968; Clogg, 1992; Dakin, 1972; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kedurie, 1971; Smith, 1986). The Greek bourgeois class of merchants and ship owners, who during the course of the eighteenth century came to a rapid ascent, was responsible for the dramatic revival of Greek letters during the last part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Schools and libraries were created and a growing (and increasingly secular) body of publications was subsidised mainly outside the confines of the Empire. Most importantly, it gradually became a common practice for the wealthiest of these families of the newly rich Greek entrepreneurs to send their sons to study in European universities. While in Europe, these young bourgeois Greeks came to be acquainted with the secular ideals of the Enlightenment and with the heady republican spirit that overwhelmed the European intellectual circles of the time. Moreover, they came to be aware of the extraordinary hold which the language and the civilisation of ancient Greece had over the Enlightenment thought. Their "national awakening" was developing hand in hand with the endowment of a glittering origin myth that had not to be constructed anew but simply to be adopted (Liakos, 1994).

However, along with the secular exaltations of ancient Hellenic reason, through the texts of the Enlightenment ideologues they also came to be acquainted with forceful critiques of the Eastern political despotism and of the prejudices of religious authority that were all too familiar for them. For the Enlightenment-minded Greek intellectuals, their contemporary Greece and Greeks were a far cry from the glories of the ancient Hellas. For the "degeneration" of modern Greeks the responsibility was placed on the age long slavery to the "barbarous Turks" and the backwardness of
the Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the rapidly growing intellectual activity in Greek communities both within the Ottoman Empire and in Diaspora centres, and the newly acquired Hellenic ancestry, were sources for optimism. The following words of the most prominent Greek Enlightenment ideologue Adamantios Korais are quite indicative in that respect,

"For the first time, the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and trembles in measuring with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors' glory. This painful discovery, does not precipitate the Greeks into despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly tell themselves, we must either try to become again worthy of this name, or we must not bear it." [...] "The Greeks, proud of their origin, far from shutting their eyes to the European Enlightenment, never considered the Europeans as other than debtors who were repaying with substantial interest the capital which they had received from their own ancestors."[10]

The "lack of despair" notwithstanding, for the ideologues of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, modern Greece and Greeks were finding themselves in a "degenerate" state which ought to be rectified: the contemporary Greeks had to be re-Hellenised. For Korais, the foremost task was the endowment of the Greeks with a language in which they could access the texts produced in the Enlightened Europe as well as the texts where the wisdom of their glorious ancestors was preserved. The varied vernacular idioms spoken by the contemporary Greek communities were obviously inappropriate, as was the late Hellenistic language of the Church. Korais, a medical doctor in training, devoted the last part of his life to construct the new Greek language that would befit the modern Greeks in their task to measure up with their ancestors and the Enlightened Europeans. The end product, "katharevousa" (purist or purified) was a linguistic concoction combining features from the fifth century attic dialect, polished vernacular Greek, and grandiose archaisms.

The Greek disciples of the Enlightenment -along with their other Balkan colleagues- used liberal principles to formulate programmes of social critique of existing State structures and institutions of the Ottoman Empire and of the Orthodox Church, with the explicit aim to bring the "lights of civilisation" and learning in the "backward" Balkans of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Kitromilides, 1990). Their texts for the first time introduced the idea that Balkan society may be conceived not as an ecumenic community of Christian Orthodox people but as a mosaic of different ethnic -linguistically defined- communities. Nevertheless, the boundaries of ethnic / linguistic identification were remarkably open ended. As Kitromilides (1990) argues, the Greek

[10] The quotation comes from a speech that Korais delivered in Paris in 1803 before a French audience, entitled "Report on the Present State of Civilisation in Greece" and which has been translated in English and appears fully in Kedurie (1971).
Enlightenment ideologues were addressing an extended Balkan audience to share in to a revived Greek nation by adopting its language and culture for "aesthetic and practical reasons".

Their political vision also was more of a cosmopolitan republican one than a nationalist in the sense that the term acquired later in the nineteenth century with the German romantic conception of Volkgeist. It is true that for the Greek enlightenment ideologues the recourse to the Hellenic antiquity was coming as part and parcel with a tracing of an ethnic ancestry. Nevertheless, the glories of the ancient Hellas and its revival in contemporary Europe constitutes more of an all inclusive resource that -as it was hoped- would unite the Balkan people in their struggle to overthrow their triple subjugation to the Ottoman rule, to the Orthodox Church and to the hold of "backwardness" and "ignorance", than an exclusive ethnic jingoism. The revolutionary activities of Rhigas Velestinlis -a Hellenised Vlach- who aspired to unite the Balkan people into a struggle for a federal republic in the closing years of the eighteenth century is a good case in point (cf. Kitromilides, 1979; 1994). Additionally, only a month before the initiation of the Greek War of Independence in the Peloponese in 1821, the secret society that for years had been working towards a Greek armed struggle, launched an unsuccessful revolt in the Danubian principalities aiming to enlist Rumanian and Serb revolutionaries, while invoking the shades of Epameinondas, Miltiades and Themistocles (Clogg, 1992). The republican programmatic aspirations of the Greek revolt were also apparent in the first constitution voted by the national assembly during the second year of the war of independence, which was modelled upon the French and the American ones (cf. Diamandouros, 1991).

According to Kitromilides (1990), the initial cosmopolitan and republican aspirations of the Greek revolt were soon abandoned. Under the pressure of the need to elicit diplomatic and military aid and not alienate the Great (monarchical) Powers of Europe, the political profile of the revolt gradually became more conservative. This trend was consolidated with the establishment of the absolute monarchy after the Independence. Most importantly, with the ideological and institutional processes of nation building initiated with the establishment of the modern Greek State, the "social contract" type of nationhood advocated within the pre-independence texts of the Greek Enlightenment ideologues gave way to an "organic" conception of the Greek nation (cf. Diamandouros, 1983; Kitromilides, 1990; 1994; Smith, 1991; Veremis, 1983).
2.2. Greek nation building: The doctrine of national unity

According to Kitromilides (1990), during the first decades of the independent Greek State's life the liberal and cosmopolitan principles of the Enlightenment that nurtured the Greek revolt vanished. The ethnic / linguistic identities that the Greek and other Balkan Enlightenments stirred and which - given the republican spirit of these intellectual critiques- could potentially evolve into many different forms of political organisation eventually came to be subsumed to the constitution of particular and conflicting national identities by the emerging States in the Balkans. Within the contemporary critical literature on Greek nationalism (in contrast to the tradition of nineteenth century nationalist historiography), the "Greek nation" is treated as an ideological construct constituted by institutional practices of the modern Greek State (see, inter alia, Diamandouros, 1983; Kitromilides, 1979; 1990; 1994; Liakos, 1993; 1994; Veremis, 1983). For Kitromilides (1990), the Greek State came to construct the Greek nation deploying as a normative ideological imperative the doctrine of national unity in three levels: the social, the geographical and the historical one.

Drawing upon Anderson's (1983) concept of imagined communities, Kitromilides argues that the constitution of the imagined community of the Greek nation came about as a result of orchestrated institutional processes of nation building. According to his analyses, the newly established Greek State had to face two major problems. On the one hand, to secure the smooth imposition of Western State structures on the traditional forms of social organisation that already existed. This concern primarily entailed the need to bridge sectional and regional interests. It also entailed the disciplining of the irregulars who fought in the war of independence and who were rather dissatisfied with their marginalisation within the new State structures. The second major problem was the linguistic homogeneization of the populations that were to become the citizens of the new State. Linguistic homogeneization was in order not simply because the Greek vernaculars varied so much as to render communication almost impossible, but also because within the borders of the State had remained large groups of ethnic Albanian and Vlachs who fought in the War of Independence and were accorded Greek citizenship. Both problems were effectively dealt with the introduction of three new State operated institutions: the army, the educational system and the judiciary.

11 It should be noticed that these sectional and regional competing interest almost led the revolt against the Ottoman Turks to extinction when they resulted in destructive and prolonged civil wars during the War of Independence.
According to Kitromilides, the army proved an effective means for the consolidation of a common national identity in three respects. First, it homogenised linguistically the recruits; second, by bringing together people both from within and outside the Greek borders it created a social space for the eventual "discovery" of a shared identity; and third, by mobilising people from different regions of the country contributed to the imaginative constitution of a common homeland extending beyond the localism of traditional identifications. The rapid development of an expanding network of elementary and high schools throughout the country had the effect of homogenising linguistically the younger generations of Greek citizens. Finally, with the gradual development of a judiciary system, forms of social behaviours that were deemed to be nationally aberrant came to be penalised and banditry (to which many of the irregulars that fought in the war of independence had resorted) was tackled.

The domestic legitimation of the doctrine of national unity was achieved by the development of a unifying code of national values. Following in the footsteps of the central authorities during the War of Independence, in the rhetoric of the new State's authorities appeals were made to the good of the larger common homeland in an attempt to resolve regional and sectional disputes. Unity in the interior of the small kingdom was propagated as imperative in order for the "unredeemed brethren" residing beyond the (perceived as) provisional borders- of the State to be liberated (e.g. the Great Idea). Of course, the new State, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, had been making consistent steps in order for the "unredeemed brethren" to be able to recognise themselves in a union of brotherhood with the residents of the Greek kingdom. Throughout this period, the Greek State had been active in establishing and operating an extended network of schools outside its borders. Moreover, the Greek Consulates in the Ottoman Empire were offering a Greek citizenship to whoever could claim some sort of participation in the Greek war of independence or was willing to make such a claim irrespectively of how well it was founded.

While the ideological doctrine of national unity involved irredentist aspirations in order to serve domestic political concerns, by the mid nineteenth century it became imperative that the ideological unity of the Greek nation had also to be accomplished in terms of history (Liakos, 1994). During the first decades of the new Greek State, the Enlightenment thesis of national awakening constituted the leading assumption that informed intellectual accounts of Greek history. A good example of that is the inaugural lecture for the University of Athens (1837). Addressing the royalty and other notables of the Greek State, the University rector presented a fragmented version of
national history in line with the Enlightenment thesis of "national awakening". The Greek nation after its demise in classical antiquity was depicted as forcefully occupied by the Macedonians first, then by the Romans, later by the Byzantines and finally by the Ottoman Turks before the time had come for its "awakening" in the late eighteenth century.

Nevertheless, by the mid nineteenth century the principles of the "national awakening" thesis had been abandoned within the leading European schools of historiography. The intellectualism of the Enlightenment's understanding of the nation had given its way to the German romantic understanding of the nation as Volkgeist and the "soul" of the nation was sought to be discovered within the lay populace, its traditions and folklore. At the same time, the Greek intellectuals were facing a major challenge. The Austrian historian Fallmerayer, after conducting field research in Greece, aired his conclusions that the Greeks of the present day could not be racial descendants of the ancient Greeks. Instead, they were argued to be of Slavic descent, as tides of Slavic peoples had repeatedly invaded and settled down in the Greek mainland during the Byzantine period (cf. Skopetea, 1997; Veloudis, 1982).

Within the parameters of this new romantic understanding of the nation and under the pressure to address Fallmerayer's questioning of the racial continuity of the Greek nation, the intellectual orientations of Greek intelligentsia changed dramatically. The historical continuity and the unity of the Greek nation arose for the first time as an ideological question that had to be answered. Breaking with the Enlightenment tradition, which exalted classical Greece and castigated modern Greeks for their degeneration, from the 1850s a growing number of Greek intellectuals turned to the hitherto neglected popular culture in order to trace the unmistakable signs of the "soul" and the "genius" of the Greek nation, laying the foundations for the establishment of the discipline of folklore studies in Greece (Danforth, 1984; Herzfeld, 1982a). The "essence" of the nation came to be understood as a metaphysical spirit that marches through historical time, informs the mundane life of the people and survives within the most humble of customs and cultural practices (cf. Kyriakides, 1968). Fallmerayer's racial criteria were dismissed as "narrow" and the "essence" of the Greek nation was argued to be manifested in the historical continuity of its "culture".

Most importantly, from 1860 to 1874 the ever since canonical for Greek historiography "History of the Greek Nation" was gradually authored and published by the professor in the University of Athens Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos. In this colossal work, the historical gap of some 2,000 years separating the rise of the Macedonians and the Greek "national awakening" in the eighteenth
century was bridged. The Macedonians were elevated to a Greek race; the Roman (territorial) conquerors were presented as eventually conquered by the superior Greek civilisation; the Byzantine Empire was represented as a Greek Empire, with its fall contributing to the European Renaissance (Xydis, 1968; 1969; cf. Liakos, 1994) and the Orthodox Church during the centuries of Ottoman occupation described as an institution that thoughtfully preserved Greek national identity in dire times. Paparigopoulos' conceptual scheme was periodically renewed (Vakalopoulos, 1961; cf. Kitroeff, 1990) and remained virtually unchallenged within Greek historiography for more than a hundred years.

According to Liakos (1994), this dramatic reversal in the intellectual understanding of the Greek nation, which constituted the Greek nation as a transhistorical entity, was predicated upon the consequences of having as an origin myth the origin myth of European civilisation and modernity itself. In the Greek case, the assumption of "national awakening" did not only entail the assumption of discontinuity, which in the case of other European nation entailed the invention of national traditions (cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983), but also entailed the assumption of "degeneration". As Liakos argues, the incorporation of the Byzantine history in the master narrative of the Greek nation had all the trademarks of a full blown intellectual revolt against an image of the national self that was imposed and adopted from European thought. After all, the European aversion of the Byzantine Empire was attributed to religious prejudices. This stance, according to Liakos, fed pro-Orthodox and anti-Western intellectual movements repeatedly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century (see also, Diamandouros, 1994).
3. Modern Greece: In the margins of West and East

3.1. Inconsummate Westernisation and the missionary aspect of the Great Idea

The Hellenic Kingdom established in the early 1830s was meant to become a prototypical European Kingdom (cf. Skopetea, 1988). Emulating the Europeans was seen as the road to "redemption" from the "barbaric pollution" of the four centuries of Ottoman rule and as the only way in which modern Greece could come close to the glories of ancient Hellas (Herzfeld, 1987). The importation of a European monarch and the imposition of Western State structures were steps in the direction of re-civilising and legitimating Greece in the eyes of the European nations. A number of further steps were also taken in the same direction.

Athens, a small town, which had been destroyed by the war, and which was not as economically significant or geographically well-placed as other urban centres, was chosen to become the capital city of the new State. The weight of the fifth century "golden age" of Athens was the decisive factor in that choice. Of course, the new capital had to be designed anew. The Bavarian architects who were commissioned with the task followed the spirit of their times. Neoclassic public buildings (as well as private ones erected by wealthy Greek benefactors) soon took the place of the old town's Turkish remnants, and the process of reconstruction also wiped out from the centre of the city any signs of a Byzantine past. Soon the new capital was endowed with all the urban trademarks of a modern European city, with any suspicions of an Eastern oriental past meticulously swept away (Politis, 1993).

Apart from the European orientation of Greek politics and the urban reconstruction in the European manner, as Politis (1993) has documented, in the early period of the new kingdom the quest for a neoclassical / European profile informed the worldly practices of the Athenian urban middle classes or, as he has put it, their "mentalities" (cf. Veremis, 1990). The pre-revolutionary popular frenzy to adopt ancient Hellenic first names and dismiss the Christian ones (cf. Dimaras, 1993; Friedman, 1994) was extended to surnames as well. The ancient Greek sounding endings (-ίδης) and (-άδης)

12 Or, at least, with a neoclassic facade! (cf. Herzfeld, 1987).

13 Rather literally, I am translating as "mentalities" the Greek term "νοοτροπία". Politis (1993: 13) makes the distinction between "ideologies" as intellectually conceived dogmas and doctrines of ruling social strata and assigns to "νοοτροπία" the meaning of their "lived" manifestations within a culture.
came to replace Turkish and Albanian phonemic endings. The new urbanites replaced the traditional Balkan clothing of the pre-revolutionary times with European ones. Traditional folk customs and leisure practices were abandoned as "obsolete" and "backward". European music became popular. Established eating habits changed, as did models of style and beauty. The study of classical philology became the chief educational aspiration for the youth. And, most importantly, there was no substantial popular reaction to the officially imposed new language of katharevoussa.

Demotic Greek remained the language of the intimacy of everyday life and popular culture but, along with its adoption by the State, the politicians and the press, katharevoussa's use in everyday parlance became indicative of culture and distinction. Despite the fact that correct use of katharevoussa was practically impossible for anyone but a few classically literate intellectuals, its archaisms and hyper-corrections came to decorate everyday speech in pursuit of (impressions of) social status. The dualism of diglossia had easily taken root. However, although, public Athenian life was taking a neoclassical / European turn along with the facades of its new buildings, European residents and travellers were not impressed. Politis' (1993) study provides a wealth of reports from archive materials, in which European witnesses seem, on the one hand, amused by the efforts of "these Levantines" to appear European and, on the other, distressed by the rapidly vanishing traditional outlook of the old Athens.

Although the West-ward orientation of the Greek intelligentsia was firmly established during the early years of the nineteenth century, by the middle of the century there were indications of a change in this attitude (Politis, 1993). According to Politis, an article by a young Greek scholar that appeared in a literary journal in 1842 and questioned whether "Greece is East or West" was an early indication of this change in intellectual mood (see also, Tziovas, 1989). Despite the fact that the article concluded by confirming the Western credentials of Greece such a questioning would have been inconceivable in the 1830s. From the 1850s onwards, this change in mood came gradually to be consolidated.

Both the incorporation of the Byzantine period in the master narrative of the Greek nation and the birth of the irredentist Great Idea were both signs and conducive to that change. For the Greek political and intellectual elites the East was not, of course, embraced as the cultural prototype for modern Greece. Nevertheless, Greece was seen as having "a mission". The "lights" of classical civilisation that were only recently "relit" in their country of origin had to be transmitted to the
East. In the official formulation of the Great Idea in the Greek parliament in 1844, the leading politician who introduced it put it this way:

"[Greece] is destined to enlighten the East through its rebirth as it illuminated the West through its fall". (Cited in Augustinos, 1977: 14)

Notwithstanding the grandiose programmatic aspirations of the Great Idea, Greece's economic and military standing during the second half of the nineteenth century was far from fit for such a task. The consistent attempts to modernise Greek economy, to transform traditional patterns of production and to establish the bases for industrial development that were undertaken by a new generation of liberal politicians at that time failed outright. The State declared its official bankruptcy for a second time in 1893. Moreover, an early irredentist attempt to incorporate territories in Thessaly ended up with a humiliating defeat by the Turks in 1897. As Veremis (1990: 15) remarks, "by the end of the century the state had lost all its credibility, both as the main representative of the nation and even as a reliable administrator of its own fortunes".

The gradual disenchantment with the Greek State has been documented in some detail by Politis (1993). He points out that evidence of a widespread "national self-depreciation" was already apparent in the early years of the Greek revolt and national independence (cf. Herzfeld, 1987). At that time, the derogatory nickname "Ψωροκώσταμα"14 (still in use today) was coined to refer to Greece and its administrative and political institutions in mundane Greek discourse. According to Politis, despite the fact that initially the targets of depreciation were the State and its institutions, gradually during the course of the nineteenth century the semantics of this term shifted to include the contemporary Greeks as a people. From the mid 1850s onwards, the Greek press regularly published articles in which a younger generation of Greeks voiced their contempt for the Greek State and its people. Arguing that only a few decades ago the Greek nation was dynamically reentering the historical scene solely on its own efforts and struggles, this generation of younger Greeks were painting a dim image of their contemporary Greece. Economic stagnation and under-development, foreign dependency, corrupt politicians and Greece's and the Greek nation's inability to fulfil its historical destiny, i.e. to liberate "the unredeemed brethren" and to spread "the lights of civilisation" to the East15 were the common themes of criticism.

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14 Any attempt to translate this metaphor in English would not make much sense! The image it conveys is of a destitute woman, crawling with lice.

As Politis points out, these criticisms reflected the confusion between two incompatible visions of "Hellenism". On the one hand, they reflected the contemporary dissatisfaction with the apparent failure of Greece to stand convincingly as a modern nation State; an aspiration that drew its cultural legitimacy from an image of classical ancestry. Athens, as a symbol of this vision of "Hellenism", was judged and found insufficient. The emulation of Europe did not seem to elevate modern Greece to the heights of civilisation to which it aspired. On the other hand, these criticisms drew upon a vision of "Hellenism" that was founded upon the might of the Byzantine Empire and entailed the dream of an imperial revival. The Greek Orthodox Church, which after gaining its autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1833 became a champion of Greek irredentism, was naturally at the heart of such a vision. Consequently, Athens and the modernising version for "Hellenism" were additionally castigated for their inability to open the way to Constantinople, the city symbol of the second vision of and project on "Hellenism". It was the ascendance to power of a liberal politician (Eleftherios Venizelos) in 1909, together with changes in the international political context, that precipitated the unification of these two visions and raised hopes both for the modernisation of Greece as well as for the realisation of its irredentist aspirations (cf. Veremis, 1990).

This widespread dissatisfaction with the Greek State did find a (temporary) political resolution in the combination of modernisation and irredentism of the Venizelos' politics. Nevertheless, the question of the Greek cultural dualism was not resolved. The adoption of the neoclassical / European vision for Greece on the part of the urban elites and the State, and the subsequent challenge to this vision presented by the intellectual turn to the Greek Volk and tradition, culminated in the late 1880s in the emergence of the "language question". The intellectual debates that arose during this period were to carry on until the eve of the Second World War and informed contrasting (cultural) political projects. Echoes of these are still traceable in contemporary debates on the, alleged, decline of the Greek language.

3.2. The language question and the ideological construct of Greekness

Although the Greek State since its political establishment was concerned with the unification of all Greeks within and outside its borders in a union of (national) culture, the notion of Greek culture that informed the State's policies was in fact rather exclusionary (Jusdanis, 1991). Its neoclassic / European orientation drew a sharp distinction between what was appropriately Greek in culture and
what was not. This neoclassical "purism" that informed the official discourse of the State, the education system, the Church and the army went hand in hand with the purist linguistic register of katharevoussa.

While the purist, neoclassical culture of the State and its institutions gained currency amongst the educated elites and informed much of the worldly practices of the new urbanites, it nevertheless alienated most of the population. It also excluded from the designation of "national" an important realm of cultural production. Moreover, katharevoussa was simply incomprehensible to the vast majority of the population and to the children who enrolled the expanding network of elementary schools established by the State within and outside its borders. This purist culture and its linguistic register could not possibly become the national culture and national language (Jusdanis, 1991). In line with the newly imported romantic conception of the nation, the turn to the popular culture was culminated in the late 1880s with the initiation of a militant intellectual reaction to katharevoussa and to the exclusionary understanding of national culture that this represented.

The main strategic aim of the demoticists (as the opponents of Katharevoussa came to be known due to their avocation of the demotic Greek register) was to demonstrate that a high version of vernacular Greek could be used to produce literary works of superior aesthetic merit. In that task the demoticists proved to be highly successful. By the turn of the century, virtually all the major literary work and criticism were written in demotic Greek (Jusdanis, 1991). Drawing upon expanded resources of folk tales, songs and poetry, demoticist authors and literary critics managed to attach a superior aesthetic value to popular culture. Cultural traditions that were hitherto ignored and despised by the neoclassicism of the political and intellectual elites were elevated to the role of repository of a dynamic and evolving national character that did not need mimetic neoclassicism as an attestment to their classical credentials. For the nationalist critics who emerged from the ranks of demoticism, "Hellenism" was understood as an eternal and evolving mystical spirit that informed popular culture. It was argued that notwithstanding the fate of the economic and military humiliations of the Hellenic State, the spirit and the glory of "Hellenism" remained unharmed. In this strand of nationalist criticism, the ideological transition from the national State to the Stateless nation was effectively accomplished (see, inter alia, Augustinos, 1977; Jusdanis, 1991; Tziovas, 1985; Veremis, 1990).

The overall project of demoticism, as Jusdanis (1991) has argued, succeeded where the neoclassicist State culture of katharevoussa had failed: using the the organic discourse of
nationalism it fused "the national" with "the popular". The rhetoric of the demoticists was populist and their overall project ethnocentric; the adjective "national" was a prominent feature of their discourse and phrases like "national unity", "national progress", "national future" and "national interest" came to be widely used in their publications (Frangoudaki, 1978; cited in Jusdanis, 1991: 72). The demoticists managed to make their cause synonymous with the modernisation of Greek society, rendering the neoclassical culture of the State institutions and the purism of katharevoussa synonymous with reaction and political conservatism. Moreover, in their hegemonic vision of national integration they embraced irredentism as an integral aspect of their overall project. In the words of the leading figure of early demoticism Psicharis,

"Language and motherland are the same. To fight for one's country or for one's national language, there is but one struggle"

and

"A nation in order to become a nation needs two things: its frontiers must be expanded and it must produce its own literature" (Both quoted in Augustinos, 1977: 21 & 22).

Despite both the popular and intellectual appeal of the demoticist movement, the demotic Greek register and the vision of national (folk) culture it represented did not penetrate the State institutions. The administrative bureaucracy, education, the Church and the world of politics remained attached to neoclassicism and katharevoussa. On the other hand, the realm of "national culture" that early demoticism managed to appropriate, remained skeptical about the incomsumate Westernisation that they saw as represented in the neoclassicism of the State institutions, and dissatisfied with what was understood as being the imitation of an imitation (Augustinos, 1977). That is, Greece imitating Europe, which in turn imitated the classical Hellenic civilisation. With the constitution of the 1911, in which katharevoussa's status as the official language of the State was guaranteed, not only the state of linguistic dualism came to be formalised but also the dualism in cultural orientation. The boundaries between the national culture of the State and intellectual production of national culture were consolidated (Jusdanis, 1991).

After the "national Catastrophe" of 1922, the political, social and intellectual landscape of modern Greek society had changed dramatically. Irredentism and the imperial fictions of the Great Idea were officially scrapped from Greek external policy. In the domestic terrain, the left came gradually to gain some political significance (Tsoucalas, 1969) and the governance of the country was remarkably unstable leading to the 1936 ascent to power of a fascist dictatorship. In the intellectual domain, a new generation (the "generation of the 1930s", as it came to be known) of authors, poets, literary critics and painters gradually came to dominate the scene. Their hallmark was the adoption of European modernism as an aesthetic and artistic framework of reference. In this context, during
the 1930s the legacy of demoticism became the apple of discord between competing intellectual trends.

In his review of the intellectual activity over that period, Tziovas (1989) has argued that three distinctive claims to the intellectual ancestry of early demoticism were articulated. First, there was a strand of intellectuals who emphasised the ethnocentric theme of demoticism and turned it to a full blown critique of modernism. Anti-westernism became the trademark of this strand. Its proponents aligned themselves ideologically with the fascist regime of the 1936 dictatorship and in the post Second World War period, with the institutional backing of the State and having exclusive access to the educational system they dominated the State defined Greek national culture.

The second strand was a socialist / marxist attempt to "read" early demoticism as a politically radical movement that aimed at reforming the social foundations of Greek society. This was considerably less influential and rather short lived. The third intellectual claim to the legacy of demoticism proved to be the most important one in terms of literary production, cultural influence and international recognition. This strand comprised of liberal bourgeois intellectuals, with a French / English educational background and a clear European orientation, who broadly adopted modernism and engaged in a creative dialogue with it. For Tziovas (1989), the intellectual debates on the ideological construct of "Ellhnikovthta / Hellinikotita / Greekness" (as opposed to "Ellhnismovα / Hellenism") that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s were, after all, an aspect of the more general conflict between the political forces of liberalism and authoritarian conservativism.

As Tziovas (1989) has documented, the very introduction of the term "modernism" and the publication of some early literary work in that aesthetic framework during the 1920s was met with strong reaction. The early Greek modernists were castigated with the by now familiar charge: that they were unthoughtfully importing and imitating Western intellectual trends that do not fit the "Greek modus vivendi" and the "Greek national way of being". The nationalist 1930s claimants of the legacy of demoticism followed a similar argumentative path. Modernism, whether in its form as an imported literary trend or as an imported political doctrine (Marxism), was argued to be incompatible with the national "soul":

"Demoticism is the most catholic, the most original Greek revolution since it stems from the national soul and perfectly fits to the national reality. What else expresses in a more profound and more

16 The only two Greek poets that have been awarded the Nobel price for literature were Seferis in 1963 and Elytis in 1979. The two of them have been the main representatives of this modernist intellectual strand.
Modernist / Marxist intellectuals, on the other hand, also felt that they had a legitimate claim to the legacy of demoticism,

"It has been a long time now since Demoticism has been imprinted as a battle cry on the flag of the Greek proletariat. It is not an invention of Psicharis. It forms a part of the ideology of an era and Psicharis gave to it its scientific expression. And if we claim all the achievements of humanity, which the bourgeoisie destroys because they obstruct its domination, even more so we claim demoticism which has been abandoned by the bourgeois class of our country before its [official] adoption" (Panselinos, 1932: 361; quoted in Tziovas, 1989: 29: my translation).

Caught between the Scylla of the ethnocentric and xenophobic nationalists and the Harybdis of the radical social critique and the internationalism of the Marxists, the liberal intellectuals who formed the highly acclaimed "generation of the '30s" opted for the radical middle ground. As Tziovas argues, their claim to the legacy of demoticism compromised their radical modernist potentialities and led them to engage with the reworking of the "national vision" of the early demoticists. Nevertheless, against the exaltation of the "national soul" and the populist anti-Westernism of the nationalists they counter posed their own version of the "national truth". The concept of "Hellenism" (ελληνισμός), which in the early 1930s carried all the ideological baggage of the Great Idea irredentist aspirations and the anti-western / anti-cosmopolitan nuances attached to it, was abandoned. In its place the concept of "Hellinikotita / Greekness" (ελληνικότητα) gradually emerged in their discourse.

According to Tziovas (1989), the generation of the '30s being both disenchanted with the ethnocentrism of the previous generations and aware of the cultural hegemonism of the West, faced the question of what modern Greece has to positively contribute to modernism and counter pose to Western cultural hegemony. Avoiding both folklorism as well as the exaltation of the ancient Greek classical past to which previous generations had resorted, they drew upon the popular (λαϊκή) modern Greek art in which they discerned the seeds of a distinctively modern Greek cultural prototype. One that creatively assimilates the old with the new, the Western with the Eastern, the modern with the traditional. Their own artistic production followed a similar path, cutting the links, as one representative of this generation has put it, both with the "panic-stricken [representatives] of the Greek superstition and with the imitators" (Terzakis, 1937; cited in Tziovas, 1989: 41; my translation).
For Tziovas (1989), the concept of "Greekness", in the same vein as similar ideological constructs like "Italianita", "Hispanidad" and "Negritude", came to represent a romantic utopian vision of resistance to Western culture. This resistance though was not characterised by xenophobic jingoism but, instead, presented a dynamic challenge to Western culture, by attempting to engage with it on an equal basis whilst, at the same time, seeking to outline the terms of national originality and distinctiveness. In his words,

"The generation of the '30s, being clearly aware of the dualism of the national identity, tried to bridge the gap between the Hellene and the Romios, to balance the schizophrenia of the Greek identity by utilising in its literature the ancient Greek mythology and by dignifying the popular, romeic elements of the work of Makriyannis and Theofilos" (Tziovas, 1989: 42; italics added; my translation).

According to Tziovas (1989), the nationalist and the liberal stances in the intellectual debates of the 1930s represent two different attitudes towards the collapse of the irredentist Great Idea. For the official State culture, the combination of classicism, Orthodoxy and anti-westernism marks what he calls the "State nationalism" which is characterised by authoritarian and defensive national seclusion. This contrasts with the "intellectual nationism" of the Greek modernists, which ideologically operated as a refined intellectual substitute for territorial expansionism. In the "intellectual nationism" of "the generation of the '30s" national particularity in culture was sought in order for that to provide the basis for an encounter with and eventual triumph over the hegemony of Western culture. In order for that to be accomplished, the tensions of modern Greek culture, its ambivalence between the Orient and the Occident, the Romeic and the Hellenic had to be embraced, accepted and capitalised upon. European modernity was not seen as a national threat but as an arena for active engagement. Against the European Hellenism, which entailed a derogatory understanding of modern Greece, these liberal intellectuals opted to juxtapose a distinctively modern Greek Hellenism (cf. Tziovas, 1994).

Nevertheless, as Tziovas argues, the long lasting political dominance of the authoritarian right that was initiated with the dictatorship of the 1936 and which carried on until the fall of the colonels' regime in 1974 gradually led the liberal, modernist intellectuals of the 1930s to retreat to a conservative ethnocentric stance, and in some cases to a full blown subscription to the authoritarian right's anti-western, anti-modernist discourse. For the right wing authoritarians ranging from Metaxas (the 1936 dictator) to the colonels of the 1967 coup and their intellectual disciples who sought to delineate and impose the national culture of "εθνικοφροσύνη" (national attitude), the modernism of the 1930s was castigated as a sell out to the West, as an abandonment of the ideals of Hellenism and dismissed as mimetic servitude. The proposed remedy was the national culture of
"εθνικοφροσύνη", which combined a sterile exaltation of the ancient Hellenic civilisation with an adherence to the religious weltanschaung and imperial fictions of the Orthodox Church.

Despite the fact that institutionally the culture of "εθνικοφροσύνη" was dominating the scene during the long decades of authoritarian rule over the country, it did not remain unchallenged. Indicative in that respect is the course that the language question had taken during these years. Katharevoussa remained the official language of the State until 1976. Nevertheless, since the 1950s it had lost completely its legitimacy as a national linguistic register. Its association with the authoritarian regime(s) of the right was decisive in that respect. It became a symbolic instrument for the exercise of political power and it was popularly understood and treated as such (Frangoudaki, 1987; 1997b). The linguistic absurdities of the 1967 colonels' use of katharevoussa are still legendary and a "good laugh" in contemporary Greece. Moreover, as Frangoudaki (1997b) argues, over that period the use of standardised demotic Greek became a linguistic register "higher" than katharevoussa. Its use in formal contexts was an indication of intellect and of liberal or left wing political orientation. Over time, the insertions of katharevoussa's archaisms in everyday parlance came to be used to convey implicit messages of sarcasm and irony.

Despite the fact that the establishment of demotic Greek as national language in 1976 went unchallenged at the time, during the last fifteen years a version of the language question has re-emerged in public, intellectual and political debates. This takes the form of what Frangoudaki (1997b) calls the "metalinguistic prophecy" on the decline of Greek language. The argument here is that modern Greek language is becoming increasingly "impoverished" and is being led to eventual extinction by a number of factors: the abandonment of katharevoussa and of the links that this used to offer with the ancient Greek language; the additional educational measures that reduced dramatically the teaching of ancient Greek in the Greek educational system; and the contemporary incorporation / use of English words in everyday parlance. For the saving the Greek language, as it is argued, ancient Greek should be reintroduced as a compulsory course throughout the grades of elementary and high school.

The calls for a crusade to save Greek language have not only gradually gained in currency but have also brought together seemingly disparate crusaders. The debate was initiated by the European-oriented fraction of the Greek left; subsequently, cadres of the socialist and the conservative party joined in; a "declaration" appeared in the national press in 1982 signed by distinguished intellectuals and artists (many of whom were part of the "generation of the '30s") voicing their
concerns and announcing the foundation of the "Greek Language League" that would work towards the prevention of the declining of Greek language; and the whole movement has also gained academic coverage by some Greek linguists (Frangoudaki, 1987; 1997b).

As Frangoudaki (1997b) argues, the decline prophecy arose and has gained in currency as a consequence (amongst other things) of the Greek participation in the E.U. According to her, the heavy burden of the ancient Hellenic ancestry that still captures the European imagination and constitutes an almost ubiquitous object of praise in any reference to "Greece" in the discourse of European politicians, has a latent function: whereas "ancient Greece" is being praised and admired, "modern Greece" is implicitly deprecated. In an extended research project on the presentation of the national "self" and "others" in the Greek educational system that Frangoudaki and her colleagues undertook (Frangoudaki & Dragona, 1997), it was found that Greek national identity appears to be presented as highly ambivalent, fragile and under threat. In their analyses of teachers' discourse in particular, it was shown that a xenophobic attitude was expressed both with regard to the consequences of European integration and towards foreign immigrants in Greece. A prevailing theme in the teachers' discourse was a strong under-evaluation of modern Greek culture.

Frangoudaki (1997b) argues that this widely shared deprecation of modern Greek culture provides for the ideological backdrop for the calls for the saving of Greek language from decline and foreign contamination. In her words,

"This project is clearly irrational: it seeks to save language from its speakers. Yet, in its very irrationality, it reveals the disguised claim of its supporters, the attempt to share (through language) part of the high value accorded to Ancient Greece, because they view present-day national culture and identity as having low value. The metalinguistic myth that so negatively judges the national language is accepted because it builds an imaginary bridge -beyond history- that links an ideal future to a very positively valued ancient past by short-cutting the negatively valued present" (Frangoudaki, 1997b: 75)

It seems that the intellectual efforts of "the generation of the '30s" to outline the aesthetic and theoretical parameters of a "modern Greek culture" that would productively marry the Romeic with the Hellenic, the oriental with the occidental and the traditional with the modern in an assertive posture against Western cultural hegemony have not taken root. The contemporary call to the arms for a vigilant protection of Greek language against "foreign corruption" and the mourning for

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As Alexiou (1986) points out "Modern Greece", "modern Greek culture", "modern Greek language" and so on constitute a unique case of a country, culture or language that have been destined to normatively have the adjective "modern" attached to them in institutional / academic as well as political discourse. A latent contrast with "ancient Greece" and "ancient Greek civilization" and "language" is always then implicated in such discourse with derogatory inferences availed for the "modern" versions of the "ancient".
modern Greeks', alleged, linguistic "αφεληνισμός" (de-Hellen-isation) carries on in the best (or, rather, worst) of the post-1936 ethnocentric nationalist propaganda. As it was the case then as well, the call for national vigilance is associated with the callers' exclusive claim to a privileged access to the ancient Hellenic symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). The occidental looking glass of ancient Greece / modern Europe apparently (still) reflects back a gloomy image of modern Greece. Distancing oneself from the misfortunes of modern Greek culture is still the paved road to "redemption" for part of the Greek intelligentsia and Greek educators. In public outcries of this type "the Romeic" and "the Hellenic" are still standing apart and castigations of the former constitute implicit claims to the latter.
4. Modern Greece in the looking glass: The politics of ambivalence

4.1. The politics of binary oppositions: The "Hellenic ideal" vs. the "modern Greek"

A comprehensive and integrated genealogy of "the Hellenic" is yet to appear in the social sciences literature. However, fragments that could constitute the basis for such a genealogy can be found within various strands of the social sciences and the humanities. For example, Bernal (1987), has sought to outline the institutional practices by means of which "ancient Hellas" came to be constituted as the virgin birth cradle of European civilisation and the ways in which its Afroasiatic roots were silenced in European scholarship from the Renaissance onwards. Said (1995) has documented the ways in which institutional orientalism represented Islam in colonial discourse as an unworthy and non-creative inheritor of the Hellenic past, in contrast to the European humanism which was proclaimed to be its "true" descendant. Historians speak about the discourse of Hellenism and the ways in which, by means of large scale institutional practices, ancient Hellas was appropriated as the utopian ancestor of modern Europe in general and of Great Britain in particular (Jenkyns, 1980; Turner, 1981; cf. Miliori, 1992). Finally, the spatial "rediscovery" of the lands and remnants of ancient Hellas in the tales, chronicles and literary production of nineteenth century travellers and pilgrims to the Greek peninsula has been fairly well documented (see, inter alia, Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, 1990; Constantine, 1984; Tsigakou, 1981).

Seeking to outline a blueprint for a genealogy of the European imagery of "the Hellenic", Tziovas (1994) maintains that two parameters should be taken into consideration: the Western colonial "mentality" and the discourse of the "supranational", "universal" appeal and validity of the Hellenic ideal. As he argues, whereas the history of Greek nationalism could not be possibly compared with the history of the (post) colonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa, the colonial "mentality" informs both discourses on the "modern Greek" and the discourse of the "supranational (ancient) Hellenic" from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries onwards. These discourses, according to Tziovas (1994), evolve around a series of binary oppositions.

The first is between the "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" aspects of ancient Greek civilisation. Citing Robertson (1924) and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1990), Tziovas draws attention to the late eighteenth century "discovery" that ancient Hellas was ridden by a fundamental duality. On the one hand, it was the Hellas of Apollo, of "light", "beauty", "reason", "democracy", "law" and "masculinity". On the other hand, the idealist philosophy and romantic philology of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century pinpointed to a different Hellas. This was the Hellas of Dionysus: "darkness", "occult ritual and sacrifices", "mysticism", "irrationality", "passion", and "desire" its hallmarks. As Tziovas maintains, traces of this duality can be found in the whole of the German thought of the time: it informs Hoederlin's analysis of Sophocles; Hegel's "Phenomenology of the Spirit"; the work of Heidegger and, more obviously, Nietzsche in his "Birth of the Tragedy".

According to Tziovas (1994), this duality between the Appolonian and Dionysian aspects of ancient Hellas shaped the juxtaposition of "ancient Hellas" - "modern Europe" vs. "modern Greece", which historically emerged at the very same historical period. The European claim to the ancient Hellenic ancestry was predicated upon the Hellenic-as-Apollonian. Modern Europe fashioned itself upon the "light", "reason", "democracy" and "law" of the Hellenic as an "ideal". This "ideal" was a supranational, universal one; one that transcended the particularities of "culture". Ancient Hellas was an "ideal civilisation" and Europe (as an amalgam of local "cultures") its inheritor (cf. Delanty, 1995). Of course, as Said (1995) has shown in his painstaking analyses, the institutional construction of European identity was predicated upon the constitution of the Orient as an "essential Other", a "surrogate self" or a negative imprint of Europe. Along with the European colonial expansion to the East, the institutional practices of Orientalism constituted the Orient as a "stagnant", "backward", "irrational" "despotical" but also "exotic", "humane" and "sensual" essential Other (cf. Hall, 1992a; Rousseau & Porter, 1990; Said, 1995).

Whereas it was conceptually unproblematic to project all these "Dionysian" qualities (the alter ego of ancient Hellas and modern Europe) on to Europe's "monolithic" and "barbarous" Other, with the case of "modern Greece" things were rather complicated. The duality of the "Apollonian" vs. "Dionysian" qualities had to be contained within "the Greek nation". The fact that "modern Greeks" were "awakening" at the time after some 1,500 years of mediaeval theocratic "darkness" and, most importantly, after 400 years of Ottoman, Oriental rule made things easier. The discourse of "oriental pollution" was upheld. The "Hellenic" remained an abstract, supranational, atemporal and universal "ideal". In contrast, its present day reinstatement to a geographically specific locale and to a culturally embodied people was deemed to be tantalised by an eternal battle between the "Apollonian" and the "Dionysian", or, the "occidental" and the "oriental", the "Hellenic" and the "Romeic":

"modern Greece was probably a historical mistake for the Europeans; an inelegant State which, obviously, could not claim for itself the ancient glories. For that of course they had made the provision for an eternal duality of the Hellenic, on the basis of a cunning colonial strategy in which many Greek scholars and intellectuals were trapped. On the basis of this strategy, they distinguished the (ancient) Hellenic from the
As Tziovas points out, a recurrent theme in European accounts of mid nineteenth century Greece has been the depiction of modern Greeks living in a state of "dual consciousness". On the one hand, was the "ideal" one: Greeks wanted to present themselves and their polity as true descendants of ancient Hellas. On the other hand, in contrast to this "ideal fantasy", there was the realm of "objective reality" that placed them firmly in the Orient. As Tziovas maintains, this recurrent theme of duality of consciousness was articulated within a realist discourse. The duality of modern Greek culture was "out-there" to be discovered equally by Greek social actors as well as by keen European observers; it was not an ideological European construct but an obvious "cultural fact".

According to Tziovas's (1994) post-structuralist account, the history of a "binary oppositions" approach to Hellenism has gone through three different phases. The first started with the nineteenth century European pilgrims to the Hellenic lands. These European travellers and philhellenes who came to Greece with an idealised image of the Hellenic antiquity were rather disappointed with the contemporary Greeks they met who seemed to be unmistakably oriental. For Tziovas, this European attitude indicates "the imperialism" of the ancient Hellenic / modern European over the Byzantine, the oriental and the Romeic. Tziovas traces signs of this colonial disposition in contemporary accounts on Greek culture be they offered by Western journalists (he cites a recent publication of The Economist), commentators (Holden, 1972), or ethnographers / anthropologists (Fermor, 1966; Herzfeld, 1987) or by Greek social scientists (Diamandouros, 1994; Mouzelis, 1978).

The second phase, according to Tziovas, encompassed Greek intellectuals who came to "realise" this duality and who unwittingly reproduced it, while trying to undermine it by seeking to empower "the indigenous", "the oriental", "the non-Western". Familiar by now figures are listed here. Korais with his eurocentric vision to re-Hellenise the Greeks and make them stand equal amongst the nations of "enlightened Europe". Psicharis, with his sentimental ambivalence, which, on the one hand, led him to celebrate the Dionysian passionate outbursts of modern Greeks and, on the other, to castigate his uncivilised Greek contemporaries from his Paris residence. And Seferis, with his project to prove that modern Greece is able to produce "Hellenism" and not merely to import "European" one.
The third phase of understanding of Hellenism in terms of the binary oppositions, according to Tziovas, is more recent and slightly different in focus. Here it is not the case that an occidental gaze merely testifies to the cultural dualism of Hellenism and/or tries to undermine it. In its more recent reincarnation, the binary opposition comes in the form of the opposition of the Hellenic as supranational and Diasporic with the Romeic of the Greek nation State. Here two seemingly radically different approaches are encompassed. First, it is an intellectual circle of mainly Greek-American scholars who are "reading" Hellenism as a supranational category, not necessarily linked with any particular "national people" but available as "a common spiritual and cultural identity" to a range of peoples in the wider region of Eastern Mediterranean throughout the centuries (cf. Jusdanis et al., 1993). However, for Tziovas, the question is,

"To what extent this third phase is different from the first one? To what extent the supranational departs from the Apollonian spirit of the Euro-ancient Greek ideal and overcomes the juxtaposition and the contrast of dualism? Isn't it possible to think of this third phase as the return of a peculiar imperialism against the Hellenic, under the disguise of the supranational, the global and the transcendental?" (Tziovas, 1994: 355; my translation).

The second approach that emphasises the supranational aspect of Hellenism against the territorially bounded Hellenism of the Greek State comes, according to Tziovas, with contemporary neo-Orthodox intellectual accounts (cf. Yiannaras, 1987; 1992). Here the supranational does not come with the Apollonian ideal of Hellenism that unites in culture a range of peoples. It is the ecumenicity of the Orthodox Church that transcends national boundaries and casts its shadow to the "miserable" entity of the modern Greek State (cf. Frangoudaki, 1987; see also ch. 3). In contrast, of course, to the de-territorialised version of the supranational Hellenism propagated by the former approach, the latter has a strong nationalist irredentist character: Hellenism expands beyond the territorial boundaries of the modern Greek State to include all the "unredeemed brothers" that have historically been left outside the Greek borders (cf. Yiannas, 1993).

According to Tziovas (1994), this blueprint of a genealogy of the Hellenic may highlight the twists that colonial discourse has taken with regard to the case of modern Greece and may contribute to an understanding of the functions of contemporary discourses on the supranational at times when nationalist fervour is rising. What it certainly indicates though, as he argues, is the need for a study of modern Greece that would be freed from the logic of binary oppositions of colonial thinking. While Tziovas acknowledges the merits and the insights gained by critical social scientific analyses that have explored the duality in Greek culture, he suggests that the time has come for critical social scientific approaches to the Hellenic to dispense with the lenses of binary oppositions. What he deems necessary is an approach along the lines of the post-colonial treatises of Homi Bhabha
that would transcend the evaluatively charged opposition between the Occidental and the Oriental, the Hellenic and the Romeic and that would focus on the "hybridity" of the Hellenic.

In contemporary critical ethnography, the name of Michael Herzfeld has become synonymous with the ethnography of Greece (cf. Atkinson, 1990). His acclaimed elaboration on the "Hellenic" and "Romeic" as symbolic aspects of modern Greek culture has been widely influential and has informed other critical social scientific accounts as well (cf. Diamandouros, 1994; Stewart, 1993; Tsoucalas, 1991; 1994). Herzfeld's (1987) elaboration on the Hellenic / Romeic dilemma expands and reworks Fermor's (1966) formulation of Greek cultural dualism in these terms. A brief consideration of the latter's work is necessary before we move to the work of the former.

4.2. The ambivalence of modern Greek national identity: The Hellenic / Romeic dilemma

"I [...] struggle to distinguish the two great currents which constitute the double-born soul of Greece".
(Nikos Kazantzakis; cited in Holden, 1972: 21)

In the early years of the nineteenth century, before the outbreak of the war of independence, three different names for the "awakening nation" were circulating amongst intellectuals and political authorities: "Ρωμιοί / Romioi", a vernacular form for "Ρωμαίοι / Romans"; "Ελληνες / Hellenes"; and "Γραικοί / Graekoi", the vernacular translation of "Greeks". From these three, "Romioi" was the one that most of the Greek speaking Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire would recognise and identify themselves with. The Byzantines, as the legitimate successors to the Roman Empire, were calling themselves "Romans". After the seize of Constantinople, the Orthodox millet was called "millet-i Rum" by the Ottomans and its flock were known and knew themselves as "Romioi". With the spread of the Enlightenment in the Balkans and the intellectuals' encounter with ancient Hellenic texts, the name "Hellenes" gained some limited popularity. Finally, for the Europeans from the Latin classics onwards, the inhabitants of the ancient Hellenic lands were known as "Greeks" and some of the proponents of the Neohellenic Enlightenment and pre-independence republican revolutionaries favoured and used this name in translation ("Graikoi" / "Γραικοί"). Folktales, songs and archive material from that period suggest that the name "Graikoi" / "Γραικοί" was competing in popular usage the one of Romioi / Ρωμιοί.
The decision concerning a national name was far from an easy task. For the Orthodox Church and the high rank Greek officials of the Ottoman Empire, "Romioi" was the natural choice. "Hellenes" was particularly disfavoured due to the paganistic connotations it had acquired in the early centuries of Christianity. "Graikoi" was also not particularly welcomed due to its use by the "heretic Franks". For the Neohellenic Enlightenment ideologues, "Romioi" was out of question. Its association with the despised Byzantines and the Orthodox Church was too much to take. Korais, opted for "Graekoi / Greeks" as a compromising middle ground solution which had the additional advantage of being the name with which Greeks were known to Europeans in the eyes of whom he sought to legitimate their cause of national liberation.

Nevertheless, it was the name "Hellenes" that eventually came to prevail and that was adopted as the national name by the first national assembly during the war of independence. In the folktales of the early nineteenth century, "the Hellenes" were a mythical race of supernatural proportions, great bravado and with an extraordinary civilisation, the marble remnants of which were still visible in the countryside and towns. With the foreign travellers who were pouring at that time in the lands of "ancient Hellas" in search for these remnants, the name was gaining some currency and when, later, during the war of independence, local warlords were addressing their recruits with the name "Hellenes" to boost their morale, this name came gradually to be established (for details on the name question, see, Herzfeld, 1982a; Kakridis, 1963).

In the neoclassical climate of the early nineteenth century, the names "Hellenes" and "Hellenism" suited very well the purposes of the ruling Greek State and intellectual elites. "Romioi" and "Romiossini" became synonymous with all these cultural aspects of the Greek nation that they wanted to sweep under the carpet. When in 1901, a demoticist intellectual published his historical account of the Greek nation using the title "History of Romiossini" a fierce intellectual debate broke out (cf. Tziovas, 1989). Despite that, "Romiossini" and "Romioi" were not consistently and exclusively adopted by the demoticists and all those who opposed the hegemony of the neoclassicist elites. Nevertheless, the "content" of the demoticists' "Hellenism" was by and large the "content" of "Romiossini". Whereas the "Hellenism" of the neoclassicists drew for inspiration and legitimacy on the glories of ancient Hellas and its emblem were the columns of Acropolis, the "Hellenism -as- Romiossini" of the demoticists drew upon the more recent Byzantine past. The

18 "Romeic-hood".
dome of Agia Sophia in Constantinople / Istanbul, the figures of the popular brigands that fought for Greece's national independence and the artifacts of "folk culture" were its emblems.

The suggestion that modern Greek culture and modern Greek national character ontologically encompass the tensions of -the intellectual / ideological constructs of- "Hellenism" and "Romiossini" was first articulated by Fermor (1966). In his account of his travels in Greece during the post Second World War years, and in a book that blurs the boundaries between ethnographic and travel chronicle genres, Fermor articulated his claim that "inside every Greek dwell two figures in opposition" (p. 106): "the Hellene" and "the Romios". Modern Greeks for him are an amalgam of both: neither of these figures ever prevails and they constantly contradict and complete each other. Fermor went as far as to construct a comparative list of attributes, allegiances and symbols (see Appendix A), which characterise these two figures, reminding his readers though that neither column of the list exclusively informs any single Greek as that would make the image of a "lopsided freak" to emerge.

One of Fermor's observations was that the terms "Romios" and "Romiossini" in their everyday usage were rather evaluatively ambivalent. On the one hand, they were used to convey feelings of "warmth and affection, of community of history, of solidarity in trouble, of sharing the same hazards and aspirations, of being in the same boat" (p. 103). They were indicative of a language of familiarity, of a language that "abolishes pretence, explanation and apology". On the other hand, Fermor noted that "Romios" and "Romiossini" in certain contexts were used with strong derogatory undertones. When he inquired about that one of the most important literary figures of the "generation of the '30s", the answer he received was that they signify "τα άπλυτα μας" ("our dirty linen").

For Fermor -and undoubtedly for his interlocutor as well- "our dirty linen" refers to all the Turkish customs that wove themselves in the web of Greek life during the centuries of occupation. They suggest "the shifts and compromises with which the more intelligent Greeks outwitted their oppressors" (p. 100). As the story goes, during the centuries of Ottoman "fierce" but also "idle and corrupt" administration, "ruse" and "compromise" became virtues for the Greeks. "Flexibility" and

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19 As the linguist Kazazis (1981) argues, whereas "Ελληνας" is stylistically neutral ("unmarked"), "Ρωμιός" is stylistically loaded ("marked"), whether in a pejorative or positive sense according to the context. For him, "Ρωμιός", according to the exigencies of the interactional context means something like: "a (contemporary) Greek, with all the virtues and vices which are usually associated with Greeks" (Kazazis, 1981: 53).
"quick wits" were essential for survival and the road to riches. Nevertheless, once the enemy was removed, "the virtues" that "Romioi" employed to outwit them remained as sad remnants of a finished war now used against fellow nationals and the national administration. As Fermor maintains, while "Romios" and "Romiossini" had the pungency of the familiar and the immediate, "Hellene" and "Hellenism" had the glamour of an idea. They were the revived facade that the nation enthusiastically adopted to cover the "bitter-sweet" profile of "Romiossini". Searching for a metaphorical figure that would convey this paradoxical split-half identity, Fermor opted for the grotesque figure of "Karagiozis", whose cunning eyes would survey the outer world through the holes of an ancient Greek mask of tragedy.

The overall tone of Fermor's account is explicitly sympathetic towards the modern Greeks. He avoids the trap of adopting an occidental perspective and castigating them for their oriental shortcomings. Moreover, he seems aware of the consequences of a romanticised exaltation of Romiossini and of the oriental aspects of Greek culture. In Fermor's enthusiastic account of modern Greeks and modern Greek culture, "the Hellene" and "the Romios" need and complement each other and he prays never either of them to come to prevail against the other. It is the amagalm of the two that fascinates him. Despite Fermor's enthusiastic approval of the Hellenic / Romeic dilemma, "foreign" commentators have not always been impressed by the duality in culture and character they discerned in modern Greece.

Holden (1972), for example, who adopted Fermor's distinction between the Hellenic and the Romeic in his account of modern Greek culture, has been rather scornful of both cultural aspects. "The Hellenic" he discerned mostly took the form of "αρχαιοπληξία" and inconsummate Westernisation, whereas, "the Romeic" the form of "annoying" oriental habits. Interestingly, Holden attributed the political problems of recent Greek history to essentialised "Greek national traits". In the Greek context, political and ideological conflicts which for the Western world would count as signs of political maturity and pluralism, have been recast as signs of an identity crisis and

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20 "Karagiozis" -the essence of Romiossini for Fermor- is the protagonist and anti-hero of an "oriental" type of traditional Greek shadow play. He is ragged, illiterate, nimble and versatile; the cunning child of poverty, surrounded by enemies; often a looser but always quick to recover; the man himself on whose help the other popular -but ancient- hero Alexander the Great relied upon to dispense with a threatening fierce dragon, as the plot of one of Karagiozis' famous adventures has it.

21 Something along the lines of "sterile enthusiasm for the ancients".
4.3. The Hellenic / Romeic dilemma and the cultural reproduction of Western hegemony

Despite their respective differences in evaluative overtones, for both Fermor and Holden, "Hellenism" and "Romiossini" are opposing (albeit complementary) "essences" that inform the context of modern Greek culture. In their accounts, this duality in culture is presented as a result of modern Greece's predicament of lying -in its distinctively paradoxical manner- in the borderline of Europe and the Orient. Greek cultural dualism then is rendered as an objectively discerned "fact" of the "external world", which in turn is objectively divided in two distinctive wholes: Europe and the Orient. Hellenism is the European pole of the duality, Romiossini, the Oriental one and the dynamic combination of the two constitute the "amagalm" of modern Greek culture that Fermor prays will never resolve its dilemma and Holden rather scornfully castigates for its incongruities. For the sake of convenience, of course, the characteristics of Hellenism and Romiossini can be handily summarised in opposing -and complementary- lists of personal and social attributes, emblems, stereotypes, opinions, lifestyle preferences and so on.

As we saw previously, for Tziovas (1994), Fermor and Holden are two only figures in a long list of intellectuals, observers, commentators, nationalist critics and so on that have fallen in the trap of the colonial "mentality" and have articulated their accounts of modern Greek culture or -even more seriously- have fashioned their constitutive national cultural production projects along the evaluatively loaded and hegemonic "binary oppositions" perspective. In Tziovas' broad sweeping and under-elaborated genealogical blueprint, "even" Michael Herzfeld's (1987) work, which approaches the opposition between "Hellenism" and "Romiossini" as a "symbolic" and not a "real" one falls in the same trap.

Nevertheless, by lumping together in the same genealogical phase of the binary oppositions history the early nineteenth century European travellers' accounts and Herzfeld's critical ethnography is

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22 Holden's book was published in 1972, at a time when the foundations of the Colonels' regime had already started to shaken and when this was struggling for its legitimacy in the eyes of the "international community". Amidst the growing anti-dictatorship sentiments of European and North American public opinion, a book like this written by a Sunday Times journalist was undoubtedly a welcomed and friendly pat on the shoulders for the Greek dictators.
more than a gross categorisation. Undoubtedly, modern Greece has been thoroughly "explored" by "survivalist" foreign ethnographers (and domestic folklorists) searching for ancient Hellenic traces in modern Greek culture. Their occidental gaze has variably been satisfied or disappointed by what they "found", in a manner rather similar to the nineteenth century travellers' ecstatic "discoveries" in or "frustration" and "disillusionment" with their encounter with modern Greece and Greeks. However, Herzfeld's elaboration on the binary opposition between "Hellenism" and "Romiossini" has been part and parcel of an overall project that sought to explicate the ideological constitution of modern Greece as a dualism ridden culture and to trace the parallels and common ideological matrix of both Greek national(-ist) and anthropological discourses (Herzfeld, 1987). If nothing else, Tziovas' (1994) gross categorisation indicates a difference of disciplinary perspective on the issue of binary oppositions when compared to the one adopted by Herzfeld.

From the vantage point of a (post-structuralist) literary theory perspective, Tziovas' concern is with the descriptive practices of (fellow) scholars, be they early nineteenth century travellers, "national intellectuals" or contemporary ethnographers and commentators, who employ the evaluatively loaded binary oppositions of Orientalism in their textual constructions of "the Hellenic" (for a recent example, see, Kourvetaris & Dobratz, 1987). Paraphrasing his argument, insofar as "the Hellenic" is described in these texts by means of these binary oppositions, the hegemonic colonial "mentality" is reiterated. This may be a reasonable criticism of intellectual accounts that aim to capture and describe the "reality" of modern Greek culture. Nevertheless, when (as it is the case with (some) ethnographic work) the poles of the binary oppositions are analytically shown to be symbolic resources that inform the practices of social actors, then Tziovas' argument is unsatisfactory. Taken to its extremes, it implies that an analysis of cultural semiotics in the ethnographic manner is untenable and the binary oppositions of the colonial "mentality" are only traceable analytically within "intellectual" accounts. The extension of this argument would be that these are the sole sites where the hegemonic binary oppositions of colonial discourse are reproduced\(^{23}\) and it is the task of post-structuralist literary critics to unveil them. Without any further comment here, let us turn to consider Herzfeld's elaboration on Hellenism and Romiossini.

For Herzfeld (1987), "Hellenism" and "Romiossini" are two cultural "images" and "ideologies" that have emerged with Greek nationalism's twin quest for origins, on the one hand, in the classical past

\(^{23}\) Of course, it could be counter argued here that it is the ethnographic focus on the symbolic uses of binary oppositions by social actors that brings them into being and that an ethnographic focus on the "hybridity" or "intertextuality" of
and, on the other, in the more recent history of the Byzantine and Ottoman period. The cornerstone of Herzfeld's argument that has been substantiated in a range of ethnographic, textual and historical analyses is that modern Greek life is marked by an intense conflict between these two "images" and "ideologies". The sites where this conflict has been played out are wide ranging. Obviously, they include the institutional nineteenth century processes of nation building. Chiefly amongst them: a) the processes of establishing a canon of national historiography that would encompass the tensions between the paganistic ancient Hellas and the Christian Byzantine and post-Byzantine periods; b) the debates within the Greek discipline of folklore studies on which cultural products (folk songs, poetry, music and so on) -and in which form- would be elevated to "epic" national heritage; and c) the debates on establishing a canon of national literature (cf. Herzfeld, 1982a; Jusdanis, 1991). The language question and the institutionalised for decades state of diglossia (cf. Sotiropoulos, 1977) is the other, obvious, domain where, according to Herzfeld (1987), Hellenism and Romiossini as ideal national images have been contrasting each other.

Architecture is another area where this tension is manifested. An interesting detail in the juxtaposition of Hellenism and Romiossini in architecture comes within the design of the nineteenth century neoclassic buildings that were erected to decorate the capital of the newly established Greek State; their impressive classic-looking facades were accompanied by humble and plain, sometimes rustic, interior designs. Herzfeld (1991) also documents the juxtaposition of Hellenism and Romiossini in the realm of architecture and urban planning in more recent times. In towns and urban centres, the occidental "high street", with its Western norms of proper shopping behaviour, is more often than not coupled with an oriental "παζάρι" (flee-market) that lies a few building blocks aside in inner city regions, where different social norms are played out by the shop keepers and patrons alike. Another example in the realm of architecture comes from Herzfeld's own field work in Crete. In the town of Rethemnos governmental attempts to declare as national heritage and restore derelict Turkish houses in the old town were met with strong reaction by the local population, on the grounds that these Turkish houses could not possibly constitute part of the national tradition and be preserved (cf. Herzfeld, 1995).

The cultural "codes" in which Herzfeld's semiotic readings attest to the juxtaposition of Hellenism and Romiossini are multiple and also include the juxtaposition of State bureaucracy and local customs; the formulation and negotiation of State policy matters; music; dressing codes;
gesticulation and folk rituals. Maybe the most interesting realm, where the symbolic opposition between Hellenism vs. Romiossini is discerned by Herzfeld (1987) is in that of the "everyday rhetoric of morality". In order to substantiate his argument, Herzfeld explicates the polarity between Hellenism and Romiossini with another distinction.

According to Herzfeld, the ostensibly historical images of the Hellenic and the Romeic inform two "ideal social constructions of the self" in modern Greece. The first one is what he calls "self-presentation" and the second one "self-knowledge" (or "self-recognition"). "Self-presentation" is associated with the long historical dominance of "Hellenism" as the image proper of the nation. It is the extrovert aspect of modern Greek national identity; the identity for encounters with "outsiders", be they European Others or unrelated co-villagers. "Self-knowledge" is the introvert aspect of modern Greek national identity. It is the identity construction of the "familiar", the "intimate" and "unexceptional" self. It encompasses all these cultural features of everyday life that were "exoticised" and "alienated" as relics of an unwanted past within the occidental discourse of neoclassicism. In Herzfeld's (1987: 41) words,

"These identities face in two directions at once; they represent a continual tension between self-presentation and self-knowledge. Self-presentation adopts the rhetoric of a cultural perfection already achieved; self-knowledge surveys the range of departures from that perfection in daily social experience".

For Herzfeld (1987; cf. Herzfeld, 1980), the "images" of "the Hellenic" and "the Romeic" and the "ideal self constructions" of "self-presentation" and "self-knowledge" relate to the older -in anthropological "Mediterraneanist" discourse- binary opposition between "honour" and "shame" (for the case of modern Greece, see, Campbell, 1964). These are categories that tap into social actors' concerns with exclusion and rejection and, as Herzfeld (1987: 64) argues, are used as a shorthand for "self-presentation" and "self-concealment": ""shame" centres on the revelation of matters considered as unfit for wider consumption [...] "honour" has to do with the aggressive presentation of an idealised self". As Herzfeld (1987) argues, "honour" and "shame" in traditional anthropological accounts are gendered: "honour" is the ideal male property and concern; "shame" the female one. They have also spatial connotations: in Mediterraneanist anthropological accounts, women are linked with the "intimacy" of the home, men with the propriety and high standards that the external affairs of the household demand. For Herzfeld, the contrast between "display" and "(fear of) exposure" that underpins the opposition between "honour" and "shame", also underpins the "ideal self-images" of the Hellenic and the Romeic. As he notes, modern Greek language, in common with other Indo-European ones, employs the masculinity / femininity polarity to
symbolise both the distinction between the active-passive and the public-interior. It is quite indicative that "Hellenism" (Ο Ελληνισμός) is a masculine noun in modern Greek, whereas "Romiossini" (Η Ρωμιοσύνη), a feminine one.

The point that Herzfeld (1987) repeatedly stresses is that all these distinctions are not real but symbolic ones. They have been initiated within the common ideological matrix of colonialism / Orientalism, anthropological discourse and the discourse of nationalism. He acknowledges that in our "post-structuralist era" it has become fashionable to attack the (ethnographic) analytic employment of binary oppositions and distinctions as evidence of an intellectual imposition of a "foreign system on indigenous values" (Herzfeld, 1987: 113). Nevertheless, as he points out, that does not preclude the possibility that these oppositions may be shown to be relevant for local social actors. However, he cautions against the (theoretical) endowment of these oppositions with a coercive power over those actors; "for its the actors who use them" (Herzfeld, 1987: 113; italics in original). In that respect, as he argues, ethnographic diagrams and lists of oppositions maybe dangerous insofar as they often entail the temptation (and common ethnographic practice) to ignore the uses that people put them to (Herzfeld, 1987; cf. Herzfeld, 1997). In order to exemplify this point, Herzfeld puts forward the argument that "the disemia" of modern Greek national identity is predicated upon the active engagement of Greek intelligentsia and Greek social actors more general within the twin ideological frameworks of Hellenism and Orientalism.

According to his argument, both the discourse of Hellenism with its "ancestral holiness" emphasis and the Oriental discourse of the "current pollution" of modern Greek culture are European hegemonic discourses that exclude modern Greece from European structures of power. Nineteenth century "philhellenic" discourses, demanded the modern Greeks to play the role of "the living ancestors" of Europe and subsequently castigated them for their inability to measure up with the ancients. Contemporary western criticisms levelled towards modern Greeks for their alleged imitation of the West echo the old orientalist refrain and the "ideology of tutelage" (Herzfeld, 1987: 110). Arguing against the "mimeticism" thesis of the Orientalist discourse, Herzfeld points out that whereas the discourses of "ancestral holiness" and "current pollution" were European hegemonic discourses, these were translated and combined in the "modern Greek" discourse of "cultural imperfection". As he maintains,

"the Greek discourse of cultural imperfection [...] is both a response to the negative opinions of outsiders -European ideologues or critical co-villagers- and an assertion of the imperative quality of the fight for redemption and independence. It is a way of reclaiming history from those who have
representationally repressed both that history and the active initiative needed to reclaim it" (Herzfeld, 1987: 108; italics in original).

As Herzfeld argues, even the most ardent nineteenth century Greek occidentalist nation builders were far from "passive recipients" of "Western wisdom" and "mere imitators". Theirs was a cultural project of "reclaiming" a past that was simultaneously granted and denied to them. Their efforts were to "refashion" their newly acquired "origins" into a new "beginning" that they would be able to claim as genuinely theirs. Herzfeld points out that the guiding metaphor that substantiated Greek nationalism's "awakening thesis" was the one of "rebirth" ("παλιγενεσία"). As he points out, this is a metaphor for "analogy" and not "identity". For Herzfeld, the discourse of "cultural imperfection" informs Korais' "Report on the Present State of Civilisation in Greece" and it guided his enterprise of constructing anew a national language that was not the ancient Greek one but was a purified version of the contemporary vernacular, "polluted" as the latter was with "oriental barbarisms".

According to Herzfeld, the search for new "beginnings" and for "refashioning origins" also informs and is evidenced in the rather odd choice of Greek folklorists to establish as a "national epic" a mediaeval folktale whose hero is a Byzantine border guard of mixed "origin": his father was an Arab, his mother a Greek. In Herzfeld's (1987; see also Herzfeld, 1982a) reading of the folktale, the hero's actions represent a constant struggle against the negative side of his origin. According to Herzfeld, the Byzantine guard's superhuman battles with the Arabs (and Death itself!) document an active struggle for "redemption" and for "remodelling" his "polluted origins". In the same vein, the modern Greek folklorists' symbolic elevation of this mediaeval tale to a national epic also manifests their concern with the nation's "redemption" and "remodelling" of its "origins" into a new "beginning".

For Herzfeld (1987), what the nineteenth century Greek intelligentsia was up to was not an exercise in "mimeticism" of the West, as their then European and contemporary Greek critics have it, but an active engagement in practical occidentalism. In Herzfeld's (1987; 1995) analyses, similar processes of practical occidentalism are evident with contemporary Greek culture. These take the form of

"detaching the category of the 'traditional' from the formulaic sense of 'backward, therefore oriental', and conflating it with being 'tasteful, therefore Western'".

A move, as he notes,
"that is further complicated by the increasingly unchallenged assumption that anything ‘traditional’ must be ‘classical’, and therefore ‘Greek’—which automatically, by a different route, similarly makes it ‘Western’" (Herzfeld, 1995: 222-3).

The examples that he gives are again wide ranging. These include, the contemporary architectonic trend in Greece of building "traditional" homes, in which the element of tradition comes in the adoption of "occidental" stylistic patterns, and the anti-American demonstrators' predilection for blue jeans! Maybe the most interesting examples though that Herzfeld gives in order to substantiate his point are from the realm of what he calls the "everyday rhetoric of morality". These centre around the conflicting interpretations of "Greek individualism" by the official State discourse and lay actors that find themselves involved in legal disputes due to their "unruly" behaviour.

In the nineteenth century Greek nationalist discourse, "Greek individualism" as exemplified in their "love for freedom" and "insubordination" to the Ottoman rule, has been treated as the Greek character's European "essence" that differentiated them from the "docile" Orientals. The brigands who fought in the war of independence were the emblematic figures of this essential Greek trait. Nevertheless, after independence and the imposition of Western State structures, contemporary Greek "individualism-as-insubordination" (this time to the Greek State structures) from a national "virtue" became a national "flaw". Most importantly, from an essentially Greek attribute, it was transformed to an "alien / oriental" infliction. The insubordination of the past is still celebrated as occidental "individualism", whereas the "individualism" of the present has been rendered to manifest "oriental self-interestness"; one more of those sad oriental remnants that Fermor (1966) was talking about as being turned from weapons against "the enemy" to "flaws" that tantalise modern Greek society. Of course, all these are features of the occidentalist discourse of Greek nationalism and State authorities. In the symbolic realm of everyday morality though, as Herzfeld assures us, an interesting inversion is taking place.

Drawing mainly on his ethnographic work amongst shepherds, often turned to sheep-thieves, in mountainous Crete (cf. Herzfeld, 1985), Herzfeld points out that in their accounts for their "unruly", "self-interested" behaviours of which sheep stealing constitutes only one aspect, the occidental State discourse of "law" and "order" was turned on its head. The institutional organisation of State "order" was becoming a present day extension of the "alien", "Turkish" rule and their "unruly" attitudes and behaviours were recast as a manifestation of the age old, celebrated and occidental "love for freedom" and "insubordinate spirit". Of course, as Herzfeld acknowledges, this is an extreme example. Nevertheless, similar symbolic inversions as he points out (cf. Herzfeld,
1992) are a common feature in accounts of lay Greek social actors for their encounters with the national bureaucracy and the State politics.

What for Greek nineteenth century nationalist discourse and for the present day State authorities has constituted the outmost symbol of Westernisation, i.e. the "rational" organisation of the administration and of the political system, in lay accounts is often castigated (and inverted) as an indication of typical "oriental flaws". Charges of "inefficiency" and "corruption" levelled against the administrative and political organisation of the Greek State abound in lay and media discourse. As a result, "cunningness", "ingenuity" and "rule bending" are deemed necessary for accomplishing the most elementary of mundane tasks. Of course, from the "occidental" State's point of view, these indicate unmistakable "oriental flaws" and "self-interestedness". From the lay actors' perspective though, these follow in the best of pre-independance tradition. These are the "occidental virtues", the celebrated "Greek individualism" that secured the survival of "the Greek nation" in the dire times of Ottoman political administration, with its "corrupted" and "inefficient" bureaucracy. As Herzfeld argues, in all these cases the "traditional" (therefore, "backward", "uncivilised" and "oriental") habits and rooted patterns of social behaviour are practically occidentalised in the symbolic pragmatics of everyday life.

Herzfeld's (1987) argument about the importance of looking at the uses that social actors put the cultural stereotypes and the binary oppositions of the discourses of Hellenism and Orientalism should by now be appreciated. It is not merely the intellectual (realist) descriptions of modern Greece on the basis of binary oppositions that reiterate the hegemonic (colonial) grip of the West / the Occident over modern Greek culture. Neither it is the case that the Greeks unthoughtfully recognise themselves in the dualistic terms of Hellenism and Orientalism and in the discourses of "ancestral holiness" and "oriental pollution". It is the transliteration of these discourses into the "Greek" discourse of "cultural imperfection" and the active practical occidentalisms and orientalisms that social actors, be they Enlightenment ideologues and nation-builders or rural sheep-thieves, engage in that reiterate these binary polarities. As Herzfeld points out, it is the "nature" of hegemony to be predicated upon active participation within the parameters of constituted knowledge and not upon its passive acceptance.
4.4. From symbolic to conversational pragmatics and back again

Herzfeld's analysis of the ways in which the ideologically dilemma construct of modern Greek national identity is reproduced within, what he calls, "everyday rhetoric of morality" is of obvious relevance to my project. My overall concern is also with the ways in which the dilemma of Greek national identity is casually reproduced within discourse. Of particular importance for my project is Herzfeld's contention that the conflicting cultural stereotypes of the oriental / Romeic and occidental / Hellenic aspects of modern Greek national identity are actively deployed by social actors within (symbolic) rhetorical practices, which he calls practical orientalism and practical occidentalism. As Herzfeld argues, seemingly innocuous lay castigations of Greek State structures, national institutions and bureaucracy should be seen as symbolic acts that orientalise these structures and institutions in the domain of cultural pragmatics and, consequently, constitute symbolic claims to an occidental identity for the lay social actors that castigate them.

Even more pertinent to my project is Herzfeld's elaboration on the alleged "essence" of modern Greek national identity, i.e. "individualism". As we saw, for Herzfeld, modern Greek individualism is an ambivalent construct, with its ambivalence manifested in the conflicting rhetorical / symbolic practices that it comes to sustain. Castigations of modern Greek phenomena of "unruly" behaviours, "cunningness", "rule bending" and so, render "individualism" equivalent to "self-interestness" (an alien oriental infliction and a flaw) when levelled by occidental social actors. On the other hand, praises of similar phenomena, by social actors that find themselves in the receiving end of orientalist charges render their "individualism" equivalent to "insubordination" (an alleged occidental virtue). "Unruly behaviours" become "acts of insubordination", "rule bending" becomes "flexibility" and so on. For Herzfeld, these symbolic / rhetorical practices of practical occidentalism and orientalism reproduce the dilemma quality of modern Greek national identity within everyday discursive practices. In the manner of Herzfeld then, discourse analytic attestments to the mobilisation of cultural stereotypes that bear upon these ideologically charged assumptions on what constitutes the orient and the occident or the oriental and occidental aspects of modern Greece and Greeks could be seen in their symbolic identity functions. They provide for the "raw" discursive material that sustains occidental identity claims, by orientalising respective aspects of modern Greece and modern Greek national character.

For all its exemplary analytic force though, there is an aspect in Herzfeld's overall account that needs to be critically considered. The impressively overarching scope that sustains his ethnographic
analyses, could be argued that is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength as long as it links contemporary discursive practices with the historically constituted discursive frameworks of Orientalism and Hellenism. It is also a strength as long as these discourses are shown to inform contemporary identity practices in which Greek social actors engage themselves in and the active reproduction of the ideologically dilemmatic construct of Greek national identity. Nevertheless, Herzfeld's emphasis on the rhetorical-as-symbolic accountability of contemporary Greek discursive practices comes at the expense of neglecting the rhetorical-as-conversational accountability that can be analytically attested to within the unfolding of talk in interaction. And this maybe considered as an analytic weakness.

In Herzfeld's analyses rhetoric is a pivotal concern (see in particular, Herzfeld, 1982b). It is used as an analytic concept that enables him to trace the active participation of lay social actors within the parameters of historically (and ideologically) constituted knowledge. It is the symbolic realm where social actors claim and disavow historically constituted types of accountable moral identities. Nevertheless, his analytic attestment to these moral, rhetorical identities comes as a result of his (admittedly fascinating) interpretative reading of cultural stereotypes embedded within a pragmatic-as-symbolic context. However, cultural stereotypes in their discursive action (often) come to be embedded within a more restricted context; namely, the context of their interactional / conversational usage. Most importantly, as various strands within the social sciences (ranging from conversation analysis to discursive psychology) purport, the interactional deployment of discourse provides for an analytic index of moral identities at stake, as manifested in the speakers' own displayed understanding within the sequential unfolding of talk in interaction.

Evidently, lay speakers' displayed understandings of the moral identities at stake within talk in interaction are not necessarily indicative of the type of moral identities associated with overarching discursive formations like Hellenism and Orientalism. As we shall see in chapter 4, usually they pertain to interactional concerns with the motivational disinterestedness of accounts and descriptions. Despite the fact that symbolic identity implications may be analytically relevant in close examinations of cultural stereotyping within talk in interaction, I suggest that an analytic concern with them should not come at the expense of ignoring the rhetorical implications of conversational uses of stereotypes. Far from considering an analysis of conversational uses of stereotypes as incompatible to an analysis of their symbolic uses, I should like to suggest provisionally that an analytic attestment to the former may provide a more firm grounding for analytic claims to the latter. Modern Greek lay castigations of, say, corrupt Greek politicians or of
(oriental type of) traits of Greek national character may be shown analytically to sustain the occidental (symbolic) credentials of speakers, while the complaining Greek speakers may be shown analytically to orient to local, interactional identity concerns. In the following three chapters before my actual analyses, I shall have the chance to elaborate on what these local rhetorical identity concerns may be and how it is possible analytically to highlight them.
Chapter Two

BANAL NATIONALISM AND THE
IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA OF PREJUDICE

1. Introduction

2. The thesis of Banal Nationalism
   2.1. "Hot" and "Banal" nationalism
   2.2. The dialectics of forgetting and remembering and
       the casual flagging of the national homeland
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3. Prejudice vs. rationality: An (everyday) dilemma of liberal ideology
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   4.1. Banal Nationalism and its relevance for a study of
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   4.4. Towards a reconsideration of the dialectic between
       universalism / internationalism and particularism / nationalism
1. Introduction

The liberal Western euphoria with the domino-like collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans after 1989 was rather short lived. The changes in the political system precipitated a dramatic redrawing of the political map of the region. Whereas in some cases (e.g. Czechoslovakia), the "Pax Communista" (Clogg, 1993) that bound together different ethnic communities into a single nation-State was peacefully abolished, in other cases developments were less genial. The political dissolution of Yugoslavia in particular, entailed bloodshed which was unprecedented in post Second World War Europe. For Western commentators (e.g. Ignatieff, 1994), the establishment of a "new world order" was seen as coming hand in hand with the "return of the repressed": the forces of ethnic nationalism that some decades earlier had led to the Balkans being accorded the title of the "keg powder" of Europe were unleashed; or, rather, "reawakening".

Greece, maybe unavoidably, was not unaffected. As mentioned earlier, Liakos (1994) assures us that the nationalist fervour generated over the dispute with the neighbouring Former Yugoslavian Republic named "Macedonia" is not comparable with anything witnessed in Greece in the recent past. Not even the escalated crises between Greece and Turkey in 1976 and 1987, that brought the two countries to the verge of an armed conflict, had such an effect. The conditions under which the symbolic appropriation of a "national name" and insignia proved more effective in striking a chord with popular national(-ist) sentiments than the "real" territorial disputes with Turkey may constitute a subject for future study. Certainly though, the "syndrome of the persecuted nation", a hallmark in the discourse of the nationalist authoritarian regimes after the "Catastrophe of 1922", reached a new peak in media, political and lay discourse (cf. Diamandouros, 1994; Liakos et. al., 1993; Frangoudaki & Dragona, 1997).

Interestingly enough, the "persecutors" on that occasion were only technically "the pseudo-Macedonians". More than them, the charge was directed against "the Europeans": they were the ones who failed to "stand by us" and to acknowledge "our historically legitimate sensitivities". "Our name is our soul" proclaimed a letter signed by leading Greek intellectuals and artists and addressed to European Statesmen. However, this argument fell upon "deaf ears". Greece was (once

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1 At the time of writing up this thesis, the long anticipated armed conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo eventually broke out and scenes of fleeting civilian refugees, burned villages and of confrontations of the Serb army with Albanian militias are flooding the global media.
again) singled out as the wayward Balkan partner with its "backwardness" this time testified to by the ethnic type of national attachments of its political leadership and populace. In Greece itself, the post-dictatorship inhibitions against anything that could be branded as "national-ist" were lifted (cf. Liakos, 1994).Explicitly addressing the global audience of CNN and other major satellite TV channels, the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the streets of Thessaloniki proudly proclaimed the "Greekness of Macedonia" in the mass rallies organised to convince the "international community" about the determination of the Greek people to "defend" their "national rights".

The circumspection or aversion of western politicians, commentators, journalists and "public opinion" to the "tides of resurgent nationalism" that swept through the Balkans, which once again, brought to the fore the distance that separates "the civilised West" from the "backward Rest" (cf. Hall, 1992a)) maybe does not come as a surprise. However, as Billig (1995) argues, it is rather ideologically suspect. A consideration of Billig's own thesis of "Banal Nationalism" will take us some way into setting the grounds for the study of the reproduction of the Greek national identity dilemma within talk in interaction.

2 The signature of Melina Mercouri, the late socialist minister, actress and European "Greek persona" favourite, both for her militant anti-dictatorship protests and campaigns as well as for her unmistak "Greek temperament", featured prominently amongst the others.
2. The thesis of Banal Nationalism

"The central thesis of the present book is that, in the established nations, there is a continual 'flagging', or reminding, of nationhood. The established nations are those states that have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particularly, are part of what is conventionally described as 'the West'" (Billig, 1995: 8)

Broadly adopting the assumptions of the "modernist" thesis (as opposed to the "primordialist" one) on the origins of the nation, Michael Billig sets his outline of the Banal Nationalism thesis in direct contrast to what he calls "projecting" and "naturalising" theories of nationalism. Briefly put, Billig argues against social theoretical accounts of nationalism that either project nationalism into West's Others by treating it as an extreme / surplus phenomenon and equating it with nationalist movements, or naturalise it as a phenomenon endemic to the human condition. In contrast to such approaches, Billig has stretched the semantic boundaries of the term nationalism to also include its "banal" aspects. That is, the ensemblange of ideological habits, practices and beliefs that daily reproduce the established nation-States of the West as nation-States and their citizens as national citizens.

2.1. "Hot" and "Banal" nationalism

Billig points out that nationalism is typically defined as something prior to, or beyond, the established nation State. Nationalism is typically associated with the strive for national independence, autonomy or unity. Used in this way, nationalism comes to resemble a developmental stage that established nation States have long passed through: a historical force that brought them into existence and thereafter has or should have, vanished into thin air. In standard social theoretical accounts though, as Billig maintains, nationalism is also seen as matter (or rather "problem") of the present. As he points out, nationalism is not only seen as the ideological force that created the nation States but also as an ideological force that threatens their contemporary stability. In this case, nationalism is thought of as taking the form of contemporary separatist movements operating both in the periphery of the West (e.g. Balkans, Eastern Europe, South East Asia) as well as within its core (e.g. Belgium, Canada). Or, alternatively, it comes to be associated with the ideological credo of fascist movements, whose propaganda and popular appeal has dramatically increased during the late 1980s and 1990s both with Western States and within States in its periphery.
Either way, as Billig argues, nationalism is equated with extraordinary, powerful and fierce emotions. Its historical role is variably seen as either positive (since it was nationalism that led to the establishment of the modern nation States in the past) or negative (since in its present day manifestation it threatens to dissolve some of them or disrupt the order of the democratic politically scenery of the West). The double-faced Roman God Janus is often used as a fitting metaphor in the relevant literature in order to convey this historically ambivalent political profile of nationalism. However, as Billig points out, this "narrow" and "hot" social scientific definition of nationalism is somewhat misleading.

For Billig, the problem with this "narrow" understanding of nationalism as a peripheral, emotionally charged and irrational force is not so much with what it comes to be included in its semantics but rather with what it is omitted and excluded. Equating nationalism either with the quest for national independence, autonomy and unity or with the politically marginal groups that seek to undermine the democratic stability of established nation States leaves the nationalism of the modern Western nation States unaccounted for. Of course, as Billig acknowledges, in the relevant literature it is usually conceded that nationalism some times, on special occasions, erupts even in nation States of the core of the West. Conflicts like the one between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands / Malvinas islands may occasionally disrupt the nationalism free polity of the established nations of the West. Moreover, the ritual display of loyalty to the national homeland during commemorations and national days is a well known phenomenon in the established nations of the West.

However, as Billig argues, if the nationalism of the established nations were to be equated with these moments of national crises and commemorations then still their nationalism would be seen as a "temporary mood" that after its surfacing soon dies out. And surely there is more than that. In between the times of crisis and the institutionalised commemoration days, the established nations continue to exist as such. As Billig points out,

"Daily, they are reproduced as nations and their citizenry as nationals. And these nations are reproduced within a wider world of nations. For such daily reproduction to occur, one might hypothesize that a whole complex of beliefs, assumptions, habits, representations and practices must also be reproduced. Moreover, this complex must be reproduced in a banally mundane way, for the world of nations is the everyday world, the familiar terrain of contemporary times" (Billig, 1995: 6).

For Billig, the contemporary social scientific and media discourse attesting to the "reawakening" of nationalism and to the "returned of the repressed" needs to be critically considered for what it omits
and what it implies. Taking issue with two contemporary accounts in which this line of argumentation is unfolded, the first a semi-journalistic, semi-scholaristic one (Ignatieff, 1994) and the second an academic social scientific one (Tehranian, 1993), Billig questions the implicit assumptions upon which the theme of the "return of the repressed" relies. According to his argument, the theme of "returning" or "reawakening" implies that nationalism in the near past had been away; or that it was in a dormant condition. The settled world of the nation-States then appears as the "point zero" of nationalism. Consequently, a series of armed conflicts of the not so remote past are exempted from the designation of "nationalist". The American "interventions" in Vietnam, Korea and so on, the Falklands / Malvinas war, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan or the Gulf war to name but a few, despite the patriotic rhetoric within which they were launched and sustained cease to appear as nationalist.

Billig points out that one of the underpinnings of the contemporary "reawakening thesis" is the familiar distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism, initially proposed by Kohn (1945). As the argument goes, the former is the social contract type of nationalism of the "old" Western European States, which stems from the universalistic values of the Enlightenment. The latter is the organic type of nationalism, it has its roots in the German romanticism and its hallmark is the discourse of "blood origin" and "race". It is the type of nationalism to be found in central and eastern Europe; the one that nurtured the rise of Hitler in power in the prewar Germany; the one which feeds neo-fascist movements throughout the globe and which informs the political rhetoric of separatist movements. It is the type of nationalism that was "repressed" under communist rule in Eastern Europe, the one that is responsible for the bloodshed in the Balkans and, of course, the one that is reawakening in contemporary Greece. Ignatieff (1994) upholds this distinction in his account on the contemporary resurface of nationalism.

Billig's critical point here is that in contemporary accounts where this distinction is drawn (of which Ignatieff's one is a good case in point) the "ethnic" nationalism of West's Others acquires a prototypical meaning. Stripped of its adjectival complements, it is rendered to be "the nationalism", lurking outside the West's perimeter. On the contrary, the "civic nationalism" of the West slips from attention altogether or it comes under the benign and comforting rhetorical designation of "patriotism". Commenting on Ignatieff's justification of "civic nationalism" as a trademark of established European democracies at their best, Billig argues that Ignatieff

"does not describe how 'civic nationalists' create a nation-state with its own myths; how the civic nations recruit their citizenry in war time; how they draw their own boundaries; how they demarcate
Taking issue with the distinction between nationalism and patriotism, Billig argues that this is an all too convenient rhetorical device with considerable ideological ramifications. Paying some close attention to the texts of the main contemporary proponents of this distinction (Connor, 1993; see also, Connor, 1978), Billig highlights the dubious distinction between the nature of national loyalties and sentiments attributed respectively to nationalism and patriotism. For Connor, nationalism is an irrational, primordial force with its main characteristic being a strong emotional attachment to one's people. Nationalists -of the likes of Hitler, Bismark and Mao- have appealed to blood ties and common origin in order to rally their people into their aggressive, irrational and destructive projects. For Connor, the immigrant nations like the USA, whose citizens naturally lack the ethnic bonds of their counterparts in other nation-States, the designation nationalist loyalties is apparently inappropriate. The emotional driving force that bonds them together is patriotism, which lacks both the dangerous emotional depth as well as the irrationality, fanaticism and mass appeal of nationalism. Within this line of argumentation of course, as Billig points out, the wars launched by the USA cease to appear as problems arising out of over-heated nationalism: "if required, they can be transmuted into the warm glow of patriotism, the healthy necessity rather than the dangerous surplus".

While the suggested distinction between "their" nationalism and "our" patriotism is couched in psychological terminology, Billig argues that within the social psychological literature there is no convincing evidence that the two, allegedly, distinctive types of national loyalties are different. For Billig, the distinction between patriotism (emotional attachment to one's homeland) and nationalism (chauvinistic and negative feelings against national Others) taps into a common theme within fascist propaganda. Fascists, Billig points out, commonly present their projects in defensive terms. Theirs is a political project motivated by their love and attachment to the homeland and their will to defend it from the conspirators and attackers working against it.

For Billig, social psychological attempts to distinguish and quantify these allegedly different emotional loyalties (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1993; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) reveal a social scientific readiness to claim and to attest to such differences rather than the objective existence of such differences. After all, the love of the homeland and the will to sacrifice oneself for her is also the driving force to kill for her. The high American scores in the patriotic scale devised by Kosterman...
and Feshbach, secured by the respondents' attestation to (amongst other things) "feeling great" whenever they saw the national flag, as Billig points out, manifest a "double forgetting": both social psychologists and their respondents forget that the national flags daily encountered are too numerous to generate such "great feelings" and national / patriotic pride. The argument about this "double forgetting" is an integral aspect of Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism.

2.2. The dialectics of remembering and forgetting and the casual flagging of the national homeland

Critical social theoretical approaches to the rise of nationalism and to the establishment of nation States invariably stress the role of historians and intellectuals in the fabrication of a selective national past (for an early statement, see Renan, [1882] / 1990). According to Billig, this selective fabrication of a national past involves a complex dialectic of "remembering" and "forgetting". The constitution of the nation is predicated upon the ideological constitution of a collective memory, of a distinct national history. From the nineteenth century onwards, historians have been the main undertakers of such large scale intellectual enterprises. Taking aboard Renan's argument, Billig points out that once a nation State has been established, its continued existence depends upon a collective amnesia. Both its historical recency as well as the brutality by means of which its establishment was brought about tend be forgotten.

Extending upon Renan's argument though, Billig maintains that the dialectic between remembering and forgetting is not only characteristic of the intellectual work of early nationalist historians. A similar trend can be detected in contemporary social scientific investigations on nationalism. For Billig, whereas historians tend to forget the past in the process of remembering it as a "national" one, contemporary Western (chiefly American) sociologists tend in their studies to forget the "national" present (and presence) in their familiar social surroundings. The reproduction of Western nation-States as nation-States is being left scientifically "unnoticed" and nationalism only emerges as a relevant object of study when in the form of separatist and fascist movements it interrupts the "normal", nationally unflavoured course of life. As Billig argues, this contemporary social theoretical forgetting of the national present is ideologically consequential. It fits an ideological pattern in which the nationalism of the West is naturalised, dissapearing in the innocuous semantics of "society", whereas the nationalism of West's Others is exoticised as a surplus, emotionally dangerous and irrational phenomenon.
According to Billig, the sociological failure to "notice" the banal nationalism of the established nations of the West is a clear indication of the profound influence of nationalism on contemporary ways of thinking. Taking aboard arguments from critical studies of ideology (Barthes, 1977; Eagleton, 1991; Fairclough, 1992; McLellan, 1986; see also, Billig, 1991), Billig points out that the unparalleled force of the ideology of nationalism comes with its transformation to contemporary common sense. For him,

"nationalism is the ideology by which the world of nations has come to seem the natural world -as if there could not possibly be a world without nations" (Billig, 1995: 37)

For Billig, paraphrasing Barthes (1977), nationalism speaks with "the voice of nature" and comprises the habits of thought and action whose combination makes the world of nations to appear to their inhabitants as the only possible natural world. The dialectic of remembering and forgetting nationalism is above all ingrained within the practices, habits and routines of everyday life. As Billig maintains, within established nation States, the "national homeland" is routinely but mindlessly "flagged". It is worth considering here, his elaboration on the "waved" and "unwaved" flags that citizens of established nation States recurrently encounter within the course of their everyday lives.

Billig's observation is that national flags, the outmost sacred symbols of the nation, play a dual role within life practices in established nations. On the one hand, they are ceremoniously upheld, waved and saluted during rituals, commemorations and in the "national days" that regularly interrupt the casual flow of everyday life. These are special occasions. Occasions in which citizens are officially addressed and consciously recognise themselves as nationals. Nevertheless, as Billig notices, these "saluted flaggings" are insignificant in proportion when compared to the numerous "unsaluted flaggings" occurring within established nations (and the USA in particular). The national flag comes (as a rule rather than an exception) to widely decorate public buildings, private enterprises, garments and the wrapping of commodities, it is casually flashed in TV screens and printed on newspapers, magazines and stamps. For Billig, these flags encountered but scarcely acknowledged provide for "banal reminders of nationhood: they are flagging it unflaggingly" (Billig, 1995: 41). By means of them, the idea of nationhood and national belonging is neither forgotten not consciously remembered, it comes to be preserved within the course of everyday life.
Billig draws upon Bourdieu's (1990) notion of "habitus" to exemplify his point about the presence of a dialectic of national forgetting and remembering within mundane life practices. As he maintains,

"the 'habitus' refers to the dispositions, practices and routines of the familiar social world. It describes the 'second' nature which people must acquire in order to pass mindlessly (and also mindfully) through the banal routines of daily life" (Billig, 1995: 42)

Billig notices that the dialectic between forgetting and remembering is well captured in Bourdieu's definition of "habitus":

"the habitus -embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history- is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product" (Bourdieu, 1990: 56; cited in, Billig, 1995: 42; italics in original)

As Billig suggests, this process by means of which the past comes to be embodied within the present in a dialectic of "forgotten remembrance" may be described as "enhabitation". The unwaved and unsaluted national flags are casually overlooked by modern citizens as familiar features of the natural (national) landscape. These "unnoticed" encounters do not provoke any particular emotional reactions. Of course, as Billig maintains, enhabitation does not only entail the routine unsaluted flags encountered but scarcely consciously registered by contemporary citizens of established nation-States. Familiar habits of language, routine phrases in political rhetoric and media discourse, according to Billig, often enhabit a -metaphorical- unwaved and unsaluted national flag.

Building upon his argument about the metaphorical flagging of national homeland within routine practices of everyday life, Billig draws particular attention to the ways in which the assumptions of nationalism are enhabited within the indexicalities of familiar language uses. Not surprisingly, his account starts with a critical consideration of political discourse. His first route station in developing his argument is a consideration of the contemporary political thesis about the, alleged, "end of ideology" at the closing years of the twentieth century, succinctly articulated in the work of Fukuyama (1992). As Billig maintains, Fukuyama's argument that after the collapse of communism there is no alternative position to challenge liberal democracy and that "there is no legitimate principle other than the sovereignty of the people" (Fukuyama, 1992: 45; cited in Billig, 1995: 93) draws upon a "hot" understanding of nationalism. Nationalism is deemed to be one of those "old" ideologies, which are gradually losing their legitimacy and disappearing from the historical scenery. As Billig points out though, the very formulation "sovereignty of the people" tells a story of Banal Nationalism. "The people" are unmistakably a series of "national people" and "sovereignty" is also a national one.
Indeed, in line with Harris (1990), Billig argues that nationalism provides for the normative discursive framework of contemporary politics. Nevertheless, not as a particular political project or stance but as the background condition for any political debates and contrasting political projects. Taking aboard Shotter's (1993) point that "nationalism is a tradition of argumentation", Billig argues that in order for competing political stances to be debated within the arena of national political life, there must be a topos beyond argumentative contestation. And that topos, is the very "national" framework of reference. Competing political / hegemonic visions of the national may be debated in national parliaments and competing political factions and parties may claim for themselves the right to speak for the nation, for the national "we". Nevertheless, as Billig points out,

"the argument is generally placed within a place -a homeland- and the process of argumentation itself rhetorically reaffirms this national topos".(Billig, 1995: 96; italics in original)

Billig's analysis of political discourse leads him to consider fragments of political rhetoric from a range of politicians from different countries. His analytic emphasis has been placed on those "small" words like, definite articles ("the"), pronouns ("we"), adverbs ("here"), which in their casual appearance within political rhetoric indexicalise "the national homeland". One of Billig's concerns is to avoid the exclusive association of this banal indexicalisation of the national homeland with conservative politicians (of the likes of Thatcher and Reagan) playing the "patriotic card". In that respect, the political rhetoric of Tony Blair's New Labour and of the Greek socialist party -amongst others- are also considered. The banal hailing of the national homeland, of course, has been attested to their rhetoric as well.

In order to preempt the potential criticism that the casual flagging of nationhood is an endemic and hardly surprising feature of political rhetoric, Billig has also turned to conduct a day survey of newspaper discourse. Here particular attention has been paid to the discourse of the serious, left of the centre British newspaper The Guardian, which attracts a middle class educated readership. The "tabloids", with their notorious chauvinistic stance would be an easy target to test assumptions of the Banal Nationalism thesis. From Billig's analysis it transpires that, hardly surprisingly, the coverage of national (and international) issues explicitly named as such predominated the material of most of the newspapers. Moreover, deictic references to the context of the national homeland, the nation and national politicians came in abundance; the weather sections of the papers abounded with discursive and pictorial indexicalisation of the national homeland; most papers were organised
in sections of "home news" and "international news" and the national flag (in Billig's metaphorical use of the term) was explicitly waved in the Sports section of the papers when "our boys", squads and so one were testing their athletic capabilities against national Others.

2.3. National identity as a form of life

For Billig, it is due to this embeddeness of "the national" in a habitual dialectic of forgotten remembrance within everyday life practices that national identity is preserved within contemporary established nation States. As he argues, national identity should not be thought of as a psychological state -an inward emotional baggage of patriotic feelings- that is stimulated by the conscious recognition of national reminders. The series of literal and metaphorical waved and unwaved flags encountered by modern citizens constitute for Billig parts of more general forms of life. The latter could be called national identities. Drawing upon social constructionist perspectives on identity (e.g. Bhavnani & Phoenix, 1994; Shotter & Gergen, 1989), Billig asserts that

"an 'identity' is not a thing; it is a short-hand description for ways of talking about self and community"

And as he goes on to qualify,

"ways of talking, or ideological discourses, do not develop in social vacuums, but they are related to forms of life. In this respect, 'identity', if it is to be understood as a form of talking, is also to be understood as a form of life" (Billig, 1995: 60).

The juxtaposition of the conceptualisation of national identity as a form of life to traditional social psychological approaches constitutes a central aspect of Billig's outline of the thesis of Banal Nationalism. His overall argument is that traditional social psychological approaches to national identity, by treating it as functionally equivalent to any other type of identity, have overlooked the historical particularities of nationalism and its role in the mundane reproduction of the world of nation States. Criticising attempts within the relevant literature to explain nationalist consciousness as a psychological state, Billig asserts that

"nationalism is more than a feeling of identity; it is more than an interpretation, or theory, of the world; it is also a way of being within the world of nations" (Billig, 1995: 65)

For the theoretical substantiation of the thesis of Banal nationalism, Billig draws critical attention to the main and most influential social psychological theory of identity, namely Social Identity Theory (SIT) (e.g. Tajfel, 1981; 1982) and its latter-day re-working within the frame of Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) (Turner et al., 1987). According to the SIT, as Billig notes,
psychological factors are of central importance for group behaviour. Social groups, and nations amongst them, only exist because their members identify with them and understand themselves in group terms. The process of identification is basically a form of categorization, as it relies upon the group members' recourse to categorical distinctions between ingroups and outgroups. Since, as SIT postulates, individuals have a need for a positive social identity they will remain members of a group or will seek membership in new groups as long as these groups contribute positively to their social identities. Alternatively, a positive social identity will be sought by comparisons with outgroups along convenient for group members dimensions. In that respect, flattering auto-stereotypes will be held by ingroup members and contrasted with unflattering stereotypes attributed to comparative outgroups.

The linkage offered within SCT between identification and stereotyping is, according to Billig, succinctly formulated by Hogg and Abrams (1988) along three stages. The first stage involves individuals categorizing themselves as part of a group, assigning themselves with a social identity and distinguishing themselves from the relevant outgroups. In the second one, individuals learn the stereotypic norms associated with their social identity. And in the third one, these norms are assigned by individuals to themselves and "thus their behaviour becomes more normative as their category membership becomes salient" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988: 172; cited in Billig, 1995: 66). Billig's criticism of the SIT and SCT approach to national identity centres, first on their universalism which results in a neglect of the specific meaning of social categories and, second, on their exclusive focus on individual categorizations. In the case of the study of national identity, as Billig argues, the latter emphasis results in a neglect of the ways in which national identity comes to be inhabited.

Drawing critical attention to the universalism of SIT, Billig points out that the psychological phenomena described by SIT are assumed to be universal ones and are not linked to any particular socio-historical context. Nations may have not always existed but social groups, group identities, ingroups and outgroups are assumed to be universal facts and the task for social psychologists is rendered to be the exploration of the psychological similarities underlying different forms of group identities. Citing Breuilly (1985) though, Billig (1995: 67) argues that "the specific meanings of nationalism are lost if it is seen as just another form of 'group identity'". For Billig (1995: 67), the crucial question that Social Identity theorists typically fail to ask is "what it specifically means to declare oneself to be a member of a national group, or to declare one's group to be a national one".
As he points out, the meaning of such declarations can only be analytically attested to by a consideration of the interactional as well as wider historical and political context of their occurrence.

Drawing upon Anderson (1983), Billig argues that the fact that nations, along with other large scale social groups, depend for their existence on their members' imaginary identification with the group does not mean that this act of imagination renders diverse large scale social groups to be psychologically similar. For Billig, such groups are imagined in different ways and therefore they are psychologically different. As he points out,

"the religious communities of the Middle Ages were imagined in different terms from the modern nation: the imagining of 'Christendom' involved different 'theories', representations of morality and assumptions about the nature of the world than are involved in the imagining of the modern nation" (Billig, 1995: 68).

As Billig maintains, by focusing on the psychological similarities between different discursive acts of group identification forecloses the analysis at the point it should begin. For Billig, SIT and particularly SCT flatten out different ways of representing the world. Their focus on the psychological factors entails an understanding of identity as "an inner response to a motivational need". As he points out though, what may be of primary importance is not "how individuals categorize themselves, but how the category is categorized". In the case of national identity,

"not only do the members have to imagine themselves as nationals; not only do they have to imagine their nation as a community; but they must also imagine that they know what a nation is; and they have to identify the identity of their own nation" (Billig, 1995: 68).

Billig acknowledges that there is no conceptual problem with the main assumption underlying SIT and SCT about the context dependency of group identifications and categorization. As he recognises, in different contexts, different identities become salient and social actors do as a result "switch" from one identity register to another. In that respect, it is perfectly legitimate to assume that one's national identity is not salient in all social contexts and encounters. Nevertheless, as Billig argues, the main problem with SIT and SCT is that they have very little to say about what happens to national identity in between situations of national salience. According to Billig, in between these situations, for SIT and SCT national identity

"merely becomes some sort of latency, or internalised cognitive schema, within the individual's 'memory-store'; there it stays, awaiting active service when the next salient situation pops along" (Billig, 1995: 69)

Of course, as Billig's theoretical and empirical analyses have shown, this is far from being the case. In the in between of national salience situations, national identity does not become some sort of latent psychological property: its maintenance depends upon constant "flaggings" and mindless
reminders of nationhood. For Billig, this means that national identity is something more than "an inner psychological state or an individual self-definition: it is a form of life, which is daily lived in the world of nation-states" (Billig, 1995: 69). As such, it encompasses a set of common sense assumptions and beliefs or ways of talking about the "natural" world of the nation States and their inhabitants. It encompasses general themes and habits of thinking which are indicative of a nationalist consciousness.

2.4. Imagining the national "Us", "Them" and the nation in a world of nations

In contrast to SCT's overwhelming emphasis on self-categorizations and on individual declarations of self identity (in terms of "we"), Billig argues that nationalism is better thought of as an ideology of the first person plural. For him, the crucial question pertaining to national identity is "how the national 'we' is constructed and what is meant by such construction" (Billig, 1995: 70). In order for citizens to be able to claim to have a national identity, the nation has to be imagined as a distinctive entity. Elaborating on the general theme of nationalistic consciousness that relates to the construction of the imagined collectivity of the nation, Billig stresses Anderson's (1983) point that the nation is imagined as a unique entity along a temporal and a spatial dimension. The temporal dimension involves the construction of a national time span that endows nations with a distinctive history and nationals with a sense of a common past and future. The articulation of national histories that accompanied the emergence of the nation States is no coincidence in that respect. The spatial dimension involves the imagining (and the political appropriation) of a particular territory that in nationalist narratives is "intrinsically" associated with the historical course and fate of the national community.

As Billig points out, national histories only very rarely comprise single and uncontested narratives. Different factions, classes, religions and ethnicities rather typically struggle for their version of national history to be established as the canonical one. As Billig maintains, "historical tales emerge from the struggles for hegemony" (Billig, 1995: 71). In that respect, as he argues, "the voice of the nation" is a fiction, as claimants to such "a voice" overlook and silence the struggles that made such a "national voice" possible. For Billig, current national histories reflect current balances of hegemony.
Drawing upon critical studies of nationalism, Billig points out that within national histories there are certain common themes by means of which the uniqueness of the nation comes to be substantiated. Stereotypes of character and temperament are typically mobilised telling a tale of "our" people marching through historical time; constructions of "culture" and "ways of life" are drawn upon as attestments to national distinctiveness; and language is often thought of as a repository of the national genius that needs to be protected from foreign contamination and interbreeding. For Billig, all these highlight the importance for studies of nationalism and national identity to focus not merely on national self-categorizations but also on the ways in which the national category is categorised; as he maintains:

"'We' do not merely categorize 'ourselves', but claim that the object of 'our' identification possesses an identity, indeed a precious unique identity" (Billig, 1995: 71).

If the theme of national uniqueness is a demarcating feature of a national consciousness, this should not be thought of as particularly restricted to certain only national cases. This notion of uniqueness stems from the universal theme of nationalism. For Billig,

"the way 'we' assert 'our' particularity is not itself particular. 'We' have a history, identity and flag, just like all those other 'we's. In this, 'we' (whichever national 'we' is to be proclaimed) speak (or imagine ourselves to speak) a universal code of particularity. This mixture of universality and particularity enables nations to proclaim themselves as nations". (Billig, 1995: 72-3; italics added).

The dialectic of particular and universal themes in the ideological framework of nationalism is evidently apparent in what Billig calls the "universal code for the naming of particulars". The uniqueness of a nation is succinctly expressed in its distinctive categorical label: its national name. Nevertheless, as Billig points out there is a universal code for the naming of the particulars. National names would not signify particularity were they to be shared by more than one nations. For Billig, the contemporary dispute over the name of "Macedonia" is a good case in point. Since a national name, which is perceived as "historically Greek" was claimed (or "appropriated") by a neighbouring sovereign State as "theirs", it is hardly surprising that a large scale political and diplomatic dispute emerged. Both the "right" to "own" national labels as well as the "right" of a people to assert a national name for themselves are parts of the universal code for the naming of national particulars. When these "rights" conflict each other, major political disputes are meant to arise. And, as Billig, points out, such disputes should not be thought of as a Balkan particularity. In the secular age of the nation States, a national name "indicates who 'we' are, and, more basically, that 'we' are" (Billig, 1995: 73; italics in original). Or, as the letter addressed by Greek intellectuals to European political leaders has it: "our name is our soul".
The imagining of a national "us", according to Billig, comes in tandem with the imagining (or, more accurately, the stereotyping) of "them". Nationalism is both an ideology of the first as well as of the third person plural. Quoting Tajfel (1981), Billig notes that a social category by indicating who "we" are also indicates who "we" are not. Most importantly, Billig stresses that in the age of the nation States "foreigness" has acquired a prototypically national framework of references: "foreigners" are the ones who do not share "our" nationality. Despite the fact that in the relevant literature nationalism is often conflated with the traditional ethnocentrism of the pre-nation State age communities, Billig argues that there is a distinctive feature in the outlook of the ideology of nationalism that renders it to be an unmistaken modern phenomenon.

Billig quotes Marx and Engels' remark in *The Communist Manifesto* that the "national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness" (1968: 39; cited in Billig, 1995: 79) of the pre-industrial age would be swept away by the international spread of capitalism. As Billig argues, the inward-looking perspective and the suspicion of "outsiders" that characterised the ethnocentrism of pre-modern communities was indeed swept away. Nevertheless, it was nationalism "as a product and producer of the modern world" that "was part of the historical force to do the sweeping" (Billig, 1995: 79). For Billig, the inward-looking perspective of traditional ethnocentrism differs from the perspective of modern nationalism. Nationalism is an international ideology and its inward-looking perspective is combined with an outward-looking one. The seclusion of traditional ethnocentric communities, that rendered the rarely encountered "outsiders" mysterious and suspicious, starkly contrasts to the ready made availability of stereotypes by means of which modern (national) "foreigners" are casually understood and talked about. As Billig points out,

"even the most extreme and unbanal of nationalists do not shut out the outside world from consciousness, but often show an obsessive concern with the lives and outlooks of foreigners" (Billig, 1995: 80).

For Billig, social psychological accounts that associate the use of stereotypes with narrow and bigoted thinking are rather misleading. As he points out, foreignness in the contemporary world of nation States is not an undifferentiated category of Otherness. The endless casual debates on how different various groups of foreigners are to "us" are a good attestment to that. Considering a number of American and European social psychological studies on national stereotyping, Billig points out that stereotypes of other nations tend not to be outrightly derogatory and vary in their evaluative force. Some of the foreigners tend to be more praiseworthy, admirable and similar to "us" than others. As Billig points out, "it is important not to stereotype the act of stereotyping" (p. 82). Discursive approaches within social psychology have highlighted the "thoughtful" character of
discursive processes of stereotypical attributions (e.g. Billig, 1985; see also, Condor, 1988; 1990; 1996) and, as he notes, in acts of stereotyping more is shown to be at stake than the mere ascription of characteristics to social groups that questionnaires capture. As Billig et al. (1988) have shown, talk about Others can be shown to manifest the speakers' concerns to establish an unprejudiced moral profile on the face of talk that renders available inferences about prejudice.

Building upon the notion of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988), Billig argues that the ideology of nationalism, as other ideologies, should not be thought of as comprising a unitary, contradiction-free conceptual framework. The key themes of universalism and of particularism that underpin it provide the food for thought, controversy and debate. Nevertheless, as Billig points out, the debate is conducted within the parameters that take nationhood and the world of nation for granted and, "in this sense, the argument is conducted within, and not against, nationalism" (p. 87). Indeed, it is the thoughtful deliberation over the universalistic and particularistic themes of nationalism that naturalise it within casual argumentation and reproduce its ideological assumptions. For Billig, the universalistic and particularistic outlooks of nationalism can be pinned down to the historical conditions of its emergance.

Taking aboard contemporary social theoretical analyses on globalisation and international politics (e.g. Der Derian, 1989; Robertson, 1991; 1992), Billig points out that the rise of the nation State coincided with the rise of the international order. He cites, for example, Robertson's (1991: 78) argument that "the idea of nationalism (or particularism) develops only in tandem with internationalism". For Billig, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was a cornerstone in modern politics not merely because it heralded the era of the sovereign nation State but also because it laid the foundations for the development of the international political system, by making provisions for international laws that would regulate the political conduct of nation States. With the emergence of nationalism not only the nation came to be imagined as an integral whole but also the whole world in a way that was unimaginable in earlier times. The extrovert outlook of nationalism came to replace the seclusion of pre-modern ethnocentric communities; nation States asserted their legitimacy and sovereignty with respect to each other; and the conventional symbols of national particularity (flags, anthems and so on) because of their conventionality became "simultaneously symbols of the universality of nationhood" (p. 85).

Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism comes as a challenge to conventional approaches to the study of nationalism. It effectively resets the agenda by arguing for an understanding of nationalism that
goes beyond its narrow conceptualisation as an extreme political phenomenon accompanied with a -fittingly- extreme emotional and psychological baggage. By calling attention to its mundane aspects, Billig explores the ways in which nationalism is ingrained and reproduced within casual practices of everyday life, be they a mindless flicking through the pages of a politically correct newspaper or casual talk about "foreigners". In Banal Nationalism Billig succinctly articulates his argument that the universalistic and particularistic themes of national ideology inform the casual arguing and thinking of modern citizens within debates that take for granted and naturalise the ideological parameters of nationalism. Nevertheless, a more detailed account on the ideological ramifications and rhetorical perplexities of lay discursive invocations of the universalistic and particularistic themes of nationalism is to be found in his and his colleagues' elaboration on the ideological dilemma of prejudice³ (Billig et al., 1988).

Billig et al.'s elaboration on this dilemma comes as part and parcel of a more general project aiming at highlighting the dilemmatic quality of ideology and of the ideology of liberalism in particular. Billig et al.'s (1988) advocacy of the concept of ideological dilemmas comes as a challenge to both the individualism evidenced in mainstream social cognitive accounts of human thought and action and to the sociological reductionism of Marxist and neo-marxist accounts of ideology. The concept of ideological dilemmas, with its emphasis on a "lived" -"enhabited" in Billig's (1995) terminology-theorisation of ideology, affords an account of ideological reproduction by virtue of its balanced attention both to the historical / ideological dimension of common sense and on the active "rhetorical subject" who thinks and argues within its parameters. Let us turn to consider in some detail Billig et al.'s -as well as Billig's (1988b)- account on the dilemma of prejudice as this will take us a step further in setting the theoretical background for a detailed analysis on the rhetorical articulation of national identities in talk.

³ In Billig's work the term "prejudice" is used to refer interchangeably both with regard to "racism" as well as "nationalism". Despite the fact that this textual practice may be controversial and in need for a theoretical explication, that would go beyond the limits of my current project and I will follow his lead on that matter. As it happens though, the appropriation of the German romantic notion of "folk" in the normative discourse of the nineteenth century Greek nationalism, as opposed to the French derived concept of "civic" credentials of "nationality" legitimate my choice. In the Greek nationalist discourse, the nation "έθνος" is often referred to as "γενιά" [patriline], a term whose racial connotations are unmistaken and which, in vernacular is often explicitly substituted by the term "ράτσα" (race) (cf. Herzfeld, 1987; 1992).
3. Prejudice vs. rationality: An (everyday) dilemma of liberal ideology

For Billig et al. (1988: 100), the dialectic of "prejudice and tolerance" within the conceptual make up of liberal ideology manifests in mostly dramatic terms "the dark side of the ideological tradition of the Enlightenment". Billig et al.’s elaboration on this ideological dilemma has a dual aim. Their first concern is to highlight the thematic ambivalence in the underlying assumptions of liberal ideology. As they point out, despite the fact that within this ideological framework the particularistic (racist / nationalist) theme is linked with the moral charge of "prejudice" and "irrationality" and the universalistic one with the virtue and the social ideal of "tolerance", this also affords for a justification of racist / nationalist views on the grounds of "rational" biological or social reasoning. In order to substantiate their argument, the authors draw, on the one hand, upon the work of Gadamer (1979), as well as on original texts of the French Enlightenment philosophes and of nineteenth-century liberal scholars, and on the other, on seminal twentieth century social psychological treatises on prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954). In so doing, they outline a genealogy of the semantic shifts that the term "prejudice" has undergone since its early textual appearance in Diderot's Encyclopédie.

Their second concern is to show that the ambivalence between prejudice and tolerance evidenced in the textual practices of liberal ideologues and theorists is also manifested in current lay discursive practices, where modern citizens argue about and negotiate the meaning of prejudice and tolerance as well as what counts as prejudiced and tolerant moral identities. In order to do so, Billig and his colleagues draw upon interview material from previously published studies (e.g. Billig, 1986; Cochrane & Billig, 1984; van Dijk, 1984; Wetherell & Potter, 1986⁴), documenting the rhetorical efforts of modern speakers aiming to deny an inferentially available prejudiced identity while expressing prejudiced, exclusionist views.

3.1. Tracing the semantic transformations of "prejudice"

A juridical and evaluatively neutral term in its inception and earlier use, the term prejudice came to acquire negative connotations first in the writings of the Enlightenment ideologues. Fashioning their weltanschaung on the ancient Hellenic concept of reason and propagating their secular

⁴ For a later complete account of this study, see Wetherell and Potter (1992).
political programme against what was deemed to be the arbitrariness of religious authority, the Enlightenment philosophes used the term "prejudice" in a negative sense. In their texts, this was associated with blind faith as opposed to the virtues of empirically based judgement. The definition for prejudice provided in the *Encyclopédie* is quite indicative in that respect:

"[a] false judgment which the mind holds on the nature of things, after insufficient exercise of the intellectual faculties; this unfortunate fruit of ignorance forestalls the intellect, blinds it and holds it captive." (Diderot, 1966; cited in Billig et al., 1988: 102)

As Billig et al. maintain, underlying the Enlightenment ideologues' use of the term there are a series of psychological assumptions about the mind and the gathering and processing of information, associating prejudice with the (individually located) failure of "rationality".

The negative connotations of the term prejudice notwithstanding, in the texts of the Enlightenment ideologues the semantics of "prejudice" were rather different to the meaning attached to the term in contemporary usage. "Prejudice" and its associated semantic invocation of the moral charge of "irrationality" were pragmatically deployed as argumentative tools against religious faith and the political dominance of religious authority. Despite the fact that the psychological allusions of the term, associating "prejudice" with false judgment, could render it in principle applicable to judgments of any kind, the term was prototypically used in its negative sense to solely castigate religious beliefs and sentiments. Hence, as Billig (1988b) notes, whereas scholars within the Enlightenment tradition were eager to criticise the "irrationality" of religious beliefs, they were equally eager to defend "prejudices" (naming them as such) of other kinds and, noticeably amongst them, "national prejudices" also.

Billig et al. argue that the fact that the Enlightenment philosophes' defence of "national prejudices" contradicts the universalistic liberal principles they were propagating, is not an unfortunate detail that should be thought of as conceptually inconsequential for the internal consistency of liberal ideology. As they point out, the Enlightenment philosophes were not merely attacking the individual psychological malfunctions which they associated with "prejudice". More than that, they were also attacking the "ways of life" of traditional religious and ethnic groups -chiefly amongst them the Jews- for their irrational prejudices. As Billig et al (1988: 122) note:

"Whole groups of people could be dismissed because their traditions were steeped in irrationality, as opposed to 'our' modern Enlightenment. In this way, the Enlightenment declared its own conditions of life free from prejudice, whilst condemning those of others."
Considering the rhetorical articulation of Voltaire's criticism of the Jews in his Philosophical Dictionary, Billig et al. suggest that the author is overwhelmingly cautious to disclaim any malicious motivation that could be thought of as lying behind his severely abusive language. Voltaire makes it clear that is not hate to be found at the roots of his dismissal of the Jews; he declares that instead of "hating" them he always "pitied" them. The invocation of sympathetic feelings, secured for the Enlightenment's premier man the profile of "tolerance", which elsewhere in his writings he had so passionately advocated. Having disavowed any irrational psychological "prejudices", Voltaire declares that his criticism of the Jews is necessitated by the "irrationalities / prejudices" he attests to their religious traditions. In contrast to the "irrational prejudices" of the Jews, the "national prejudices" of Voltaire and of the Enlightenment in general are exonerated for their "rationality" in a rather circular manner. Since the ethnic/religious "ways of life" dismissed are targeted for their "irrationality", both the intellectual labour evidenced in the act of criticising them as well as the "objective" properties of the "object" of criticism warrant for the "rationality" of the Enlightenment ideologues' argumentative enterprises.

Billig et al. maintain that the current difficulty in appreciating the Enlightenment ideologues' use of the term "prejudice" in a positive sense is largely due to a semantic shift that this has since undergone. Gradually, the negative connotations of the term and its associations with "irrationality" became prevalent. Correspondingly "national prejudices" were transformed to "national sentiments", with the "rationality" of the later though still in need of defence and justification by means of "rational" biological or social reasoning. Quoting Barker (1981), Billig (1988b) points out that this current unease with a positively valued semantics of the term is all too evident in debates about the -so called- new racism. Whereas "national sentiments" are often invoked and defended on "rational" grounds by right wing authors and politicians, critics of theirs use the designation "national prejudices" to refer to the same "sentiments". As Billig et al. argue, in the twentieth century the term "prejudice" has not only been overwhelmingly associated with the moral charges of "false judgment" and "irrationality" in general but also, and most importantly, has been gradually rendered to signify prototypically nationalist and racist views, opinions and sentiments. This prototypical association of prejudice with the irrationality of nationalism is something that in the analysis of Billig et al. is attested to both in academic psychological treatments as well as in lay discourse.
According to Billig et al., the prototypical association of prejudice with irrationality is all too evident in the early post-war (and by now classical) social psychological treatises on prejudice, namely Allport's (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice* and Adorno and colleagues' (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*. Written in the cold war climate of the early 1950s United States, Allport's work is infused with the concern that the liberal ideals of American society were endangered by the rise and success of totalitarian regimes that the twentieth century had already witnessed. Although Allport's fear that liberal democracy is threatened by totalitarianism was more closely linked to the anticommunist hysteria in McCarthy's U.S. than to the horrors of fascism (cf. Henriques, 1984), Adorno and his colleagues concern was with the rise and popular acceptance of fascism in Europe.

Despite the considerable differences between these two major social psychological treatments of prejudice (for detailed discussions, see *inter alia* Henriques, 1984; Samelson, 1986; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), as Henriques (1984) argues, their common denominator is that both linked prototypically prejudice with the irrationality of nationalism and racism and both regarded the irrationality of prejudice as abrogating and flying in the face of the rationality which is, or arguably ought to be, the cornerstone of liberal democratic societies. For Henriques, both also saw the individual as the site of this breakdown of rationality and, therefore, as the object proper for research and, at least for Allport, also for remedial action in the form of education. The prototypical sense in which prejudice is associated with irrational views is also, according to Billig (1988b) and Billig et al. (1988), clearly - and most importantly - manifested in lay accounts and in situ negotiations of what is the meaning of prejudice and what (should) count as prejudiced and tolerant identities and actions.

Despite the fact that in both Allport's and Adorno et al.'s work the underlying assumption about human nature guiding their approaches is the one of human sameness, or otherwise the "universalistic" theme of Enlightenment, this had not always been the case with psychology. Samelson's (1978) historical account on the emergence of "prejudice" as an object of social psychological enquiry, documents that this came as a result of a dramatic topical reversal. In the pre-war years, psychologists were mainly preoccupied with the task of discovering the real race differences between the objectively different races and nationalities. As he argues, it was mainly because the race studies paradigm was appropriated by the Nazis and because the administrative / immigrational legislation priorities within the United States eventually necessitated scientific research on conflict resolution and harmonious coexistence that this topical shift came about. Not only the "particularist" assumption guiding research on race differences became obsolete but the particularist / xenophobic sentiments of lay people became morally problematic. From the perspective of Billig et al., Samelson's historical analysis can be seen as highlighting the way in which psychology as a discipline, in constructing its objects of study partakes in and reproduces the dilemmas of liberal ideology.
3.2. Claiming a rational profile: prejudice and tolerance in lay discourse

Billig et al. have put forward the argument that the ambivalent legacy of Enlightenment's philosophical tradition is manifested in lay discourse, where implicitly or explicitly people invoke the notion of "prejudice" in accounts of their relations, opinions and views on national / racial Others. The empirical evidence Billig et al. draw upon came from contemporary at that time discourse studies on prejudice and racism (e.g. Billig, 1986; Cochrane & Billig, 1984; van Dijk, 1984; Wetherell & Potter, 1986).

According to Billig et al., in these studies two interrelated rhetorical features were commonly evident in speakers' articulations. First, the spectrum of unreasonable, irrational, prejudiced behaviours and sentiments was commonly invoked as a "problem" that the participants would testify as existing in their surrounding social environment. This normatively would be castigated and the speakers would distance themselves from such sentiments and actions. Second, often as corollary to that, the participants would normatively preface the expression of views that could be treated as racist or nationalist with disclaimers, usually of the type "I'm not prejudiced, but...." (cf. Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). This rhetorical strategy of prolepsis, according to Billig et al., aims at deflecting potential criticism in advance and opens the way for the expression of racist or nationalist views. Let us take into consideration some of the examples that Billig et al. consider.

Cochrane and Billig's (1984) study aimed at examining the ways in which adolescents in Britain accounted for their support of the National Front within group discussion sessions organised by the authors. Considering the material from that study, Billig et al. argue that the participants' talk bear all the insignia of dilemmatic thought. Stories about the abuses that Asians and West Indians in their area received from the bigots of National Front were typically relayed and the participants were careful to distance themselves from such actions. They even recounted incidents where they themselves were targeted and abused by bigoted schoolmates for befriending and socialising with "half caste" Others. Clearly, all that was morally unacceptable for Cochrane and Billig's research participants. Nevertheless, such a clear cut demarcation of the moral boundaries, separating them - for their tolerance- from the "lunatics" of the National Front, was only half the part of the overall story they would tell. As one of the participants commented:

"You'd think at our ages we wouldn't be colour prejudiced because we've been to school with them. But we're not really. Things have happened. Just silly things happen, and it turns us against them."
(Cited in Billig et al., 1988: 100)
The recounting of the "things that have happened" would invariably include incidents where "their" violence was highlighted; "their" privileged treatment from the authorities spotted as abrogating the liberal principle of equality; and "their" appropriation of limited scarce resources such as jobs, that-legitimately-should-be-reserved-for-"us", bitterly commented upon. For all these "things", National Front's exclusionist propaganda was embraced and having "them" leaving "our" country appeared to be a "reasonable" demand. After all, it was not the participants' ill psychological motivation that led them to express and espouse xenophobic, exclusionist views, as it was allegedly the case with the "lunatics" of the National Front. The "hard facts" of life were necessitating them. Billig et al. argue that this ambivalence, manifests a dilemma similar to the one evidenced in Voltaire's dismissal and justification of dismissal of the Jews. In both cases, "unreasonable" prejudice is associated with the "irrationality" of ill psychological motivation and the spectrum of "unreasonableness" and the taint of prejudice / irrationality is disclaimed by means of social reasoning. Both Voltaire as well as Cochrane and Billig's research participants proclaim a tolerant profile compromised by harsh realities of social "facts" or "things". In their respective rhetorical moves, the higher moral ground of universalistic sentiments and convictions is implicitly acknowledged "but...".

Billig et al. turned to van Dijk (1984) for further empirical evidence on the contradictory themes that as they argue the Enlightenment's tradition inherited to contemporary common sense. In the stories that Dutch people had to say about "foreigners" in "their" country, van Dijk discerned what he calls the "on the one hand and on the other hand" opinion formulation strategy. The word "but" was often used to connect contradictory narrative themes, with the first one usually affirming the interviewee's commitment to versions of "tolerant" sentiments and the second one, contradicting that by expressing, xenophobic views. In van Dijk's analytic treatment (1984; see also van Dijk, 1992) this rhetoric of "two-handedness" was seen as a strategic manipulation and impression management on behalf of the interviewees. They were, presumably, trying to present themselves in a positive light to the middle class-apparently-liberally-minded interviewer. Nevertheless, as Billig et al. point out, the same lay theory about what is meant to count as "prejudice" and "prejudiced" and "tolerant" identities was implicitly invoked.

In Wetherell and Potter's (1986) report that Billig et al. also consider (as well as in their fuller report of that study in Wetherell & Potter, 1992) similar rhetorical concerns were attested to. Their Pakeha interviewees were also cautious to distance themselves from the accusation of being prejudiced against the Maoris, usually admitting racism to be an existing feature and "problem" for
their society but redirecting the accusation to other groups of people and claiming its irrelevance for themselves personally. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) remarked, throughout their interviews, considerable argumentative and rhetorical effort was undertaken towards "dodging" the identity and imputation of prejudice, on the face of discourse which was rendering inferentially available such an imputation. Billig et al.'s rhetorical / ideological approach has since been taken up and further exemplified in a number of studies on prejudice and the on construction of national, ethnic categories in lay discourse (see inter alia, Ullah, 1990; Verkuyten et al., 1994; 1995). Here some reference will be made to two additional studies (Bozatzis, 1993; Figgou, 1996) which also document this dilemmatic tension between "prejudice" and "tolerance", this time though in Greek talk.

By largely taking aboard the ideological dilemmas perspective, both studies have shown that in the discourse of Greek research participants and interviewees, the contradictory moral imperatives of liberal ideology were also apparent. The first study (Bozatzis, 1993) set to examine the ways in which Greek students in the University of Lancaster talked about Albanian refugees in Greece. Despite the fact that the main analytic concern of that study was with the ways in which the discursive construction of the refugees in the participants' talk was imbued with evaluative overtones, some emphasis was also placed on the participants' negotiation of prejudice / racism. The following extract amply illustrates Billig et al.'s argument that in modern common sense racism is associated with the individual failure of "rationality" and that the invocation of the spectrum of "irrationality" failure in "others", works towards the establishment of a "rational", unprejudiced profile for the speakers.

Tassos [...] racism is a feeling of dislike towards a [large
Alexia [exactly
Tassos a large group of people=
Alexia =I agree totally=
Tassos = for some reasons=
Alexia =no (,) for no reasons (,) just because somebody is member of this particular group=
Tassos =hold on a [second
Alexia [no no
Tassos hold on (,) for example (,) let's say (,) the racism against black people exists due to their skin colour=
Alexia =exactly is this a justification? EXCUSE me=
Tassos =it's not a justification (,) what I'm saying i::s=
Alexia =the only reason why somebody dislikes a black person (,) if he is a racist is because he is
black=
Tassos = yes (,) so there is a reason (,) irrespectively if this reason is not rational (laughter) (,) there
is a reason despite the fact that your rationality and your education=
Alexia = no (,) I can't accept it as a reason (,) NOT AT ALL
Tassos =it's because of your rationality you cannot accept it=
Alexia =of course we are talking about me now (,)
In this extract the participants are puzzling over the definition of racism and this, early in the extract, leads to a disagreement. The "feeling of dislike" which for both of them is a criterion par excellence defining racism, according to Tassos is triggered by "some reasons"; his claim though is challenged by Alexia. According to her it is "just" the group affiliation of some people which triggers "feelings of dislike". Tassos counter argues that he has been misunderstood. The "reasons" he referred to are, in his example, factual reasons like "skin colour". The mere reference to "skin colour" though provokes a new response from Alexia, who challenges him by asking whether that (should) constitute a "justification" for "feelings of dislike". Tassos eventually clarifies that he did not mean to justify racism. He only wanted to point out that racist "feelings of dislike" do have some "reasons", despite the fact that these are not "rational" ones. For him, racism is equated with "feelings of dislike", caused by non rational reasons, whereas for Alexia is equated with "feelings of dislike", which do not have a reason and therefore are irrational. In Tassos' clarification, both the participants are exempted from the taint of racism / prejudice on the grounds of their "rationality", which distinguishes them from the "thousands of other people" who hold irrational feelings against others, only because "factual" differences like "skin colour" lead them to gross generalisations about the personality characteristics of the people in question.

Similar analytic evidence transpire from a study by Figgou's (1996). Examining the social representations that lay people and "experts" hold, on the one hand, of prejudice and, on the other, of the refugees that have in recent years settled in Northern Greece from republics of the ex USSR and Albania, Figgou has shown that the liberal ambivalence between "prejudice" and "tolerance" informed the discourse of her participants. Racism and the prejudicial treatment of the refugees were castigated by both lay people and "experts" alike, with lay people redirecting the accusation to "other" Greeks and the "experts" commenting upon the prejudices of lay people. Both groups

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6 For an explication of the transcription convention used see Appendix B.

7 It should be noticed that what I am translating here as "reason" is the Greek noun "λόγος", as 'rational' the adjective "λογικός" and "rationality" the noun "λογική". "Λόγος" in Greek though is used both with the English everyday meaning of the word "reason" as well as to denote what in English would be translated as "rationale". Alexia disagrees with Tassos because she reads more into "λόγος" than mere "reasons"; she reads "λόγος" as in "rationale". The phonetic
would invariably account for the prejudice that the refugees face in Greece by pointing to "social facts" such as State disorganisation, unemployment, high rates of criminality and so forth which presumably stir xenophobic attitudes and behaviours (cf. Bozatzis, 1993). Take for example the following extract.

Interviewer: How do you think things are going to be in the future. (. ) I mean what about the difficulties you have been talking about?
Male 33: Look (1) since there are real problems like unemployment which are getting worse and worse instead of being resolved (. ) I think we will end up turning the foreigners out or killing them (. ) That will be just a product of indignation. I'm on friendly terms with all sorts of people (. ) I do believe that you can't differentiate between human beings wherever they may come from. (. ) Regardless of being Albanians, Russians or even Niggers (3) But when they come in your house and they contest a piece of the cake (. ) then what happens? (. ) It's okay if they take one piece (. ) their piece of cake (. ) but if they take yours as well? You have to eat something too (. ) don't you?

(Appearing in, Figgou, 1996: 40)

As Figgou notes in her analysis, the ambivalence between the universalistic and particularistic assumptions of nationalism lies at the core of such reasoning, which attempts to legitimate expulsion policies and -potentially- violence as well. The refugees' national affiliation is momentarily left aside; "we are all humans" after all. But when this undifferentiated mass of fellow human beings enters "our" national home(land) then problems arise. The competition for scarce resources ("a piece of the cake") is fierce; and, moreover, "they" are competing for "the piece of cake", which is legitimately "ours", not in "our" capacity as "human beings", which "we" share in common with "them", but because of "our" rights as citizens of this country which they lack as nationals of other homelands. The moral high ground of universal brotherhood is invoked and appreciated but the harsh realities of life, it is argued, unavoidably compromise them. Exploiting the particularistic possibilities of the discourse of nationalism, "our" rationality and tolerant profile is maintained. As Figgou (1996: 41) notes, it appears that "we are not arguing against the foreigners. We are arguing in the name of equality and fairness" (cf. van Dijk, 1991).

By considering Billig et al.'s (1988) and Billig's (1988b) analyses on the ideological dilemma of prejudice, Billig's point in Banal Nationalism that the international (outward looking) and national (inward looking) themes of national ideology inform contemporary common sense argumentation has been further exemplified. The contradictions in the conceptual make up of nationalism (and of liberal ideology more generally) have been shown to inform and provide the seeds for deliberation resemblance of all these words adds to the whole confusion and accounts for Tassos' reflexive laughter after having said something evidently paradoxical along the lines of: "there is a reason, but this reason is not reasonable".
and arguments in a range of current research settings. In the studies that Billig et al. have reviewed, as well as in subsequent ones, citizens from different nation-States have been shown to argue and account for their views on the position of national / ethnic / racial Others within "their" national societies by reiterating the ambivalent postulates of the Enlightenment.

The universalist theme of nationalism and of liberal ideology has been upheld by the various research participants in order to secure their moral, rational profile. Views which could be variably named as racist, nationalist or xenophobic were in principle condemned. The rhetorical attestation to their international convictions and universalistic sentiments granted the participants with a "tolerant" moral identity and would invariably open the way for and facilitate the expression of exclusionist views. This proleptic invocation of international convictions together with the warranting of the subsequently expressed exclusionist views by means of social reasoning, works towards the establishment of a "tolerant", "rational" profile. The latter does not need any rhetorical warrants and qualifications; as Wetherell and Potter (1992: 211) maintain:

"The moral identity of tolerance [...] tends to be portrayed as the proper state while prejudice becomes the deviant or fallen state: blameworthy and accountable. A tolerant identity does not usually have to be explained. Its moral value provides sufficient accountability and a rationale for the motivation. The whole thrust of the prejudice problematic, therefore, encourages a discourse characterised by circumambulation and avoidance. Everybody wants to be tolerant and nobody wants to be prejudiced".

From the perspective of Banal Nationalism, the lay deliberation over what counts as prejudice, as well prejudiced and tolerant moral identities is indicative of a nationalist consciousness. It is an indication of the ways in which the ideological parameters of nationalism inform casual habits of thought and argumentation. The inward looking, national theme of nationalism is not upheld without qualifications, resulting in an outright rejection of "foreigners" as it may have been the case with a traditional ethnocentric consciousness. On the other hand, the outward looking, international theme of nationalism in its implicit proleptic invocation provides for the rhetorical credentials for a moral legitimation of nationalist, exclusionist views.

Along the lines of the thesis of Banal Nationalism, this genuine ideological puzzlement in its lay rhetorical articulation shows the extent to which nationalism has succeeded in providing the normative framework for thought and argument. The demand for rational or empirical justification of nationalist / exclusionist views is not an indication of the triumph of the liberal universal project of the Enlightenment. Rather, it is an indication of the way in which the cohabitation of universalistic and particularistic themes within the ideological framework of liberalism and nationalism are perpetuated within everyday morality and rhetoric. "The paradox is" as Billig
(1988b: 108) argues, "that the more prejudices are criticized, the more the prejudices of liberalism are justified". Let us now turn to consider the overall framework of Banal Nationalism against the particular case of modern Greek nationalism and modern Greek national identity in the light of the social theoretical accounts outlined in the previous chapter.
4. Banal Nationalism and the case of modern Greek nationalism and national identity

The thesis of Banal Nationalism has a clear, critical political message. At a time when the liberal Western hysteria for the "return of the repressed" was at its peak and with the USA seeking to define the "new world order" in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the thesis of Banal Nationalism brought into perspective what hitherto had been eluding social theoretical scrutiny. Namely, the nationalism of "the established nations", of those "that have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particularly are part of what is conventionally described as 'the West'" (Billig, 1995: 8). Within the thesis of Banal Nationalism, nationalism emerges as the most successful ideological framework of modern (and postmodern) times. It emerges not only as the ideological force that brought into existence the world of nation States but also as the ideological force that sustains the world of nation States in its place. Through the lenses of the thesis of Banal Nationalism, nationalism ceases to appear as an exotic property of West's Others and the very process of its exotisation and Othering comes to be questioned as an integral aspect of the naturalisation of Western nationalism. In this last part of the chapter, in the light of my review of accounts on modern Greek nationalism, I will consider the extent and the ways in which the thesis of Banal Nationalism may be relevant to a critical examination of Greek nationalism and, more specifically, of national identity and its reproduction within talk in interaction.

4.1. The thesis of Banal Nationalism and its relevance for a study of modern Greek nationalism and national identity

Although Billig acknowledged "that there is a distinction between the flag waved by Serbian ethnic cleansers and that hanging unobtrusively outside the US post office" (Billig, 1995: 6), the possibility that the waved flags of "hot" nationalism may co-exist with the unwaved flags of "banal" nationalism within the context of a single nation State is of course not foreclosed. The examples that Billig draws from Greece of the early 1990s are quite indicative in that respect. As mentioned before, commenting upon "the Macedonian question" Billig acknowledges that the nationalist Greek fervour over the name "Macedonia" may be easily (but also misleadingly) dismissed by Western observers as "a Balkan peculiarity". At another juncture of Billig's account, the political rhetoric of the Greek socialist party is also considered, along with the rhetoric of the British New Labour, in search for banal indexicalisation of the national homeland, the national people and so on.
Obviously, political developments in modern Greece during the last decade provide a fertile ground for social theoretical analyses of the "hot" aspects of the "reawakening" Greek nationalism (see, *inter alia*, Liakos et al., 1993). On the other hand, if Billig's general outline of the thesis of Banal nationalism were to be substantiated by wide ranging empirical examples of the mundane flaggings and casual indexicalisations of particular national homelands, then contemporary Greece could easily be one of them. Going further, I want to suggest that the case of modern Greek nationalism and modern Greek national identity may provide the grounds for an expansion of the theoretical scope and of the analytic reach of the thesis of Banal Nationalism. Despite the fact that a fully fleshed endeavour in that direction goes far beyond the limitations of my current project, in what follows some hints in that direction will be outlined, without losing sight of my specific research interest: the rhetorical articulation of Greek national identity in talk.

To start with, it may be rather problematic to include modern Greece in the category of "the established nations" that "have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particularly, are part of what is conventionally described as 'the West'". In an obvious sense, the modern Greek nation State is an "established" one. Nominally at least, it has been a sovereign State and part of the international community since the 1830s. Indeed, the Greek nation State was one of the first beyond the "old" nations of the West to join in the league of the international community of nation States (Schroeder, 1994). Nevertheless, the irredentist character of Greek nationalism, the successive territorial expansions until 1922, the subsequent siege mentality nurtured by the authoritarian regimes of the right from 1936 until 1974 and the "cold war" with Turkey and the "Macedonian question" that have been feeding this siege mentality in more recent times may lead us to reconsider the political semantics of the term "established" in the case of modern Greece.

Does the modern Greek nation have confidence in its own continuity? As we saw in the previous chapter, whether framed in racial / biological or cultural terms, the question of the "continuity" of the Greek nation has been a battlefield for ideological contestation both between Greek nationalist

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8 On a note that is meant to be more realistic than an indication of modesty, I should make it clear that mine is not a project of reformulating and sharpening the critical edge of the thesis of Banal Nationalism through the consideration of modern Greek national identity. The fact that modern Greek national identity in its imaginary constitution encompasses the hegemonic tensions of the juxtaposition of "the West" to "the Rest" may indeed provide the grounds for such a theoretical and analytic enterprise. For the more restricted and less ambitious in scope project of mine though, this is far from a priority. The extent to which my recourse to critical social theoretical work on modern Greek national identity in order to substantiate an empirical analysis in the spirit of Banal Nationalism may contribute to an expansion of the thesis of Banal Nationalism is a rather secondary concern of mine.
intellectuals and a variety of European commentators as well as between different nationalist projects within modern Greece. For Liakos (1994), the fact that both Europe and modern Greece share the same origin myth has unavoidably coloured the span of the Greek national historical time with the ideological taint of "degeneracy". For Herzfeld (1987), the interplay of symbolically "idealised" and "polluted" origins has informed virtually the entirety of cultural practising of national identity in the context of modern Greece for more than a hundred and fifty years. And, for Frangoudaki and Dragona (1997), Greek national identity appears in contemporary school textbooks and in the discourse of educators as fragile, ambivalent and under threat of extinction.

Is modern Greece "part of what is conventionally described as 'the West'? Here are the bones of contention! As should be apparent by now, this question has tantalised modern Greeks and Western commentators alike ever since the nineteenth century when the processes of the imaginary constitution of the Greek nation begun. As it transpires from the ethnographic records of Michael Herzfeld, modern Greeks themselves appear to be quite unsure about the answer to that question and, as he informs us, hardly a day passes without one of the Greek newspapers addressing this question in one form or another. As Herzfeld (1987; 1995) argues though, rather than attempting to provide an answer, it may be more interesting to examine the contexts in which this question is asked and the symbolic consequences of formulating and answering it, or, indeed, attempting to evade an answer.

On these grounds it might be argued that the thesis of Banal Nationalism may not be applicable to the case of modern Greece. Maybe the critical lenses of Banal Nationalism should be strictly reserved for the "established", "confident" nations of "the West". Quite paradoxically though, exempting Greek nationalism from such a critical scrutiny would constitute one more act of exoticising and Othering it as alien to "the West". Moreover, in so doing, a chance may be missed to reflect upon Billig's critique of Western hegemony by considering critically the case of modern Greek nationalism and national identity, which in their historical emergence encompass the hegemonic tensions between the West and its Others.

4.2. National distinctiveness and cultural ambivalence

As we saw in the previous chapter, the imaginary constitution of the modern Greek nation in the nineteenth century was predicated upon two wider ideological enterprises: on the one hand, the
institutional appropriation of ancient Hellas as the birth cradle of European civilisation and, on the other, the institutional construction of the Orient as an essential Other to Europe. These complementary ideological enterprises culminated the process of the constitution of a hegemonic European identity at a time when the European colonial expansion to the East was underway. In this historical context, Greek nationalism's quest for legitimation from Europe entailed more than simply the imaginary constitution of a distinctive national entity, which would recognise its particularity in the universality of the established nation States. The fact that modern Greek nationalism laid a claim to the same origin myth as Europe entailed a wide ranging, orchestrated ideological enterprise of cultural transformation. In the words of Herzfeld (1995: 218),

"In one of the most colossal pieces of global chutzpah ever perpetrated, the Greeks were effectively taught that whatever was most familiar in their everyday lives was probably of Turkish origin and therefore by definition 'foreign'".

Of course, as we saw in the previous chapter, the hegemonic occidentalising project of the Greek elites, State institutions and intellectuals did not remain unchallenged. Other "voices" came gradually to be articulated that sought to assert their right to speak for the national "we". The conflicting national projects of classicists and demoticists initially, of the different intellectual strands that fought for the legacy of early demoticism later and the decades long polarisation between the State culture of the "Graeco-Christian Ideals" and the intellectual production of "national / popular" culture amply exemplify Billig's (1995) point about the battles for hegemony fought within any nation State.

One thing should be noted though. All of these cultural and political battles fought over the right to speak for and define the national "we" reiterated the assumption of the "natural" division of the world between the "civilised West" and the "backward Orient" and the ambivalent position of Greece within this "essential" dichotomy. At the very least, what the historical battles for national hegemony within modern Greece may suggest is that "the world of nations" within which the Greek nation sought to legitimate and recognise its particularity was not, in fact, a global community of nations. Rather, it was a world hierarchically divided between "the world of nations" of the civilised Europe and the "barbarous" and "monolithic" Others, the Orient. Under these circumstances, the criterion for the "universal" (i.e. European) legitimation of the particularity of the Greek nation was not merely the ability of Greek nationalism to impose order and to hold the

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9 The fact that modern Greek nationalism was the first nationalism to appear outside Western Christendom (Kedurie, 1971) and as Kohn (1945: 537) remarks- the first movement to reinvigorate the "banner of nationalism and liberalism" after the downfall of Napoleon, highlights further both the restricted horizon of the "world of nations" at the time as well as the inescapable European orientation of Greek nationalism.
monopoly of violence within the sought to be established nation State (cf. Giddens, 1985). More than that, the criteria were "cultural", or rather "civilisational". In the same manner that modern Greece was Othered in the hegemonic gaze of Europe, in the hegemonic gaze of the Greek elites it was the Greeks and Greek culture at large that were Othered and sought to be transformed.

In danger of simplifying matters, it could be argued that the conflicts over national hegemony within modern Greece have always had a "cultural" dimension. The question underlying them has always been what is the right road to a state of occidental cultural perfection, which would approximate the ancient Hellenic "ideal origins": would that road go through European modernity or would it follow a solitary, anti-Western path? This ideological positioning of the modern Greek nation in the verge of the Occident and the Orient accounts both for Greek nationalism's espousal of the Orientalist European assumptions that Othered the Orient as well as for the Othering of whatever was familiar, oriental, and therefore, not Hellenic in contemporary modern Greek culture. A critical study of the rise of modern Greek nationalism and national identity then may contribute to the expansion of the thesis of Banal Nationalism by drawing attention to the terms in which the distinctiveness of different national entities have been historically articulated. For Greece at least, a "legitimate" position within the emerging in the nineteenth century international order of the world of nations was only secured in so far as the terms in which its national distinctiveness was articulated were dictated by "the West".

4.3. Western "us" and non-Western "them": Cultural stereotypes and their uses

As Billig points out, the distinctiveness of national entities and their endowment with a unique identity was accomplished within the "national histories" that emerged at the time that nation States were being established. These national histories, for Billig, commonly mobilised "themes and stereotypes of national character and temperament", constructions of "culture" and "ways of life". The elevation (and the construction) of national language as a repository of the national genius also worked in the same direction. According to Billig then, the genealogical background of the contemporary nationalist habit of thinking of "us" as "a people" with a distinctive "national character", "temperament", "culture" and "ways of life" can be traced back to the national narratives of the nineteenth century. Given that Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism refers exclusively to the "established nations of the West", the national "us" in question refers exclusively to these nations.
What I want to draw attention to now is Billig's treatment of what he considers to be the second major indication of contemporary nationalist consciousness: the stereotyping of "them". As we saw, according to his argument, with the rise of the international order of the nation States, the ethnocentric seclusion that characterised pre-modern communities gave way to an overwhelming interest in national Others. The availability of stereotypes in terms of which national Others are talked about and the endless mundane arguments on how much similar or different to "us" certain national Others are, constitute for Billig an indication of the extent to which the introvert (national) and extrovert (international) themes of national ideology inform modern consciousness. From the examples that Billig gives, it transpires (not surprisingly) that the national Other of the contemporary citizens of the established nation of the West are both fellow Westerners as well as citizens of non-Western nation States.

However, what I want to point out here is that whereas Billig traces the genealogy of modern Western, national (auto-) stereotypes of "character" and "culture" in the national histories that endowed these Western nations with "a character" and "a culture", the stereotypes in which national Others from non-Western States are talked about are left in his account without a genealogical heritage. Nevertheless, the age of the imaginary constitution of European national histories coincided with the age that the Others of Europe were constituted in European imagination. The age of Enlightenment, liberalism and romantic nationalism was also the age when "Europe" constituted its Others, whether they were deemed to be in the Eastern Europe (Wolff, 1994), in the Near East (Said, 1995), in the Americas and the Pacific (Rousseau & Porter, 1990) or in the Mediterranean European South (Herzfeld, 1987; 1992). In that respect, it could be argued that a consideration of the terms in which contemporary "non Westerners" are talked about by "Westerners", or indeed they talk about themselves, may be revealing about the reiteration of hegemonic Western assumptions about "the character", "the culture" and "the ways of life" of West's Others. After all, as Delanty (1995: 88; see also, Hall, 1992a) argues,

"The hegemony of the West consisted in its ability to control the means of communication, to impose definitions of otherness on non-Europeans and to ensure that they perceive themselves in the language of the dominant".

A few examples will illustrate my point. Arguing against psychological treatments that regard stereotyping as an indication of narrow thinking and bigotry, Billig has drawn attention to social psychological evidence that highlight the fact that stereotypes of national Others are not invariably derogatory. Some of these Others are deemed to be more praiseworthy and similar to "us" than others. As an example, Billig cites Katz and Braly's (1935) early study of national stereotypes, in
which it was found that American students regarded certain Others (predominantly European) as more praiseworthy than certain Others (predominantly, non-European ones). Germans, for example, were described as "efficient", whereas Turks were deemed to be "cruel". Despite the fact that Billig reports a later postwar study (e.g., Harding et al., 1954), in which it was shown that the favourable stereotypes of the Germans within the American public declined after the USA had entered the Second World War, one may want to question the genealogical origin of the terms in which Germans and Turks have been described by American participants in the first place. The ascription of "efficiency" to Europeans and "cruelty" to the "barbarous" Others of Europe (and the Turks have played this role for a long time) are trademarks of the discourse of Orientalism (Delanty, 1995; Said, 1995).

Moreover, since Von Ehrenfels (1957; 1961) has argued for a North-South polarisation in national attitudes and stereotypes, social psychological research has shown that Western Europeans, when they judge each other and themselves, do so with recourse to a limited number of dimensions. According to a number of studies, these judgments revolve around a core juxtaposition. Northern Europeans are seen as "efficient", "hard working" but also, "cool" and "socially distant". Southern Europeans, on the other hand, are regarded as "inefficient", "easy-going" but also "warm" and "intimate" (e.g., Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994; Peabody, 1985; Pennebaker et al., 1996; cf. Hopkins et al., 1997). The limited social psychological research on Greek (auto-) stereotypes and Greek national identity (Chrysochoou, 1996; 1997; Hantzi, 1997; Triandis & Vassiliou, 1967; Triandis et al., 1968) largely supports these findings.

To the extent that, as Social Identity Theorists (e.g., Tajfel, 1981) argue, stereotypes represent widely shared beliefs, and as Billig (1995) argues "stereotypes are shared, cultural descriptions of social groups" (p.80: italics added) the question that may arise is the genealogical provenance of these shared beliefs or descriptions. In the same way in which Billig attributes the auto-stereotypes of European nations to the national histories that endowed these nations with a distinctive "character", "culture" and "ways of life", European (and American) stereotypes of non-Westerners and the non-Westerners' auto-stereotypes of themselves could be attributed to the hegemonic institutional practices by means of which "Europe" constituted its Others. A reasonable case can be made that these stereotypes trace their genealogical heritage into nineteenth century discursive constructions of Europe proper and the exotisation of cultures in its margins (cf. Herzfeld, 1982; 1987). "Inefficiency", "easy-going(ness)", "warmth" and "intimacy" are (some of) the attributes that the discourse of Orientalism has endowed Orientals with, as they have been deemed to be trapped
into an early developmental stage, where their "inefficiency" accounts for their lack of "progress" and their "humane" attributes are indicative of their "innocence" and their non-alienation by modernity (cf. Delanty, 1995).

As far as the case of Greek (auto-) stereotypes is concerned, we saw in the previous chapter that the constitution of modern Greek national identity in the nineteenth century had been centred around the ideological question of what "is" and what "ought to be" the content of modern Greek national identity. Fermor's (1966) list of attributes, allegiances and symbols of the oriental "Romios" and occidental "Hellene" (see Appendix A) summarises at a glance the dilemmatic "stereotypes of character and temperament", constructions of "culture" and "ways of life" and even the contrasting linguistic registers that the ideological constitution of modern Greek national identity as an ambivalent one has entailed. Modern Greece, resembles other colonised countries which came to "know" themselves through the occidental, colonial gaze and the subject matter of this "self-knowledge", as we saw in chapter 1, is the "intimate" but embarrassingly non occidental profile of Romioissini.

Of course the emerging theoretical question here concerns the status to be attributed to this "knowledge" that historically has been constituted through hegemonic Western institutional practices. Is it to be understood as an ideology in the classical Marxist sense of "false consciousness", which "blinds" and "holds captive" the colonised subjects within a hegemonically ordered global system of asymmetrical power relations? The social theoretical debates on the concept of ideology abound (for recent examples, see Eagleton, 1991; Zizek, 1994). For my current needs and purposes, it is sufficient to point to Herzfeld's argument that I outlined in the previous chapter.

As we saw, Herzfeld (1987) has warned against the analytic endowment of "ideologies", "images" or "cultural stereotypes" that trace their genealogical origin in hegemonic European institutional practices with a "coercive power" over social actors. As Herzfeld's analyses show, such "ideologies", "images" or "cultural stereotypes" are actively used by social actors in the symbolic realm of the everyday rhetoric of morality. In modern Greece, as he argues, social actors (whether they are State authorities, Cretan sheep-thieves or citizens disenchanted with the national bureaucracy) "orientalise" their Greek Others' conduct and "occidentalise" their own within the realm of symbolic cultural pragmatics in pursuit of social accountability. For Herzfeld, the hegemony of the West is reiterated within modern Greek culture not because Greeks passively
accept their cultural (or rather, civilizational) Othering within the Orientalist division of the world but because their cultural practices in resisting this Othering perpetuate the hegemonic orientalist assumptions.

As I suggested in chapter 1 though, for all its exemplary analytic force, Herzfeld's account on the active uses of cultural stereotypes could be further exemplified by means of critical social psychological and discourse analytic work on stereotyping. Critical social psychologists have also pointed to the active use of cultural stereotypes by lay social actors. In their case though the elucidation of the uses to which cultural stereotypes are put is not sought in the symbolic realm of cultural pragmatics but in the more concrete realm of interactional / conversational pragmatics. Billig (1995) has hinted in that direction by arguing that in acts of stereotyping, "more is at stake than the ascription of characteristics to groups" (p. 82). As we saw, the ideological dilemmas approach to prejudice has highlighted the ways in which the contradictory themes of national ideology are *enhabited* (in Billig's (1995), terminology) within contemporary common sense and therefore work towards the casual reproduction of the assumptions of national ideology, by informing thought and argument. The interplay of the universalistic and particularistic themes of national ideology in contemporary talk about Others, while speakers strive to accomplish rhetorically a rational, non-prejudiced profile, pinpoint towards the direction that stereotypes about national Others are not unthinkfully spilled out of the mouths of contemporary national citizens.

The critical social psychologist whose name is most closely associated with the argument about the active use of stereotypes is Susan Condor. In her critical assessment of the "stereotypes as shared beliefs" assumption that underlies the SIT / SCT research traditions, Condor (1990) has pointed to some major theoretical problems. As she argues the Marxist underpinnings of SIT, with their implicit assumptions about "hegemony" and "domination", lead social identity theorists to take the assumption of "social stereotypes as shared belief" as an *a priori* given, and therefore to preclude instead of open for investigation the question about the dissemination of stereotypes within a social arena, which in practice often means the nation-State. In Condor's argument, part and parcel to the assumption of stereotypes as shared beliefs comes an assumption about their unitary and consistent nature.

Nevertheless, as she argues, within social theory this is a largely contested assumption and sociologists (often adopting a Gramscian perspective) have highlighted the multiple ideological resources, complexities and inconsistencies which underpin modern consciousness and common
sense belief systems (cf. Billig et al., 1988; Billig & Sabucedo, 1994). Taking aboard an approach to stereotypes as aspects of discourse rather than perception, Condor (1996, 1997a, b) has been able to show how in her participants' talk the traditional stereotype of the Anglo-British as "having history" has been subtly negotiated and variably oriented to with regard to the speakers' concerns with (moral) identity management.

Given that Billig's (1995) was a broad ranging project on the elucidation on the banal reiteration of nationalist assumptions within established nation States and not on the reiteration of assumptions of a particular nationalism or national identity, it is hardly surprising that his focus is placed on the ways in which national categories are categorised and not on how individuals categorise themselves and national Others. What is of importance for him is to stress that national identities (generically) are enhabited within the "natural" environment of nation States and inform the casual arguing and thinking of modern citizens and not to ponder over the terms in which specific national identities are talked about. For him the important point is to emphasise that historically any national categories have been constructed as having an "identity".

In the light of my review of social theoretical accounts on the constitution of modern Greek national identity as a dilemmatic ideological construct though, it emerges that in the context of modern Greek culture it is not merely the ideological parameters of nationalism that are enhabited and naturalised within cultural practices of a wide variety but also the dilemmatic ideological parameters of this particular national identity. In that respect, in my analyses some emphasis will be placed on the terms in which Greece / Greeks and (European) Others are talked about by my research participants as well as on the symbolic (in the manner of Herzfeld, 1987) and interactional (in the manner of Billig et al., 1988) uses that these terms, cultural stereotypes are put into. Nevertheless, the fact that historically Greek nationalism's quest for legitimation from the "civilised nations of Europe" entailed an ideological demand of cultural transformation necessitates a reconsideration of Billig's elaboration on the dialectic between the universal / international and particular / national themes of national ideology.

4.4. Towards a reconsideration of the dialectic between "universalism / internationalism" and "particularism / nationalism"

The imagining of the "world of nations" as solely restricted to the civilised community of Europe is, of course, not a unique peculiarity of modern Greek nationalism. It reflects the wider ideological
processes of the imaginary constitution of Europe, as the universal standard of civilisation and its juxtaposition to its distorted mirror image of the Orient at the age of imperialism. As Delanty (1995: 85) has succinctly put it,

"Europe solved the age-old problem of the universal versus the particular by consigning the sphere of the particular to the relativism of national cultures while the idea of Europe was designated to be the realm of the universal. Culture was seen to be relative and embodied in national histories, while civilisation was universal and transfixed in the crucible of Europe".

Delanty, like Billig (1995), points to the universalist dimension of nationalism. He argues that in the legal framework of the nation State, an acknowledgement of the universality of nationalism was essential for the legitimation of individual nation States and for securing the loyalty of their citizens. Nevertheless, as he argues, it was the idea of Europe that expressed the universalist project of nationalism "and the unfulfilled claims of the nation-state to universality" (Delanty, 1995: 85) in the age of imperialism. In the hegemonic sets of contrast of the discourse of Orientalism, one of the dimensions along which the Orient was Othered was in terms of political culture. The nation State as a form of rational political administration was juxtaposed to Oriental despotism (Said, 1995; cf. Turner, 1994). It was part and parcel of a whole set of attributes (e.g. progress, civic culture, social stability, individualism) that distinguished the superior civilisation of Europe and Europeans from the stagnant, despotic, innocent and exotic Orient and from the passive and servile Orientals.

If the international order of the world of nations at the time of its emergence was not an unqualified global one but one in which the "universal" was conterminous with "European" and "civilised", what are the implications with regard to Billig's (1995) elaboration on the international and national themes of national ideology? Certainly his contention that the interplay of these two themes within mundane discursive practices naturalises and reproduces the reality of a nation in a world of nations does not lose any of its theoretical and empirical validity. Nevertheless, it might be possible to assume that the interplay of these two themes within mundane discursive practices may also naturalise and reproduce the ideological ordering of the world of nations into nations of the West and of the Rest. A study of the discursive articulation of modern Greek national identity, which in its imaginary constitution encompasses the hegemonic tensions between "the Occident" and "the Orient", may constitute an exemplary case study. Its exemplary status notwithstanding, the conclusions drawn from such study should not be thought of as necessarily relevant only for Greece. The modern Greek nation, obviously, is not the only one that has been symbolically both included and excluded from the universal community of "the civilised West".
In order to pursue such a study, I suggest that a certain feature of Billig's (1995) thesis of Banal Nationalism and of Billig et al.'s (1988) elaborations on the dilemma of prejudice needs to be reconsidered. That is, the suggested interplay of the international and national themes of nationalism in casual talk for the rhetorical establishment of a rational motivational profile. In the next chapter, I will take the chance to further expand on this issue.
Chapter Three

THE NATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL AND A FURTHER DILEMMA IN THE PROBLEMATIC OF PREJUDICE

1. Introduction

2. National, international sentiments and their direction

3. The realm of international allegiances: Cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitans
   3.1. Cosmopolitanism as an Enlightenment Ideal
   3.2. Cosmopolitans in contemporary cosmopolitania

4. Xenomania as an ideological charge and concern in modern Greek culture
   4.1. The charge of mimicry and xenomania in contemporary intellectual debates
   4.2. Xenomania and the politics of cultural distinction
   4.3. Modern Greek xenomania as a cultural "fact"

5. Blueprinting a rhetorical dilemma
1. Introduction

For Billig (1995), the measure of "success" of the ideology of nationalism is its transformation into contemporary common sense. The interplay of national and international themes within mundane talk about "us" and "them" is, according to Billig, an indication of the extent to which national ideology informs modern consciousness. The ideological / rhetorical concern of disavowing prejudice and establishing a rational profile is predicated upon this interplay of the introvert (national) and the extrovert (international) themes of nationalism.

In this chapter, I will seek to expand upon Billig's (1995) elaboration on the ideological and rhetorical interplay of the national and international themes of national ideology. Having considered the historical specificities of modern Greek nationalism, my overall aim in this chapter is to show how the interplay of these two themes in intellectual and (potentially only, at this point) lay debates may naturalise and reproduce more than nations in a world of nations. My suggestion is that what is also naturalised and reproduced is the hierarchical, hegemonic division of the world of nations, into nations of "the West" and "the Rest". In that respect, familiar habits of nationalist consciousness may be thought of as complemented by habits of what (for want for a better term) we may term as an occidentalist consciousness.

In order to unfold my argument, I will start off by problematising the realm of international allegiances and sentiments. In so doing, I will be working towards the elucidation of a dilemma hitherto uncharted within the ideological dilemmas approach. The relevance of the moral charge of prejudice, as I will try to show, may not only emerge when critical views are levelled against national Others. On the contrary, favourable treatments of "them" may also be consequential with regard to speakers' accountability and moral identity.
2. National, international sentiments and their direction

One way of reading Billig's and his colleagues' account of the dilemma of prejudice is as stemming from and resonating with the moral ambivalence that surrounds national sentiments. As Billig (1995) has argued, both in social theory as well in common sense national sentiments are endowed with both a positive as well as with a negative moral value. In their positive version, they are recast as patriotism. In their negative version they are transformed to morally (and politically) accountable irrational, nationalist sentiments. Considering social scientific texts, in which this distinction is conceptually elaborated (e.g. Connor, 1978; 1993) and social psychological ones, where purportedly it is supported with empirical evidence attesting to its psychological reality (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1993; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), Billig (1995) notes that less than with the intensity of "national" feelings, this distinction touches upon their direction. The term patriotism is conveniently used to describe emotional states of loyalty and attachment towards one's national homeland, whereas nationalism is rendered to designate hostility and aggression against national Others. Evidently, as Billig (1995) argues, this is a rather flimsy distinction to be drawn, as it rests more on a theoretical, political and analytic willingness to draw it rather than on any substantiated conceptual analyses or sound empirical evidence.

Nevertheless, the dilemma of prejudice in its manifestation in lay discourse could be argued that is predicated upon this moral ambivalence surrounding the realm of national allegiances and sentiments. An expressed allegiance to universalistic / international sentiments is pragmatically invoked in order to counterbalance discourse which may render inferentially available not merely an excess of national feelings but a state-of-national-feelings as geared against national Others. These could be treated as signs of national prejudice and, as Wetherell and Potter (1992: 211) argue, "nobody wants to be prejudiced". In the problematic of prejudice as outlined by Billig et al. and also in subsequent studies, this conceptual ambivalence within the realm of the national is effectively charted and shown to be manifested in the discourse of research participants from different countries, when they talk about Others residing in their respective national homelands. The invocation of positively valued universalistic / international sentiments deflects inferences about morally unwarranted nationalist ones. Nevertheless, if national sentiments in their discursive invocation are characterised by an ambivalence between their positive and negative versions, then a question that may arise is whether universalistic / international ones are similarly ambivalent. Is the realm of international commitments, allegiances and sentiments always subsumed under the moral high ground of the liberal postulate of universalism?
If the answer to this question was an affirmative one, then we would have to face the obvious difficulty of what to do with constitutional / legal as well as moral imperatives militating against the charge of "high treason". Is it not the case that the loyalty to one's national homeland is not only ideologically naturalised but also legally prescribed in order to safeguard against what for nationalists and patriots of any shape and size would appear to be the most sinister of all sins: the betrayal of one's homeland in favour of a national Other homeland (cf. Grodzins, 1956). Suffice it to point out here that the issue of the *direction* that international sentiments may take is as relevant for the realm of national sentiments as for international ones. It seems reasonable enough to start exploring the commonsensical ramifications of the articulation of international sentiments and allegiances. The working assumption could be that (as it is the case with the realm of the national), the international ones may also be morally sanctioned *only insofar as* they are not, (without sufficient "reason"), directed *against* the national ones. We may want to start thinking that prejudice, with its associated connotations of irrationality, may be as relevant a moral charge for unwarranted international sentiments, as it is for unwarranted nationalist ones.
3. The realm of international allegiances: Cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitans

3.1. Cosmopolitanism as an Enlightenment Ideal

A detailed account of the universalistic theme of the Enlightenment can be found in Schlereth's (1977) "The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought". The author prefers the term "cosmopolitanism" to "universalism" or "internationalism", since, as he argues, "universalism" conveys too strong an association with theology, "internationalism" with politics and both fail to underline the dimension of the "ideal", that as he argues, the universalist theme has had in the textual and worldly practices of the Enlightenment philosophes. According to him Enlightenment cosmopolitanism had a number of distinguishing characteristics:

"[...] it was an attitude of mind that attempted to transcend chauvinistic national loyalties or parochial prejudices in its intellectual interests and pursuits. In the ideal, the "cosmopolite, or "citizen of the world", sought to be identified by an interest in, a familiarity with, or appreciation of many parts and peoples of the world; he wished to be distinguished by a readiness to borrow from other lands or civilisations in the formation of his intellectual, cultural, and artistic patterns. (op.cit.: xi)

In Schlereth's account the cosmopolitanism evidenced in the writings and practices of Voltaire, Hume and Franklin has always remained an "ideal": it never acquired doctrinal purity. Moreover, in the years that followed the heyday of the Enlightenment, cosmopolitanism as an intellectual posture and social or political "ideal" was rather quickly swept away by nationalism and its ensuing idea of national sovereignty that emerged as the guiding political principle in the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe.

Schlereth acknowledges that much of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism was more symbolic and theoretical than actual and practical. He recognises that the Enlightenment philosophes' call for uniformity on the grounds of universal reason more often than not entailed an attempt to dissolve particularistic traditions, practices and beliefs. As he points out, the philosophes were rather guilty of "ignoring, distorting, or even mutilating -often for the best "cosmopolitan" purposes- what did not fit their Procrustean bed" (Schlereth, 1977: 127). Nevertheless, in contrast to Billig et al.'s (1988) elaboration on this apparent contradiction, Schlereth treats phenomena like Voltaire's dislike for the Jews, Hume's for the Irish and Franklin's for the French as "failures" to conform in actual practice to an "ideal" rather than integral features of the inescapably ambivalent ideological framework they were advocating. The particularistic theme of the Enlightenment, which gave rise to competing nationalist projects, is rendered to a cancerous tumour that developed on the healthy body of liberalism.
Schlereth's account, written within a traditional "history of ideas" perspective, laments the lost opportunity of realizing the ideal of "cosmopolis", which existed as he maintains, for a brief moment in the eighteenth century in the international network of a few intellectuals. According to his argument, unfortunately for humanity as a whole, the combination of the democratic idea of popular sovereignty with the emotional force of nationalism "consumed and perverted the rationalistic, individualistic, cosmopolitan ideals of the Enlightenment" (p. 135). Nevertheless, as he concludes, if "civilization" is to be equated with the eternal struggle and process of aiming towards and creating "one world and one humanity" then "the Enlightenment hope for a cosmopolitan world still remains one of the great civilised ideals in human history" (p. 136).

Notwithstanding the lament for the prospect of a "cosmopolis" that Schlereth saw as vanishing under the weight of nationalism's ascendance in nineteenth century Europe, in more recent social theoretical debates on globalization the issue of a cosmopolitan world culture -characteristically termed by Waters (1995: 133) as "cosmopolitania"- is being readdressed. The relevant debates revolve around what McGrew (1992) calls the dialectical dynamic of globalization processes. That refers to the widely held understanding amongst theorists of globalization that the intensification of global interconnectedness entails both centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand, globalization universalises features of western modernity, chiefly amongst them the operational horizon of nation State politics. On the other, it intensifies and fosters particularisation and concerns with difference and uniqueness, as evidenced in the recent resurgence of ethnic nationalist movements across the globe.

In contemporary sociological writings, the reawakening of a virulent nineteenth century type of nationalism, which, according to Schlereth, swept away the possibility of the establishment of a world order based on the cosmopolitan ideals of the Enlightenment is dialectically juxtaposed to the internationalism of transnational corporations, international political organisations, consumer fashion and culture industry¹. Most importantly, the landscape of our postmodern global era is

¹ Of course a simplistic evaluatively loaded distinction between "bad" resurgent nationalism and "good" cosmopolitan world culture rather misses the point of what Billig (1995) calls the hegemonic possibilities of nationalism. Contemporary political and intellectual calls for and celebrations of the new global, cosmopolitan order have been often described as hegemonic nationalist practices of global Western powers (mainly the U.S.) who lay a claim for themselves to legitimately speak for the global "whole". Advocates of a left wing nationalism point out the issues of political and cultural hegemony at stake in those calls and celebrations of the international, cosmopolitan world order. Moreover, they defend existing and emerging nationalist movements of the third world and of the Western periphery and semi-periphery on the grounds that their cause is a struggle against political and cultural hegemonic relations and the only hope for an internationalism which is not conterminous with Western domination (for variants of this
depicted as being populated by people who fall neatly into the extremes of the national-international continuum: ethnic cleansers and local warlords (cf. Ignatieff, 1994) have their place and co-exist -albeit one would think not quite harmoniously- with cosmopolitans of various kinds in the cosmopolitania of the end of the century. Within various approaches in contemporary social theory, cosmopolitanism has been transformed from an "ideal" that missed its chance to be realised to a contemporary sociological "fact".

3.2. Cosmopolitans in contemporary cosmopolitania

A clear manifestation of such a perspective can be found in the work of the leading social anthropologist of the "global ecumene" Ulf Hannerz. In his contribution to the collective volume "Global Culture" (Featherstone, 1990), Hannerz sought to map out not only the conceptual parameters of contemporary cosmopolitanism but also the profile of contemporary, postmodern cosmopolitans. Hannerz's essay with the vocative title "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture", starts with the assertion that in today's world culture there are two discernible categories of people: "there are cosmopolitans, and there are locals" (p. 239). Describing cosmopolitanism as primarily "a perspective, state of mind or [...] mode of managing meaning" (p. 239) and less as a feature irrevocably tied with populations in a condition of mobility such as tourists, exiles, labour migrants or expatriates, Hannerz offers a definition of contemporary cosmopolitanism which is strongly reminiscent of Schlereth's definition of the Enlightenment one.

According to Hannerz, "genuine cosmopolitanism" is both a matter of "orientation" and "competence". It is a matter of orientation since it involves a willingness to engage with the Other, conditioned upon an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness. A cosmopolitan's acquaintance with Other cultures, in this definition, involves viewing them as art works. "Genuine cosmopolitanism" is also a matter of "competence" in two interrelated senses. On the one hand, it is a matter of "personal competence": "a personal ability to make one's way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting". On the other hand, it is also a matter of "cultural competence": "a built-up skill in manoeuvring more or less expertly with a particular system of meanings and meaningful forms" (p. 239).

perspective, see inter alia, Brennan, 1997; Nairn, 1996). As Billig (1995) argues though, such anti-imperialist political programmes are deeply reformist in that in their vision the naturalness of the "world of nations" remains unchallenged.
Most importantly, in relation to the issue of personal and cultural competence, Hannerz maintains that cosmopolitanism involves a "narcissistic streak": "the self is constructed in the space where cultures mirror one another". Competence and acquaintance with other cultures endow the cosmopolitan with a sense of "mastery". As Hannerz puts it: "one's understandings have expanded, a little more of the world is somehow under control" (p. 240). Nevertheless, Hannerz argues that this sense of mastery comes in a paradoxical interplay with a sense of "surrender". Despite the fact that, as he argues, an eclectic cosmopolitanism, where fragments from alien cultures would be selectively chosen at will is not an impossibility and may as well represent the ultimate condition in a cosmopolitan life course of collecting experiences, the prevailing cosmopolitan modus operandi is of a different kind. Usually, the Other culture is not negotiated, it is accepted as a "package deal". The cosmopolitan does not differentiate between elements and aspects of the Other culture, accepting parts of it and rejecting others.

As Hannerz argues though, this ostensible "surrender" is part of the cosmopolitan's sense of "mastery". Let me quote him at length:

"The cosmopolitan's surrender to the alien culture implies personal autonomy vis-a-vis the culture where he originated. He (sic) has his obvious competence with regard to it, but he can choose to disengage from it. He possesses it, it does not possesses him. Cosmopolitanism becomes proteanism. Some would eat cockroaches to prove the point, others need only eat escargots. Whichever is required, the principle is that the more clearly the alien culture contrasts with the culture of origin, the more at least parts of the former would even be seen with revulsion through the lenses of the latter, the more conspicuously is surrender abroad a form of mastery at home. Yet the surrender is of course only conditional. The cosmopolitan may embrace the alien culture, but he does not become committed to it. All the time he knows where the exit is" (Hannerz, 1990: 240).

What I find important and I want to draw attention to with regard to Hannerz's account is the inescapable dialectic between "abroad" / "home" that he discerns at the root of a cosmopolitan make up. In Billig's (1995) terminology, the realm of international allegiances, predilections and expeditions is depicted as consequential with regard to the cosmopolitan's (symbolic) posture towards her "home culture". Her orientation to and competence with the Other culture comes in the form of a "surrender". Paradoxically, this "surrender abroad" entails "mastery at home". Apparently, Hannerz's cosmopolitans are not only free from parochial national(-ist) attachments but, moreover, their immersion to the Other culture is an indication of their symbolic mastery over the "home culture". In a strong sense, Hannerz's cosmopolitans come to resemble the "heroic"
travellers of the Enlightenment (see, *inter alia*, Wolff, 1994). The latter's acquaintance and stance of "openness" towards Other cultures was part and parcel of their critical disposal towards ethnocentric seclusion.

Nevertheless, there are certain conceptual features of Hannerz's rather idealised and definitely abstract discussion of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitans that I would like to consider in some detail. This will facilitate my subsequent discussion of the dilemma in which international sentiments and allegiances may be seen as implicating social actors, at least in the context of modern Greek culture. In particular, it is Hannerz's discussion of the feature of "competence" in the conceptual and experiential make up of cosmopolitanism that may help us start thinking about the way in which national allegiances and sentiments may become implicated in the realm -and in the direction- that the international ones may take.

As we saw, according to Hannerz, cosmopolitan competence involves a "narcissistic streak", which interweaves "mastery" and "surrender" in a paradoxical interplay. Cosmopolitanism is a sign of competence-as-mastery with regard to the other culture. A bigger part of the world and of its complexities is harnessed and available for classification in the experiential collection of the cosmopolitan. This mastery-abroad though is also predominantly a surrender-abroad. The other culture is bought as a "package deal" and no invidious distinctions are drawn amongst its constituent elements. However, as Hannerz maintains, surrender-abroad stands in a paradoxical opposition to mastery-at-home: the bigger the surrender abroad, the bigger the mastery at home. The extent of the surrender to the other culture becomes a measure of the cosmopolitan's mastery-and-therefore-independence-from the home culture. The latter is possessed by the cosmopolitan; it does not possesses her. As Hannerz notes though, this is a rather safe process for the cosmopolitan. The surrender to the other culture is not unconditional, insofar as the cosmopolitan knows where the "exit" is. Moreover, since this surrender entails increased mastery at home, the "exit" from the other culture inadvertently leads to a more comfortable "re-entrance" to the home culture. At least until the time for the next cosmopolitan expedition would come.

The first feature of Hannerz' discussion of contemporary cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitans that I would like to take issue with concerns the way in which cultural / national belongingness and cosmopolitan endeavours are linked within his account. Cosmopolitanism is blueprinted as implicating not only an orientation of openness towards and competence with the Other culture, but also by the same token, as implicating a certain stance towards the culture of origin. For Hannerz,
these two are inseparable: cosmopolitan surrender abroad goes hand in hand with a sense of mastery at home. The realm of international sentiments and practices inescapably relates to a sense of disengagement-cum-independence from the (national) culture of origin. Whereas in Hannerz's account cosmopolitanism is seen as the opposite of cultural (national) parochialism, cosmopolitan expeditions are depicted as tension free. Even when the fictional cosmopolitan of his story chooses fully to disengage from the culture of origin and to "buy" the other culture as a "package deal" this does not seem to raise any moral tensions: the "entrance" door into the "home culture" is always open.

The stark contrast between the realm of international / cosmopolitan allegiances -as depicted by Hannerz- with the ambivalence ridden realm of the national ones emerges vividly if we were to apply his "transactional" metaphor not in the realm of international / cosmopolitan dealings but to the national ones. Choosing to "disengage" from international experiences, to immerse oneself to one's own national culture, buying it as a "package deal" invokes, more than images of benign patriots, images of bigoted nationalists. Evidently, Hannerz' aim in that essay was not to speculate on the possible tensions that the realm of cosmopolitan sentiments and practices may implicate. Still though, are we to assume that the inescapable dialectic between the national and the international in the realm of cosmopolitanism to which his account evidently attests to does not raise tensions with regard to the "direction" that cosmopolitan sentiments and practices may take?

Hannerz' analysis manifests the common trend within various niches in the social sciences of studying, as Condor (1997c) has put it, the "social" within the "individual". Fictitious (individual) cosmopolitan actions and life style patterns are drawn into his account in order to capture a part of the "social" domain: "cosmopolitanism" as a trend of contemporary global culture. Nevertheless, as Condor argues, the "social" should better be seen and studied as located between social actors and not within their consciousness or, I would add, in uncontextualised, fictitious descriptions of social actions. Hannerz's cosmopolitans are devoid of social accountability, which arguably provides for the fabric of social action and social life (cf. Buttny, 1993; Shotter, 1984). Their unaccountable solitude in pursuing the expansion of their experiential field, motivated as it is by intrinsic existential forces and narcissistic drives, renders them to appear more as convenient figures in literary fiction than plausible descriptions of social actors.

Nevertheless, Hannerz insists that cosmopolitanism is a "real" "perspective", "state of mind" or "mode of managing meaning". Moreover, "cosmopolitans" and "locals" are, allegedly, clearly
separate categories of people, with their difference substantiated not by means of demographic criteria of mobility but evidenced in their orientation and competence with regard to Other cultures. However, Hannerz's account is not fashioned as an ethnographic one. The orientation and competence he discerns at the roots of a cosmopolitan perspective, state of mind and modus operandi are not presented as observational evidence transpiring from ethnographic records. His argument is mostly based on a scholarly consideration of literary texts, travel guides and academic literature. However insightful his account may be (and its inclusion in my account attests to so much at least) there are certain issues that need to be addressed.

The orientation and competence he discerns as "real" differential criteria for distinguishing between "cosmopolitans" and "locals" and, on the other hand, the dialectic of "surrender abroad" / "mastery at home", that he describes as a corollary theme to cosmopolitan competence may be seen analytically primarily as discursive resources that "real" people (the ones who constitute the "object" of anthropological study) draw upon within relevant argumentative contexts, while managing their moral identities and accountability in talk. Obviously, I do not mean to discredit Hannerz's analysis. However, I do want to point out that the categories of "openness" towards Other cultures, "competence" with regard to them and also "surrender / mastery" apart form being available resources for uncontextualised anthropological descriptions unfolded within specific disciplinary debates may also be seen as lay categories deployed within mundane or, indeed, research framed conversational settings for various rhetorical ends.

Cosmopolitanism may also be seen as an ideologically ambivalent construct. Its dilemmatic quality may be manifested within the realm of symbolic cultural pragmatics (cf. Herzfeld, 1987) as well as within the pragmatics of interactional exchanges (cf. Billig et al., 1988), where lay actors manage their social accountability. "Buying" the Other culture as a "package deal" at the expense of "disengaging" from the culture of origin may not be as morally unproblematic and pragmatically inconsequential as Hannerz' account by default leads us to assume. "Package deal" purchases (of any kind) may be argumentatively contested as indicative of and as stemming from "false", "pre-" judgments that "the mind holds on the nature of things, after insufficient exercise of the intellectual faculties".

The final feature of Hannerz's account on cosmopolitanism that I want to take issue with relates to his undifferentiated treatment of possible "cultures of origin" and the incumbents of the category "abroad" that are implicated in contemporary cosmopolitan expeditions. Despite the fact that
overall in his account it seems that he is talking more about modern Westerners than anybody else, when it comes into the details of cosmopolitan practices he is careful to rebut such a reading. For example, in the quotation from his text that I used earlier he cautiously remarks, with regard to the issue of autonomy vis-à-vis the culture of origin, that "some would eat cockroaches to prove the point, others need only³ eat escargots". Whereas with such a formulation images of cosmopolitans both from "the West" and from the "Rest" are invoked indulging in culinary adventures in Other cultures, what is missing is any reflection on the differences in symbolic value that these actions may have in their indigenous cultural context of occurrence. The "point to be proved" may not be merely cosmopolitan credentials in a paradoxical interplay of surrender-abroad / mastery-at-home. Or, rather, cosmopolitanism may be too generic and too undifferentiated as a term in order to capture, on the one hand, the multiplicity of phenomena and, on the other, the multiplicity of their potential -evaluatively loaded- local⁴ interpretations that it purports to cover. At least as far as modern Greece and Greeks are concerned, this appears to be the case.

³ Hannerz' use of "only" in this phrase though is indicative of a creeping occidentalism. Apparently, eating "escargots" in order to prove one's cosmopolitan predilections is much less of an extravagant and "painful" transcultural practice than eating "cockroaches"; ...by universal taste standards!

⁴ In using the term "local", I mean to refer both to "local-as-cultural" and "local-as-conversational / rhetorical".
4. Xenomania as an ideological charge and concern in modern Greek culture

In the light of the accounts of the cultural ambivalence of modern Greek national identity that I considered in chapter 1, Hannerz's implicit assumption that "package deal" cosmopolitan purchases are morally unconsequential seems rather problematic. In the context of modern Greek culture, the realm of international allegiances and sentiments seems to be far from tension free and undilemmatic. Instead, it emerges as a field of intellectual and political contestation, where rationales of cultural politics, political platforms, and moral identities are coming at stake. The ideological constitution of the Greek nation as one that fits uneasily within the Europe of modernity, progress and civilization accounts for the problematic status of international sentiments and allegiances in the context of modern Greek culture.

Hannerz's argument that cosmopolitan expeditions implicate social actors in a paradoxical interplay between "surrender abroad" and "mastery at home" is indeed relevant in examinations of modern Greek culture. Not as an uncontextualised anthropological reflection on the (global) contemporary state of cosmopolitanism though. It becomes relevant as a descriptive tool and, therefore, argumentative position in historical / political / cultural debates and, as I will start arguing in this chapter, as a rhetorical concern in lay argumentation. As we saw in chapter 1, the political and intellectual enterprise of constituting the West as a discernible and real historical, political, and geographical entity entailed claims to its civilizational supremacy. It also entailed the Othering and degradation of cultures and traditions beyond its cultural and geographical borders (cf. Delanty, 1995). As I have already shown, modern Greece (from its inception in the discourse of nineteenth century Greek nationalism to its constitution as a nation-State) has been paradoxically enmeshed in this process.

The genealogical claim to ancient Hellenic ancestry made by nineteenth century Greek nationalism within the European climate of romantic Hellenism and taken up in modern Greece as the official

A possible translation for this quotation would be something like: "somebody has to write at some point the strange romance of Greek xenolatria and xenophobia". The terms "xenolatria", i.e "worship for the foreign" and "xenomania", i.e. "madness for the foreign" are used interchangeably both in modern Greek parlance and in the literature, academic or otherwise (cf. Faubion, 1993: 110).
doctrine of the State's cultural politics and as the ruling elites' hegemonic credo renders modern Greece a *sine qua non* member of the civilized Occident. On the other hand, more recent Greek history, which points to the administration or "yoke" of the oriental Ottoman Empire, has rendered an infinite range of cultural phenomena within modern Greece problematically oriental. According to Herzfeld (1987), the adoption of this Western, orientalist perspective on the part of official Greek nationalism, and its perpetuation by domestic classicist / Hellenising cultural politics has resulted in two images of Greekness: occidental Hellenism has become the official cultural ideal to be sought, whereas oriental / Byzantine Romiosini has become the intimate but also embarrassing - intellectual and lay- "self knowledge" on Greek national identity.

Reviewing the relevant literature in chapter 1, I have charted some of the ways in which, as it has been argued, Hellenism and Romiosini have informed contrasting political and cultural projects in modern Greece. Whereas occidental Hellenism had been elevated to the cultural ideal proper for Greece and modern Greeks, with its longed for fulfilment - allegedly- to secure the full inclusion into the civilised community of the West, it should better remain, as the argument goes, just that: an "ideal". Were its educational, aesthetic and cultural standards widely attained, the power of the ruling elites would be threatened (Herzfeld, 1995). According to the orientalist thesis espoused by critics of "the West" (be they Greek or otherwise), "surrender" to and immersion in the hegemonic occidental (Hellenic) vision of Greek national identity which originated "abroad" and was appropriated at "home" in the life practices of the political and cultural elites entailed in symbolic and material ways "mastery" within the oriental rendering of the Romeic "home". The latter has been traditionally seen as represented in the oriental backwardness of the culture of the lower socio economic strata.

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6 Terminology here, as everywhere, can hardly be evaluatively neutral.

7 As Herzfeld (1987: 113) warns us though, this evaluatively loaded dichotomy between Hellenism and Romiosini should not be thought of as resting upon an "ideology" vs "reality" juxtaposition. As he notes:

"Appearances of "two-faced" hypocrisy in Greek culture have arisen from the necessity of responding to exterior probings, most recently presented by anthropological research but for much longer a direct product of the discourse of morality that had Greeks begging for inclusion in the European standards to which they had supposedly given birth. Thus, rather than posing a traditional real-ideal dichotomy, I would prefer to suggest a polarity between two ideal types that are constantly and dialectically parlayed into virtually the entire range of social life. Both are ideals in that both are stereotypes; but, by the same token, what gives both experiential reality is their use in the day-to-day rhetoric of morality. That rhetoric constitutes their reality" (italics in original).
4.1. The charge of mimicry and xenomania in contemporary intellectual debates

Nuances of the orientalist thesis which treats the modern Greek European orientation as a manifestation of a political, cultural and a moral stance of servitude towards the West can be found both in the discourse of Westerniser Greek intellectuals as well as in the discourse of their neo-Orthodox opponents, albeit in rather different ways. I have prefaced this part of the chapter with a quotation by Nikos Dimou where he argues for the need for the "strange romance" between Greek xenolatria (xenomania) and xenophobia to be written. Nevertheless, in contrast to what my use of Dimou's quotation may insinuate, I am not intending here to undertake this task of "writing". For one thing, to use the familiar post-structuralist metaphor, this "strange romance" is regularly "written" or performed within cultural practices in Greece. Indeed, Dimou's book entitled "The Misery of Being Greek" from which this quotation is drawn, may be seen to be playing its own part in the staging of this "strange romance". In the frequent public debates among Greek intellectuals as to whether Greece is or should be included in or excluded from the category "Europe" (see for example, Pretenderis, 1994; cf. Herzfeld, 1987; 1995), Dimou has his own argumentative position.

Dimou is an outspoken pro-Westerner, who deprecates the oriental / Romeic aspects of modern Greeks and modern Greek culture urging "us" to reaffirm "our" cultural linkages with the Hellenic civilization and, most importantly, with its modern day re-instantiation in the West. Dimou has often defended this position in fierce debates with intellectuals of the neo-Orthodox strand (cf. Yiannaras, 1979; 1989; 1992), who seek a definition of Greekness in the Byzantine / Romeic past and present aspects of modern Greek culture. For the latter, Dimou's is a "xenomaniac" intellectual posture. By turning to the modern West in order to outline a cultural ideal for modern Greece, he dispenses with and is critical of all these modern Greek cultural aspects that, as Herzfeld argues, constitute Greek "self-knowledge". That is, the (intimate but also embarrassing) oriental flavours of modern Greek life, which are rendered problematic in the occidental gaze either of European or domestic agencies. Of course "xenomaniac" would not be a label that Dimou would accept for his perspective. After all, by virtue of his genealogical cultural reasoning, whatever is Western is by definition Greek, therefore the charge of "xenomania" would be irrelevant.

For Dimou though, "xenomania" surfaces as a relevant description for a series of modern Greek cultural phenomena. These, allegedly, highlight the superficial and mimetic way in which modern Greece and modern Greeks consume the Occident as a commodity without subscribing to and inseminating its weltansshaung. At the argumentative sights of Dimou lie, first of all, the "object"
of modern Greek "knowledge". Or, as Herzfeld would say, what modern Greeks see in the occidental looking-glass as inescapably oriental and, therefore, embarrassingly Greek / Romeic. On the other hand, his criticisms also target the modern Greek "coping strategy" of "self-display" (Herzfeld, 1987). That is, the sterile and clumsy adoption of an occidental facade, whenever the latter is deemed appropriate. Dimou's arguments, of course, are attaching a certain moral value to his own voice. Castigating the oriental flaws of modern Greece and Greeks as well as their mimetic occidentalism, his voice lays a claim to truly occidental credentials. His is a stance in the best of ancient Hellenic / modern Western tradition, whereas the world of modern Greece he is criticising is a world of oriental degeneracy and of fake, mimetic, Westernisation.

For Dimou's argumentative opponents though, both he (as well as any Westernisers, from the Neohellenic Enlightenment's godfather Korais to current realpolitic governmental modernisers (εκσυγχρονιστές)), have all got it wrong. The intellectual champions of neo-Orthodoxy, having their anti-Western mistrust nourished by a range of resources -ranging from the mediaeval schism between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches (Yiannaras, 1992) to anti-imperialist political platforms (Karambelias, 1993)- view with circumspection, if not aversion, "the West". While in this strand of thought, the genealogical claim to ancient Hellenic cultural ancestry is not dispensed with, the spirit of ancient Hellas is seen as imprinted and cultivated within the Byzantine theological tradition.

In social theoretical treatments from this perspective, the West is an essential "Other" to Hellenism. First of all, because it appropriated with the Enlightenment Hellenism's intellectual heritage. And second, because from the nineteenth century onwards, with the aid of its domestic intellectual and political disciples, it alienates modern Greek culture from its intellectual roots and its (alleged) cultural, religious and political Orthodox allies in the Balkans and beyond. From this perspective, the modern Greek cultural phenomenon of "xenomania" (viewed as being primarily attested to in the frenzy consumption of Western cultural and material products) is nothing but a symptom of a more generic intellectual and political modern Greek trend, which dates well back in time.

The way in which Yiannaras (1992: 9) opens his book "Orthodoxy and West in Modern Greece" is quite indicative in this respect. Challenging the traditional historiographical habit of treating the year 1453, when Constantinople was seized by the Ottoman Turks, as a conventional landmark for the beginnings of the modern period of Greek history, the author asserts:
"As far as the development of Greek civilization is concerned [...], the landmark or the starting point of the "modern" times is not the year 1453. It is rather the year 1354: the year when Dimitrios Kydonis, with the exhortation of the Emperor Ioannis Kandakouzinos, translated into Greek the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas. Kydonis, ecstatic with the new "light" that comes from "Western Europe", committed himself in transmitting it to his Greek compatriots. This fact demarcates a new era for Hellenism, a new historical period. A period when the interest of the Greeks is moved gradually from their own tradition and their own civilisation to another prototype and vision of life" (italics and quotation marks in original; my translation).

As Yiannaras argues, Greece in the ancient times has always had an interest in other civilisations and was always keen on assimilating elements from other cultures. Nevertheless, up to the late Byzantine period, these "loans" were always working towards the "enrichment and renovation" of the "Greek self-conception". From then onwards, both during the period of the Ottoman occupation and after the constitution of the modern Greek nation State, "the Greeks are living with their gaze and spirit turned exclusively to the "lights" of the "West"" (Yiannaras, 1992: 10). In stark contrast to the normative discourse of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, in the discourse of the neo-Orthodoxy the very assumption that the "lights" of Hellenic antiquity were "relit" in the European Enlightenment and then found their way to back to their country of origin is being challenged.

The rhetorical upshot for the moral identity of neo-Orthodox intellectuals is not very different from their Westernisers opponents' although it is even more arrogant. The idealised past of Hellenic antiquity is their scarce resource as well (cf. Appadurai, 1981). Nevertheless, their intellectual route to this idealised past challenges and discredits both modern Western claims to the role of the depository of ancient Hellas, as well as the dominant tradition within modern Greek intelligentsia which sanctions this claim. By castigating what they see as an attitude of intellectual and political servitude to the West, as well as manifestations of the same attitude in popular culture, the proponents of neo-Orthodoxy rhetorically manage a double disassociation. First, they disassociate themselves from what they view as the intellectual fallacy of the Enlightenment. Second, they disassociate themselves from "the stalemate" of Hellenism that they discern in the condition of the modern Greek nation-State and its culture (see for example Yiannaras' (1987) book with the vocative title "Finis Graeciae").

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8 "Εξ Εσπερίας" in the original text, which is a katharevoussa expression for "Western Europe" conveying messages of irony and sarcasm since Katharevousa's loss of legitimacy as a linguistic code in modern Greece (cf. Setatos, 1973; as quoted in Frangoudaki, 1997b).

9 In a critical commentary on the latter, Frangoudaki (1987: 259-260) argues, that this melodramatic rhetoric of desperation about the degeneration of Hellenism conveys an important latent message:

"that the author does not relate to, does not share the responsibility, does not resemble and cannot identify with the misery that he sees in the Greek state, in the Greek citizen and in the (Greek) national
4.2. Xenomania and the politics of cultural distinction

As we saw in chapter 1, the moral charge of occidental inauthenticity or oriental mimicry has a long history within modern Greek intellectual debates. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that this moral charge is not solely restricted to solemn academic discussions or to the kind of diluted intellectual debates that gain coverage in the national media. James Faubion (1993), in his ethnographic account on the cultural practices of Athenian sociocultural elites, has noted that a similar rhetoric was evident in their everyday discursive practices as well. His informants, on the one hand, appeared to judge the extremism of localist / traditionalist practices as outdated and "vulgar". On the other hand though, they also forcefully criticised the xenolatria / occidentalism evidenced in what they viewed as the modern Greece's middle and lower strata "mania" for "foreign" (European or American) styles and services. As Faubion notes, this xenolatric attitude was rendered suspect for its superficiality, "for not flowing from anything, indeed anything at all, "within"[...]

suspect, with all its allegedly thoughtless mimicry, as a sort of consummate selling out". According to Faubion, this is a critique which targets the attitude of "doing at home what one would only do "in Rome"; of preferring to be a tourist on one's own native and natal soil" (p. 112).

Evidently, cultural tourism or cosmopolitan expeditions in the context of modern Greece do not necessarily involve crossing geographical, national borders. Also, and most importantly, the "surrender abroad" / "mastery at home" paradox appears to be far from morally inconsequential. Instead, it is transformed to an argumentative position appropriated by the intellectual and sociocultural elites in Greece in order to distinguish their intellectual posture and modus vivendi from what is deemed to be the mimetic and incomsummate occidentalism of the lower strata. I have stressed the word "appropriated" above deliberately. It is important to acknowledge that this discourse of denunciation that the intellectual and sociocultural elites in Greece deploy against what they view as mimetic and inauthentic in popular culture is not an endemic invention of the

identity. He is not a Greek-member of the "miniature state", he has nothing to do and no relation with the "misery, the absurdity or the annihilation of the territorially bounded Greek miniature state"; he is a universal "precious man", he resembles the "monuments", he belongs to the "Greek modus vivendi", to the diachronic Diaspora, he relates to the antiquity, he belongs, after all, to the immortal "race", to the eternal "patriline" of the Greeks, which has nothing to do with the small-minded and worthy of so much of contempt beings that constitute together with the institutions the "miserable territorially bounded Greek miniature state." (quotation marks in original, denoting expressions taken out from Yiamaras' text; my translation).

As Frangoudaki argues, "the author falls in the classic trap of racism. By discrediting with contempt and aggression his country and compatriots he thinks that he disclaims himself from the inferiority that he discerns as a constituent characteristic of his national identity".
modern Greek intelligentsia. As Herzfeld (1995; see also, 1987) has argued, in hegemonic Western criticisms, the Greek bourgeoisie have traditionally been rendered accountable to the same moral charge.

Whereas under the scrutinising hegemonic gaze of Western critics, Greek intelligentsia and their cultural practices have been finding themselves at the receiving end of the moral charge of occidental inauthenticity / oriental mimicry, in the domestic field of contemporary cultural politics the tables are reversed. The sociocultural elites of Greece, moving from the uncomfortable position of defendant to the role of prosecutor, press the same charges of inauthenticity and mimicry to the lower strata for their respective cultural practices. According to Herzfeld's (1987; 1995) analyses, such criticisms involve a hegemonic gate keeping of the symbolic capital of the occidental (ancient Hellenic / modern Western) cultural perfection (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). If the charges of inauthenticity and mimicry levelled from the West keep Greece and Greeks "in their appointed place on the margins of Europe", the same charges levelled by the Greek sociocultural elites keep the Greek lower strata in their appointed place within Greek society.

In the context of the modern Greek nation State, from the nineteenth century onwards, education and in particular higher education has been elevated to a catholic value for Greek society as a whole. Historically, education has functioned both as a means for and as a distinctive mark of social ascent (cf. Tsoucalas, 1976; 1987). Up to the 1970s (and to a lesser degree in the 1980s), higher education not only entailed the realistic prospect of employment in the highly valued public sector but also, conferred the credentials for participation to the middle class Hellenic high culture. Having higher education meant that one had command of katharevousa, which was a prerequisite for transactions with State institutions. It also entailed socialisation to the Hellenic values, by means of gaining knowledge on the Classics and history of Hellenism. Moreover, during the politically turbulent years that followed the civil war up to the mid 1970s more often than not higher education entailed inclusion to the ruling political / clientalist circles of the right.

Stewart (1991; 1993) has argued that the dramatic increase in the consumption of Western European products in Greece from the mid 1970s onwards, which culminated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, can be seen as a parallel, or alternative to education, process of social "distinction" (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). The increase in the domestic consumption of whisky, a drink traditionally associated with the "sophisticated" tastes of the urban upper classes is a good case in point (Stewart, 1993). In 1971, the annually imported whisky in Greece was approximately 124,000
litres; in 1982, it had increased to 4,000,000 litres. In the same period, as Stewart reports, the consumption of domestic wines decreased dramatically. According to him, this is an indication of the extent to which the "style" of the elites has been appropriated by wider strata of modern Greek society.

Most importantly, as Stewart argues, changes of this kind in the life style of the lower / middle strata are resulting in changes in the life style and in the predilections of the elites. According to Stewart's analysis (see also Faubion, 1993), in the context of contemporary Greek culture these changes take two different forms. On the one hand, the cultural elites turn to adopt more and more exclusive occidental tastes, by purchasing Western products currently unavailable or very expensive in the high streets of the Greek urban centres. On the other hand, the cultural elites' differentiation from the "vulgar" occidentalism of the lower classes takes also the form of appropriating cultural elements traditionally associated with Romiosini and the "backwardness" of the modern Greek Ottoman past. Refashioning them with a touch of occidental sophistication, these cultural elements are elevated to archetypes of "good" distinctive(ly) Greek taste (cf. Bourdieu, 1984).

Moutsou's (1994) field research in Thessaloniki provides a good example of this process. She documents the ways in which practices, spaces and symbols traditionally associated with the city's oriental past are currently refashioned as the cutting edge of sophistication for the urban, middle class, educated, social elites. In her study, Moutsou draws on an extensive range of examples of entertainment places and practices in Thessaloniki, which from the late 1980s onwards manifest what could be labelled as "return to the origins" (επιστροφή στις ρίζες). As she notes though, "origins" in this case does not refer to the idealised Hellenic antiquity but, rather, to practices and cultural expressions commonly thought to originate in the more recent Ottoman past. Urban youth socialisation practices, like going out for a coffee, for a drink or for dancing, which since the mid 1970s have carried with them unmistakable occidental / "modernising" connotations as opposed to "traditional" ones (cf. Cowan, 1991) have been radically influenced by this change in spirit.

To start with, a whole area in the centre of Thessaloniki (Λαδάδικα) has been "restored". "Ta Ladavdika" were until recently full of derelict buildings which dated back to the early twentieth century. Up to the late 1980s this area exclusively accommodated warehouses and hardware commerce during the day and during the night was transformed to the low class, red light district of the city. Thessaloniki's selection as the "cultural capital of Europe" for the year 1997 provided the
initiative and secured the bulk of the funds for a large scale urban transformation enterprise. The warehouses gave way to stylish "traditional" restaurants and night clubs and the underdog crowd of pimps, sailors and villagers who were previously roaming its streets gave way to the crowds of (upper) middle class clientele of the new / traditional entertainment outlets. In the city as a whole, most of the European type of "cafeterias" that became popular during the late 1970s with Greece's "turn to the West" were closed or became passé. These were replaced by new trendy coffee shops, which payed claim to sophistication and good taste by incorporating in their decor elements of "λαϊκός πολιτισμός" (popular culture), like oriental style coffee tables, nargilehs and chaplets and serving Greek / Turkish coffee in the "traditional" manner. Maybe the clearest indication of this "return to the roots" trend is manifested in the rapid changes that have been taking place in the night life entertainment practices of urbanite (young) Greeks.

The anthropologist James Faubion reporting on his fieldwork conducted in Athens during the second half of the 1980s (Faubion, 1993: 107-117) noted that in the absence of "cutting edge" domestic musical production, the nightclubs of Athens, which attracted a young "trendy" clientele, were exclusively entertaining their patrons with English and American tunes. Most importantly, he reported on an incident that happened in the summer of 1987 outside one of the most trendy and commercially successful nightclubs of that time, where the moral categories of "xenomania" and "tradition" were played out by the patrons of the nightclub and a group of local protesters. The latter were publicly complaining, on the face of it, about the noise pollution that the nightclub was causing to their district. More substantially though, as Faubion reports, their protest targeted the Americanisation / Westernisation represented in their view in the nightclub and its culture.

In Moutsou's report of her early 1990s fieldwork in Thessaloniki, it is asserted that in the domain of night life entertainment "only partial tendencies towards the adoption of oriental elements can be found and in the majority [of nightclubs] the American style remains the predominant pattern" (Moutsou, 1994: 37). As she argued, Western pop music is (was) to such a degree associated with youth "modern" culture, that until very recently for young people listening to Greek music was an outdated practice, solely restricted to segments of working class and rural youth, who anyway were stigmatised as "backward". Nevertheless, in her fieldwork she documented a slight change in spirit. Despite the fact that western pop music remained the established canon in the nightclubs of Thessaloniki at the time that her research was conducted, she noticed that late after midnight, at the height of "κέφι" (fun), the music would invariably change to a Greek / oriental type one and the dance of the order was "τσιφτέτελι" (belly dancing).
In the late 1990s, this early trend that Moutsou documented has not only been crystallised but has actually given birth to a new type of nightclubs "ελληνάδικα", (literally, "houses of Greek music"). This is a hybrid type of nightclub. It retains much of the ambience of the Western-type ones of the 1980s (as well as their D.J.- played music mode) but it also incorporates elements of the "μπουζουκτσίδικα", a type of nightclubs which has remained popular with elder Greeks since the 1960s and which, invariably, host live Greek / oriental bands. Despite the fact that in terms of global music industry, the domestic Greek production of "cutting edge" is still in want, nowadays in the "trendy" nightclubs throughout the country the mood has "gone Greek". Oriental tunes, enorchastrated though in occidental fashion, are the rule of the game. Ten years ago, at the time that Faubion was conducting his field research in Athens, this sort of music would only excite parochial and / or working class segments of the Greek youth; or -exceptionally- sophisticated, middle class, urbanites in "within culture" cosmopolitan expeditions. Nowadays, yesterday's embarrassingly pass,, oriental, "on the table" belly-dancing is the cultural norm for a proper Saturday night-clubbing.

It should be stressed though that this redefinition of Greekness along orientalising lines that Moutsou has documented does not entail an unconditional reconciliation with the Ottoman heritage, imprinted on the Romiosini aspect of the ambivalent -"disemic" in Herzfeld's (1987) terminology- Greek national identity. Along with the new type of trendy "traditional" coffee shops, the old type of coffee shops "καφενεία", which traditionally have attracted mainly a working class clientele still exist. Next to the bourgeois glamour of the "ελληνάδικα", the seedy "σκυλάδικα" (literally, "dog houses"!) for the underdogs of Romiosini still survive. Most importantly, as Moutsou reports, her informants were reluctant to acknowledge that the oriental ambience of their preferred, fashionable, sophisticated entertainment outlets was ...oriental. The coffee they were drinking was "Greek" or maybe "Byzantine" but not "Turkish".

These cultural processes of redefining Greekness along orientalising lines should perhaps be thought of as processes of "practical orientalism" (cf. Herzfeld, 1995). If practical occidentalism has entailed the age long, active appropriation of occidental cultural elements as "truly Greek" by Greek intelligentsia, practical orientalism is a reverse process. With the former processes, as Herzfeld argues, Greek elites seek to "redeem" modern Greek culture from the taint of "oriental pollution". With the latter process, the redemption sought may correspond to the equally unfavourable to "oriental pollution" charge of "occidental inauthenticity". If according to the
Enlightenment and neo-Hellenic Enlightenment canon "the West is the Greek tradition" (Herzfeld, 1995: 229; italics in original), then the melting pot of the Byzantine tradition may provide for the "font" where the orient is rebaptised and purged as "Greek".

The growing -since the 1980s- anti-Western sentiments held by Greek sociocultural and political elites, which found a succinct expression in the early passionate "self determination" political rhetoric of PASOK and which culminated in the early 1990s with the dissatisfaction (both of the political circles as well as of the public) over the Western stance on the "Macedonian question", provides a suitable political environment for the initiation of such a large scale, enterprise in cultural politics. In any case, the currency of the moral charge of "xenomania" seems to be in an increase and, growingly informs not only the discourse of Greek media and the reports of attentive ethnographers but also the coverage of Greek news in the international press.

4.3. Modern Greek xenomania as a cultural "fact"

A recent article in the British newspaper The Guardian provides a good example of the currency of "xenomania" as a descriptive category of cultural trends in modern Greece. The newspaper's correspondent in Athens, in a report on the current state of affairs of the local culture industry, was writing on the 25th of April 1997 under the heading "Big in ...Greece", a subtitle in bold, "Andreas and Mimi Papandreou", and next to a tete-a-tete snapshot of the late Greek socialist prime minister with his ex-mistress-to-be-wife:

After years of falling prey to xenomania (the obsession with all things foreign), the Greeks have finally become preoccupied by all things Greek. Music, film (...) and the arts have each been considerably marked by this change of heart.

The article which followed this introduction is rather peculiar in many respects. Basically it was a commentary on the commercial success of an Andreas Papandreou's biography written by one of his sons. The article relayed the information that the last wife of the deceased prime minister was preparing her own version of Andreas Papandreou's biography and it also relayed allegations that a Papandreou movie, with international stars of the likes of John Malkovitch and Antony Hopkins in the cast was in the pipeline. Leaving aside the evident orientalism-as-sensationalism (cf. Said, 1995; Kabbani, 1986) of this textual and photographic representation of Greece, maybe the most interesting feature of the reportage was that in the list of the Top Ten books in Greece at the time, there was only one written by a Greek author -the biography mentioned above- and this one only in
the fifth position of the chart. Moreover, there were no Greek music albums in the Top Five chart provided, with a Jean-Michel Jarre album occupying the top one position and the Spice Girls featuring prominently in the fifth one. Finally, in the Top Five Films chart there was only one Greek movie in the third position. Apparently, the comment that the age long Greek "xenomania" was receding, giving its place to an increasing passion for "all things Greek" reflected more than the "sheer facts" of the billboards, the foreign correspondent's acquaintance with the rhetoric of "xenomania" available within discursive practices of a wide variety in contemporary Greece.

In less sophisticated (compared to ethnographic ones) approaches to modern Greek culture within the social sciences literature, modern Greek "xenomania" is often depicted as a "factual" puzzle. In their limited examination of xenophobic views expressed in the Greek press towards refugees coming into Greece from East European and "third world" States, Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou (1994) express such a puzzlement. They start their paper by wondering how it is possible in a society which "is" xenomaniac and whose citizens refer to "foreign customs, institutions, economies and States only to state Greece's inferiority in a broad range of areas" (p. 787) for xenophobia to find fertile grounds to blossom. Their answer though to this puzzlement is a non-answer. As they state: "we do not intend to cast doubt on what most Greeks consider a factual reality", referring to the existence of xenomania as a prevailing ethos in contemporary Greece.

Lay social actors though, at times seem to be more perceptive than the social scientists who study them. For example, they may deliberate over the question of "who" consists the attitudinal object and "how" different categories of "foreigners" may be treated differentially within Greece. Take for example the following two extracts from my study (Bozatzis, 1993) which I have previously considered. Here Greek students in the University of Lancaster elaborate on the issue of integration of Albanian refugees in Greek society.

Irini [...] anyway nobody gets integrated easily (.) nobody
Costas well (.) Europeans and people like them (.) they can get integrated, easily (.) I don't think that there is any problem (.) maybe because we think of them like (.) that they have (.) that they are of a certain status anyway

(Extract 19, p. 46; DG1: 359-362; transcription notation slightly altered.)

Tania [...] it's very important the issue of the country of origin (.)
Spyros [hhmm
Anna [hhmm
Tania for example nobody cares about all those Ame::ricans that have moved to Greece (.) working in the military bases and living in Glyfada=
Spyros =yes but they haven't come as immigrants=

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Modern Greek xenomania as such is not explicitly named in the discourse of these students. Nevertheless, its constituent elements are pragmatically deployed: "Europeans and people like them" do not encounter problems in their integration into Greek society "because we think of them like ...that they are of a certain status". "Americans", similarly, do not face any difficulties "because...they are coming from a country not culturally but financially stronger ... and we look on them with a feeling of awe". The rhetoric of the first person plural that the participants employ notwithstanding, in their accounts it is the xenomania of Other Greeks that causes their xenophobic attitude towards "inferior" nations and impedes the integration of Albanians into Greek society. As it happens, the rhetorical invocation of Greek xenomania, is not a "factual reality", standing out of the canvas of social scientific observations, which aim at highlighting its dialectical opposite, the one of xenophobia. The other-Greeks' xenomania can be invoked by "lay people" who constitute the readership of the press that Mikrakis and Triandafyllidou examine in order to account for these other-Greeks' xenophobia. By the same token, of course, they exempt themselves personally from both moral charges. Evidently something important is missed when researchers lightheartedly leave xenomania unquestioned, which in their turn social actors may treat as a "factual" reason for Other Greeks' xenophobia.
5. Blueprinting a rhetorical dilemma

In the light of my account on xenomania as a relevant moral charge in contemporary Greece, it is evident that the "xeno" in question is not an unqualified one. It does not invariably refer to any non-Greek national or cultural category. As the xenomania charge arises from modern Greece's symbolical cum political predicament to be both included in and excluded from the community of the "civilised West", it is the West to which the "xeno" in question refers to. To put it in another way, the Greeks would have no "reason" to covet and, therefore, to be accountable for having a "mania" for anything "oriental", "backward", "underdeveloped" and "pre-modern". In the hegemonic perspective of its Western critics, that is what modern Greece is all about. Moreover, in the perspective of Greece's sociocultural elites, that is what the condition of modern Greek "low" culture indicates.

As it happens then, pro-"third world" refugees sentiments would not render as relevant the charge of moral, cultural, political, aesthetic or whatever, servitude towards the origin country of the refugees. As one of the participants I have quoted above would have argued, the Greeks do not have a reason to "look on them with a feeling of awe". Pro-"third world" sentiments and allegiances do not render inferentially available an "anti-Greek" moral stance as "pro-Western" ones do. The occidental cultural condition, as represented in modern West / ancient Hellas, is what modern Greece "ought" to conform to. If it is not, and this is what Greeks have been repeatedly told for more than a century and a half now (cf. Herzfeld, 1987), then "manias", "mimicry" and so on may arise. Then by being "pro-Western" in the symbolic pragmatics of modern Greek culture implies being anti-Greek / Romeic.

What the extracts of talk that I have previously considered may alert us to is the possibility that in modern Greek talk on "us" and "them", the interplay of the national and international themes of national ideology may give rise to a hitherto uncharted (social psychologically speaking) dilemma. In the context of contemporary Greek culture, it is not solely the excess of national sentiments and allegiances which are rendered accountable and in need of rational justification in order for the moral charge of prejudice to be disavowed (cf. Bozatzis, 1993; 1994; Figgou, 1996; 1997). We may start thinking that it is not merely the case that social actors need rhetorically to warrant their national sentiments, making sure that they do not take a directional twist which would transform them from indications of benign patriotism to signs of unaccountable nationalism.
The history of cultural politics that gave rise and sustains the relevance of the moral charge of mimicry and xenomania when a "cosmopolitan" stance of "openness" towards "the West" is at stake and the perceptive remark of the participants in my previous study about the differential treatments that categories of "foreigners" may receive within Greece may suggest that international sentiments and allegiances are not as uncontroversial and undilemmatic as the ideological dilemmas perspective by default may lead us to assume. To put it in another way, the currency of the moral charge of xenomania in contemporary Greece suggests that "pro-Western" international sentiments and allegiances may be rendered accountable and problematic because they make available inferences of "directionality". That is, by being favourably disposed towards "Western" national Others entails the discrediting of Greek's own national category. Of course, this is an accountable matter. Consequently, in talking about "the West" Greek social actors may need to establish rhetorically their rationality and their non-prejudiced-as-non-xenomaniac profile.

In Billig's (1995) terminology, such an (additional) ideological / rhetorical concern may be considered indicative of the modern Greek nationalist consciousness. As such it naturalises and reproduces within casual (Greek) habits of thought and talk not merely Greece as a nation in a world of nations, but also the "natural" division of the world of nations between nation of "the West" and of "the Rest" and Greece's ambivalent position within this hegemonic, imaginary and politically real world division. To the extent that modern Greece is not a unique case of a nation that is both included and excluded from the "civilizational" community of the nation of "the West", this dilemma should not be a unique "property" of the modern Greek nationalist consciousness. I will come back to this question in the concluding part of this thesis. For the moment, suffice it point out that unfolding my analyses of my current research participants' accounts of their living experiences in countries of (Western) Europe, I will be watching out for rhetorical claims to a rational profile. In this case, rhetorical claims to a rational profile in talk about European Others may entail both the rhetorical disavowal of xenophobia as well as of xenomania. Nevertheless, before proceeding to the analysis, a theoretical / methodological account on how to proceed with the analysis is in order.
Chapter Four

CONSTRUCTING THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: DISCOURSE(S) AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

1. Introduction

2. Analysis of discourse(s): Texts, ideology and power
   2.1. Discourse analysis and discourse definition
   2.2. Criteria for distinguishing discourses
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3. Discourse as social practice: Discourse analysis
   3.1. The study of discourse as social practice: Function, variation and construction
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4. Discursive Psychology: The Discursive Action Model
   4.1. Action, fact and interest and accountability
   4.2. Discourses and rhetorical organization
   4.3. The Discursive Action Model and research on the rhetorical deployment of Greek national identity
1. Introduction

My overall research concern with the ways in which the dilemmatic ideological assumptions of modern Greek national identity may be manifested within talk in interaction poses certain methodological imperatives. It necessitates a discourse analytic framework which integrates two analytic concerns. First, the investigation of what images of Greece / Greeks and Europe / Europeans are mobilised within my research participants' talk. Second, the investigation of how these images are rhetorically organised and what sort of rhetorical work they accomplish in their conversational deployment. This dual research concern locates methodologically and theoretically my project at the heart of unresolved (and, one would think, unresolvable) debates within the various traditions of research in what -rather misleadingly (cf. Condor, 1997c)- has come to be known under the all encompassing heading of discourse analysis in contemporary social psychology. Put simply, these debates largely centre around the paradoxical nature of language, which Roland Barthes (1982) eloquently captured in his contention that people are both masters and slaves of discourse.

Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell in their 1987 book, which initiated and popularised the turn to language in social psychology, have traced the intellectual origins of the discourse analysis they proposed in both post-structuralism and ethnomethodology / conversation analysis. Running the danger of oversimplifying matters, the former strand of thought may be seen as outlining conditions of structural "slavery", whereas the latter as outlining people's "mastery", locating it at the performative aspects of language. Nevertheless, the "marriage scheme" between the two that Potter and Wetherell have offered has been far from uncontroversial (see Bowers, 1988, for an early criticism).

Subsequent debates between analysts who rely more on the work of Michel Foucault in outlining their discourse analysis (e.g. Ian Parker and Erica Burman) and those who are more keen on drawing upon the work of Harvey Sacks (1992) (e.g. Jonathan Potter and Derek Edwards) undoubtedly have helped to clarify conceptual and theoretical matters but have also polarised the debate along irreconcilable stances of (critical) realism and (variants of) relativism (see for example, Burman, 1991; Edwards et al., 1995; Parker, 1990a,b; 1992; Parker & Burman, 1993; Potter et al., 1990; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; and for reviews, Antaki, 1994; Burr, 1995; Michael, 1996).
However when the debate moves from epistemological or ontological stances to the more practical level of research, things appear less polarised. The argument of "differences in emphasis" is invoked (cf. Burr, 1995) and reports of research studies which focus on the minutiae of spoken interaction can be found next to reports of studies which focus on a macro-discursive level in the same edited collection (see contributors in Burman & Parker, 1993). The argument of "differences in emphasis" notwithstanding, Antaki (1994) in his review of the relevant literature has suggested that a working distinction can be drawn between content and organization based approaches to discourse analysis. While, as he maintains, content is a notoriously difficult concept to define, he argues that what brings researchers of this strand together is their analytic recourse to some "complex constellation of cultural theme" (p. 121), variably called "repertoire(s)" or "discourse(s)". As he notes though,

it is tempting to say that the only thread which binds the variety is the negative one that none of these notions of "content" explicitly calls on the way the traffic of the material is regulated -its cohesion, its turn-taking, its rhetorical devices and so on. (op.cit.: 121)

An interesting manifestation of the difficulties encountered in attempts to accommodate a focus on content as well as a focus on organization under the roof of the same project is manifested in the (presumably) widely recognised but rarely commented upon analytic practices of the protagonists of discourse analysis within social psychology. 1992 saw the publication of two widely acclaimed discourse analytic books. Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter published their "Discursive Psychology", and Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter their "Mapping the Language of Racism". In "Discursive Psychology", the discourse analytic link with conversation analysis was formalised and systematised in the Discursive Action Model (DAM) (see also, Edwards & Potter, 1993). "Mapping the Language of Racism", on the other hand, attempted to link the analysis of talk with theoretical developments in post-structuralism (most noticeably, with the work of Foucault) and with neo-Marxist perspectives (i.e. Althusser)\(^1\).

What is worth noting upon is that in the former book there is only one passing reference to the concept of interpretative repertoires (the content component of Potter and Wetherell's discourse analytic model) and in the latter only one (again passing) reference to the concept of action orientation of language, a core concept in conversation analysis and in the work of Edwards and Potter (1992a), Edwards (1997) and Potter (1996a). A difference in research emphasis maybe (Potter & Wetherell, 1995), but a quite telling one with respect to the problems in combining an

\(^1\) Noticeably, the work of Foucault and Althusser has been the theoretical resources par excellence of Ian Parker (i.e. Parker, 1990a,b) in his debate with Potter, Wetherell and Edwards (i.e. Potter et al., 1990).
interest in the organisation of talk with an interest in content. If players in the content and the organization based strands of discourse analyses may occasionally swap teams, the framework of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) has been variably enlisted as a theoretical ally for all interested parts.

Ian Parker (1992: 49-50) has welcomed the political / ideological dimension of the ideological dilemmas perspective and its emphasis upon the historicity of the topics elaborated upon in talk. Wetherell and Potter (1992) drew extensively on Billig et al.'s arguments about the ideological dilemmas inherent in the problematic of prejudice. And, most interestingly, Edwards and Potter (1992a), as well as Edwards (1997) and Potter (1996a) elaborating on the scope and the premises of discursive psychology build upon the idea that talk is rhetorically organised and manifests dilemmatic quandaries with regard to speakers' accountability and moral profile. In terms of analytic practice though, Parker has a scant interest in the rhetorical manifestation and negotiation of the dilemmas that Billig and his colleagues have argued for. The rhetorical aspects of the dilemma of prejudice are rather analytically underdeveloped in Wetherell and Potter's broad sweeping concern with the interpretative resources. And Edwards and Potter, explicitly chose not to focus on the ideological dimension of the rhetorical dilemmas manifested within the micro structures of talk and the organization of texts.

A clarification is needed here. My rather brief and sketchy outline of the shifting methodological and theoretical terrains and eclectic allegiances to be found within the turn to language in social psychology is not meant to be heard as a criticism. Rather, my aim is to provide a brief introductory outline of the productive tensions and overlappings between these different approaches to the turn to language in social psychology and to justify my own eclectic approach in the construction of my methodological frame of analysis. In this chapter, I shall pick up aspects of the content and organization based approaches to discourse analysis, which will be relevant to my own research project.

After this clarification, two disclaimers are in order. In the course of discussing these approaches to discourse analysis within social psychology, I am going to blackbox (cf. Latour & Woolgar, 1979) two sets of concerns and areas of theoretical controversy. Each of the these approaches that I will consider has been proposed as an alternative to mainstream (social) psychological assumptions, theories and research practices. Of course, they differ both in what they propose as an alternative mode of (social) psychological enterprise as well as, most importantly, in what they see as (the
properties of) the object to be deconstructed (cf. contributions in Parker & Shotter, 1990). Nevertheless, they do share a critique of psychological reductionism and cognitivism. Although it is not clear that all these approaches could be subsumed under the banner of anti-cognitivism (cf. Edwards, 1997; Harre, & Gillet, 1995; Still & Costall, 1991), they may all be considered non-cognitive in their perspective and analytic practice. However, for the purposes of my analysis, I will blackbox the question whether the discursive phenomena I will be working with attest to underlying cognitive processes or not. Put simply, I am not engaging in a dialogue with mainstream social psychology in order to ascertain the theoretical or methodological merits of a discursive approach. Instead, in my project I capitalise upon the establishment of the turn to language as a substantiated and principled alternative to mainstream social psychology and I will be engaging with different theoretical and research traditions within it in order to pursue my research question.

The second area of controversy which I will bracket concerns the philosophical underpinnings and differences between the different perspectives within the turn to language in social psychology. The epistemological, meta-theoretical debates within the turn to language in social psychology that I have alluded to reflect wider debates within the humanities and social sciences, ranging from philosophy and literary theory (e.g. Bhaskar, 1989; Derrida, 1977a,b; Wittgenstein, 1953) to social anthropology, folklore and cultural studies (e.g. Bauman & Briggs, 1990; Bronner, 1988; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Ferguson & Golding, 1997). A discussion of them, let alone the defence of an explicit argumentative stance, goes far beyond the needs and limits of my current project. I take it that the practical upshot of the relevant (often "Byzantine" type of) debates within the turn to language in social psychology is, using Edley and Wetherell's (1997) words, "get on with it" and that is what I shall be attempting to do throughout my analysis.
2. Analysis of discourse(s): Texts, ideology and power

Within the turn to language that social psychology has been witnessing during the last ten years or so, Ian Parker is the author that is most commonly referred to as being influenced by post-structuralism in his elaborations on discourse analysis (cf. Antaki, 1994; Burr, 1995). In his writings he explicitly makes the case and stresses the linkages of his work with the work of Derrida (e.g. Parker, 1988) or, more often, Foucault (e.g. Parker, 1989a,b; 1992). Nevertheless, post-structuralism with its ensuing emphasis on discourse and texts is not the sole theoretical resource that Parker draws upon in outlining his version of discourse analysis. A Marxist / Althusserian conception of ideology is also invoked in his writings in order to complement the Foucauldian couplet of power / knowledge. In what follows, I will outline Parker's Foucauldian perspective in order to ascertain what aspects of that could be conducive to my own analytic concerns.

2.1. Discourse analysis and discourse definition

According to Parker (1989b; 1990a,b; 1992) discourse analysis is, or rather, should be a politically informed, radical enterprise. It is described as a welcome outcome of the crisis debates that social psychology went through in the 1970s (cf. Armistead, 1974; Harre' & Secord, 1972) and of the early attempts to refashion the discipline along the theoretical postulates of hermeneutics (Shotter, 1975) and structuralism (Harre, 1979). In the writings of these new paradigm authors, language - either as a field of joint activity in the production and negotiation of meaning (hermeneutics) or as the underlying structure which informs the activities of social actors (structuralism)- has been seen as playing a preeminent role in the phenomena that social psychology has been traditionally dealing with. Nevertheless, as Parker argues, these early accounts failed to acknowledge and provide for an analysis of meaning in terms of power. And this is the gap that discourse analysis comes, or should come, to fill in.

According to Parker (1992; see also Burman & Parker, 1993), there is nothing inherently politically radical in discourse analysis. Its radical potential emerges as a function of the "conceptual work" that should precede and intersect its actual application. It is the moral task of the social psychologists who take aboard a discourse analytic perspective to develop analyses which will be critical of psychology as a discipline, which will highlight the workings of power (here both as productive in a Foucauldian sense and as oppressive in a Marxist one) and offer a sustained
ideology critique in the field of their application. Discourse analysis, according to Parker, should avoid being recast as one more "academic" tool in the armoury of psychology (see also, Burman, 1991) and should become a variant of action research aiming towards progressive political directions by transforming the discipline of psychology as a whole and putting it into the services of the marginalised and the oppressed. In Parker's argument, the first crucial step in setting towards such a politically radical direction is the definition of discourse.

According to Parker (1992:3), "discourse analysis strikes a critical distance from language, and one useful aspect of the approach is the reflexivity urged upon a researcher, and reader". This reflexivity involves a constant interrogation of the terms in which certain texts are formulated, a contemplation about alternative terms that may had been used but were actually not, an interrogation of the connotations availed by the specific terminology used and an elaboration on how these fit to certain ways of describing the world. This reflexivity should not merely come to be an academic, textual exercise; it should be historically grounded.

Drawing upon the genealogical / archeological work of Foucault (1971; 1977; 1981) and of his followers (Rose, 1985; 1989), Parker (1992) puts forward a dual argument. On the one hand, that these detailed archive studies highlight the ways in which discourses of individual pathology, madness and individual responsibility emerged in the nineteenth century as descriptive and prescriptive categories in tandem with techniques of discipline and surveillance. On the other hand, that "discourses do not simply describe the social world, but categorise it, they bring phenomena into sight". According to Parker, by looking at the historical constitution of discourses it becomes apparent that they are "quite coherent" and they are furthermore "systematised" in their academic elaboration and their common sense, everyday appropriation. As it happens then, the working definition of discourse that Parker puts forward is one which holds it to be "a coherent system of statements which constructs an object". Consequently, the task of discourse analysis is to:

"deliberately systematise different ways of talking so we can understand them better. A study of discourse dynamics takes off from this to look at the tensions within discourses and the way they reproduce and transform the world" (Parker, 1992:5).

Nevertheless, as Parker argues, this definition of discourse and of the enterprise of discourse analysis needs to be supported by a number of criteria, which should be used, on the one hand, in order to help analysts in the identification of the "object" of their study and, on the other, to enable them to engage "with, and in, discourse analysis".
2.2. Criteria for distinguishing discourses

Parker outlines seven initial *sine qua non* criteria for distinguishing discourses. The first one pertains to his contention that "a discourse is realised in texts". He warns us though that discourses as such cannot be found. What analysts encounter are fragments of discourses realised within "texts", or, "fields of meaning" of a wide variety, ranging from talk in interaction to architecture. The task of the analyst then is to interpret, describe these texts and explore the connotations, allusions and implications which the texts evoke. Parker's second criterion calls for an appreciation of Foucault's (1972; 49) contention that "discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak". Therefore, the analyst has to both describe as well as interrogate the objects referred to in texts.

With the third criterion, attention is drawn to the subjects contained in discourses. As Parker (1992:9) argues "a discourse makes available a space for particular types of self to step in". Taking aboard Althusser's (1971a) argument of the ways in which ideology operates, Parker maintains that the discourses which inhabit texts "hail" us, "shout" at us and make us listen as certain types of persons. Discourses also position us as subjects by means of the different rights and expectations placed on us when we are addressed as subjects of a certain kind. Parker recognises that, of course, there is space for *resistance*; nevertheless, as he argues, even resistance stems from prior positioning. The analyst, therefore, has to specify what sorts of persons are talked in a discourse and to speculate on what can be said within that discourse.

Parker's fourth criterion calls for an understanding of discourse as "a coherent system of meanings". The metaphors, analogies and pictures that a discourse invokes in depicting a particular "object" can be distilled into statements. These can be given coherence by the analyst, by virtue of his reliance on culturally available understandings on what constitutes a topic. With his fifth criterion, Parker draws attention to the reflexive nature of language, which he associates with the contradictions within a discourse. As he argues discourses entail and presuppose other discourses. These contradictions raise the question of what other discourses are at work. The task of the analyst, therefore, is to juxtapose and contemplate on the different objects that different discourses constitute and find the overlapping points.
With Parker's sixth criterion attention is drawn to the reflexive moves instantiated within texts and, in particular, talk. These may range from denials of the type "don't get me wrong" to lengthy justifications of the expressed views, which imply a particular moral / political position. Parker suggests that these reflexive moments within a text should be picked upon by the analyst, should be related to other texts where the same discourse is reflexively commented upon and this analytic process may endow the analyst with the confidence that what she is dealing with is a discrete discourse of a particular kind. With the last of his seven initial criteria for identifying discourses Parker points to the historicity of the discourses to be picked out from texts by aspiring discourse analysts. As he argues, the "objects" to which discourses refer to have been constituted in the past by this or related discourses and "a discourse refers to past references to those objects" (op.cit.:16). Consequently, the analyst should consider how and where a discourse emerged and the historical changes that precipitated their emergence.

According to Parker, these seven criteria are both necessary and sufficient for identifying discourses. Nevertheless, as he argues, there are three more criteria, corresponding to additional aspects of discourse(s) which should (for moral / political reasons) also be taken into consideration. The first of these, refers to the relationship between discourses and institutions. As Parker maintains, not all discourses are implicated with the structure of institutions. The ones which are, as he notes, are the more interesting ones. As an example he brings the discourse of medicine. This discourse, as Parker argues, is manifested in texts of a wide variety and in practice its employment (more often than not) reproduces the material basis of the institution. The analyst, therefore, ought to identify the institutions that are reinforced when a particular discourse is used and the institutions that are attacked when a particular discourse appears.

The next political criterion for distinguishing discourses, pertain to discourses' role in the reproduction of power relations. Parker acknowledges that "we should speak about discourse and power in the same breath". However, he goes on to assert that these two are not the same thing. His concern is that the conflation of the two terms entails the danger of thinking that "power is everywhere" and voicing Poulantzas' (1978) argument, maintains that this would render power as a pointless category to refer to and would also make attempts to attack it appear futile. According to Parker there are three good reasons why power and discourse should not be thought as necessarily entailing one another. First, because in this way an understanding of power as coercive and resistance as the refusal of dominant meanings would be lost. Second, because in so doing it would be difficult to appreciate how discourses challenging power are often tangled in oppressive
discourses. And, third, because in this way it would be difficult for discourse analysts to align themselves with and contribute to the empowerment "of those at the sharp end of dominant discourses and practices". Therefore, a politically informed discourse analysis should aim at identifying the categories of people that gain and lose from the employment of a certain discourse and the groups of people who would be willing to promote and dissolve a certain discourse.

With the last political criterion, Parker draws attention to the ideological effect of discourses. His complaint is that within discourse analysis, and largely due to Foucault's influence, the concept of ideology has largely disappeared. As he argues though, the use of the concept of ideology has "progressive political effects" and that one need not "buy the whole [Marxist] package" of "false consciousness" with its -putative- juxtaposition to the concept of "truth". As long as discourse analysts are prepared to use the category of ideology, Parker warns that there are two traps that should be avoided. The first one is the conflation of ideology with belief system. In so doing, either ideology is rendered as being everywhere with the consequence that attempts to resist existing power relations are recast as equally ideological as the practices which sustain them or political stances come to be equated with individual choices. For Parker, both options are equally ideological. The second trap that Parker points to is the danger of trying to distinguish between discourses which are ideological and ones who speak the truth. For him this entails the reification of ideology, its treatment as being a "thing". As Parker argues,

we should see ideology [...] as a description of relationships and effects, and the category should be employed to describe relationships at a particular place and historical period (Parker, 1992: 20; italics in original).

The example of Christian discourse is used and Parker maintains that at times this can be seen as ideological, say, in cases where it is shown that it supports racism, and as empowering in cases where it informs libertarian politics. Radical discourse analysts then should explicate how a discourse connects with other discourses which buttress oppression and the ways in which certain discourses legitimate the stories that dominant groups tell of the past in order to justify the present.

2.3. Analysis of discourse(s) and research on the rhetorical deployment of Greek national identity

Looking at Ian Parker's outline of discourse analysis from the vantage point of my own research project, I cannot help but be ambivalent about it. As a matter of fact it would be all too easy to
bypass it as irrelevant. My project has not been designed to be a variant of action research and no prior "conceptual work" has been undertaken in the direction of Parker's parameters of a politically informed, radical discourse analysis. Moreover, my very working assumption that discourses of modern Greek national identity would inform the rhetorical practices of my research participants and, therefore, substantial analytic attention need to be paid to the organization of their talk, might be problematic from the point of view of Parker's approach.

Arguably, the central point of divergence between Parker's approach and the research questions that my project seeks to answer is the different understandings of ideology that underpin them. Despite Parker's disclaimer that the Marxist understanding of "false consciousness" and its juxtaposition to "truth" needs not to be bought as a "package deal" by discourse analysts, the outline of his approach is infused with the revelatory, missionary tone of classical Marxist ideology critique. Discourses become ideological at the moment that they are deployed by dominant social groups in order to have their story (which reiterates social inequality) legitimated. Consequently, the task of the analyst is to unveil the ideological operation of discourses and align herself with the marginalised and the oppressed. Of course, such an understanding of ideology is not rare within contemporary social theory. Nevertheless, it is far from uncontroversial (cf. Eagleton, 1991; Zizek, 1994) and its adoption by discourse analysts has not remained unchallenged (Condor, 1997c; see also Billig et al., 1988). In any case, it is not my task here to address its shortcomings. Suffice it to point out that the understanding of ideology that underpin my research question is a different one.

My reliance on Herzfeld's (1987) critical ethnography, which highlights the symbolic oppositions of ideological images, discourses and stereotypes within a range of cultural practices in modern Greece and on Billig's (1995) analyses on the naturalisation of national ideology within the mundane course of everyday life accounts for my research concern with the reproduction of the ideological assumptions of Greek national identity within talk. Two things should also be stressed here. First, that according to Herzfeld's analyses the hegemonic assumptions of orientalism are shown to be reproduced within modern Greece in the discourse and cultural practices of both Westernisers and their anti-Western critics. Second, that according to Billig's argument, the assumptions of national ideology are reproduced in the discourse and practices of political parties (left wing and anti-imperialist ones included), which are fighting for hegemony within the naturalised scenery of the nation State and of the world order of nation States. In the light of these two strands of analyses, which represent a wider trend within contemporary social theoretical
discussion of ideology, Parker's argument about the varied ideological effects of the same discourse(s) is deemed to appear rather problematic.

Notwithstanding the differences in understanding ideology that inform Parker's approach to discourse analysis and my project, there are certain aspects of Parker's outline that may be relevant for my work. For example, Parker's recourse to Foucauldian scholarship in stressing the historicity of discourses and their entanglement at the time of their emergence in institutional power / knowledge practices resembles the critical social theoretical accounts on the historical constitution of modern Greek national identity that I considered in chapter 1. After all, Said (1995) has acknowledged the influence of Foucault on his own work on orientalism. Moreover, Parker's recourse to the Althusserian concept of ideological hailing resembles Billig's argument about the numerous national flaggings that hail modern citizens as nationals. More specifically though, it is Parker's recourse to the post-structuralist concept of subject positions as a relevant concept for discourse analysis (cf. Davies & Harre, 1990; Harre & Van Langenhove, 1992; Van Langenhove & Harre, 1993) that may be useful for my analyses. Some elaboration on that is in order here.

Drawing on Foucault, Parker argues that one of the objects that discourses contain are subjects (or subject positions). To my understanding, Parker's argument implies that in cases where the texts under consideration are conversations, the subjects (or subject positions) contained in discourses would be analytically relevant both as the objects of the speakers' descriptive practices as well as the positions from where certain descriptions or arguments are levelled. In the case, say, of the discourse of orientalism, the fundamental identity polarity within this discourse between "civilised and rational occidentals" and "uncivilised, backward and exotic orientals" would provide both a resource for descriptions but would also afford for the moral (and politically consequential) stances from where certain people may be criticised as "uncivilised and backward" or praised as "civilised and rational".

We saw in chapter 1 that, according to Herzfeld, in modern Greece social actors orientalise Greek-Others' conduct laying for themselves a claim to an occidental identity. Despite the fact that the examples discussed in Parker (1992) do not compare with the subtlety of Herzfeld's analyses, it could be argued that Parker's understanding of subjects positions contained within discourses resembles Herzfeld's understanding of the moral identities at stake in the symbolic universe of
modern Greek cultural pragmatics. In that respect the post-structuralist concept of subject positions may be useful for the analyses of my conversations, where Greek research participants talk about Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others. It may be used to designate in discourse analytic terminology the (shifting) symbolic identities that Greek social actors lay a claim to when they talk about Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others, using the cultural stereotypes that the constitution of modern Greek national identity as an ambivalent one has historically afforded.

Nevertheless, as I argued in chapter 1, Herzfeld's analyses on the symbolic uses of cultural stereotypes in the context of modern Greek culture may be supplemented with a discourse analytic study of the uses social actors make cultural stereotypes within the pragmatics of interactional exchanges. In chapter 2 we saw that, according to critical social psychological approaches, the ascription of cultural stereotypes to social groups appears to be far from morally unproblematic for social actors. The moral identity of the prejudiced (-as-xenophobic) (and also, as I suggested in chapter 3, the identity of the prejudiced-as-xenomaniac) may be shown analytically to be culturally available (and hearable) identities that speakers strive to disavow in their talk while stereotypical ascriptions are made. As I suggested, the analytic tools in order to highlight the rhetorical instantiation of these ideological concerns within talk in interaction may be found within the turn to language in social psychology.

Nevertheless, Parker's approach to discourse analysis is rather inappropriate for that task. The course of analysis outlined in his approach has nothing to say about discourse in its rhetorical practice. Indeed, his understanding of discourse as "sets of statements", which need to be extracted from their textual context and synthesised by means of politically informed "conceptual work" by the analyst, distracts the analytic attention from the pragmatics of conversations. Whereas the concept of subject positions may be useful for a scholarly (cf. Billig, 1988a) or politically informed discourse analysis, as Billig et al. (1988; see also, Condor, 1996,1997a,b,d) have shown, a close attention to conversational exchanges is revealing for the speakers' concerns with their moral identities. If Parker's approach does not provide the analytic tools for dealing effectively with the rhetorical subtleties of talk in interaction, other strands of discourse analysis within social

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2 Of course, in Herzfeld's account the symbolic identities of occidental / Hellenic, oriental / Romeic are not exclusive properties of distinct social groups. As we saw in chapter 1, Herzfeld argues that the occidental State authorities, which orientalise certain social behaviours of the Greek public are themselves a subject of symbolic inversions in the everyday rhetoric of morality in which they are recast as oriental Other. Apparently, Parker's emphasis on "real" power, which is bestowed on "dominant" groups, comes at the expense of ignoring the symbolic operations of power within cultural pragmatics.
psychology do. In the next part of this chapter, I will review Potter et al.'s (1990) outline of discourse analysis, in its critical juxtaposition to Parker's approach.
3. Discourse as social practice: Discourse analysis

The second major strand of discourse analytic work within contemporary social psychology is in a strong sense more than one. Potter and Wetherell (1987), constructing the "origin myth" of their analytic framework in their by now classical introduction of discourse analysis to social psychology, have claimed a dual intellectual ancestry for their approach. Continental post-structuralist philosophy (Foucault, 1972), developments in Marxism / structuralism (Althusser, 1971b) and semiotics (Barthes, 1972; 1974) have been paired up with English analytic philosophy (Austin, 1962), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984) and conversation analysis (Sacks et al, 1974; see also, Sacks, 1992) in an as much inspiring as controversial "arranged marriage".

An important consequence of bringing together these "rather ill-matched parents" (Potter & Wetherell, 1995: 81) is that the offspring, discourse analysis, has developed a twin focus. Subsequent studies have either focused, rather exclusively, on the resources / content of talk (e.g. Wetherell & Potter, 1992) or, again rather exclusively, on discourse practices (Edwards & Potter, 1992a; see also Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996a). Despite the fact that in a recent account of discourse analysis Potter and Wetherell (1995) insist that this distinction just marks out "different shades of research emphasis" and that "answering DA questions usually necessitates a combined focus on discursive practices and resources" (p. 81), commentators on the developments of discourse analysis within social psychology take a different view.

For Antaki (1994), Wetherell and Potter's (1992) work, with its emphasis on interpretative repertoires falls (albeit rather uneasily) within the boundaries of a content based approach along with the work of Ian Parker on discourse(s). Instead, Edwards and Potter's (1992a) work it is suggested that should better be seen as an organisation based one (cf. Burr, 1995). In order to deal effectively with this divergence in analytic scope and emphasis, I will consider these two (sub-) strands of discourse analytic work separately, starting with the work of Wetherell and Potter.

3.1. The study of discourse as social practice: Function, variation and construction

Potter et al. (1990; see also, Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 89-93) have centred their critical objections to Ian Parker's approach to discourse analysis on two issues: on Parker's conceptualisation of
discourse and on issues pertaining to analytic practice. Potter et al. maintain that Parker's reliance on Foucault's definition of discourse as "a coherent set of statements" leads him to a reified understanding of discourse. As they argue,

"Parker is endorsing something akin to the geology of plate tectonics-great plates (discourses) on the earth's crust circulate and clash together; some plates grind violently together; others slip quietly over top of one another" (Potter et al., 1990: 209).

As they point out, the limitation of such an approach is that discourses come to be understood as coherent and systematised wholes endowed with causal agency. Potter et al. acknowledge the historical twist that comes with such a Foucauldian definition of discourse(s). Nevertheless, they argue that such an understanding of discourse(s), with its overwhelming emphasis placed on the propositional function of discourse, ignores the pragmatics of language use. Discourses come to be seen as working in the abstract, automatically producing objects and subjects. What it excludes is any attention to "the actual working of discourse as a constitutive part of social practices situated in specific contexts" (p. 209; italics in original).

For Potter et al., an ethnomethodological injection in the understanding of discourse is deemed necessary: discourse should also be seen in its local action orientation (Heritage, 1984). Potter et al. argue that Parker is able to recommend a direct apprehension of discourses only because of his reified understanding of them. For them, it is not clear how the set of statements that a discourse consists are derived from current texts. Moreover, they argue that the very "preliminary" analytic task of "creating texts" is problematic since it involves a lot of unexplicated interpretative work on behalf of the analyst (see also, Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). Potter and Wetherell (1992: 90) maintain that an understanding of discourse as social practice has some important implications for the course of analysis.

The context of situated use of discourse is seen as the primary analytic resource for deciding on the meaning of text and talk, as opposed to analytic claims about meaning arrived at by considering the abstract organisation of a discourse into sets of statements. Hence, the course of analytic practice is overturned. Instead of deriving discourses from texts, by means of unexplicated interpretative practices, and then seeing how these discourses work together and against each other in the abstract realm of discursive formations, the analyst is urged to focus on the workings of these discourses in actual settings. Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995: 62) in a similar vein criticise Parker's recommended analytic practices as exhibiting a tendency towards what they call ascriptivism:

\[
\text{ascriptivism}
\]
"imputing a discourse to texts (or bits of speech and writing) without explicating the basis for that imputation. Consequently, empirical analyses tend to gloss the social functions of language use, rather than describing them".

The postulate that language should be approached analytically in its action orientation has been a constituent element of Potter and Wetherell's (1987) approach to discourse analysis. For them, language or discourse is both a means for and a field where social actions are taking place and, as such, should constitute a topic of research in its own right. In order to substantiate and set to highlight analytically the action orientation of discourse, Potter and Wetherell suggest that discourse analysis should involve some consideration of three major aspects of discourse: function, variation and construction.

**Function**

Potter and Wetherell's understanding of the action orientation of language has been substantiated by reference to arguments and empirical findings ranging from analytic philosophy (e.g. Austin, 1962) to detailed analyses of talk in interaction by conversation analysts (e.g. Sacks et al., 1974). Arguing for the performative dimension of language, Potter and Wetherell start their discussion with Austin's speech act theory and its tenet that all utterances both describe things and "do" things. They also point out to the major role that studies in ethnomethodology (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967; Wieder, 1974) have played in shifting the social scientific attention from language as an explanatory resource for scientific accounts to an object of study in its own right. As they maintain, within ethnomethodology, lay explanations and accounts are not enlisted as resources for the development and the substantiation of academic theories but are becoming the object of study and analytic scrutiny.

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3 In one account of their analytic method (i.e. Wetherell & Potter, 1988), the authors explicitly supplement their notion of function in the speech act / conversation analytic sense with an understanding of function in terms of ideological unintended consequences. As they argue,

"The discourse analyst incorporates both of these aspects under the general term function. We can think of a continuum from more 'interpersonal' functions such as explaining, justifying, excusing, blaming and so on, which define the local discursive context, to the wider purposes discourse might serve - where, for instance, a social analyst might wish to describe an account, very broadly, as having a particular kind of ideological effect in the sense of legitimating the power of one group in a society" (p. 169: italics and quotation marks in original).

Nevertheless, since in previous and also subsequent accounts of theirs the ideological effects of discourse is exclusively discussed with regard to the concept of interpretative repertoires, I shall ignore here this injection.
Conversation analysis\textsuperscript{4} constitutes the most important resource for Potter and Wetherell in substantiating their argument about the functions that language performs in its use. Conversation analysis focuses on the minutiae and sequential character of talk in interaction. Potter and Wetherell arrive at conversation analysis after having examined Austin's (1961) work on accounts, the development of his ideas within sociology (e.g. Hewitt & Stokes, 1975; Scott & Lyman, 1968) and the recent at the time social psychological overview of the accounts literature provided by Semin and Manstead (1983). Running the danger of oversimplifying matters, Potter and Wetherell's argument about the relevance of conversation analysis for the model of discourse analysis they were proposing can be summed up as follows.

The typologies of accounts, which followed in the wake of Austin's, have been most fruitfully reworked within the empirical frame of conversation analysis. This is so because the latter approach treats accounts as occasioned features of talk and seeks to understand the way they work by paying due attention to their sequential positioning. In order to illustrate the importance of the sequential organisation of talk for the understanding of the ways in which accounts work, Potter and Wetherell (1987) considered briefly two key empirical findings in conversation analysis: the finding that talk in interaction is organised around adjacent pairs of utterances and that this organisation is regulated by a powerful preference structure. Taking into consideration a range of examples from classical studies in the field, Potter and Wetherell drew attention on the one hand, to the normative manner in which accounts crop up within the sequential unfolding of talk and, on the other, to the subtle and varied interactional work they are designed to perform.

As it transpires from the records of conversation analytic studies, accounts are conversational events which appear after a dispreferred second turn. When, for example, requests are followed by refusals, assessments by disagreements and questions by unexpected answers (cf. Levinson, 1983: 336), then the interactional space is opened for an account to appear. With respect to the normative expectations about the preferred second turn that first turns raise, accounts are structurally designed to provide for the reasons why the preferred second turn could not be given\textsuperscript{5}. Evidently, as Potter

\textsuperscript{4} See for example, Sacks (1992); Sacks et al. (1974); Atkinson and Heritage (1984); Drew and Heritage (1992); and for reviews, Antaki (1994); Goodwin and Heritage (1990); Levinson (1983); Psathas (1995).

\textsuperscript{5} It should be pointed out here that the notions of preference, preferred and dispreferred second turns and normative expectations do not have a psychological or even statistical meaning as to the speakers' or hearers' individual preferences or to what statistically is mostly probable to follow a certain first turn. As Levinson points out, they are closely linked to the linguistic concept of markedness:
and Wetherell point out, in the process of doing so, the formulation of accounts involves a wealth of constructive work. Versions of the world, its (relevant) features and its constrains are mobilised as well as versions of selves, their motives or lack of them and of the constrains impinging on them. Since accounts are oriented to different functions then, as a rule of the thumb, it could be expected that close examination of extended sequences of talk or of talk over time and different contexts should reveal analytically a considerable variation.

Variation
For Potter and Wetherell, the notion of variability in discourse is both an analytic heuristic as well as a theoretical prediction based on the conversation analytic finding that talk in interaction is designed to accomplish variable local functions. At its simplest, it is predicated upon the intuitive assumption (and is testified to in the empirical finding) that any single "object", be it event, person, group, political issue will be described differently depending on the different things that people may be doing by means of its description. As Wetherell and Potter (1988) argue, for discourse analysis variation can be seen analytically as both an index of the social functions of language in its use as well as an index of the constructive work done in talk.

Construction
In early accounts (i.e. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1988), it has been argued that the metaphor of construction is of central importance both for understanding the workings of discourse and the analytic focus of discourse analysis for three reasons. First, because it alerts the analyst to consider the constructed dimension of discourse. It brings attention to the fact that language in its use mobilises pre-existing linguistic resources. Second, it cues the analyst to the point that a process of active selection is ongoing when discourse is unfolded. Out of the variable resources that could be drawn upon, only certain of them are being used while others are silenced. Third, it establishes the conceptual linkage of discourse analysis with social constructionism more generally.

Potter and Wetherell's discussion of construction as a central feature of discourse and as a fundamental concern for discourse analysis relates back to their claim that structuralism, semiotics and post-structuralism constitute the other parental half to ethnomethodology and conversation.

*In essence, preferred seconds are unmarked -they occur as structurally simpler turns; in contrast dispreferred seconds are marked by various kinds of structural complexity. Thus dispreferred seconds are
analysis for their approach. In Potter and Wetherell (1987), semiotics has been argued to provide a radical departure from models of language which seek to conceptualise the generation of meaning as a consequence of the relation of "words" to "objects". For them, the structuralist tenet that it is the underlying system of oppositions and differences (la langue) that gives meaning to specific words (signs) has some important implications for the discourse analytic study of descriptions / accounts. As they maintain, it calls attention not only to the words, metaphors and narrative forms used but also to the ones that are absent. Construction then, as active selection draws analytic attention to the absent other term(s), against which accounts and descriptions gain their meaning.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged impetus that the "parental" influence of semiotics provides discourse analysis with, Potter and Wetherell (1987) are quick to notice that semiological analyses raise many question with regard to their empirical basis. In particular, the search for absent terms begs the question of over reliance on analytic intuition. Potter and Wetherell make the point that it is the overwhelming emphasis of structuralism / semiotics on language as a system (la langue) and the ensuing theoretical / empirical underestimation of language in use (la parole) that lies at the heart of the problem. As they argue, an empirical programme of discourse analysis could be envisaged, that would retain much of the semiotic emphasis on the underlying structure of language as well as having more attention paid to language use.

A more elaborate account of what construction may mean within the context of discourse analysis is given in Wetherell and Potter (1992: 94-98). There, they argue that three different senses of the term may be distinguished. At its most simplest, construction may be seen as referring to the referential property of language. Referential terms or full blown descriptions may be argued that construct their objects in the sense that speakers come to be concerned not with language but with the objects that language use invokes. According to Wetherell and Potter, the second much more satisfactory sense in which construction should be understood relates more closely to poststructuralist analyses on the textual effects of realism. The general argument here, as they put it, "has realism as a product of historically developed familiarity in the use of discourses" or what they have been calling interpretative repertoires (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 94).

Developing on their earlier critique of the static and idealised character of semiotic analyses, Wetherell and Potter (1992) suggest a third sense in which the concept of construction should be typically delivered: (a) after some significant delay; (b) with some marking their dispreferred status, often the particle well [...](Levinson, 1983: 307; emphasis in original).
understood and inform empirical analyses. For them, post-structuralist accounts provide for a rough "outline sketch waiting to have the colours filled in". The argument they put forward is that there is a third, rhetorical sense of construction, which works in a complementary manner to aid discourses or interpretative repertoires in their deployment in texts or talk to produce effects of realism. In Wetherell and Potter's view, it is not merely the historical familiarity of certain discourses (or interpretative codes or interpretative repertoires) which makes certain accounts or versions of reality appear literal and real. Beyond that, it is the way in which these resources are organised in texts and talk by means of a wealth of rhetorical devices that warrant versions and give them a solid factual sense. It is important to emphasise here that it is with this third rhetorical sense of construction that Potter and Wetherell's overall argument about the action orientation of discourse, both in the local conversation analytic sense as well as in the broader / historical post-structuralist one, comes to be fleshed out.

Wetherell and Potter argue that the post-structuralist tenet that texts are structured around absences (i.e. other discourses which are silenced when familiar discourses are textually present) fits with the rhetorical meta-theory on language use suggested by Billig (1987; 1991). Billig's suggestion that arguments (versions of the world) are not merely assembled in talk in order to put forward a position but are also designed to work against (often implicit) argumentative alternatives is seen as providing the grounding that makes the post-structuralist analyses about the organisation of language as a system relevant for an empirical programme on language in its use. Wetherell and Potter (1992) associate the absences and silenced Other discourses analytically attested to in post-structuralist accounts with the implicit counter themes that as Billig has argued can be analytically detected in the level of casual talk or argumentation.

Moreover, while they see the premises of Billig's rhetorical psychology as complementary to post-structuralist accounts, they also argue that it works in a complimentary fashion to conversation analysis. As they point out, conversation analysis underplays the importance of tensions and conflicts as structural (and structuring) elements in talk and a rhetorical injection could only compensate for that. Overall, using the notion of rhetorical construction as the intermediate third term between post-structuralism and conversation analysis, Wetherell and Potter (1992) outline the grounds for a discourse analysis, which should pay equal attention to resources (discourses or interpretative repertoires) and practices (local functions of discourse). The concept of interpretative repertoire(s) and the call for an empirical focus on the rhetorical organization of talk and text have been argued to present complementary aspects of discourse analysis. Nevertheless, in terms of
actual research practice they have sustained separate empirical programmes of research. Let us consider first why Potter, Wetherell and their colleagues prefer the concept of interpretative repertoires to discourse(s) and then how the concept of interpretative repertoires is implemented in actual analytic practice.

3.2. Interpretative repertoires: Abstractions from practices in context

Potter et al. (1990: 212) argue that it is not the term discourse(s) used by Parker that they find problematic but the assumptions underlying it in Parker's use. As we saw, their main concern with Parker's account of discourse analysis is its tendency to reification. As Potter et al. argue, by defining discourse(s) as regulated systems or sets of statements which construct objects, there is little room left for an analytic concern with the discursive practices within which objects are constructed and which outline the parameters of their specific discursive articulation. For them, discourse analysis should capitalise upon the clear tension between seeing people as active users of discourse and seeing discourse as enabling and constraining. As they put it: "discourse analysis studies how people use discourse and how discourse uses people" (Potter et al., 1990: 213). To that end, they argue that despite the fact that the term discourse(s) is useful and they often use it in order to signal linkages with the semiological / post-structuralist tradition, they prefer the concept of interpretative repertoires which, designates "abstractions from practices in context" (Potter et al., 1990: 209; italics in original).

Maybe the most elaborate definition of interpretative repertoires is provided in Wetherell and Potter (1992). As they state⁶,

"By interpretative repertoire we mean broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images. In more structuralist language we can talk of these things as systems of signification and as the building blocks used for manufacturing versions of actions, self and social structures in talk. They are some of the resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions. Interpretative repertoires are pre-eminently a way of understanding the content of discourse and how that content is organised. Although stylistic and grammatical elements are sometimes closely associated with this organization, [the] analytic focus is not a linguistic one; it is concerned with language use, what is achieved by that use and the nature of the interpretative resources that allow that achievement" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 90-91; italics in original).

⁶ While this particular definition is the most inclusive one compared to all the others provided in different texts, it is worth noticing that in Potter et al. (1990: 212) the definition provided also includes as a constituent feature of interpretative repertoires the rhetorical notion of common places (cf. Billig, 1987).
According to Potter et al. (1990: 212), the concept of interpretative repertoires emphasises the flexibility of language in its use in a way that the concept of discourse(s) organised in sets of statements fails to do. The suitable metaphor for interpretative repertoires, as they maintain, is a choreographic one. Interpretative repertoires resemble the array of available moves that a ballet or an ice dancer have at their disposal (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 92). From a wide array of (interpretative) moves, particular ones may be selected in a way that fits effectively to the contingencies of the discursive context. In this manner, the focus of analysis is shifted. Instead of deriving discourses from texts and theorise about their workings in the abstract, the emphasis is placed "on the implementation of those discourses in actual settings" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 90). As they stress, interpretative repertoires do not have an ascribed use value. They can be used in contrasting ways to sustain different argumentative practices and, in so doing, they provide for a flexible patchwork of resources which can be mobilised both for the legitimation as well as the discrediting of certain ideological / oppressive social and political practices.

The acclaimed flexibility of interpretative repertoires as opposed to the notion of discourse(s) has been, rather classically, argued for in Wetherell and Potter's (1992: 91) work on race relations in New Zealand. The example they discuss in order to substantiate the point relates to their white New Zealanders respondents' elaborations and uses of the notion of "culture" in their talk about the Maoris. As Wetherell and Potter noted, talk on culture was a recurring topic within their interview material. Nevertheless, while the very term culture and allusions to that were frequently cropping up in their interviewees' talk, Maori culture came to be constructed in (amongst others) two distinctively different ways. On occasions, it came to be constructed "as heritage" and on others "as therapy". In its first version, Maori culture was argued to consist in the assemblage of traditions, rituals and values being passed from one generation to the other. It was rendered to designate something akin to a species in danger of extinction and in need to be preserved. In its second version, culture was described as something that contemporary Maoris have lost within the State structure and capitalist economy of New Zealand and as something that they need to rediscover in order to become "whole" again.

The point that Wetherell and Potter draw attention to is that whereas in the abstract these two different constructions of culture fit easily together, within the unfolding of the interviews they were drawn upon selectively. This was so, as they argue, not because the interviewees could not possibly reconcile them conceptually but because they were employed within different argumentative courses of actions. They entailed different objects and subjects and implied different
upshots with regard to contemporary New Zealand debates on social policy. The merits, then, of attending analytically to discourses-as-interpretative repertoires-as-abstractions from practices in context are, according to Wetherell and Potter, clearly highlighted. Deriving these two different discourses on culture from the "texts" of the interview materials and, subsequently, theorising about them in the abstract could be positively misleading. What is important is to highlight the argumentative practices that these discourses come to inform within the unfolding of the interviews. Of course, as they point out, in order for the ideological thrust of these local argumentative practices to be substantiated, their linkages with the broad ideological framework of liberalism, the dilemmas that this sustains (Billig et. al, 1988), the colonial history of New Zealand and contemporary social and political debates within it on racial matters and social policies needs also to be explicated.

There is an important corollary issue pertaining to their argument about the flexibility of interpretative repertoires and the workings of ideology that Wetherell and Potter take some note of. On the one hand, they are keen to go as far as to argue that it is important to substitute the concept of ideological practice for that of ideologies (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 173).

"Discourse and argument become ideological at the moment of mobilisation. It does not seem particularly useful, in this context, as in other contexts, to describe particular types of arguments as inherently ideological, that is, as inherently orientated towards the maintenance of unequal power relations" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 186).

On the other hand, they are quick to notice that the argument about flexibility and variability should not be over-stressed. As they argue,

"Due to historical precedent, some practices of argumentation and some interpretative resources do seem inexorably directed to some agendas, and in that sense become almost (but not quite) inherently ideological" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 173).

Indeed, the main analytic concern in Wetherell and Potter (1992) has been to show how discursive resources, interpretative repertoires or common places which hinge upon liberal notions of individual rights, equality and practical rationality are used to support "illiberal" stances within wider current debates in New Zealand on topics like the future of affirmative action policies, land disputes, the teaching of Maori language at schools and Maori seats in parliament. With respect to that, the mobilisation of "liberal" resources is argued to sustain arguments which legitimate the maintenance of unequal power relations and the dominance of Pakeha New Zealanders. If "liberal" resources can have ideological effects and work towards the maintenance of "illiberal" oppressive practices then the opposite can also happen. Wetherell and Potter point out that, in common with some strands within the feminist movement, the political rhetoric of some activist Maori groups
within contemporary New Zealand draws upon essentialist biological assumptions in order propagate their political, anti-racist struggle.

Evidently, the understanding of ideology that underlies Wetherell and Potter's account is rather similar to the one taken aboard in Parker's approach to discourse analysis. Their concern is also with the ideological effects that certain argumentative practices (may) have in the wider social and political arena and not with the ideological assumptions that may underlie certain local argumentative practices. Of course, Wetherell and Potter do criticise Parker for his "theorising in the abstract" on the ideological effects that certain discourses may have. In Wetherell and Potter's account of their own analytic practices, they claim that they avoid falling in the same trap as Parker by paying due consideration on the (local) rhetorical organization and argumentative thrust of discursive practices. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that what they claim as doing in theory may not be what they do in actual analytic practice.

3.3. From discourse analytic theory to discourse analytic practice

As I have already mentioned, in overviews of the discourse analytic literature within social psychology Wetherell and Potter's (1992) work is commonly lumped together with the work of Ian Parker as a content based approach to discourse analysis. Obviously, the grounds for this classification lie upon their stated interest in that work to "map the broad sweep of sense making about race that goes right across a culture [and] to characterise the dominant discourses of majority group members in New Zealand" (p. 97). Notably, the above stated quote from their text is located within that part of their book where they elaborated upon the rhetorical sense of the term construction which they described as a necessary feature of discourse analysis since they see it as "central to the mobilisation of meaning and the development of argumentative practice". Nevertheless, as they state, in the analytic part of their book most of their emphasis would be placed on the overall pattern of discourses or interpretative repertoires.

The rather obvious question that may be raised is if indeed the rhetorical (and sequential cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992a; 1993) organization of talk is "central for the mobilisation of meaning and the development of argumentative practice" (or even better, for the grounding of analytic claims about the mobilisation of meaning and the development of argumentative practice) then how it is possible by underplaying its importance to arrive at analytic conclusions about the mobilisation of
interpretative repertoires or discourses without doing what Parker has been criticised for doing. That is, reading on the surface of texts deriving content components from it (be they called interpretative repertoires or discourses) and then by means of theoretical / political arguments examine how these repertoires or discourses fit within wider social or political debates and work towards the reproduction of societal patterns of domination (i.e. what Potter et al. and Wetherell and Potter would call "theorising in the abstract"). Widdicombe and Wooffitt's (1995) charge of ascriptivism for discourse analytic work in the tradition of Parker (1992) seems to me equally relevant for the work of Wetherell and Potter (1992) as well. At least in principle.

The analysis presented in Wetherell and Potter (1992) has often been criticised for its failure to treat their interviewees' talk in its sequential positioning (cf. Antaki, 1994; Condor et al., 1990; Leudar & Antaki, 1996a). Indeed, the prevailing mode of unfolding their analyses has been the presentation of lengthy extracts of participants' talk, more often than not, without stating the actual question that triggered that talk in the first place. Nevertheless, if indeed talk in interaction is rhetorically organized and analytic claims about the meaning of utterances and accounts should be grounded with respect to their occasioned positioning, then some provision should be made in the direction of explicating the argumentative thrust and context of specific accounts. Speaking about argumentative thrust, I do not mean the wider social debates with which the content of an utterance seems to resonate with. Rather, I mean the argumentative thrust of an utterance within the context of its interactional occurrence. In order to exemplify my point, let me consider an example of Wetherell and Potter's analytic practices. The following extract is chosen, more or less randomly.

James: Yeah, that's sort of, sort of like the argument about the Ministry of Women's Affairs (yes) uh it's an unequal thing having a Ministry of Women's Affairs, why don't we have a Ministry of Men's Affairs? Um and I think to a certain extent the same applies, we have we have a Maoris land courts, we have um Maoris can get uh loans from the department of Maori Affairs, that sort of thing. Well I don't see why they can't just go to the housing court like everyone else? (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 182).

This extract comes in that part of Wetherell and Potter's analysis where they discuss the sedimentation within Pakeha New Zealanders' common sense of interpretative resources which can be linked back to the main tenets of liberal ideology, namely "equality, freedom and individual rights". Both immediately before and after this extract what is unfolded is Wetherell and Potter's argument about the conceptual tensions within the ideological framework of liberalism. Certainly, the rhetorical positioning of this extract within Wetherell and Potter's account does its job to illustrate that (parts of) these themes (conceptually linked to the heritage of the ideology of
liberalism) are manifested within their interviewees' talk. Nevertheless, the question that in terms of their own suggestions for discourse analysis begs for an answer here is what is the interactional status of this account. Does it come as (part of) an extended second turn, where the first turn is being "read" as a threatening for the interviewee's moral (unprejudiced) identity probing question and, therefore, it can be seen analytically as a justification? Or is it an alignment with the sentiments and opinions that the interviewer may have expressed before. The opening part of the account "yeah, that's sort of..." perhaps hints towards the second option. Moreover, if attention to construction (in the rhetorical sense of the term) provides for the organizational grounding of historically familiar discourses (say, of "equality" here) within texts, then one should expect that some analytic attention is needed to highlight the way that this account is rhetorically organised in order to produce such effects of familiarity.

Presumably, within the frame of the "different shades of research emphasis" argument (Potter & Wetherell, 1995: 81) such objections could be countered as pedantic. Nevertheless, such a charge would only imply that in order to decide analytically on the meaning of certain utterances and to put forward an argument about the interpretative resources mobilised within it there is no need to consider its sequential placement (cf. Leudar & Antaki, 1996a). Or, moreover, that on certain occasions there is no need to attest analytically to the rhetorical organization that makes historically and culturally familiar discourses gain their local status of familiarity / facticity. In that respect, it could be counter-argued that the very analytic postulate for the need to attend to the sequential / rhetorical organization of talk is nothing more than a pedantic triviality that can be unproblematically bracketed off when the research emphasis is place on macro discursive phenomena. However, following the logic of Wetherell and Potter, I would think that it is exactly the discourse analytic interest in explicating the ways in which macro discursive phenomena (discourses, ideologies, interpretative resources) manifest themselves within talk and texts that necessitates an analytic emphasis on their rhetorical (and in the case of talk) also sequential organization.

A related question with regard to the analytic practices of Wetherell and Potter (1992) has to do with the status accorded to the extracts of talk that they consider. As we saw previously, Potter and Wetherell (1987) celebrated the ethnomethodological / conversation analytic approaches in which language is not used as explanatory resource mobilised to support the analyst's argument, but as a topic in its own right. Undoubtedly, in Wetherell and Potter (1992) "the broad sweep of discourses and interpretative resources" has been treated as the topic of analysis. Nevertheless, the question
arising here has to do with the status of specific segments of talk like the previous one that I considered. Placed as this is amidst an elaborate academic argument about the sedimentation of historically and culturally specific themes in contemporary common sense, and without attracting any analytic scrutiny and supporting no micro analytic claim, its mere rhetorical function is to illustrate and warrant a theoretical claim that could be put forward without it anyway. As it stands, this extract is left to speak for itself; or, rather, it speaks for itself in the way it does due to its occasioned positioning within Wetherell and Potter's narrative and argumentative course of action. In other words, it seems to me that their participants' talk is used as an explanatory resource and not as a topic of analysis. The fact that it is an explanatory resource for theoretical claims about interpretative (discursive) resources and not, say, about consumer preferences I think it does not make much of a difference.

After considering the premises, examples and also the divergences from analytic theory to analytic practice of the content based approach to discourse analysis outlined in Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Wetherell and Potter (1992), let me now turn and assess the relevance of this approach for my research project.

3.4. Discourse as social practice and research on the rhetorical deployment of Greek national identity

In this part of the chapter, I considered the approach to discourse analysis outlined in Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Wetherell and Potter (1992) and the emphasis that this approach places on discourse as social practice. What I have been seeking within this approach is a methodological framework that would provide me with the analytic tools and concepts to examine the uses that the cultural stereotypes of modern Greek national identity are put to within talk in interaction. In that respect, Potter and Wetherell's recourse to ethnomethodology and conversation analysis seemed quite promising. Hence, while reviewing the objections levelled from within this strand of discourse analysis to the approach of Parker (1992), I largely endorsed the proposed conceptualisation of content components of talk (interpretative repertoires) as "abstractions from practices in context".

Part and parcel to my endorsement was the hope that in actual applications of this discourse analytic approach, the rhetorical practices and the speakers' moral concerns around which the
content of talk is structured would be highlighted. As I argued previously though, this was far from being the case. Wetherell and Potter's emphasis on the "broad sweep" of interpretative resources came at the expense of ignoring the rhetorical and sequential organization of their interviewees' talk. Most importantly, while at a theoretical level they drew extensively on Billig et al.'s (1988) analysis on the dilemma of prejudice, in terms of analytic practice they did not highlight exactly how this dilemma was manifested and rhetorically managed within the sequential unfolding of their interviews.

Given the "division of analytic labour" between, on the one hand, Wetherell and Potter and, on the other, Edwards and Potter this neglect of rhetorical practices by Wetherell and Potter may not be surprising. Nevertheless, if indeed content components of talk should be analytically approached as "abstractions from practices in context", then one should expect that both the "practices" as well as the interactional "context" deserve primary analytic attention. Apart from this divergence between analytic theory and practice, which makes me have reservations about Wetherell and Potter's approach, there is also a question with their conceptual conflation of "discourses" with "interpretative repertoires" that I think that needs to be addressed.

Notwithstanding Parker's (analytically under-theorised) suggestion for a direct apprehension of discourses within texts or talk in interaction, I take it that his post-structuralist understanding of discourse(s) encompasses conceptual features that are not included in the concept of interpretative repertoires. In particular, the issues of historicity and of the genealogical implication of discourses in power / knowledge processes. Whereas the concept of interpretative repertoires seeks to capture content components actively mobilised by participants within current conversational / rhetorical practices, the concept of discourse(s) is much broader than that. It seeks to capture the historically contingent assumptions and textures of meaning that are spoken through the participants' content of talk. Overall then, it seems to me that the concepts of discourse(s) and interpretative repertoires seek to capture "objects" of a different order. The concept of discourse(s) refers to broader cultural bodies of knowledge that by and large are resources that the analyst is invoking in order to locate current talk and text in a historical perspective. In contrast to that, the concept of interpretative repertoires (at least programmatically) aims to capture the resources that participants themselves orientate to as relevant within the rhetorical / sequential unfolding of talk in interaction.

In the case of my study, the conflation of discourse(s) with interpretative repertoires would practically mean that any particular cultural stereotypes that my participants would draw upon in
describing, say, Greece and Greeks would either be conflated with the discourses of Hellenism and Romiossini or that it should be elevated to the status of a discourse in its own right. Of course both these moves would be problematic. As we saw in chapter 1, social theorists argue that Hellenism and Romiossini are wider sets of contrasting cultural images, symbols and stereotypes of lifestyles and character that historically emerged and were attributed to modern Greece and Greeks through the complementary institutional practices of Hellenism and Orientalism. In an obvious sense then, Hellenism and Romiossini, as broad categories that capture the dilemmatic ideological constitution of the modern Greek nation, are social theoretical categories. Whereas, as Herzfeld's analyses highlight, social actors are performing Hellenism and Romiossini within the realm of symbolic cultural pragmatics, this does not imply that social actors are necessarily aware of the genealogical provenance of the assumptions that their cultural practices rely upon (cf. Condor, 1997c). It seems to me then that the conceptual distinction between discourse(s) and content "abstractions from practices in context" should be maintained. Nevertheless, approaching analytically the cultural stereotypes mobilised within talk as "abstractions from practices in context" seems to me as a principled discourse analytic move.

Since Wetherell and Potter's analytic practices do not encompass the minute attention needed for the analytic manifestation of the discursive practices from which content components are "abstracted", it is time to turn to consider the work of Edwards and Potter (1992a).
4. Discursive psychology: The Discursive Action Model

The term discursive psychology was coined by Edwards and Potter (1992a). The authors' rationale for introducing this new term (as an alternative to discourse analysis) was their growing awareness that the turn to discourse within (social) psychology had often been understood to designate merely a methodological shift. As they point out, the early focus of discourse analytic work within psychology on developing critiques of mainstream theoretical concepts and analytic practices has helped to show the relevance of discourse oriented work for psychology. Nevertheless, a byproduct of this emphasis has been that the theoretical coherence of the discursive perspective was not always apparent.

Edwards and Potter (1992a), drawing on earlier studies (i.e. Edwards, 1991; Edwards & Middleton, 1986; 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992b; Potter & Edwards, 1990), have attempted to articulate a comprehensive treatise in which the discursive perspective within psychology would be shown to be a coherent and viable framework where basic psychological assumptions are reworked. Their starting point was a critique of the assumptions and of the limitations of mainstream psychological work on memory and attribution. These areas of psychological work have been treated in Edwards and Potter's account as representative of the cognitive and social cognition perspectives within psychology and social psychology at large. In order to synthesise elements, themes and conceptual developments that discursive studies have had hitherto highlighted and to pinpoint to their coherence, Edwards and Potter suggested the Discursive Action Model (DAM) as a summary conceptual scheme. As they state, this scheme attempts to capture "some of the features of participants' discursive practices that we have found it necessary to distinguish, and illustrates some of the relationships between them" (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 154; italics added).

The features of the model, as they clarify, should not be seen as independent despite the fact that they can and have already provided specific focuses for different research studies.

4.1. Action, fact and interest and accountability

In the DAM the focus is placed on action rather than cognition. This marks a major departure from traditional approaches to memory and attribution. Whereas, traditionally memories and attributions have been treated as perceptually derived cognitive phenomena and have been conceptualised as
mental constructs, representations or processes, discursive psychology treats them as *actions*. Within DAM they are conceptualised as things that people do within communication, interaction and argumentation.

As Edwards and Potter argue, the recasting of memories and attributions as discursive phenomena is both theoretically and operationally consequential. Theoretically, it dispenses with the individualistic and reductionist tendencies within cognitivism and allows for a more naturalistic and functional approach to traditional objects of psychological enquiry. As they maintain, for discursive psychology the point of departure is a

"curiosity about what remembering is, and is for, in everyday settings; what is the nature and role of attributions of causal responsibility in ordinary life" (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 156).

This theoretical shift of perspective entails a major shift for analytic practice as well. It confronts the analyst with discourse as social practice. Memories and remembering are turned into acts: "giving of reports of 'what went on', the offering of accounts, the deployment of versions, descriptions and formulations". In the same vein, attributions are seen as either the explicit upshots or conclusions substantiating causal links within the reported state of affairs or, most importantly, as the implicit upshots that reports are designed to render inferentially available and are treated as such by the participants within the unfolding of interaction.

As Edwards and Potter maintain, another important issue that the DAM draws attention to is that in the ongoing unfolding of talk in interaction, discursive practices of remembering and attribution come as *parts of activity sequences*. For Edwards and Potter, these typically involve interpersonal or intergroup issues entailing amongst other things blame, responsibility, reward, compliments and invitations. As they maintain, these activity sequences are the cornerstone of "lived human life" and "it is they that give sense to the individual discursive acts which make them up". Hence, for discursive psychology maybe the central topic of analysis is the nature of discursive actions in terms of the activity sequences within which they come to be manifested.

Edwards and Potter (1992a) argue that, due to their design, laboratory studies of memory and attribution have systematically (and unthoughtfully) eliminated from the analytic focus people's interest and stake in reports of memories and in the making of attributions. Nevertheless, as they argue,

*People treat each other, and often treat groups, as entities with desires, motivations, institutional allegiances and biases, and they display these concerns in their reports and attributional inferences.*
Anyone who produces a version of something that happened in the past, or who develops a stretch of talk that places blame on someone or some category of persons, does so at the risk of having their claims discounted as the consequence of stake or interest” (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 158; italics in original).

It is this recognition that leads Edwards and Potter to argue that participants within ongoing conversations "should be thought of as caught in a dilemma of stake or interest". This dilemma pertains to the practical concern of how to provide accounts which attend to interests without affording the possibility that these accounts be undermined as interested.

Edwards and Potter acknowledge that there may be a variety of ways in which this dilemma can be managed interactionally but they point out that this dilemma is usually managed via the use of reports or versions of events and actions. As they argue, interactionally sensitive attributional actions (which include the most obvious ones like blamings and praises and less obviously sensitive ones like mitigations) may be performed indirectly by means of "ostensibly disinterested factual report[s] which allow others to follow through the upshot or implications of the report". Of course, this calls for attention to the next feature of the DAM which lies with the facticity of reports.

As Edwards and Potter point out, the dilemma of stake or interest can be managed successfully only when the reports / accounts provided are accepted as factual or their rhetorical organization makes them difficult to be rebutted or undermined. Edwards and Potter stress that factual descriptions are social accomplishments: "factual accounts are constructed as factual using a variety of discursive devices". By means of these devices, factual reports and accounts are constructed to convey an impression of "out-there-ness"; they appear to be unmotivated representations of "the world out there". Drawing on an extensive range of studies from conversation analysis, sociolinguistics and literary criticism, Edwards and Potter (1992a) go on to identify nine techniques of fact construction, which the participants in their own studies have resorted to in order to manage the dilemma of stake or interest. Obviously, as they maintain, these nine techniques are not supposed to be covering the full range of possibilities by means of which reports may come to be constructed as factual. They are presented only as indicative of participants' fact construction practices and the authors acknowledge that more of them may be identified as the records of research within discursive psychology will be expanding. Let us have a brief look at them.

Fact construction devices
Category entitlements. Drawing on work within ethnomethodology / conversation analysis (i.e. Jayyusi, 1984; Sacks, 1979; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990), Edwards and Potter point out that reports may be warranted in terms of specific entitlements and category membership. As they maintain, category entitlements can be given. This refers to cases where speakers speak from the standpoint of an official / institutional category membership which confers a status of expert knowledge or warrants special epistemological skills. Nevertheless, category entitlements can also be actively worked out and rhetorically claimed within reports.

Vivid description. As Edwards and Potter maintain, studies within sociolinguistics (e.g. Tannen, 1989) and conversation analysis (i.e. Wooffitt, 1992) highlight the importance of reports which abound with contextual detail in creating the impression that the speaker has special observational skills and that she is merely depicting factual state of affairs. A particular form of vivid description is what Wooffitt (1992) calls active voicing, where forms of direct quotation are used in order to convey the impression of a verbatim recall mode of narration.

Narrative. Edwards and Potter point out that this is a form of factual accounting best studied within literary criticism (e.g. Barthes, 1974) but recently gaining momentum as an object of study within social sciences as well (e.g. Atkinson, 1990; Gergen, 1988). It closely resembles vivid description, but its defining characteristic is that the event described is embedded within a causal sequence recasting it as an expected, inescapable and necessary outcome. In this way, the plausibility of the description increases and "a useful discursive opportunity [is offered] for the fusing of memory and attribution".

Systematic vagueness. According to Edwards and Potter this fact construction device stands in a stark contrast to vivid description and narrative. Here, "vague and global" formulations are used, often employing idiomatic expressions (cf. Drew & Holt, 1989), which, on the one hand, make it difficult for them to be rebutted and, on the other, allow for particular inferences to be availed.

Empiricist accounting. This discursive form, as Edwards and Potter point out, is particularly characteristic of scientific talk and writing and its rhetorical function has been the object of study within the sociology of scientific knowledge (cf. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). Its main feature is that, "it treats phenomena themselves as agents in their own right, and either deletes the observer entirely or treats her as a passive recipient. In this discourse, the facts force themselves on the human actors who have an entirely secondary role" (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 162).
Rhetoric of argument. In this fact construction device, the articulation of claims and attributions comes within formal argumentative types, which provide "a reassuring sense of rationality". As Edwards and Potter point out, this is a useful strategy for making relevant attributional inferences of blame since blame emerges as an inescapable requirement of external events and actions and not of the speakers' motivational make up.

Extreme case formulations. With this rhetorical device, initially studied by Pomerantz (1986), actions and events are warranted by invoking the extremes of "relevant dimensions of judgment". Thus, the impression that certain events may be exceptional is undermined and they come to appear unexceptional, expected or natural. As examples of that that Edwards and Potter bring are situated claims of the type "everybody carries a gun", which in relevant argumentative contexts may be used to recast what appears as exceptional (and therefore accountable) behaviour to normative facts of life. As they point out, expressions like these are a pervasive feature of talk and this device often combines with other forms of factual accounting.

Consensus and corroboration. Drawing on the work of Smith (1978) as well as on their own analyses, Edwards and Potter point out that a common and powerful way of warranting versions of events comes with the rhetorical invocation of other "witnesses" or "independent observers" who are corroborating on the facticity of certain state of affairs. Constructing consensus often blends with rhetorical claims to normativity as it is the case with arguments of the type: "everybody in X position would agree on Z", where in the format of an extreme case formulation a consensual panel of "others" is invoked to attest to the normative character of a certain opinion.

Lists and contrasts. Edwards and Potter draw on work in conversation analysis (Jefferson, 1990) and particularly on studies of political oratory (Atkinson, 1984; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986) in order to highlight the rhetorical effectiveness of list constructions -particularly of three part lists- in externalising the subject matter of reports and creating a sense of completeness. As these studies point out, list constructions often come in a direct contrast with the formulation of threatening alternatives which are constructed as unconvincing counter claims.

With regard to the rhetorical effectiveness of these fact construction techniques in managing the speakers' dilemma of stake or interest, Edwards and Potter are quick to point out that these devices should not be thought of as guarantees that secure the treatment of reports as truthful and factual. In practice people are skilled in undermining them. For Edwards and Potter, this relates to the next
premise of the DAM, which draws attention to the rhetorical / argumentative organization of reports. As they argue, seeing reports as rhetorically organized places emphasis on two related features,

"The first is that they appear in the contexts of dialogues, disputes and conflicts of one kind or another. The second is that they are designed for their adequacy in undermining alternative versions and, at the same time, resisting attempts (actual or potential) to undermine them as false, partial or interested" (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: 164).

At this point, Edwards and Potter (1992a: 165) briefly link their argument about the rhetorical organization of factual reports with Billig's (1991) outline of the premises of rhetorical psychology and with Billig et al.'s (1988) notion of ideological dilemmas. For Edwards and Potter, their argument about the rhetorical design of reports and versions of events should not be thought of as narrowly confined to the specific exigencies of face to face interaction and explicitly argumentative contexts. The argumentative positions taken up in local contexts as well as the counter-positions they are designed to undermine pertain to wider social controversies and debates. As they point out, it is these wider controversies, disputes and contrasting interests that open up the field for the rhetorical design of versions of events in local contexts.

Edwards and Potter argue that although research on attribution places an overwhelming emphasis on the ways in which agency and responsibility are assigned to events, circumstances and persons within reports, it completely ignores the accountability of the speaker who is producing reports and versions of events for her assignment of responsibility and agency in the report produced. Nevertheless, as they point out, studies in ethnomethodology have demonstrated the socially consequential nature of report giving. Within natural settings, persons producing reports can be held accountable for the veracity of their reports. Moreover, since reports are parts of activity sequences, the producers of reports can be held accountable for these particular actions undertaken and which reports come to substantiate and to be part of. The example that Edwards and Potter give is reports which are interactionally oriented to substantiate acts of blaming. They point out that in this case speakers can be held accountable for the potential motivation or interests that inspired the blaming in the first place.

Pertinent to the issue of accountability as a participants' concern and as a topic of analysis is also the concept of footing (Goffman, 1979; Levinson, 1988) that the DAM also draws attention to. Briefly put, using the concept of footing Goffman (1979) sought to highlight the different
relationships (alignments) that speakers and producers of reports have to the descriptions they provide. Goffman (1979: 17) drew an initial distinction between the animator (or the "speaking machine"); the author (or the person / entity "that has chosen the sentiments expressed and the words in which they are encoded"); and the principle of a report (or "someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who has committed himself to what the words say"). The concept of footing has been further elaborated upon by Levinson (1988) and recently has substantiated a debate around the status of participants' talk when used within discourse analytic narratives to support analytic claims (i.e. Leudar & Antaki, 1996a,b; Potter, 1996b).

What is important to note here is that for Edwards and Potter (1992a; see also, Potter, 1996a), considerations of footing play a central role for the management of accountability in the production of reports. A report provided on a close footing (i.e. talking as "the author" or "the principle" of a report) enhances the speaker's accountability for the description provided. On the other hand, establishing a distanced footing (appearing to be merely relaying information) can diminish the producer's accountability. This can also work though towards the establishment of the authority and the facticity of a report, since the information or judgments provided are attributed to the authoritative voice of absent Others (Potter, 1996a; cf. Bozatzis, 1997a,b).

4.2. Discourses and rhetorical organization

Edwards and Potter (1992a) have gone some way into explicating the relevance of issues of rhetorical construction for discourse analysis. However, Edwards and Potter do not consider the post-structuralist sense of the term construction (cf. Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 94). Namely, what Wetherell and Potter (1992: 94) call the role of the historically developed familiarity in the use of discourses for the textual production of (effects of) realism. By failing to take that aspect of the term construction into account though, Edwards and Potter's argument is substantially weakened. For example, they could be read as arguing that the mere "packaging" of whatever "discursive content", say, into a three-part list could possibly, and most importantly, intelligibly constitute for the participants -and therefore for the analyst as well- a claim to the facticity of a report. Nevertheless, in Potter (1996a), where the premises of the discursive action model have been further elaborated upon, the "balanced" sense of construction outlined in Wetherell and Potter (1992) is re-drawn.
Potter's (1996a) overall discussion of (fact) construction elaborates upon arguments first presented in Potter and Wetherell (1987), Wetherell and Potter (1992) and Edwards and Potter (1992a). Discussing, for example, the potential relevance of the work of Foucault for the analysis of the social construction of facts, Potter reinstates the importance of Foucauldian genealogical analyses in highlighting the historical constitution of knowledge(s). He also draws attention (again) to the limitations of viewing discourses as pre-formed coherent entities attributed with a status of causal agency. With regard to post-structuralist literary analyses on the textual production of realism, previously identified problems are also again reinstated. It is argued again that these analyses have nothing to say about how codes and discourses have their effects; that the facticity of texts inhabited by them is treated solely as an effect of the endemic historical familiarity of these resources; and that in such accounts there is no attempt made towards the identification of the devices and the procedures by means of which historically developed discourses are rhetorically deployed and sustain local claims to facticity.

According to Potter's overall argument, if post-structuralist work provides for the conceptual foundations for analyses of fact construction, "conversation analysis provides the final story" (Potter, 1996a: 102). This rather balanced (compared to Edwards and Potter (1992a)) discussion of fact construction is succinctly summed up in the following quotation where the very metaphor of construction is explicated.

"We can imagine the words and syntactical possibilities as the bricks and girders that are needed for any building. Post-structuralist discourses and codes can be thought of as prefabricated wall and ceiling sections that can be used as parts of very different buildings. The devices and procedures that are grist to the mill of conversation analysis make up the bolts and cement that hold the whole structure together. Nothing works without the stuff revealed by conversation analysis, but a study of fact construction will be limited without a close examination of bricks and prefabricated parts". (Potter, 1996a: 102-103)

Acknowledging the potential limitations of this metaphor, Potter (1996a: 103) goes on to qualify,

"Its main shortcoming is that it treats the parts as solid prior to the building. What we actually need to imagine is that the bricks are soft and vague in outline, so that they only snap into shape as they are cemented into place. And the prefabricated sections must themselves be somewhat inchoate, with their solidity emerging as they are bolted together. Everything exists in a fuzzy and fluid state until crystallized in particular texts or particular interactions".

Its shortcomings notwithstanding, this is admittedly a rather neat and illustrative metaphor. Two already-constructed constituent elements are identified, i.e. on the one hand, words / syntactic possibilities or "bricks" and "girders" and, on the other hand, discourses and codes or "prefabricated
walls and ceilings”. Moreover, by reference to conversation analysis active processes of construction are alluded to: (local) activity sequences, which in the process of their interactional unfolding are drawing upon the (fluid) "bricks" and "girders" as well as the "prefabricated walls and ceilings" in order to have factual constructions / reports crystallised. These factual reports are designed to manage the participants' accountability with regard to the reports and the activity sequence within which these reports are unfolded. The dilemma of stake or interest is (attempted) to be resolved by means of devices and processes, which give shape and instantiate interactionally historically contingent familiar discourses.

In this manner an analytic scheme is blueprinted which accommodates both a provision for the already-constructed dimensions of discourse (discourses, interpretative codes) as well as for the agentic / constructive dimension of discourse that ethnomethodology and conversation analysis pinpoint to. Participants regarded as "doing things" manage their accountability by laying a claim to the identity of a motivationally disinterested person. In doing so, it is suggested that they mobilise historically developed discourses and interpretative resources.

4.3. The Discursive Action Model and research on the rhetorical deployment of Greek national identity

In this part of the chapter, I considered the premises of discursive psychology in search of the analytic tools and concepts that would enable me to highlight analytically the active rhetorical processes within which cultural stereotypes come to be embedded within talk in interaction. In that respect, the analytic tools and concepts outlined within the Discursive Action Model seem to me indispensable for such an analytic enterprise. DAM's emphasis on the rhetorical organization of talk, on the morally consequential character of descriptions and on the activity sequences of which descriptions and accounts are parts of carries with it the promise of a methodological framework that would allow me to highlight the uses that my research participants would put to the cultural (auto-) stereotypes of Greece / Greeks and Europe / Europeans while accounting for their living experiences in Lancaster and Brussels.

7 As Potter acknowledges, this is presumably so because of their exclusive focus on literary and academic texts rather than spoken interaction.
As we saw in chapter 2, according to Billig (1995) and Billig et al. (1988), talk of modern citizens on national Others may manifest rhetorically an ideological concern with the establishment of a rational, non-prejudiced (-as-non-xenophobic) moral profile. In chapter 3, I suggested that in cases where the modern citizens are Greeks and the national Others they are talking about are Europeans, the dilemma of prejudice may also take a further twist: apart from xenophobia, the ideological charge of xenomania may also become relevant and sought to be rhetorically disavowed. Using the terminology of the DAM then, it could be suggested that my research participants can be broadly seen as caught in a dual dilemma of stake or interest. They have been enlisted within a research context as Greek nationals; they have been faced with the task to account for their living experiences in Lancaster and Brussels respectively; and that task inescapably necessitates the production of reports / descriptions, where the "objects" to be described are European Other national categories and their varied constituent features.

Given the embeddedness of reports and descriptions within local activity sequences (say, criticisms and praises) it can be assumed that my participants' reports and descriptions would be rhetorically designed to deflect morally consequential inferences about lurking prejudice; in this case understood as both xenophobia and xenomania. In line with the DAM then it could be expected that this moral "threat" would necessitate the externalisation of the objects of my participants' descriptive practices and the rhetorical accomplishment of the facticity of their reports. Overall, the parameters of the DAM seem to offer a viable methodological framework for highlighting what my research participants would be doing, while talking about "us" and the (European) "Them". Nevertheless, given, on the one hand, Edwards and Potter's restricted focus on issues of rhetorical organization and, on the other, my stated analytic interest in a combination of both (local) rhetorical as well as wider ideological issues, some theoretical questions emerge here that need to be briefly addressed.

As we saw previously, Potter (1996a) has attempted to merge the post-structuralist sense of the concept of construction outlined in Wetherell and Potter (1992) with the rhetorical sense of this concept outlined in Edwards and Potter (1992a). In his balanced perspective on construction, Potter argues that accounts and descriptions gain their sense of facticity partly due to the historical familiarity of the resources (discourses or interpretative codes) that they draw upon and partly due

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8 Edwards and Potter (1992a: 153) acknowledge that their account of the DAM does encompass all the topics of what discursive psychology consists in. As they point out, despite the facts that analytic issues that bear upon critical
to the rhetorical *practices* (procedures and devices) by means of which these resources come to be interactionally instantiated. In this manner, an analytic scheme is blueprinted by Potter, which encompasses both a concern for the *already-constituted* aspects of discourse that post-structuralist accounts pinpoint to as well as with the *agency* / *construction* aspects of discourse that ethnomethodology and conversation analysis focus upon. My concern with this ostensibly neat and balanced perspective on construction lies with what I see as a watertight distinction drawn between discursive resources and practices. It seems to me that resources are kept at the one end of the analytic continuum, rhetorical practices, devices and procedures at the other and in a pivotal position at the centre lies the participants' accountability and (moral) imperative to accomplish a motivationally disinterested profile.

There are two issues that can be raised here. The first has to do with Potter's understanding of discourses as pertaining merely to the resources that speakers (flexibly) draw upon in order to *actively* construct disinterested versions of the world and its inhabitants. Nevertheless, as Billig's thesis of Banal Nationalism points out, the discourse(s) (or ideological framework) of nationalism does not only endow modern citizens with readily available resources that can be argumentatively deployed in discursive constructions of "our" and "Others"' national character, culture and ways of life and so on. Beyond that, the discourse of nationalism implicates people in a specific dilemmatic situation and is constitutive of the type of motivational disinterestedness that may be rhetorically relevant when "we" and "they" are talked about. In the same vein, as we previously saw, the discourse(s) or the ideological framework of Greek nationalism (again) have been constitutive not only of discursive resources of Greek culture, character and so on, but also of a particular ideological concern with regard to political, moral stances of "openness" towards "the West".

Nevertheless, in Potter (1996a) the issue of the ideological constitution of participants' concerns with accountability has been rather underestimated. Or rather, it was limited to sporadic references to post-structuralist work aiming at deconstructing Western notions of the sovereign individual (cf. Sampson, 1993a,b). Beyond that, the same status of analytic heuristic was attributed to participants' efforts to deflect any personal interest in reports where a description of the type "[...] you've got shoes on" is offered as an interactionally subtle request (cf. Potter, 1996a: 108-109) and to the interviewees' efforts in Wetherell and Potter's (1992) to deflect any inferences about their ill-psychological motivations that may have triggered unfavourable constructions of Maoris. The point discourse analytic concerns are not included in their account, these have been elaborated upon elsewhere (e.g. Billig, 1991; Billig et al., 1988; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
of course is not in that in the first case the interestedness at stake for the participants is a trivial one whereas in the second one is morally more important. The point is that the more the rhetorical similarities of participants' practices in deflecting interestedness across a wide range of accounting practices is highlighted, the more the ideological dimensions of the dilemmas practically / rhetorically dealt with in talk are disappearing from analytic attention.

Or, to put it in another way, if indeed, as Potter (1996a: 103) has argued, "a study of fact construction will be limited without a close examination of bricks and prefabricated parts", then the "prefabricated" aspects of discourse should be sought to be highlighted not merely as the raw and fluid material that the participants' rhetorical efforts crystallise within reports. Beyond that, the "prefabricated" aspects of discourse should also be highlighted in their role as constitutive of the dilemmas that the participants within interactions orient to and attempt to resolve. The advocated balanced analytic interest with discourses or interpretative resources should not merely be thought as an extra treat that comes to be served after the discourse analytic concern with practices in their interactional unfolding has been consumed. I would rather think that such a balanced perspective resonates more with a close attention both to the rhetorical dilemmas manifested in talk (and text) and to their ideological history.

The second issue that can be raised with regard to what I see as Potter's watertight distinction between discursive resources and practices has to do with the post-structuralist concept of subject positions. Wetherell and Potter (1992: 134-136), in a similar manner to Parker (1992), attest to the relevance of this analytic concept for discourse analysis. As they point out, discourses afford and open up the space for subject positions to be taken up by speakers within talk in interaction. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Potter's (1996a) project was the merging of insights from post-structuralism and from ethnomethodology / conversation analysis into a balanced account of rhetorical (fact) construction, the concept of subject positions is not picked up upon in his discussion. Presumably, given his contention that "conversation analysis provides the final story of how fact construction gets done" (p. 102), the concept of subject positions is equated with the local, interactional identity claims to a motivationally disinterested profile that can be analytically attested to by means of the DAM. Nevertheless, I would think that such a conflation is rather misleading.

Local constructions of, say, "corrupt Greek bureaucracy" may indeed draw upon historically familiar discourses. They may also be rhetorically designed in a manner in which the taint of a motivationally interested moral identity is warded off. Nevertheless, by arguing that the only
discourse analytically relevant identity claim that can be discerned in such a subtly organized
castigation of Greek bureaucracy is the one of the non-prejudiced, narrows the scope of discourse
analysis unnecessarily. As we saw, in Herzfeld's ethnographic account, such castigations orientalise
in the symbolic domain of Greek cultural pragmatics certain aspects of Greek culture and confer to
the social actors that pursue such criticism a symbolic, occidental moral identity. In more discourse
analytic language, it can be argued that such criticisms are levelled from a subject position that is
afforded within the discourse of orientalism. I want to suggest that by attending analytically to
identity matters in talk in this dual way, more justice is done to the paradoxical nature of language.
Speakers come to be seen both as "masters", by means of the analytic elucidation of their own
rhetorical / moral concerns manifested in the organization of their talk, as well as "slaves" of
discourse, insofar as the assumptions and the identity locations from where their argumentative
practices are levelled are already constituted for them. In the following two chapters, I will have
the chance to explicate this argument by means of specific analytic examples.
Chapter Five

TALKING ABOUT
ENGLISH ORGANISATION AND GREEK DISORGANISATION:
CULTURAL STEREOTYPES IN ACTION

1. Introduction
   1.1. Participants and research procedure
   1.2. Backstage to the analysis proper
   1.3. The research frame and rhetorical consequences

2. Accounting for experiences of English organisation
   2.1. English organisation as an advantageous state of affairs
   2.2. Criticising English organisation
       2.2.1. English organisation as deficient
       2.2.2. English organisation as a flaw
       2.2.3. English organisation as an appearance

3. Discourse analysing Greek talk on English organisation / Greek disorganisation
   3.1. Organisation / disorganisation as flexible discursive resources
   3.2. Cultural stereotypes and identity concerns: Interactional / rhetorical uses
   3.3. Cultural stereotypes and identity concerns: Symbolic / rhetorical uses
1. Introduction

For the first of my empirical studies, I opted to consider the ways in which Greek students studying in British universities account for their living experiences in their host country and university. According to the Greek press (TO BHMA, 24 April 1998), the number of Greek students currently studying in universities abroad comes up to 30,000. Of these, according to unofficial estimates of the Greek Embassy in London, some 25,000 are enrolled in British universities. For a country of the population of Greece (approximately 10,000,000) and given that there are some 300,000 students enrolled in domestic universities and institutes of higher education, this number of immigrant students is a vast one. In a strong sense, it is indicative of the value placed on education within the context of modern Greece.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, education has traditionally been understood and operated in Greece as a means for social ascent (Tsoucalas, 1976). One of the results of this overwhelming emphasis accorded to higher education is that since the late 1970s Greek universities have been facing difficulties in accommodating the increasing demand for university education. Throughout the 1980s, the governmental educational policies have been in the direction of stretching the annual intake of students in the State operated universities and institutions of higher education to its absolute limits (as Greek academics often complain). Still though, the demand exceeded the available within Greek institutions positions for study.

Over this period, emigration for studies abroad, which was by no means unknown in the late 1960s and 1970s, started gradually to increase in numbers. The usual destinations were Italy and Eastern European countries (and to a much less degree Britain, France and Germany), where the cost of living was inexpensive enough for Greek economic standards and, moreover, entrance to their universities could be secured by relatively low high school marks. The "prestigious" universities of the USA and Britain were only accessible to students from upper (middle) class families. Nevertheless, over this period, studying in the "easy" Universities of Italy and Eastern Europe was always deemed to be the last choice only to be considered when entrance to the Greek Universities, with the stiff competition that this entailed, was not succeeded. In the early 1990s, the scenery in Greek immigration for studies changed dramatically.

The overloading of the Greek market with graduates, turned postgraduate qualifications from a luxury to a prerequisite for successful job-hunting. Since the postgraduate courses offered in Greek
Universities are very limited and even more so is the number of students they can enrol, immigration for postgraduate studies increased. The one year Master's courses offered in British Universities and given the reduced fees that Greek students pay as E.U. residents have become an attractive option. Moreover, Britain from an elite destination for undergraduate studies, gradually became a "popular" one. Conducive for this change to occur have been two factors. First, the establishment of an increasing number of preparatory institutions within Greece (associated with British universities), which offer preparatory courses for studies in Britain. And second, the traditional "prestige" accorded to British universities, which has redirected the flow of immigration for studies from Italy and Eastern Europe to Britain.

As it happens, in the late 1990s studies in British Universities, whether they are taking place in Britain or in the increasing number of branches\(^1\) of theirs opened in Athens and Thessaloniki, compete in popularity with studies undertaken in Greek universities and institutes of higher education. The increase of the popularity of studies in Britain for the Greek market of students is amply exemplified in the dramatic increase of Greek students admitted in the University of Lancaster over the last ten years. In 1988/89 the combined number of Greek undergraduate and postgraduate students admitted was 6; in 1997/98 it came up to 143. Currently, with some 400 Greek students studying in Lancaster, the Greeks are by far the biggest community of foreign students in this university\(^2\).

1.1. Participants and research procedure

For the needs of my study, I decided to conduct a series of focus group discussions. I preferred this option to conducting interviews since I was very much interested in having in my corpus of data as much argumentative practice as possible. To that end, I thought that discussion sessions amongst peers without myself being present would be the best option. Overall, 12 focus groups sessions were held with 44 students taking part in them. In each of these sessions participated (variably) 3 to 5 students, a mixture of males (26) and females (18) and undergraduates (22) and postgraduates

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\(^1\) It should be noted though that the degrees offered by these branches of foreign universities are not officially recognised by the Greek State as university degrees but are accorded the lower status of a college degree. The reason for that is a clause in the Greek constitution that prescribes that university education within Greece can be only State provided and free of charge.

\(^2\) I am grateful to Andrew Okey from the Lancaster University Student Registry for providing me with the relevant statistics.
The vast majority of my participants (30) were from Athens, 5 from Thessaloniki and 9 from other smaller Greek urban centres (see Appendix C).

The procedure I followed in finding participants for my study was as follows. I would invariably approach one student (with some of whom I was already acquainted), introduce myself as a postgraduate student in social psychology and ask them if they were willing to take part in a research project that was aiming to explore the living experiences of Greek students in Lancaster. If they were willing, then I would explain that I was planning to set up discussion groups, audio record the conversation and enquire them whether they could invite 2 to 4 of their friends or acquaintances to join in the discussion sessions. My initial contact persons arranged where and when they wanted to have the discussion sessions conducted.

In the discussion sessions arranged, I introduced myself to the group and gave to each of the participants a handout with some background information about the research and with some indicative themes for discussion (see Appendix D). I assured the participants that the conversation would be strictly confidential, that it would be used for the needs of the research only and that they could terminate the discussion whenever they wanted. Then I would leave some time for the group to read through the handout, answer to any question they would have, set the audio recorder and leave the room. When the discussion was over, my initial contact student would call me to go and collect the tape.

1.2. Backstage to the analysis proper

The conversations recorded lasted variably from 45 to 90 minutes. They were fully transcribed resulting in approximately 500 pages of typescript. During the transcription, I noted some interactional minutiae like overlapping talk and a rough estimate of pauses. This initial corpus of conversational data was read through successively a number of times before any attempt was made to proceed to coding. My initial broad focus was on the ways in which my participants spoke about Greece / Greeks and England / English with respect to the different research questions that I had set to them. The coding process went through a number of stages and, following Potter and Wetherell's (1987) suggestions, I tried to include in the emerging categories all the chunks of talk that seemed to be relevant instead of running the danger of excluding material that might be relevant later.
During this initial coding phase, it was becoming increasingly evident that a profoundly recurrent theme in my participants' talk was the issue of "organisation" as a differentiating characteristic between Greece / Greeks and England / English. Maybe my participants' recurrent references to "organisation" should not come as a surprise. One of my suggested discussion topics explicitly directed the participants to report on:

Impressions from the level of the organisation of the studies and from your relationship with the academic staff.

Nevertheless, "organisation" either explicitly named as such or by means of related words, concepts and allusions was repeatedly emerging throughout the participants' talk as a relevant topic. My growing acquaintance with ethnographic and social psychological literature on Greek (auto-) stereotypes alerted me that maybe this is a theoretically important theme and I decided to focus my analysis on that. An extensive number of extracts were isolated. I reworked their transcription notation in some more detail (for the transcription conventions used, see Appendix B), these extracts were translated to English and a big part of them analysed. The extracts and the analyses appearing in this chapter are necessarily a small part of these initial analyses.

1.3. The research frame and rhetorical consequences

In the previous chapter, elaborating upon Wetherell and Potter's (1992) analytic practices I criticised them for their lack of attention to the interactional context from where the extracts they present were drawn and for their ensuing failure to consider analytically the questions that triggered the interviewees' talk that they analysed. Since one of my primary analytic interest lies on the rhetorical manifestation of ideological assumptions about Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others, it is imperative for me to take into consideration the assumptions that underline my research practices as well as the rhetorical formulation of the questions that my research participants elaborate upon. As far as the latter is concerned, I will consider the rhetorical implications of my

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3 In a strong sense, of course, translation is already an interpretation. This is an unavoidable problem when the analysis has to be presented in a language different than the one of the original transcripts. I tried to substitute Greek colloquial expressions with equivalent in English but, at times, I suspect this was done rather clumsily. Moreover, talk in interaction is marked by incongruities and "loose edges" and when these have to be translated then things are becoming even more difficult for easy comprehension. I tried to keep a balance between my wish to remain as faithful as possible to the original Greek transcript and the need to present the extracts in a readable English form.
questions while unfolding my analyses. As far as the former is concerned though, some notes could be made from the outset.

In the handout that I gave to the research participants, my research was introduced as follows (see Appendix D):

The aim of this research in which you are participating is to study the adjustment of students who are coming from another European country, in this case from Greece, in the environment of an English University and in this country in general.

In the light of Billig's (1995) thesis of Banal Nationalism, it goes without saying that the rhetorical frame of my research setting bears upon and reproduces the assumption of a the natural division of the world into nation States and, moreover, of the natural existence of the category "European countries". From the onset the participants have been invited to address the discussion topics in general within a national frame of reference.

More specifically, the participants have been constructed as nationals of a European country, who immigrated for studies in England (another European country) and the research question appears to be their adjustment to the university and to this country in general. Indeed, the research project as a whole, by addressing the issue of the participants' adjustment, presupposes a discontinuity of experience located in the participants' move across national borders. Simply put, from an array of possible identity dimensions that could be associated with their identity as students (such as age, religious affiliation, subject of studies and so on), the dimension which the research project orients them to and problematises in terms of adjustment is their identity as nationals. The participants knew from the first moment that I approached them, requesting them to take part in my research, that the reason they were approached was that they were Greeks. Having said that though, I should make it clear that this national frame of reference was not unproblematically (or inconsequentially) taken up by the participants.

In the previous chapter, in the light of my discussion in chapters 2 and 3, I suggested that my participants may be seen as caught in the horns of a dual ideological dilemma. In so far as they are talking about national Others, the unfavourable moral identity of the prejudiced (-as-xenophobic) may need to be warded off; in so far as they are talking specifically about European Others, the additional moral identity that they may need to ward off is the one of the xenomaniac. In both cases, the rhetorical profile that may need to be established is the one of a rational (as free from ill...
psychological motivation) person. Using the terminology of discursive psychology, the participants may be seen as caught in a dual dilemma of national stake or interest or as I prefer to call it in a dilemma of national disinterestedness.

In chapter 2, I had the chance briefly to consider some extracts from previous studies in which the talk of Greek research participants was shown to manifest rhetorically the speakers' entanglement within the ideological dilemma of prejudice, as described by Billig et al. (1988). In those cases, Greek research participants were elaborating upon the standing of non-Western Others in Greece. The participants in my current study are finding themselves in a radically different situation though. Due to the design of my current research, the Others in question are not a "minority" group of "foreigners", who for historical or political reasons find themselves within the cultural and geographical borders of the participants' "national culture". On the contrary, it is my participants who are the expatriates, the ones who find themselves residing and studying within another national homeland. Moreover, my research participants find themselves in a situation where they are invited to account for a specific life choice of theirs. That is, their decision to leave Greece and come for studies in (another) European country, Britain.

In the symbolic pragmatics of modern Greek culture, their stance of "cosmopolitan openness" towards the European national context where they pursue their academic studies may raise questions of accountability. Choosing to come to England may be thought of as implying a critical stance towards Greece and studies in Greek universities. Their choice may invoke the suspicion (to the Greek researcher, at least) that this was motivated by a naive, unquestioned, prejudiced and, at the end of the day, "irrational" appreciation of Europe / degradation of Greece rationale. Apart from and maybe more than the charge of xenophobia, it is the moral charge of xenomania that is rendered as an omnirelevant-to-be-disavowed moral charge for the participants. Throughout the analyses presented in this chapter, one of my analytic aims will be to highlight the participants' rhetorical efforts to ward off inferences about "hearable" xenomania.

It should be noted though that the term xenomania as such was hardly ever used by my participants. In actual fact, it was used only once, in the following excerpt of talk, where some of my research participants discuss the academic standards of Lancaster University.

Stelios: right (.) let's try neither to mystify nor to demystify (.) the bad think with Greece is that (.)

Most people in Greece (.) mystify the system abroad (.)

Themis: ((inaudible)) it is the xenomania that always exists (.)
In Stelios' account there is this particular problem with Greece: people "mystify the system abroad" and "abroad" here undoubtedly stands for "the West". Themis has a word for it: "it is the xenomania that always exists". In Stelios' subsequent rhetorical reflection on his previous "mentality", xenomania is admitted to have been his own attitude as well. Due to "all these things" that he "used to hear", all the exaltations of the "system abroad", he expected that he would find a "better system" in Lancaster. Nevertheless, on the one hand, because of his initial circumspection and, on the other, by means of his empirical,"hands on" experience, the "system abroad" has been "demystified": "it has been proven that there is no grain of truth" in the stories he used to hear. Circumspection and, most importantly, empirical evidence do the trick and dispel the haze of xenomania, of positive but false prejudgments. "Rationality" as the mental process, which stands into a stark contrast to "prejudice" needs to be invoked and rhetorically warranted in the discourse of these Greek students. Otherwise, their choice of coming to England for studies may be thought of as indicative of a "package deal purchase" and as illustrating an uncritical positive attitude towards the West, which in the cultural pragmatics of modern Greece by implication entails a degradation of their homeland. Despite the fact that the term "xenomania" was hardly used in my participants' talk (and hardly also was the term "prejudice" used), in my analyses I will try to show how the concern to ward off inferences about lurking xenomania and xenophobia has been informing the rhetorical practices of my participants.
2. Accounting for experiences of English organisation

In my analyses, I shall mostly focus on extracts where the participants discuss the following two topics:

- Initial positive or / and negative experiences in this country or in this University
- Your impressions of the level of organisation of studies and of your relations with the academic staff

These discussion topics appeared in the second and third position on the handout that the participants were provided with. In most of the conversations, the participants turned to the discussion topics in the order which they were presented to them. Nevertheless, this does not mean that their elaborations always came as neatly discernible chunks of talk. At least as far as those two specific topics are concerned, the participants treated them as interchangeable. This should not come as a surprise though, since the subject matter of their experiences in general was usually formulated as being about their experiences of studying in the University of Lancaster. In the analysis which follows, I shall focus on extracts from parts of the conversations where the participants elaborate on either of those two topics, noting briefly which particular research question they are responding to.

As I said in the introduction to this chapter, my overall analytic focus has been placed on talk where the issue of "organisation" as a differentiating characteristic between Greece / Greeks and England / English was discussed. As I also said, there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to do so. In the relevant literature, "organisation" appears to be one of these dimensions that modern Greeks lack in when compared to other Europeans. As Said (1995) has shown, in the discourse of orientalism a key theme is the juxtaposition of the rationally organised West, with the rationality of its organisation accounting for its progress and development in stark contrast to the backward and underdeveloped Orient. Fermor's (1966; see Appendix A) blueprint of the respective attributes of the occidental "Hellene" and of the oriental "Romios" relies heavily upon this evaluative juxtaposition. Moreover, Herzfeld (1987: 111-112) has argued that,

"Greek identity is caught between two extreme poles, each derived from the image of a conquering Other. At one end stand law-abiding Europeans, imposing on themselves laws for which they can give objective reasons. On the other are the no less stereotypical orientals, loosely clad [...] and as loosely organized, lacking in organization and self-control but rejoicing in their natural spontaneity as well as in their ability to fix events according to their needs. Koraes [...] and Zorba vie for the Greek soul".

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The limited social psychological literature on Greek (auto-) stereotypes and national identity also attests to the currency of "organisation" as a defining characteristic of Greek national identity. In Triandis and Vassiliou's (1967; see also Triandis et al., 1968) research, which opted to discern the "veridical nature" of American stereotypes of the Greeks and of Greek auto-stereotypes, a prominent differentiating characteristic between the two nations was found to be the "unsystematicity" of the Greeks and the "systematicity" of the Americans. In Hantzi's (1997) more recent research, a sample of Greeks responding on the question "the meaning of being Greek" have (amongst others) used the attributes "lack of organisation", "third-world" and "underdeveloped" to describe modern Greece and Greeks.

In the light of these social psychological accounts, the recurrent emergence in my participants' talk of the topic of "organisation" maybe should not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, obviously, what these social psychological accounts fail to consider is the uses into which attributions of "lack of organisation" or "unsystematicity" are put by Greek social actors. The extract of talk that I considered above rather succinctly manifests that stereotypes such as the Greek lack of "systematicity" are not just "stated" as relevant characteristics of Greece but are used within local identity management courses of actions. Moreover, as we saw in the first chapter, according to Herzfeld, modern Greek lay complaints about the inefficiency of Greek bureaucracy are treated as symbolic actions. Such complaints are argued to orientalise the Greek State institutions and their functionaries and occidentalise disenchanted with the State bureaucracy and institutions lay social actors in the symbolic domain of modern Greek cultural pragmatics. Bearing in mind my analytic concern with this dual understanding of uses of cultural stereotypes, let me sketch out the course that my discourse analytic approach will take.

My analytic emphasis with regard to the specific extracts of talk that I shall be working on will be placed on two interlinked discursive phenomena. First, on the elucidation of the conversational / rhetorical procedures that attest analytically to my participants' ideological / rhetorical concern with a moral profile of national disinterestedness. In order to do so, I will rely heavily on analytic concepts, tools and empirical findings from discursive psychology and conversation analysis. As a corollary to that, my second analytic concern will be to elucidate the participants' orientation to certain themes (in Potter et al.'s terminology, "abstractions from practices in context") relating to "organisation" as normative and / or factual discursive resources in talking about Greece / Greeks and England / English.
Given that the two discussion questions that I will be working upon entail the production of evaluatively tinged accounts and descriptions of (features of) England and the English, I will start of my analysis by considering some extracts where the participants seem to praise "English organisation". This will be followed by the second part of the analysis where "English organisation" seems to be criticised. Finally, at the end of the chapter, I will turn to my other overall analytic concern. That is, to the wider discursive (or symbolic) identity implications that evaluative Greek talk on European Others' and Greek "organisation" and "disorganisation" may be argued to have.

2.1. English organisation as an advantageous state of affairs

Let me start my analysis by considering the following extract of talk.

Extract 1

((This extract follows a long sequence of talk in which the participants had been complaining about the existence of too many Greek students in the University of Lancaster. Immediately before the start of this extract, one of the participants raised the question whether by focusing exclusively on their experiences with Greeks in Lancaster they are responding to the discussion topic appropriately.))

1a

1 Chronis  ahh:: (. ) initial (. ) initial positive or and negative experiences in this country
2 Elpida ye:s
3 Chronis also in this country or in this university=
4 Stella =it's the organisation
5 Fotis it's the organisation yes (. ) the cleanliness=
6 Chronis =the positive=
7 Stella =the cleanliness ye:::s=
8 Chronis = >yes let's speak about the positive things for a while< =
9 Elpida hmmm (. ) their concern ((giggle))
10 Chronis yes yes
11 Elpida not that mess

(DG12: 580-656)

Registering the relevance of a nationally disinterested perspective

As I want to argue, Chronis' turns in this short excerpt of talk orient to the relevance of a nationally disinterested perspective on talk about experiences in England. At the beginning of the extract, Chronis assumes the temporary role of the "chairman" of the conversation. In order to resolve the question whether they have been responding to the discussion topic appropriately, Chronis goes back to the handout and reads aloud the discussion topic. As soon as his recitation finishes (line 3)
comes Stella's latched utterance "it is the organisation" (line 4) and Fotis' agreement and building upon Stella's contention "the cleanliness" (line 5).

What I want to draw attention to though is Chronis' turn in line 8. In his formulation is displayed an understanding of Stella's and Fotis' previous contentions (i.e. "organisation" and "cleanliness") as being about "the positive things", about which he urges the participants (including himself) to speak "for a while". What I want to suggest here is that Chronis' gist formulation (Heritage & Watson, 1979) hints towards and registers the relevance of "the negative things" that should also be forthcoming in the course of the discussion. Heritage and Watson (1979) have shown that gist formulations of what has been said in a conversational context are sequential activities, whose primary task is to demonstrate understanding and, moreover, have this understanding attended to. My point here is that Chronis' (re)formulation of Stella's and Fotis' talk aims at readdressing the evaluative balance, introduced by the discussion topic, and which has (momentarily) been ignored by his interlocutors, since they embarked on a recounting of positive only experiences.

Relevant discursive resources: organisation and mess
Elpida (line 9) carries on with one more positive experience: "their concern", and, notably, Chronis responds with an agreement (line 10), which could be interpreted as a sign that as long as his remark about the positive-negative framework has been registered, he has no problem in consenting about a recounting of positive experiences. Elpida's (line 11) completion of her utterance is making explicit the comparative national framework of her recounted positive experiences: "the concern" found here is juxtaposed to "that mess" there. In this short excerpt of talk, English "organisation" and the opposing Greek "mess" are oriented to by the participants as relevant discursive resources that sustain a praise and a criticism of the English and Greek national categories respectively. Let us carry on with the second part of this extract.

1b

12 Stella =you don't get lost in the:: (. ) univ- (. ) generally (. ) in the department* you are
13 Elpida there is a good service
14 Stella yes
15 Elpida basically I mean if you need something you find it (. ) this is characteristic of England
16 Fotis you could say that it's a::: (. ) particularly user* friendly* country in inverted commas
17 Fotis yes [yes
18 Stella [yes
19 Fotis to the extend that you are told:: (...) in the lavatory=
20 Elpida =hmm=
21 Fotis =you are told wash your hands=
22 Elpida =yes yes=
23 Fotis =before you get out=
Features of English organisation

Since a balanced perspective on experiences in England has been interactionally registered, talk on the "positive things" of England flows rather easily. In lines 12-14, Stella and Elpida elaborate on their previously stated positive experiences: the University is characterised as organised because "you don't get lost" and "their concern" is glossed over as "good service". In line 15, Elpida summarises her point by concluding: "basically I mean if you need something you find it". Interestingly, and in line with the formulation of the discussion topic, which enquires experiences from both the university and the country, according to her this is a characteristic of England as a whole and not only of the University. In lines 16-26, Fotis, taking up the theme of the organisation of England, characterises it as a "user friendly country" (and reflexively ironises the appropriateness of his characterisation). His claim is rhetorically endorsed with an extreme case formulation (i.e. the lavatory example), with which the "user friendliness" of England is rather sympathetically mocked. In lines 27-39, Stella switches the frame of reference of praising from the organised state of affairs of institutions (e.g. University, "the country" in general, public lavatories (!)) to include the social behaviour of a generally unspecified, but nationally specific "they". "They" are the ones who would "take care of you", who would "receive well any question" and who "would help you in any possible way". Let us now turn to the last part of this extract.

1c

40 Chronis anyway [here
41 Stella [anywa:::y
42 Chronis there is ((in life)) (.) there is this general thing tha:::t (.) anyway you are asking for something
43 and you are listened to (.) which thing i:::s=
44 Elpida =((giggling)) yes in Greece [it's a bi:::t rare ((laughter))
45 Chronis ][(inaudible)) for the Greek reality
46 Stella hhe::: yes (.) and you find things that you wouldn't find in Greece
47 Elpida hhmm=
48 Stella =I mean I don't really know I haven't looked for in detail (.) let's sa::y for jobs (.) but here I
49 could be be::ttier infomed about (.) where to go:: (.) what to do::=
50 Elpida =yes yes yes all those things yes=
51 Stella =what reference book to look a:t (.) in what office to go to:=
52 Fotis =yes there is organisation in those things yes=
53 Stella =whereas in Greece (.) despite [the fact that I have
55 Elpida [NOTHI:::NG
56 Stella lived there for twenty one years (.)
57 Elpida it's a mess (.) yes (.)
58 Chronis me I have looked for things a bit and there is no [no such a thing
59 Stella [I have no idea (.) I
60 have no idea (.) nothing (.)
61 Elpida yea:::h=
62 Fotis and it's not only the university which is like this relat- (.) helpful (.) it's also the:: (.) for
63 example in the shops (.) I don't know if you have noticed that (.) if they don't have something
64 and you ask (.) you know where I could find it (.) in Greece they would tell you (.) "ohh: mate
65 I don't stock it" (.) "I don't know anything about that" (.) "don't ask me I have no ide:a"=
66 Stella =yea::h (.)
67 Fotis whereas the English they would give you phone nu::mbers addresse::s
68 Christos even if it's of a [competitor of theirs
69 Stella [yes yes yes
70 Elpida they are very::: (.) hhe: very very helpful
71 Fotis yes yes

More on national comparisons: English institutional organisation vs Greek mess

The gist of the long list of constituent features of English organisation is (re-)formulated in Chronis' turn (lines 42-43) as being the attentive way in which enquiries are received in this country. Interestingly, his gist formulation comes to be followed with an upshot type formulation (Heritage & Watson, 1979), which is collectively unfolded with Elpida (lines, 43-45). The upshot is a derogatory for "Greek reality" comparison. In comparison to the abundance of services and organisational infrastructure in England, in Greece there is "nothing". Stella's admission (line 48) that she does not have a personal experience of looking, say, "for jobs" in Greece and, therefore, maybe she is wrong about her dismissal of the Greek "mess" comes to be complemented by Chronis' first hand experiences (line 58): he has a basis for how he knows (cf. Pomerantz, 1984a): "me I have looked for things a bit and there is no such a thing". An opinion which could potentially hold its bearer accountable for prejudice is absolved from such a moral charge on the basis of empirical knowledge.

Overall in this last part of the extract, the participants display an orientation to English organisation and Greek disorganisation as praiseworthy and criticisable matters respectively. The evaluative force of these constructions has been made possible to be sustained due to the foregrounding of a nationally disinterested perspective in the first part of this extract (1a). More locally, when a reflexive consideration on the lack of empirical basis for judgments arose, first hand experiences came to be invoked in order to establish the facticity of Greek disorganisation.
A feature of the participants' evaluative construction of English organisation that I would like to draw attention to concerns the content of the participants' (formulated as) positive experiences in England. The participants have oriented their praises to various aspects of English institutional organisation, in a comparison to Greek institutional disorganisation, which has been criticised. For reasons that will become clear as I will proceed with the analysis, I would also like to draw some attention to the participants' praise not only of the institutional infrastructure available in England, but also of the general "caring" atmosphere found in this country. In lines 64-65, Fotis active voices (cf. Wooffitt, 1992) a (or, rather, any) Greek shopkeeper who is unwilling to assist a customer in her enquiries on a product not stocked in the former's shop. This construction of normatively unhelpful Greek behaviour starkly contrasts to the factual construction (by means of a list, cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992a) of helpful and attentive English behaviour.

In the first extract that I considered, constructions of English institutional organisation and Greek institutional disorganisation have been oriented to by the participants as normative praiseworthy and complainable matters respectively. The relevance of a national disinterested trajectory in their talk was established early on in the extract and the facticity of the praised and criticised "objects" was established by means of certain fact construction devices. In the following extract a similar rhetorical concern with a nationally disinterested perspective is apparent and English institutional organisation is again oriented to as a normatively praiseworthy discursive resource. Nevertheless, the "negative things" about England are not postponed for a later elaboration.

**Extract 2**

((With the talk reported in this extract, the participants switch from the initial bantering talk to the "serious" business of talk about the research project.))

1 Sakis hhe:: okay (.) a positivity
2 Maria =GENErally speaking ye:s (.) it's well organised (.) our department is very: goo:d (.)
3 Sakis about positive experiences what I would say is (.) those typical things (.) arriving in
4 Ma::nchester (.) in that big ai::report (.) with the::=
5 Tania =ohh: [yea::h right
6 Sakis =trains a::nd
7 Tania the organisation in genera:l=
8 Sakis =and the train arrived on time a::nd=
9 Tania =at eight past si:x=
10 Sakis =and it departed immediately a::nd=
11 Tania =((giggling)) I still remember that (.) ye:s
12 Maria no- we::ll (.) but generally they a::re (.) it is correct what is said about the
13 English that they a::re (.) very distant (.)
14 Tania they are
15 Maria they are polite but distant
Accomplishing national disinterestness

a. Symmetrical formulations

As was the case before, in this extract as well the "balanced" formulation of the discussion topic on "initial positive or / and negative experiences" provides the stepping stone for the participants' accomplishment of a nationally disinterested perspective. The participants have been prompted to provide symmetrical accounts of the type "positive is this, negative is that", and so they did. In line 1, Sakis gains temporarily the floor to address the discussion topic copying the first part of my symmetrical formulation: "a positive". He is interrupted though by Maria who comes up with her own account of positive experiences (line 2). In line 3 he regains the floor, signaling to the rest of the participants that he has a "story" to tell (cf. Antaki, 1994; Sacks, 1972) by providing a preface: "about positive experiences what I would say". In the lines 3 to 11, Sakis (jointly with Tania) unfolds his story of positive experiences. Finally, in lines 12-13, this jointly unfolded story is coupled with Maria's turn: she acknowledges Sakis' and Tania's reference to their positive experiences in England but points out to a certain negative one: the English being "distant".

If for no other reason, given the wording of the discussion topic to which the participants have been elaborating upon, the symmetrical positive-negative structure of their talk about another national category, is hardly surprising. It could be argued that they have been positioned in a nationally balanced perspective and they are taking it up. The rhetorical accomplishment of national disinterestedness in its simplest form: a nationally Other category is both praised and criticised, warding off any allusions to a xenomaniac and a xenophobic identity that could become hearable. Nevertheless, as I would like to argue, national disinterestness is also accomplished by the participants in rhetorically more subtle ways.

b. Vivid description and script formulation.

As we saw in the previous chapter, according to Edwards and Potter (1992a), vivid description is one of the externalising devices that may be employed in the course of descriptions in order to provide for a quality of out-there-ness to their subject matters. Moreover, Edwards (1991; 1994; 1997), reworking traditional areas of cognitive psychological research within a discursive perspective, has argued for the analytic merits of treating categories, such as prototypes, and scripts as interactional phenomena, oriented to by the particular rhetorical concerns of participants in talk.
Going back to the extract, we see that for Sakis the positive experiences include: "the big airport in
Manchester, with the trains that arrive on time and depart immediately". Tania, in her completion
turns, states her agreement with Sakis' assessment of "Manchester airport" as a positive experience;
reformulates the gist of Sakis' reference to "the big airport with the trains a::nd..." as "organisation
in general" and constructs the punctuality of English trains, mentioned by Sakis, as something
memorable (cf. Billig, 1992; Middleton & Edwards, 1990), by recollecting the exact time of the
train's arrival.

My point here is that Sakis' and Tania's jointly produced description of their initial positive
experiences in this country, by being delivered in a script format and by including minute details,
conveys a strong sense of the "real" of the scene of their arrival. In their account, what comes to be
prioritised is the described sequence of events, (attesting to the factual entity of English
organisation) and not the perspective of the person(s) doing the description, who could be held
accountable for xenomania. Let me now turn to a last rhetorical feature of this extract which, as I
would like to argue, also contributes to the rhetorical establishment of a nationally disinterested
perspective for the participants.

c. National categories as shared knowledge: Shifts of footing and joint completion

As we saw, in line 3, Sakis regains the floor to tell his story of positive experiences "in this country
or in this University". What he also does though is to attend to the ordinariness of his positive
experiences by, reflexively, demarcating what is about to follow as "typical". In other words, the
story he is about to tell is rhetorically caste not exactly as "his own" story; neither as a story of
positive experiences; rather it appears to be the common story of positive experiences. My
suggestion here is that Sakis' invocation of the category "typical" to describe his initial positive
experiences in this country marks a subtle shift in the footing (Goffman, 1979; see also Leudar &
Antaki, 1996b; Levinson, 1988) of his talk. To formulate something as being a "typical" positive
experience orients to a shared knowledge about those things as being "positive", existing
independently of the speaker, "out-there" in the world. Taking into consideration the positioning of
the participants within the research project as being "Greek (students)", I would like to suggest that
the implied principal / author to whom Sakis' assessment is rhetorically caste as originating from,
are the Greek people in general and that Sakis assumes a footing akin to what Goffman has referred
to as that of a spokesperson. In so doing though, he renders potentially relevant, the non
committing nature of his assessment. Or, to put it in another way, his limited accountability: he
should not be held personally accountable for (over) praising an Other national category, as he just relays commonly held views amongst the Greek people in general.

Notably, Sakis' shift of footing to a mere relayer of commonly held views generates an agreement from Tania (line 5); opens the space and allows for her to reformulate Sakis' first part of his assessment (line 7) and subsequently to contribute to Sakis' list of "positive experiences" jointly completing his turns (lines 9 and 11). Locating rhetorically the principal / author of the assessment offered to the collectivity of "Greeks" allows for a footing of collective relayers as well (cf. D'az et al., 1996). Sakis' story of positive experiences in England is not only oriented by him as a piece of common knowledge for the participants but is also recognised and treated as being such by Tania's sequential reception of it.

Let me now turn to Maria's symmetrical counter assessment (lines 12-13). Maria starts as the principal of her talk (i.e. "they are") but halfway through she self-repairs (Schegloff et al., 1977) and recasts her assessment as originating in others (i.e. "what is said about the English"), claiming for herself as well the footing of a relayer and mere corroborator of what has already been "said" and consensually held in common by "others". My suggestion is that by this formulation, Maria readdresses the national balance, which has been rather ill attended to by the participants Sakis and Tania in their preceding, consensual (albeit rhetorically distant and non personally committing) reference to positive only experiences. On the footing of a relayer of equally shared knowledge, a criticism is levelled at the English (a negative experience for the participants in England as it were) and national disinterestness is jointly accomplished by and for the participants. Tania's emphasis in her agreement turn (line 14) merely upgrades (cf. Pomerantz, 1984b) Maria's second assessment.

Flaws of English national character: A normative counter resource to English organisation?

As it was the case with the previous extract as well, in the present one institutional organisation has been oriented to by the participants as a factual and praiseworthy attribute of England. Interestingly, the rhetorical accomplishment of the facticity of English institutional organisation as a praiseworthy attribute has also been complemented by its rhetorical construction as something normatively praised by generalised Other-Greeks. What I would like to note in passing here though is Maria's recourse, at the closing part of this extract, to an attribute of English national character that (again) is recast as a normatively Greek criticism of the English: "they are polite but distant". In the second part of the analysis in this chapter, we shall have the chance to see how similar unfavourable constructions of English national character come to be rhetorically counterposed to
English institutional organisation. For the time being, let us see how (constructed as) normative praises of English airports and so on for their organisation may be rhetorically oriented to as accountable matters.

Extract 3

((Before the start of this extract, the participants have been elaborating upon their expectations before coming to England.))

1 Christos well it says here (.) initial positive or and negative experiences in thi::s country (..) or in this
2 university (...) let me:: talk about it (...) well okay as soo::n (...) as soon as I ca::me here (.)
3 things were different (.) no comparison with Greece (.) and I don't mean tha::t (.) ((mimicking
4 and mocking)) "ohh:: the airport was like this or like tha::t" (.) ((inaudible)) and bullshits like
5 that (..) hhe:: (..) it was differe::nt (.) and I realised tha::t ((inaudible)) (..) I realised that it wa:s
6 (.) different (.) >I don't know if it was better or wor::se< (..) hhe: but after tha::t (.) yes there
7 were also: (.) some (.) negative things such as (.) so::me (... the English who were
8 chauvini::sts (.) which I realised in the first perio::d (.) hhe::: (..) and the language in the
9 beginning which we don't all of us speak very well (.) you know because we are no::t (..) we
10 and all tha::t (...) don't draw out easily

(S1DG9: 227-238)

Christos' introductory turn reported in this extract is particularly interesting for two complementary reasons: first, for the explicitness with which he disclaims a particular (but only potential) reading of his argument about what constitutes the difference between England and Greece. Second, for the ambiguity in which his claim about the difference between the two countries is delivered. Let me elaborate on these.

Disclaiming a normative Greek xenomaniac profile

Christos, in lines 1-2, introduces the discussion topic and gains the floor to elaborate on that. Despite the fact that he starts speaking about himself coming "here" (line 2), he then changes the object of his talk and starts speaking about the "things" found "here" (line 3). Despite the fact that his reference to the "things" found "here" is evaluatively ambiguous, i.e. "things were different", he introduces a comparative national framework and asserts that there was "no comparison with Greece". At this point comes his disclaimer, on which I will subsequently elaborate a little bit further. He disclaims a candidate reading of his attestment to an existing "difference" between Greece and England, which he active voices (Wooffitt, 1992; see also Potter, 1996a). For Christos, what his claim should not be understood as being about is, amongst other things, "the airport", which "was like this or like that". Subsequently, his claim about the "difference" is repeated once more and at this time is made explicit that this claim does not have any clear cut positive or
negative, evaluative overtones. Nevertheless, immediately after that, he draws attention "also" to the "negative things", in which he includes, the "chauvinism" of the English and language problems.

In the analysis of the previous extract we saw how the participant Sakis has voiced his appraisal of English institutional organisation (by reference to the "big Manchester airport" and the punctuality of the British Rail) on a distant footing of a normative Greek assessment. As I argued, in this way the potentially relevant identity of a xenomaniac was subtly disavowed. Concerning this extract, I would like to argue that, in a sense, a reverse rhetorical orientation is displayed in Christos' turn. His reference to his initial experiences does not include an explicit reference to positive experiences but does include an explicit disclaimer of a reading of his ambiguous statement that would hold him accountable for being a xenomaniac.

Sakis in the previous extract oriented to the positive appraisal of the Manchester airport and of "the organisation in general" as a normative discursive resource by constructing his views as "typical". I would like to argue that Christos' talk in this extract does display a similar orientation, with the important difference, that such a normativity of views is something that he explicitly disassociates himself from. My argument that Christos' talk displays an orientation to a positive appraisal of English institutional organisation as a normative discursive resource is made on the basis of two rhetorical features of his turn. First, it is his displayed concern to disclaim the particularly reading of his ostensibly evaluative neutral claim, which asserted a "difference" between England and Greece; second, it is the way his disclaimer is formulated.

Christos' displayed concern to disclaim this particular reading of his utterance, renders this reading a candidate one. Moreover, it constructs it as an unfavourable reading. Christos, as Sakis in the previous extract but in more explicit and dramatic tones, distances himself from the rhetorical identity of the Greek, who would uncritically praise English institutional organisation. Therefore, he reformulates his ascertainment of "difference" as neither conclusively positive nor negative.

The second point I would like to draw attention to here is the way in which Christos' disclaimer is formulated. He uses the rhetorical device of active voicing to utter the words which would convey the meaning that he explicitly disavows. Notably, the inclusion in his utterance of the qualification "and bullshits like that" denotes that it is not exactly the actual words he active voiced that he disclaims, but the, kind of words, which would convey a similar message. Moreover, taking into
consideration the mocking impression of his mimicking voice, I would suggest that it is the identity of the people who would convey such a message that Christos is disclaiming here.

Another point that I would like to make concerning this extract (rather speculatively though) relates to the way in which Christos formulates his reference to the asserted "difference" between England and Greece. I would like to argue here that despite the fact that Christos explicitly states that "I realised it was different; I don't know if it was better or worse", the interactional details of his initial reference to "difference" may suggest that the term "difference" was meant to substitute "better" and the whole subsequent disclaiming sequence could be understood as a self-repair. My evidence for that reading includes the symmetrical formulation of the research question ("positive and / or negative") that Christos has introduced and is responding to and which he subsequently, explicitly but partially, takes up by stating that "there were also some negative".

If this is a viable reading of this sequence of talk, then Christos' turn can be seen as a manifestation of the perplexing dynamic of the national disinterestness dilemma. Due to the moral imperative (and the rhetorical priming) to be nationally balanced, Christos prompts for a symmetrical rhetorical formulation, in the first arm of which a praising of the English (institutional) organisation would occur. Nevertheless, an unqualified and direct praising of English (institutional) organisation may render as relevant for the speaker the unfavourable moral identity of the xenomaniac Greek, an option which Christos is quick to caricature and disavow. As a result, Christos' take up of the symmetrical rhetorical formulation, i.e. "positive is this, negative is that" has been left short, as the first leg has been missed, despite the fact that his of "also" may suggests otherwise.

In this first part of the analysis, I have highlighted ways in which institutional organisation has been oriented to as a normative (and praiseworthy) attribute of England. I also highlighted ways in which the participants' rhetorical constructions of national categories manifests a concern with the establishment of a nationally disinterested perspective. In the first and third extract, this concern has been analytically attested to by means of considering the rhetorical features of the conversational turns in which the praise of English institutional organisation has been delivered. In the second extract though, the favourable construction of English institutional organisation has been coupled with a critical construction of the English. In so doing, unfavourable attributes of English national character have been rhetorically constructed as normative Greek criticisms. In the following part of the analysis, I shall have the chance to consider extracts where this juxtaposition between Greek and English national character is again oriented as relevant.
2.2. Criticising English organisation

As it may have been already apparent from the extracts I considered, English organisation has not always been an object of unconditional praise in my participants' talk. Actually, the opposite is the case. In the conversations as a whole, the bulk of references to English institutional organisation have been in various ways rather critical in tone. In the following three sections, I will draw on extracts where the participants construct versions of English institutional organisation in which this is criticised as being "deficient", a "flaw", and an "appearance".

2.2.1. English institutional organisation as deficient

In this section of the analysis, I will deal with extracts where the participants construct versions of English institutional organisation as deficient. In the extracts considered previously we saw how the theme of English institutional (organisation) has been constructed as a normatively praised attribute of England, whether or not the speakers subscribed to such a praise. The following extract is quite interesting because the assumption that England is an organised country is challenged, although not without interactional consequences for the speaker who "dared" to challenge such an assumption.

Extract 4

1 Nina we'll now (.) we talked about expectations (.) now (.) initial positive or and negative
2 experiences in this country:: (.) or in this university (.) positive is the organisation (.) ri:ght?
3 Michalis [no
4 Yiannna [yes [that's right
5 Nina [why::not
6 Michalis there is no organisation
7 Nina [THERE IS NO ORGANISATION?
8 Yiannna [THERE IS NO ORGANISATION?
9 Michalis there is no organisation::tion
10 Yiannna no (.) come o::n
11 Michalis AS FAS AS the departments* are concerned mine hasn't got any (.)
12 Nina don't put it this way
13 Michalis why? (.) don't put it (.) I judge from a::hh where I AM (.)
14 Takis look they have better organisation=
15 Nina =compared to Greece=  
16 Takis =compared to the Gree::k [standards ri::ght
17 Michalis [well okay compared to the
18 Greek yes but compared to:: to how it should be they don't have organisation (.)
19 Nina okay (.)

(S1DG4: 168-189)

Failing to introduce a nationally balanced trajectory of talk
Nina's introduction of the second discussion topic (lines 1-2) is followed by an immediate answer by her and a request to the rest of the participants to confirm her assessment: "positive is the organisation, right?" Rather predictably, in Nina's turn the symmetrical structure of the wording of the discussion topic is copied. The reference to "organisation" is marked as "positive" and one would expect that a reference to a negative experience would follow soon after, if her question, inviting the rest of the participants to agree with her, would have been met with a unanimous acceptance of her assessment.

At first, I would like to draw some attention here to the conversational details of Nina's failed attempt to establish a balanced discursive framework (i.e. positive is "this", negative is "that"). Nina (lines 1-2) is offering an assessment of the participants' experiences "in this country or in this university" and subsequently with her question invites the participants to agree with her assessment. Work in conversation analysis (e.g. Pomerantz, 1984b; see also, Levinson, 1983) has shown that the preferred (in structural terms) second parts after assessments and invitations are agreements and acceptances respectively and that disagreements and refusals are typically marked as dispreferred (i.e. prefaced with delays, marked with "well(s)" and "hhmm(s)" etc.). Nevertheless, in this part of the transcript we see that Michalis (line 3) comes up with an unmarked refusal to Nina's invitation to confirm her assessment: a bold "no".

Arguing against normative knowledge: An accountable matter

In the exchange that follows Michalis' turn what is manifested is the participants' orientation to what is noticeably absent, i.e. an agreement. Nina's turn (line 5), displays an understanding that Michalis' refusal to accept her assessment is an accountable matter. Interestingly, Michalis' promptness to account for that (line 6) displays his own understanding that his "no" has legitimately held him accountable. Even more interesting, for the needs of my analysis, is Nina's and Yianna's reception of his account (lines 7-8): the overlapping and the increased volume denote surprise and by repeating his assessment ("there is no organisation") they are directly challenging it. I take it that this exchange is a proof for the analytic claim that English organisation constitutes a normative conclusion about experiences in "this country or in this university". To put it in another way, Nina's assessment that "positive is the organisation", despite the fact that has been met with disagreement, did not hold her accountable. Instead, Michalis' disagreement "no" has been treated as an accountable matter and, indeed, Michalis consents and accounts for that (lines 9, 11).

Constructing a comparative frame of reference and situated identity concerns
In line 11, Michalis mitigates his criticism about the lack of organisation by formulating the context of its reference. For him, it is not the case that "there is no organisation" in general (in England). The frame of reference of his assessment is the University departments and his own in particular, which "hasn't got any". What I would like to suggest here is that Michalis' explicit formulation of his frame of reference as being the local departmental one projects an understanding and constructs Nina's frame of reference as being the wider, national one. In line 12, though, Nina challenges the appropriateness of the frame of reference of his criticism but Michalis (line 13) insists and justifies his framing by invoking a category entitlement (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992a; Potter, 1996b): he can only judge on the basis of what he knows best, and as a student, this is the situation in his department.

There is something more to be noted here though. Michalis' invocation of the category entitlement of the student is a situational claim to a particular identity, tuned to the contextual needs of his specific argumentative project: he needs to justify his assertion ("there is no organisation"), which is counterposed to a positive and (oriented to as) normative assessment of another national category. The way in which he does so is by rhetorically constructing a switch of frame of reference: to his (displayed) understanding, Nina's frame of reference has been a comparative national one, whereas he refers to a local departmental one. In this way though, he also rebuts negative identity inferences (national prejudice) as his newly acquired voice is that of the "universal-and-nationally-blind student".

Consenting to normative knowledge and sustaining the criticism

In line 14, Takis offers one more qualified disagreement to Michalis' criticism, by (re)introducing the comparative framework: "they have better organisation". Nina, line 15, completes Takis' disagreement by making explicit the national dimension of his comparative framework: "(they have better organisation) compared to Greece" and Takis, line 16, confirms his agreement to Nina's completion of his turn. After all this conversational exchange, Michalis (lines 17-18) offers a qualified agreement (cf. Pomerantz, 1984b) to Takis' and Nina's joint reformulation of Nina's initial assessment: compared to the Greek standards "they have better organisation" but "compared to how it should be they don't".

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4 I am claiming that his voice is "newly acquired" because as I am arguing in the introduction of this chapter, the voice/identity of the "Greek" is an omnipresent and implicit assumption for the participants within the rhetorical frame of this research context.
Michalis' eventual (qualified) agreement to Nina's assessment is particularly interesting because I think that it displays a combination of two different voices, or two different rhetorical identity concerns. On a comparative national frame of reference, English organisation is admitted to be superior than the Greek. Such an admission adheres to the moral imperative to be nationally balanced, and disavows the identity of the nationally prejudiced in the face of what appears to be normative knowledge, i.e. that the English are organised and the Greeks disorganised. On the other hand though, speaking with the voice of the nationally blind, rational student, English organisation is criticised as being deficient in its own right, or more accurately as being deficient compared to "how it should be".

In this extract, the normativity of the theme of praiseworthy English institutional organisation was momentarily challenged, albeit not without considerable identity implications for the speaker who did the challenging. Eventually, the criticism of English institutional organisation was only possible to be sustained when it was consented that English institutional organisation is much better than the Greek one and it is only to be criticised as deficient in terms of absolute ideal standards. Nevertheless, in the next extract, some other participants proceed in a direct comparison of Greek and English universities and the conclusion drawn, despite the fact that is not flattering for the English, does not render the moral charge of prejudice relevant for them. Let us see how this was interactionally managed.

Extract 5
((This extract is drawn from that part of the conversation where the participants elaborate upon their expectations before coming to England. Nevertheless, in this extract the participants have moved quickly from discussing their expectations to elaborating upon their actual experiences in England and in Lancaster.))

5a

1 Dimitra [...] and because of that I was a bit >you know< afraid=
2 Ermioni =yes=
3 Michalis =no (.) I believe=
4 Dimitra =but on the other hand I had demystified to a great extent the universities abroad=
5 Michalis =hmmm=
6 Dimitra =and I believed (.) I mean after Brussels (.) I believed that the universities in Greece are much better (.)
7 Ermioni =much better (.)
8 Dimitra =but the same happened to me in Italy (.) but I thought in England it would be different (.) I mean I expected better organisation compared to what I found here (.) hhe:: (.) I mean I expected (.) since I had lived in Germany as well (.) I thought that things would be similar here (.) and I was disappointed by:: (.) the organisation the buildings the:: (.) I was disappointed by all those posters stuck everywhere (.) and there is this situation of anarchy that also exists in Greece (.)

195
In the introduction to this chapter, while considering the only extract of talk where the term *xenomania* as such appeared into the body of my transcripts, we had the chance to see how the charge of xenomania was levelled by some participants to generalised Greek Others for their tendency to "mystify the system abroad". In contrast to the Greek others' xenomania, these participants had claimed a rational profile by virtue of their hands on experience with "the system abroad", which aided them to "demystify" it. Dimitra's trajectory of talk before the start of this extract and within it manifests a similar rhetorical course of action. At a certain juncture of her talk before the start of this extract, Dimitra had referred to the traditional prestige that English universities enjoy within Greece. Later she referred to her disappointing experience of studying in Brussels. Nevertheless, mainly due to her concerns on whether the course she would undertake in Lancaster was suitable for her, she had stated that she was still a bit uneasy with coming to England for studies.

**Disavowing xenomania, availing inferences of chauvinism**

At the beginning of this extract comes Dimitra's admission that she was "a bit afraid" to come to Lancaster. Nevertheless, she is quick to point out (lines, 4-5, 7-8) that after her disappointing experiences in Brussels, she had "demystified to a great extent the universities abroad" and that she believed that "the universities in Greece are much better". Given Dimitra's persistent rhetorical references to her disappointing personal experiences from studying "abroad" and the juxtaposition of her own critical stance to the generalised Greek others' tendency to "mystify" English universities, her argument about the superiority of Greek universities comes as the rhetorical epitome of a non-xenomaniac, therefore, rational profile.

Nevertheless, what follows her assessment indicates that such a generalised praise of Greek universities may be amenable to the (opposite to xenomania) moral charge of chauvinism. Her
assessment is followed in the transition relevance place by an attributable silence (line 8). It is eventually followed by a minimal token of agreement in line 9; and in line 10, Dimitra once again repeats the assessment component of her previous turn (i.e. "much better") in pursuit of an unqualified agreement (cf. Pomerantz, 1984b). Nevertheless, her second assessment is also followed by an interactionally meaningful silence. Evidently, rhetorical claims to a rational-as-non xenomaniac moral profile may at times come at the expense of rendering inferentially relevant the also morally unfavourable identity of the chauvinist. Let us see how the participant Michalis follows up Dimitra's line of argumentation.

Michalis (line 11) aligns himself to a certain extent with Dimitra's argument. His line of argumentation builds upon Dimitra's critical stance towards the xenomania of Greek Others: his first hand experiences from Italy made him suspicious of uncritical exaltations of foreign universities. Nevertheless, he would not go as far as to claim that Greek universities are "much better" than any other foreign universities. His first hand experiences from Germany account for his knowledge that there are "better organised" universities elsewhere abroad. Implicitly in his turn runs the argument that having expectations about English institutional organisation may indeed be a rational, non-xenomaniac a priori assumption, in need though to be verified by empirical evidence.

Michalis' mitigation of the overgeneralised critical thrust of Dimitra's argument though has led him (through a negative comparison of the Lancaster University with German ones) to argue that, to his disappointment, "the situation of anarchy" found in Lancaster resembles the situation in Greek universities. Hardly surprisingly, this argument has not gone uncontested. In the lines 18, 20-21, Antonis challenges the extent to which "the situation of anarchy in Greece" resembles the situation found in Lancaster. Michalis (lines 22-23) consents that it is "a bit less" chaotic here "but the difference is not huge". Erhioni (lines, 24-25) introduces the relevance of particularised comparisons (cf. Billig et al., 1988) between specific universities across different countries and both Michalis (line 26-27) and Antonis (lines 28-29) consent and take up this argumentative perspective.

So far in this extract English institutional organisation has been oriented to by the participants as a normatively praiseworthy matter, albeit, only to be (consequentially) challenged as such. In Dimitra's "demystification" line of argumentation (largely implicitly), English institutional organisation is treated as something that generalised Greek Others praise because they do not have the first hand experience needed to "demystify" it. Dimitra's argument though was challenged when
it culminated in a general statement about how "much better" Greek universities are when compared to the ones abroad. In Michalis' line of argumentation English institutional organisation is a legitimate thing for one (a Greek) to expect. Interestingly, an unexplicated linkage has been made in Michalis' talk between Germany and England. Presumably, as long as institutional organisation is to be found in Germany, it should also be found in England as well. Nevertheless, his line of argumentation also led him to a generalised equation of the "Greek chaos" with "the situation in Lancaster". This, of course, was also effectively challenged by the rest of the participants. Let us now see how in the last part of this extract English institutional organisation is effectively challenged as deficient, without concerns about negative identity inferences (chauvinism) and the irrationality of over generalisations arising.

5b

30 Dimitra = apart from the squats
31 Antonis [but
32 generally=
33 Dimitra = their philosophy of entering the university is different
34 Antonis [yes yes
35 Dimitra I mean (. ) I don't know maybe (. ) we (. ) we know that if (. ) if we are interested we
36 have to work by ourselves (. )
37 Antonis yes=
38 Dimitra = it is working more than they need to (. ) more
39 than they are told to (. ) they are within the system (. ) I (. ) remember that we
40 said that (. )
41 Ermioni yes=
42 Dimitra = to hhe:: Jon=
43 Ermioni = to Jones=
44 Dimitra = to Jones when we had that meeting
45 Ermioni yes=
46 Michalis = Jones is the head of the department isn't he
47 Dimitra yes he was saying [he was saying that there is
48 Ermioni [the course* director* the course* director*
49 ((collective laughter))
50 Ermioni ((her)) supervisor* ((inaudible)) ((laughter))
51 Dimitra he was saying that (. ) that chaos prevails in Greek universities (. ) and we said
52 to him that (. ) the system might be chaotic but the students are much better
53 they are too mature
54 Ermioni [if we don't praise our house
55 it will fell down upon us
56 ((collective laughter))

((After the collective laughter the participants changed the topic of conversation and started talking about the situation they encountered in the Lancaster University halls of residence.))

(SIDG1: 339-390)

"Their" organisation, "our" virtuous national character

In this last part of the extract, the comparative national framework between England and Greece is still ongoing. Nevertheless, the dimensions of national comparisons have slightly changed. So far
the argument was about national universities, infrastructure and "posters" untidily "stuck on walls". Dimitra though (line 33) introduces a new dimension for national comparisons. The focus is now placed on nationals: "their philosophy", "we know". English institutional organisation (and its superiority over the Greek one) is not directly challenged within this line of argumentation. Nevertheless, the English "system" is deemed to be so overwhelming that the English students are enslaved within it ("they are within the system"). Against the English students that "don't seem to work more than they are told to" stand the Greek ones, who being aware of the disorganisation of the Greek universities (lines, 35-36), as long as they are interested in what they study, they work by themselves.

The ordinariness as well as the normative status of this line of argumentation is attested to by Dimitra's recollection of a past debate (lines, 39-56), in which Greek students had to defend their national category against English charges of Greek university disorganisation along these lines. In Dimitra's recollection, against the "chaos that prevails in Greek universities" stand the Greek students who are "much better" (when compared to the English) and "too mature". At the end of her recollection, comes a formulaic Greek expression, which reflects upon and legitimises self-praising sequences and effectively the argument stops there (cf. Drew & Holt, 1989).

In the analysis of Extract 3 above, we saw how the participant Maria juxtaposed the normatively attested to English institutional organisation to the (again) normatively attested to flaws of English national character. In this extract, it is the normatively attested to flaws of the "Greek system" that are juxtaposed to the "virtues" of Greek national character. In the next section of the analysis, the "virtues" of Greek national character are again mobilised to counterpose the normativity of English institutional organisation.

2.2.2. English organisation as a flaw

In this section of the analysis, I will deal with extracts where the criticism of English organisation is substantiated by discursive constructions of it which depict it as a flaw. Let us consider the first extract.

Extract 6
((After a very brief elaboration on their positive experiences "in this country or in this University", in this extract the participants report on their negative ones.))

**6a**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Andreas hhe:: negative:::=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kleanthis basically I thought (.) you know that (inaudible) and things (.) maybe that there would be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>an order ri::ght (.) and let's say you have (.) you are in a rush to get a ticket because you're</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>the bus is going (.) and let's say you have a person in front of you asking (.) you know to get</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>information*, say, about when there will be available* a ticket for a journey ten years later(,)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>and how he could ((inaudible)) (.) and you have to wait in the queue or (.) in the bus (.) you</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>know (.) rai::ning (.) and everybody is waiting in the queue for the old granny to get in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>bus you know slow::ly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Andreas look it's the we- (.) it's the weather that makes the people ri::ght (.) I mean since here they</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>have this cold weather and this and tha::t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kleanthis yea::hh (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Andreas I don't know (.) they became you know (.) this is more in accordance with their climate (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>hhe::: the way they move (.) the way they::</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kleanthis (((inaudible))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Andreas we are more re::stless (.) mo::re=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kleanthis =((inaudible)) (.) our blood is boiling hhe::=:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Andreas =it's boiling yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foregrounding a nationally disinterested perspective**

At the beginning of this extract, Andreas attempts to gain the floor in order to elaborate on his negative experiences. Nevertheless, his utterance is interrupted by Kleanthis, who has a negative experience of his own to report (lines, 6-8). In his turn, formulated on an "I was X, when Y" format (cf. Jefferson, 1984; Sacks, 1984; Wooffitt, 1992), an initial expectation is constructed, "there would be an order", to preface its refutation, which comes within two script formulations (cf. Edwards, 1994), pointing out to the flawed character of the "order" found in England. With regard to the rhetorical formulation of Kleanthis' turn, I suggest that both the "X, Y" format and the script formulations work towards the establishment of a nationally disinterested perspective. The formulation of a prior positive expectation disclaims the existence of negative prejudgments on his behalf and the script formulations to the ordinariness and facticity of the described events. These are rhetorically constructed as representative instances of a larger whole, namely English "order".

**Criticising a people or their "order"?**

Andreas' qualified disagreements (lines, 9-10, 12-13) display an understanding of Kleanthis' prior turn as targeting the English people (and not the "English order") and aim at excusing them for the (constructed as "typical") behaviours for which they have been criticised. The excuse is offered with a causal syllogism invoking meteorological determinism: they are like this because of their climate. Kleanthis' agreement to the excuse offered (line 11) should not come as a surprise since his
target of criticism was not the "English people". They were only invoked in order to instantiate "English order", which was the main target of his negative assessment.

"Their" queuing behaviour, "our" boiling blood
In their subsequent turns (lines, 15-17), Andreas and Kleanthis construct a version of "us" as "restless" people with "boiling blood". The first thing to be noted here is that the explicit reference to Greek national characteristics is contrasted to the English national characteristics for which "they" have been excused. The queuing behaviour of the English (rhetorically juxtaposed as it is to the Greek "restlessness" and "boiling blood") is rendered to be equivalent to what could be (provisionally) glossed as "passivity". A second thing to be noted is the nationally balanced rhetoric of meteorological determinism: it is not only the "English" who are determined by the "weather" it is also "us". Notably, considering the subject matter of Kleanthis' script formulations, in Andreas' line of argumentation it is not rhetorically clear, whether the environmentally ascribed Greek national characteristics are necessarily to be favoured. "Restlessness" might be favoured over "passivity" in the first of Kleanthis' script formulations of events. Nevertheless, I am not quite sure whether the participants would go as far as favouring "restlessness" over "passivity" (which can easily be glossed as "patience" or "politeness"), in the second of Kleanthis' script formulations and, therefore, suggest that the "old granny" should be kicked out of the queue!

In this first part of the extract, English organisation has initially been oriented to as a normative expectation. The participant Kleanthis, prior to coming to England, "thought" that he would find "an order" here. Evidently, he has not been held accountable for such an expectation. "Order" is one of those things that a Greek would legitimately expect to find in this country. Indeed, Kleanthis did find some sort of "order" here. Nevertheless, the "order" found has not been exactly praised. In Kleanthis' account there is something wrong with the queuing behaviour of the English, which is drawn upon as an indicative example of the more general phenomenon of English "order". Nevertheless, the critical tone of his account, which drew attention to the English as a people has been mitigated by means of a meteorological determinism line of argumentation. "They" should not be criticised for what (due to factual climatic conditions) they "are". Let us see though how this sequence of talk develops.

6b
18 Kleanthis I tell you (. ) ((with awe)) their serenity while they are waiting in the queue (. ) while they
19 Nikitas =that's their vice
20
English queuing behaviour: a "national vice" or part of "their psychology"

Kleanthis (lines, 18-19) starts offering a reformulation of his assessment of the queuing behaviour of the English, which despite the fact that is interrupted and completed by Nikitas (line 20), evidently displays a downgrading of the previous critical tone: the adjective "serenity" (as opposed to "our" "restlessness") is used to describe "their" attitude and his voice denotes exclamation. As Pomerantz (1984b) has shown, the downgrading of a previously stated assessment, which has been followed by qualified disagreement, is a common conversational strategy in pursuing a preferred second turn, namely an agreement. Nikitas (line 20) though, by reintroducing the "hard" critical line to English queuing behaviour, displays a disagreement with Kleanthis' attempt to moderate his critical tone. For him, "their serenity while they are waiting in the queue" is a "vice, a national vice".

Nevertheless, as before, Andreas (lines, 23-24, 26-27) disagrees with negative assessments of the English. In his attempt to provide an excuse for "them", he restates his meteorological determinism argument as well as a new causal explanation, which invokes "their psychology": "the way they have been raised" accounts for the way "they are". Nevertheless, Nikitas (line 28) insists on his negative assessment: "yes but they like it somehow". According to his argument "the English" should not to be excused for their queuing behaviour on the grounds of meteorological, psychological or social determinism because there is also an element of free will involved: "they like it". Therefore, "this" is more of a "vice" and less, something for which they do not deserve "our" pity or sympathy. Andreas (line 29) questions whether indeed "they like it" and goes on to complete his list of lay scientific excuses with a psychoanalytic theme (lines, 31, 33-34): "they don't even realise it". Eventually, Nikitas states his agreement acknowledging that "it's happening unconsciously".
In this second part of the extract, the English "order" (in its instantiation in the English queuing behaviour) has been quickly transformed from something that constituted a positive Greek expectation from England to an evaluatively dubious social fact. Notably, as it was the case in previous extracts as well, the transition from English organisation / order as an evaluatively positive attribute to an attribute of a dubious evaluative quality has been accomplished by means of populating the abstract English system or "order" with its nationals. Organisation and order when they are drawn upon to characterise individual (national) behaviours seem to be rather problematic. The last part of this extract is quite indicative in that respect.

Arguing about "disciplinary" and "flexible" systems

In this final part of the extract, the issue of the "English system" (or "order" or "organisation", since the participants use those terms interchangeably), from where all this discussion about the English people started from, is reconsidered. For Stelios, the English queuing behaviour is "imposed by a system", as a "form of disciplining them". Andreas (lines, 38, 40) disagrees and counters Stelios' assertion with the question "in Greece haven't you learned to live within various systems?". Andreas' counter argument projects an understanding of Stelios' assertion as targeting the "English behaviour" by describing it as the outcome of an imposed "system", and not as a result of meteorological conditions or socialisation processes as he was previously arguing.
I think that it is important to highlight here the rhetorically consequential differences between Stelios' "imposed system" argument and Andreas' "socialisation processes" one. Despite the fact that the former draws critical attention to the "system" itself, I want to argue that critical attention is also drawn to "the people", who allow themselves to be "disciplined" by "a system imposed". The "socialisation" line of argumentation though, despite the fact that draws critical attention to "the system" absolves the people within it, who "naturally" are shaped by meteorological, social, cultural or other conditions. The differences in evaluative overtones within these two lines of argumentation is manifested in the way in which this argumentative dispute unfolds.

According to Andreas' line of argumentation, since in Greece people also "learn to live within various systems" without ending up behaving like the English do, Stelios' attribution of their behaviour to "a system" is misplaced. According to Stelios' line of argumentation though, "in Greece we have learned thousands of ways". His argument effectively champions the Greek "system" for enabling people, by teaching them "thousands of ways", whereas the English system constrains people by, presumably, teaching them one way only, and therefore disciplining them. Nikitas' contribution to the debate (lines, 45-46) "in Greece there is a lack of system and according to the circumstances we make up one" is much in line with Stelios' argument.

For Stelios, in Greece there is an a priori system, despite the fact that it is very flexible, whereas for Nikitas, in Greece there is no a priori system, but according to the circumstances systems are made up. In line 49, Stelios reformulates his previous argument in marked disagreement with Nikitas and counter argues that "there is a system" but "it's not so rational as...". In line 53, Nikitas comments that "it's too loose" and therefore, doubts if it should be called "a system". Stelios (line 54) agrees with the characterisation "loose". In line 55, Nikitas expands on his comment that "it's too loose" by adding that "everybody threads their way around it" and Stelios (line 56) agrees, since Nikitas' comment is much in line with his assertion about the "thousands of ways" offered by the Greek system and its "not so rational" nature.

In this final part of the extract, Stelios tries, and eventually manages, to reformulate the whole preceding talk in the parameters of "English organisation as a flaw" theme. His argument is that the orderly, criticisable English queuing (social) behaviour is the product of "a system" which aims at disciplining "them". Therefore, according to his argument, the disorderly social behaviour of the Greeks should be attributed to the more flexible ("loose") "system" in Greece, which does not
discipline people but, instead, urges them to take initiative and "thread their way around it". In that respect, effectively both English organisation or "order" as well as English national character as manifested in their "typical" social behaviour are criticised. In the next extract, we shall again have the chance to see how the theme of English organisation is transformed from a praiseworthy state of affairs to a flaw. This transformation implicates again a construction of English organisation as a deplorable feature of English national character and its juxtaposition to virtuous constructions of Greek national character.

**Extract 7**

((The talk reported in this extract is located in the part of the conversation where the participants were discussing the topic "Impressions from social associations with Greek and non-Greek colleagues". Prior to the following exchange, Zeta had been describing her fellow, English students as not being "open-minded".))
In contrast to previous extracts where the participants were reporting on their experiences in Lancaster and in England more generally, in the present one they are elaborating on the discussion topic which inquired their impressions from socialising with Greek and non-Greek colleagues. In this particular extract the participants talk about the English. Unfolding my analysis, my primary concern will be to highlight the rhetorical devices employed in the articulation of the negative evaluation of the English. As I will be arguing, this negative evaluation has been sustained by means of various rhetorical devices attending to the facticity of the participants' discourse. I will also draw attention to the way in which the theme of organisation is oriented to as a relevant differentiating characteristic between the English and the Greeks and, more specifically how it is used to sustain a criticism of the former and (its absence) a praise of the latter.

**Externalising a criticism of national Others**

Let me start with a consideration of the opening sequence of this extract (lines, 1-7). Vana starts off by taking up Zeta's previous comment that her English colleagues are not "open minded" and formulates her subsequent talk to be hearable as an additional proof for that. She goes about offering a causal explanation in terms of a lay psychological account ("the way they have been raised") and argues that "it" (the "non-open-mindness) "starts from within the family and carries on with the way they organise their life". I would like to argue that the causal explanation offered by Vana, ("it has to do with the way they have been raised") is the first in a series of externalising rhetorical devices employed by the speaker in order to accomplish the "out-there-ness" (Potter, 1996b; Wetherell & Potter, 1988) of her object of talk. This lay "empiricist accounting" (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) places their "non-open-mindness" within a causal advent of events, "in the world out there", extrinsic to the speaker's / observer's motivation and stake in the description at hand.

A question of particular interest here is to whom the indexical pronoun "they" (line 2) may refer to. Immediate candidates, of course, are Zeta's English colleagues in person. Nevertheless, I think that there are good reasons to argue that more possible candidates are the "English people in general", rather than the specific persons Zeta was referring to. Sacks (1992: 568-577) has argued that once a "categorial term" (like the term "English" here) has been used in a conversation, later use of indexical words like "we" and "they" preserve reference to that categorial. In addition, the level of
abstraction of Vana's subsequent account (lines 3-7) points to a generalised, abstract subject rather than specific persons. Vana does not seem to describe specific persons, being raised in particular families and leading their particular lives in certain ways, as it would be the case if she was referring to Zeta's English colleagues in person. She is rather describing members of a national category, noting that they are organising their lives strictly, in a "motor-like" way.

Let me draw attention here to some more externalising rhetorical devices featuring in Vana's turn. The rhetorical device of "three part list" (Edwards & Potter, 1992a; Jefferson, 1990) is used twice here. In lines 4-5, "their non-open-mindedness" is argued as being evident "in their work, in their entertainment or wherever". In lines 6-7, "the non-open-mindedness" is equated with "motor-like" behaviour and fixed timetables in "going to work", "stop working", "eating". Edwards and Potter (1992a) maintain that descriptions formulated in this manner appear to be complete and representative, by positioning the speaker as an external observer. Vana, in this case, appears to be describing "states of affair" external to her judgment. In addition, her description is cast as something that "you can see", with the use of "you" here invoking a "generalised audience", with "you" possibly being "everybody" and incidentally "me" (Sacks, 1992: 348-353).

So, to summarise my point: in the immediate local conversational context of speaking about non-Greek colleagues, Vana's orientation displays and makes relevant a negative evaluation of the members of another national category, the English. The attribute of national character criticised here is that of "non-open-mindedness", which subsequently is equated with "motor-like" behaviours, testified in over-organised, strict timetables. Not surprisingly, considerable rhetorical effort has been put by the speaker to present the negatively assessed national attributes as external to her motivation, warding off the potential ascription to her of the identity of the nationally prejudiced.

"Their" organisation; "our" disorganisation?

Let me draw some attention now on the way in which the construction of an Other national category attributed (and criticised for that) with "non-open-mindedness / over-organisation" opens up the possibility for a construction of "our" national category in a positive light, on the same grounds. Billig (1987) has noted that every argument against something is at the same time an "argument for" something else. The rhetorical counter theme of "non-open-mindedness / over-organisation" could be something like "open-mindedness / disorganisation". Let us see how the participants' talk is oriented to that.
In line 8, Zeta's interruption offers a completion to Vana's description and at the same time displays a certain understanding of the attributes under consideration as something "amazing", tuned to the negative evaluative overture of Vana's turn. Interestingly enough, Vana (lines 9-10, 12) completes her interrupted turn with an evaluation of "us". Here again, I would like to argue that the pronoun "us" rather that referring to the "local us" of the conversational participants, makes relevant their national affiliation, since a national frame of reference was introduced by Vana previously. Nevertheless, I would like to stress something else here. As I have argued, Vana previously has rhetorically attempted to accomplish the facticity of her evaluation, which targeted certain national Others. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is exactly her accomplishment of national relevance that could subsequently be taken up for a rhetorical destruction of her argument.

Since she has been criticising national Others, this opens up the possibility of a counter argument of national interestedness on her behalf. She could be held accountable for speaking from a nationally biased perspective and therefore amenable to be criticised as national prejudiced. I suggest that by formulating a completion of her turn in this way, Vana accomplishes her national disinterestedness. "They" are criticised for being "over-organised" and "we" for being "completely disorganised". This symmetrical treatment of "us" and "them" wards off any chauvinistic innuendoes that her previous talk may invoke. In so doing though, Greek disorganisation is cast as something amenable to criticism. Or even more accurately, the extent to which the Greeks are disorganised, i.e. "completely", and the things in which they are disorganised ("those things") is amenable to criticism. Note that the indexical character of "those things" turns as its principal subject candidates all the previously mentioned areas in which "they" were judged as being "over-organised", i.e. a range of things, from "going and leaving work at a certain time" to "eating on a certain time".

Aliki's next turn (line 13) is quite complicated because it conveys two seemingly contradictory conversational actions. On the one hand, it could be argued that it displays an agreement with the correctness of Vana's assessment of the Greeks as disorganised, as she does not challenge Vana's respective ascription of national attributes. Nevertheless, her utterance is shaped as a dispreferred disagreement⁵ (Pomerantz, 1984b). A question that may arise is what is the target of the disagreement component of Aliki's utterance here. I think that what Aliki is disagreeing with is not the assessment of the Greeks as disorganised but the negative overtones implied in this assessment.

⁵ This would be much clearer if instead of "I prefer it though", she had said the pragmatically equivalent "Yes, but I prefer it"
by its symmetrical sequential positioning against the negative evaluation of the English as over-organised. For Aliki, disorganisation does not seem to be inherently negative. Or, even more accurately, when disorganisation is counter posed to over-organisation then it is to be preferred by her.

In line 14, Vana comes up with an agreement to Aliki's assertion and also accounts for the reason why she prefers it as well: Greek disorganisation is much "healthier" than English organisation. In line 15, Aliki's explanation overlaps with the last part of Vana's turn and both utterances are interrupted by Zeta, who gains the floor and explains the reasons why she prefers "it": she prefers it because in what is glossed as Greek disorganisation (as opposed to English over-organisation), one maintains a certain individual particularity.

In line 18, Zeta reformulates her turn and disavows with disgust the prospect that one might "have a programme" in one's personal life. In line 19, Aliki expands on Zeta's disgust, reacting to the prospect of having a (fixed) schedule on "tea time". What we see here is that what can be glossed as preferred disorganisation is the disorganisation in one's personal life, whereas Vana's initial negative evaluation of the English's over-organisation included aspects of both "personal" and "public life" (i.e. fixed work timetable). Greek disorganisation in this part of the extract is treated as something to be celebrated. It is not the "complete disorganisation" to be criticised along with the over-organisation of the English. It is the healthy particularity of the members of a social / national body to be celebrated against the unsound uniformity of over-organisation of the English.

In line 20, Vana reformulates her negative evaluation of "our disorganisation". At this time though, disorganisation is referred to explicitly as a quantifiable entity, and what is to be disavowed is the "degree" in which "we" possess it. This is much in line with her initial symmetrical criticism, in which the disorganisation of the Greeks was counter-posed to the over-organisation of the English. In both cases, she is opposed to the extremes of a continuum.

In line 22, Aliki repeats the term "disorganised" used by Vana and challenges its very appropriateness in this context. According to her, the issue under consideration is "disorganisation in life in general" (for which she is reluctant to accept it as a negative attribute), whereas, as far as "public life" is concerned, "it's obviously a bad thing", according to Zeta's completion of Aliki's utterance. When the "we" under consideration is a national "we", then the "public life" of this national "we" can be easily understood as its institutional aspects, state infrastructure, civil services etc, for which obviously, "disorganisation is a bad thing". Whereas, the "life in general" of a
national "we" could be understood as the (national) modus vivendi of its members, for which, "disorganisation" is not the proper term to refer to. Aliki and Zeta seem eager to criticise the "Greek disorganisation" when this refers to the Greek public life, State etc but they are not eager to accept the term "disorganisation" as the appropriate one to characterise the Greeks when it comes to "personal life".

In lines 32-35, a novel criticism to the English is collectively formulated by Vana and Aliki. Vana elaborating on her criticism "that they operate like little computers" adds (and Aliki completes her) that "if you take them out of their track, they are blocked". In lines 36-41, the criticism is completed and glossing it, it could be said that what the criticism is all about, is lack of individual wit. I think what is important to note here is that Vana, by offering this new twist in her initial criticism of the English as "little motors", is making clear what are the personal qualities she criticises the English for lacking. Note that while in the opening sequence of this extract the criticism was "little motors" in general, in this final sequence, the criticism is "little computers". The semantic difference between those two might not be vast, but the pragmatic implications are maybe noteworthy. Substituting the "motor" metaphor with the "computer" metaphor, what is made relevant is the lack of those, human par excellence qualities, like wit, ingeniousness and flexibility. Those things are the English criticised for lacking and by rhetorical implication the Greeks as praised for having.

In this part of the analysis English organisation has been explicitly criticised as a flaw. The rhetorical move that has facilitated such a criticism has been the transformation of organisation from an attribute of institutions to an attribute of national character. Whereas, the normatively praiseworthy character of institutional organisation has been preserved, organisation as an attribute of nationals and their ways of life has been criticised. In that respect, Greek national character with its associated "disorganisation", "flexibility", "wit" and so on emerges triumphant from the comparison.

### 2.2.3. English organisation as an appearance

In this final section, I will consider a third critical construction of English organisation. At this time it is neither its efficiency nor its virtue which are challenged. Instead, what is brought into critical focus is the question whether English institutional organisation actually "is" what it is supposed to
"be". In the following extract for example, the rhetorical contrast between organisation as an "essence" and as an "appearance" is rather neatly introduced.

Extract 8

((Before the start of this extract, the participants were discussing instances and episodes from their early experiences in the University of Lancaster))

1 Spyros ((reads)) the level of organisation
2 Yiorgos the level of organisation (.) we:ll look (.) if we compare it to the Greek one it's
3 very good (.) perfect (.) I don't think that (.) hhe:=
4 Tania =yes (.) look basically okay (.) everythi:ng seems nice and good (.) but if you go (.) you have
5 a query (.) they don't don't have the faintest idea (.) when I was trying to change the courses in
6 the combined* science* (..) they didn't- (.) on the one side of the handout it was written that
7 there are no:: prerequisites (.) in order to get the course (.) and on the other side there wa::s
8 another clause stating that one has to have passed another course let's say (.)
9 and the secretary said (.) "ohh:: I haven't noticed tha::t" (.) and then you had to go about
10 asking a hundred lecturers about that (.) particularly in the last registration we had to do

I would like to start the analysis of this extract with a consideration of the participants' use of the pronouns "we", "you", "I" and "they". Following Sacks' (1992: 144-149; 348-353) analysis, I would like to suggest that a consideration of the subtle pragmatic nuances in the participants' use of those pronouns may be proved particularly useful in the task of disentangling particular rhetorical identities at stake.

The indexicalised subject(s) of pronouns

The extract starts with Spyros introducing the second discussion topic by reading aloud part of its original wording. In line 2, Yiorgos introduces a comparative national frame of reference and suggests that "the level of organisation" (of studies) is "very good, perfect", "if we compare that to the Greek one". At first, I would like to draw attention to the use of the pronoun "we" in this case. The question that may arise here is to "whom" does this "we" refers. The obvious answer, of course, is that it refers to the group of the participants as ratified addressees of the discussion question. I do think though that such an answer forecloses rather than assists any attempted analyses. Bearing in mind the overall flow of my analysis in this chapter and, in addition, Sacks' suggestion that:

"We" clearly can refer to a category, which has as one of its crucial properties that no intention exists of listing the incumbents, and furthermore they're not listable. That is, "we" can refer to an infinite population. (Sacks, 1992: 148-149)

I would like to argue that the use of "we" by Yiorgos (line 2) refers to the infinite population of the category rational and nationally disinterested (as opposed to nationally prejudiced) persons.
Yiorgos's reference to the "level of organisation" is constructed as a positive assessment of an Other national category. In so doing, his own institutionally\textsuperscript{6} sanctioned national affiliation is being obscured, whereas the category "Greek" comes to be the object of his talk and not a category which he aligns himself to in one way or another.

Let me now move to Tania's reception of Yiorgos' positive assessment of English organisation, in which the pronouns "you", "I" and "they" appear. Before doing so though, let me consider the interactional details, which preface her turn. At first, it should be noted that Tania's second turn (lines 4-10) comes after two attributable silences (Levinson, 1983). The first comes after the initial assessment component in Yiorgos' utterance ("very good") and the second after his second assessment component ("perfect"), which upgrades its positive character. It also comes as an interruption to Yiorgos' attempt to justify his assessment, in the face of the lack of any agreement second turn by the rest of the participants and of the noticeable silences, which normally preface disagreements to assessments (Pomerantz, 1984b).

In Tania's turn, Yiorgos' assessment is undermined in a subtle rhetorical way. A first feature to note here is the way in which the rhetorical possibilities of the rational, nationally unprejudiced footing are exploited to counter Yiorgos' argument. Tania glosses over the comparative national framework, which sustained Yiorgos positive assessment of English organisation, by prefacing her turn with the phrase "okay, everything seems nice and good". I would like to argue that, in so doing, she embarks on two distinctive rhetorical courses of action. On the one hand, she acknowledges the merits of a nationally disinterested approach, which attests to the superiority of English organisation. On the other, she lays the foundations for a criticism of English organisation on the basis of a rhetorical distinction between appearances and essences.

At this point, I think that it is worth contemplating a little on the implicit rhetorical subject of the verb "seems", as well as on the question to whom the pronoun "you" that she uses twice (line 4) refers. I would like to argue that both of them convey reference to the infinite population (or universal audience) of rational and nationally disinterested agents as did the "we" used by Yiorgos previously. As far as the understanding of "you" in particular is concerned, I would like to quote Sacks once more:

\textsuperscript{6}I use the term "institutionally" here to refer both to official citizenship and to the identity of the Greek made relevant for the participants by means of the rhetorical presuppositions of the research project as a whole. At the end of the day,
That openness of "you" means that "you" can in fact be a way of talking about "everybody" - and indeed, incidentally, of "me". For "you" stands as a pronoun for the set of terms: "everyone", "someone", "people" etc. (1992: 349; emphasis added).

It should be noted here that, in congruence with Sacks' observation, in line 5, Tania uses the pronoun "I" to exemplify her complains by starting a story about a problem she has experienced due to contradictions in the handout for her course (lines 5-10). The gist of her story is that the superior organisation of the English is just an "appearance", which is contradicted by insights gained from closer experiences. Notably, the subject of those experiences is an infinite and nationally unprejudiced "you", which incidentally becomes "me" ("I").

I would like briefly to note two more related points here, which will be more closely elaborated in the analysis of subsequent extracts. The first one has to do with the subject matter of Tania's complains about English organisation. Since the target of her criticism has been both the contradictions of the handout and the secretary's inefficiency, it could be argued that the implicit criteria for an institution to pass as "organised" have to do with the satisfaction of their "users". The second point I would like briefly to draw attention to has to do with an implicit theme which runs through accounts of English organisation as just an "appearance". In order to arrive at that though, let me gloss over the rhetorical work accomplished in this short exchange.

After Yiorgos' initial assessment, Tania did not disagree with the contention that English organisation compared to the Greek is much better, "perfect". As I have noted in the analysis of most of the extracts in this chapter, within a comparative national frame of reference, English organisation and Greek disorganisation have been oriented to by the participants as normative discursive resources. Challenging these, as we have seen, may render speakers accountable for national prejudice. Nevertheless, in this particular extract, Tania manages to level a criticism at English organisation without rendering "hearable" negative identity inferences for her. By drawing and expanding on the footing of "rationality" adopted by Yiorgos, she recasts what appears to be normative knowledge as an epiphenomenon, which could not endure the test of actual experiences.

Tania's rhetorical strategy has certain resemblances with the strategy we saw that was employed in previous extracts, where, again on a footing of rationality, the contention of English organisation was argued to be a result of the xenomania and of the mystifying propensities of (other) Greeks. In the (research) practices of the social sciences in general and of psychology in particular should be recognised to play a significant part in the const-(inst)-itution of subjectivity (cf. Foucault, 1967; 1979; Rose, 1989).
these cases though, the target of criticism was the attitude of the Other Greeks and not English organisation in its own right. In this extract, Tania, by introducing the rhetorical split between appearances and essences, manages to criticise English organisation, without rendering relevant the identity of xenomaniac for Yiorgos. For her, it is the complexity of the phenomenological world, which may lead to positive (Greek) appraisals of English organisation and not the identity flaws (xenomania) of the perceiving Greeks.

This brings me to the last point I want to make about the criticism of English organisation as an appearance, which is only "potentially there" in Tania's discourse but is actively pursued by participants in the subsequent extracts. What if the complexity of the phenomenological world, i.e. the split between appearances and essences, is not a matter of "real" properties of the world "out-there" but a result of manipulation by deceitful agents? What if Greek impressions of English organisation are formed because a "show of organisation" or a pretence aiming at deceiving them, is underway?

**Extract 9**

((Before the start of this extract the participants, discussing their expectations before coming to England, were complaining, albeit bantering, that they had been deceived because in the promotional video of Lancaster University that they were shown in Greece, the weather was good, the people happy and smiling and so on.))

1 Panos when we first came here (.) you were not here for the intro* week* (.)
2 Vlassis of course we were here for the intro* week*
3 Yiorgos I would say yes we were here (...)
4 Panos you saw them (.) they took good care of us (.) you know ((mimicking)) "what ever you= 5 Yiorgos =last year (.) last year [we were here a week before the intro* week*= 6 Panos [want" (.) "how are you" and things like 7 that (.) but as soon as this week goes by::: (.) they don't care if you exist or not 8 Yiorgos oh::: yea::h ((inaudible)) (....)

(DG10: 210-217)

There are a few interesting features of this extract that I would like to comment on. But at first I would like to note that unlike most of the extracts I have considered so far, in this one there is no reference to "(institutional) organisation", Greek or English, at least explicitly named as such. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that in this extract Panos, in voicing his complains, is ostensibly drawing on what Sacks (1992) would call members' tacit understanding of the incumbents of the category "organised institutions". In the last extract, but also, throughout the extracts considered in this chapter, the participants' criteria for praising English institutional organisation and criticising Greek institutional disorganisation involved some reference to "user's satisfaction" of various services provided by institutions and/or to the "care" exhibited by institutions or their agents to their
users. "Institutional organisation" is an inference rich category (cf. Sacks, 1992: 40-48; Schenkein, 1978; see also, Antaki et al., 1996) and the incumbents of that category may invoke the unstated but tacitly understood members' category.

Are "they" organised or simply pretending?

There are two points on which I would like to comment on in this extract. First, I think it is worth considering the particulars of Panos' construction of his complains about the "organisation" of the University of Lancaster. He constructs two contradictory public profiles of the University. On the one hand, it is the "caring" image promoted in the "intro week". On the other hand, it is the indifference exhibited immediately after that and for the rest of the academic year. Importantly, both versions involve actual behaviours or (lack of behaviours) on behalf of University's functionaries. It is "they" who "took good care of us". And also, it is "they" who "as soon as this week goes by [...] don't care if you exist or not".

The point I want to make here is that in Panos' construction of events, the temporal location of the "caring behaviour" at the beginning of the academic year and also the invocation of "actual" actors who exhibited the complainable behaviours pinpoint towards an institutionally staged deceit. Moreover, the discursive contrast between an initial "caring" behaviour, which is soon to be annulled by indifference, invokes as a relevant issue for the understanding of this contradiction, the underlying dimension of "authenticity" of emotions, as a determinant of behaviour. This is evident in Panos' parodising of the functionaries who have been active voiced (Wooffitt, 1992). I will have the chance to elaborate on this point in the analysis of the next extract.

The second point I would like to make is that the construction of English organisation as an appearance, created by cynical performances of organisation, frees the participants from the concern to display national disinterestedness, in the face of the normative knowledge which favours English (institutional) organisation over Greek (institutional) disorganisation. Such a rhetorical move effectively entails a change in the comparative frame of reference. The comparison between Greek and English institutions gives way to a comparison between the English and the Greeks as a people, with ascribed attributes in their national characters. This rhetorical move, which questions the "authenticity" of emotions in the behaviours of English functionaries of institutions is explicitly drawn upon in the following extract.

Extract 10
Reporting on their negative experiences from Lancaster University, in the beginning of this extract, the participants Stelios and Nikitas level a direct criticism to English organisation for its tendency to endorse inflexibility. This criticism is very similar in tone to the critical constructions of English organisation as a flaw that I considered in 2.2.2. What I want to draw attention to though is Andreas' turn (lines, 6-9) because it opens the way for a critical construction of English organisation as an appearance, which is unfolded in the second part of this extract that I consider below.

"Like robots": a criticism or an excuse?
I want to suggest that Andreas' turn offers a nice example for considering the incongruence that may exist between the semantics of an utterance and its pragmatic orientation. On the face of it, and without a consideration of its sequential placement, Andreas' utterance may be read as a criticism or as a negative appraisal of the English. They are depicted as close minded, sticking to the rules, "operating like robots", whereas "we", in Greece, "have learned to think a bit different as well". Nevertheless, a consideration of its sequential placement leads to a radically different understanding of this turn.

Andreas' turn follows Nikitas' expansion on Stelios' negative assessment of the English. In Nikitas' expansion, the target of criticism is placed exclusively on the English people and on their attitude towards organisation. In this discursive context, Andreas' assertion "that's their system" and what follows after that is treated by Stelios (10) as an attempt to excuse the English for being "pushy with organisation". Let me consider Andreas' turn in some detail.

Andreas' assertion "that's their system" projects an understanding of Nikitas' prior turn as a negative assessment of English people. By his assertion though, Nikitas is excusing the English for their being "pushy with organisation" on the grounds of denial of intent (Semin & Manstead, 1983). In
his account, the English are constructed as being "pushy with organisation" because of the way in which "their system" is and because they have not learned to "think a bit different as well" as "we" have. Andreas in order to substantiate his excuse is constructing Nikitas' and Stelios' negative assessments as possibly being the result of misunderstanding, something which happened to "them" as well when "they" "first came here".

In line 10, Stelios, on the one hand, agrees with the absolution of personal responsibility for the English offered by Andreas', and on the other, insists on his criticism: "right, it's not flexible though". In this way, Stelios manages to blend two different rhetorical constructions of the "English". In his agreement to the absolution of personal responsibility, he invokes a construction of the "English" as members of a society who should not be blamed for their culturally determined constitution. Insisting on his critical tone though, he asserts the right to endorse his negative judgment of the English not on cultural differences grounds, but on the rational grounds of the nationally uncoloured criteria of organisational efficiency. Their way of (justifiably) being what they are, makes their organisation (unjustifiably) inflexible, and therefore, amenable to a rational critique.

So far in this extract, the introduction in the comparative national framework of national Others (in their professional (institutional) capacities) has facilitated a criticism of English institutional organisation as a flaw. I think that this has been a quite remarkable rhetorical achievement in its own right. First, because English institutional organisation constitutes a normatively positive "thing" in the participants' discourse. Second, because this direct criticism of English institutional organisation as a flaw has been carefully designed in a manner in which negative identity inferences about potential prejudice have been warded off. The way in which the talk reported in this extract proceeds though is even more interesting for my current analytic purposes.

10b

10 Stelios right (.) it's not flexible though (.) because let's say (.) when you ask for=
11 Andreas =hhe:::=
12 Stelios =for example for a room and he tells you (.)
13 Andreas ((inaudible))
14 Stelios "hhe:. (.) it's not my (.) it's* not* my* business*" (.) or he tells you: (.) "wait" (.) I don't
15 know (.) "on a waiting* list*" (.) and you have to (.) and he tells you (.). on the one hand (.)

7 At this point, Andreas is relying upon a categorisation of the participants, as third year undergraduate students (with three years of experience in England), which category includes himself and the two other participants who do not appear in this extract, and postgraduate students (with an experience in England of less than a whole academic year), which category includes both Stelios and Nikitas.
"go now and leave it to me" (..) ri::ght (.) "I will let you know" (.) and at the end of it it's 
17 shown that it is you who have to keep an eye on him (..) this means that it i::s (.)
18 Nikitas okay this i::s (.)
19 Stelios I mean typically::=
20 Andreas =the the point i::s=
21 Stelios =typically they show an interest (.) but essentially they don't give a damn (.)
22 Kleanthis I mean there is this thing tha::t (.) all right (.) I've heard from many people saying tha::t (.)
23 you know not (.) ss- (.) I mean it's better clearly to say to you "fuck off" (.) instead o::f
24 Stelios =exactly=
25 Kleanthis =of saying (. )"yes yes of course we'll do it for you" let's say (.) and ((inaudible)) to tell you
26 "fuck off"
27 Stelios I mean ((here)) you see (.) while in Greece the indifference of a simple employee makes you
28 feel indignant=*
29 Kleanthis =at least there you knew it=
30 Stelios =and you sa::y "damn it"=
31 Kleanthis =he makes it clear to you right from the beginning therefore:: (.) ((giggling)) kn- (.) you know
32 what to do=*
33 Stelios =over here you come to the point to:: (.) to be enthusiastic=
34 Andreas =that's true=*
35 Stelios =about the fact he smiles to you=*
36 Andreas =((inaudible))=
37 Stelios =and shows a typical interest (.) but essentially he's doing nothing (..)
38 Andreas yes that's true
39 Nikitas it i::s (.) the proper* behaviour (..) to:: show (..) to smi:le
40 Stelios it is simply the diplomacy of the English (.) but that doesn't mean anything
41 Nikitas politicially* correct* (.) which is only:: (.)
42 Andreas it mi- (.) yes it might as well (.) it's not only:: (.) I don- I don't think that they are pretending
43 anymore on that (.) ri::ght (.) ((mimicking)) diplomacy (. ) it's simply that they have=*
44 Nikitas =that's how their culture is
45 Andreas yes that's their culture

This part of the extract starts with Stelios giving an example of what he means by English institutional inflexibility. In so doing, he tells a story (lines, 10-17) about applying for university accommodation, stressing the inconsistencies that one may find in the accommodation officer's behaviour: on the one hand, "you" may have him assuring you that you will be placed on a waiting list, and on the other "you" realise that you still have to "keep an eye on him". Nevertheless, my impression is that Stelios' example does not really work in the direction that he meant it to be working. In lines 19, 21, Stelios offers a gist formulation of his story stating: "typically they show an interest but essentially they don't give a damn". Despite the fact that I am not really sure how the (formulated as) point of his story relates conceptually to his (also formulated) intention to explain the institutional inflexibility of the English, since the trajectory of his talk has not been problematised by the rest of the participants I will not comment further on that.

"Their" inauthentic caring profile, "our" authentic rudeness

The point I want to make here is that with his formulation of the gist of his story, Stelios takes a critical line towards English (institutional) organisation constructing a discrepancy between its
appearance and its essence. According to his argument, it may seem that the allocation of on
campus accommodation in the university of Lancaster is a well organised business, manifested in
the existence of waiting lists and in the officer's assurance that students will be notified about
vacancies. Nevertheless, "at the end" the students "have to keep an eye on him", presumably
because the order of the waiting list is being transgressed or the students are never being notified.
According to Stelios' argument, the institutionally organised profile is only one side of the coin.
This is coupled with the personal indifference of the institutional agents, who violate the rules,
since "they don't give a damn". In lines 21-26, Kleanthis takes up Stelios' point and on the footing
of "many people" relays the view that it is better for services' users to be discouraged on the spot
about their enquiries, instead of being promised services, promises that eventually will be breached.

In lines 27-28, Stelios makes an explicit comparison with the situation in Greece and subsequently
(lines, 29-41), jointly with Kleanthis, formulates a favourable view of the situation there.
According to them, the straightforwardness with which the "employees" "indifference" is
expressed in Greece is to be preferred to the "smiles" and "typical interest", attributed to "politically
correctness" and to the "diplomacy of the English", exhibited to cover up their real "indifference".
In lines 42-43, Andreas suggests that the English should not be accused for "pretending" and agrees
with Nikitas that their behaviour should be attributed to the way "their culture is".

In this extract, the construction of English (institutional) organisation as an appearance has been
taken a further twist, compared to the previous two extracts. What was rather implicit there, became
explicit here: the argument that English (institutional) organisation is an "appearance" (and,
therefore, criticisable) relies heavily on its counter argumentative theme (Billig, 1987), i.e. that
Greek (institutional) disorganisation is an "essence" and, therefore, favourable. Evidently, such a
rhetorical move draws on discursive constructions of institutional organisation / disorganisation
which focus on the institutional agents' role in the running of institutions. Caring and indifference,
criteria *par excellence* for the participants in order to pass judgments on institutional organisation
or disorganisation, are considered in terms of personal behaviours: the English maintain a caring
profile, which only disguises their essential indifference, whereas the Greeks do not even bother to
present a caring profile, making their indifference an explicit behavioural statement. Notably, the
grounds on which the participants favour the latter and criticise the former are not moral or
aesthetic but purely practical (or rational). Being presented with a caring profile, which covers up
indifference, misleads institutions' users to expect that their enquiries will be fulfilled and,
therefore, they cease to take any further action; whereas, the straightforward indifference of the
latter leads the users to pursue their enquiries with other means and have them, eventually, succeeded.

As a final comment, I would like to note the way in which the national disinterestedness dilemma is managed in this, overtly critical towards the English (institutional) organisation, extract. The first point I want to make here is that in Stelios' talk, as in the talk of other participants in the previous extracts, the move from acknowledging the superiority of English (institutional) organisation over the Greek one to criticising English (institutional) organisation is facilitated by the discursive construction of institutional organisation in terms of personal / national qualities. As this extract also shows, when the frame of national comparisons is not an institutional one but a national character one, then the Greek participants have, normatively, something to boast about.

The second point I would like to stress relates to Andreas' contribution in the last lines of this extract (see also 10a above). The discursive construction and criticism of grotesque national Others always entails the unfavourable but hearable identity of the nationally prejudiced for the speaker(s). One way of coping rhetorically with that danger is to mitigate the force of the criticism. According to Andreas, the English institutional functionaries should not be blamed personally for "pretending". Their behaviour should better be understood as dictated by culturally (nationally) specific "ways of being". The invocation of a reified cultural field (with its associated cultural determinism) turns the potentially politically empowering theme of cultural relativism upside down: national Others are absolved from the responsibility for being "what they are", in the same way as "we" are absolved. Moreover, their way of being what "they are" is not compared to our way of what "we are" on aesthetic or moral grounds. The difference and the claimed superiority is grounded on "practical", "rational" criteria: our way of "being institutionally" is presented as superior because, quoting John Major (!), "yes it hurts, yes it works".

In this final part of the analysis, I have taken into consideration extracts where the critical line towards English (institutional) organisation has been built upon a distinction between its appearance and its essence. This discursive construction of English institutional organisation draws upon a criticism of the human factor of organised English institutions and, in so doing, opens the way for a comparative national framework, where Greek national traits may be favoured or even celebrated. As it was the case with critical constructions of English organisation that I considered before, in these extracts as well the participants' concern to maintain a rational, nationally disinterested motivational profile while criticising the English has also been apparent.
3. Discourse analysing Greek talk on English organisation / Greek disorganisation

The backdrop for the analyses presented in this chapter has been provided by Billig's (1995) and Billig et al.'s (1988) elaborations on the ideological dilemma of prejudice and by my previous discussion about the relevance of the ideological charge of xenomania in the context of modern Greek culture. Using analytic tools, concepts and findings from the discursive turn in social psychology, I opted to highlight ways in which the rhetorical organisation of my participants' talk manifests an ideological concern with the disavowal of the unfavourable identities of the prejudiced both as xenophobic and xenomaniac. Moreover, by focusing my analysis on the cultural stereotype of "organisation", I opted to demonstrate the thoughtful and morally consequential character of stereotypical ascriptions as manifested within the participants' orientation to and discursive deployment of this stereotype.

In this final part of the chapter, looking back at my discourse analyses, I shall (re-)consider my micro analyses of talk against the backdrop of the ideological dilemmas and of Banal Nationalism perspective. In terms of narrative coherence, such a consideration was rather difficult to be sustained while my focus was placed on the micro discursive phenomena I was dealing with analytically. My main preoccupation in this final part of the chapter though will be a reflection on the extent to which the analytic manifestation of the local, interactional uses of cultural stereotypes may be linked to the ethnographic arguments that I considered in chapter 1 with regard to the symbolic uses of stereotypes.

3.1. Organisation / disorganisation as flexible discursive resources

As I said in the introduction of this chapter, I focused my analysis on the topic of "organisation" both because there were good theoretical reasons to do so as well as because on the pre-analytic phase of coding, talk on "organisation" appeared to be a recurrent feature of the conversations. However, there is an important theoretical and methodological issue that emerges here. In the pre-analytic stage of coding, I was able to identify segments of talk that bear upon "organisation" on the basis of my commonsensical understanding on what may constitute talk about "organisation". The identification of these segments of talk, of course, was largely made possible on the basis of my reading of the semantic content of the conversations.
Nevertheless, after my discourse analysis of (some of) these extracts, what should be apparent is that abstracting "stereotypes" from talk in interaction on the basis of the semantic content of talk is a rather restrictive analytic practice. As I hope that I have shown, "organisation" and "disorganisation" were actively oriented to by the participants within certain activity sequences. It was in the course of these activity sequences that versions of "organisation" and "disorganisation" were flexibly constructed as relevant features of the world and its inhabitants by my participants. Unfolding my analysis, I used the labels "English organisation as an advantageous state of affairs", as "deficient", as "a flaw" and as "an appearance" in order to designate the transmutations that the theme of "organisation" has gone through, while mobilised (and used) within certain discursive practices. In Potter et al.'s (1990) terminology, these labels are meant to designate "abstractions from practices in context".

As it was shown in my analyses, "organisation" not only ceased to appear as a feature of the world and its inhabitants with a fixed evaluative content, but, moreover, its very properties and constituent elements changed in accordance to what the participants were doing while drawing upon it as a discursive resource. Following Billig (1995), Billig et al. (1988) and Condor (1990; 1996, 1997a,b,d) then, what these active uses and interactional transmutations of a cultural stereotype (which traces its genealogical origins in the discourse of orientalism) may be argued to indicate is the thoughtful nature of acts of stereotyping. Clearly, my participants did not merely appear to "think" that Greece, Greek Others and themselves as Greeks are "disorganised" (as orientals or Romioi). Neither, of course, that they are "organised" (as Europeans or "Hellenes"). More was at stake when "organisation" in its transmutations was drawn upon as a normative discursive resource. Certain identity work was interactionally accomplished.

3.2. Cultural stereotypes and identity concerns: Interactional / rhetorical uses

As I have noted at the beginning of my analysis, the rhetorical design of my project has explicitly made relevant for the participants a national frame of reference. They have been hailed within it as Greek nationals and their standing within another national context was problematised. Rather not surprisingly, my banal nationalist research practices generated similarly banal nationalist discursive practices on behalf of the participants. The framework of national comparisons that was by and large introduced by my research practices provided food for thought and argument for my
participants; albeit for thought and argument within the parameters of national ideology. The English were not simply dismissed for their "organisation". Instead, arguments broke out on how much "they" are similar to "us", which aspects of "their" culture and way of being are to be favoured and which to be criticised and so on. Most importantly, as I have shown, in criticising England and the English my participants manifested their concern to disavow the hearable moral identity of the nationally prejudiced (-as-xenophobic). In Billig's (1995) terminology, this rhetorical concern of my participants is indicative of a modern nationalist consciousness. It indicates the extent to which the introvert and the extrovert (or the national and international) outlooks of national ideology are naturalised within casual argumentation reproducing the tacit assumption of the natural division of the world into nation States.

As I have argued though, the ideological constitution of modern Greek national identity as an ambivalent one entails an additional ideological dilemma when the national Others talked about are Europeans. The design of my project, by inviting Greek participants to account for their living experiences in (another) European country has also worked in the direction of rendering the moral charge of xenomania a relevant rhetorical concern for them. Throughout my analyses, I showed how the rhetorical articulation of praises of England and the English were carefully designed to ward off inferences of creeping (albeit, morally consequential) favouritism of European Others or xenomania. Most importantly, we also saw how explicitly or implicitly the charge of unreasonable exaltations of the English "system" or "organisation" was directed by my participants to Greek Others, who were deemed to be uncritically dazzled by it.

As I suggested before, the very rhetorical manifestation of this ideological concern with disavowing xenomania rests upon (and reproduces) the assumption of the natural but also hierarchical division of the world into nations of the West and the Rest. Or, more specifically, it rests upon and reproduces the dilemmatic ideological constitution of modern Greek national identity. The concern not to appear xenomaniac, while articulating praises of the English (as European Others) rests upon the assumption that potentially there are "reasons" for Greeks to be xenomaniac. In other words, that certain national Other categories (the European ones) may be normatively the objects of uncritical Greek exaltations and coveting. The redirection of this charge from oneself to Greek Others is strongly reminiscent of the standard rhetorical move of redirecting the charge of prejudice from oneself to generalised, bigoted and irrational Others (cf. van Dijk, 1984; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
As I have shown in my analyses, the interactional articulation of the stereotypes of "organisation" and "disorganisation" manifested my participant's concern to disavow this (complementary to prejudiced) identity of the xenomaniac. It could be argued then that merely the analytic attestment to this ideological concern could sustain a discourse analytic claim to the reproduction of the ideological dilemma of Greek national identity within talk in interaction. Nevertheless, I think that there is room for a further (albeit cautious) analytic move. To that end, what I want to draw attention to is the symbolic identity implications associated with my participants' recourse to the cultural stereotype of disorganisation in sustaining interactionally praises and criticism of England and the English.

### 3.3. Cultural stereotypes and identity concerns: Symbolic / rhetorical uses

So far, I have based my claim that the dilemma of Greek national identity is reproduced within my participants' talk on two grounds. First, on the genealogical provenance of the cultural stereotypes of "organisation" and "disorganisation", which have been *flexibly* albeit *normatively* oriented to by my participants as relevant features of England / English and Greece / Greeks. Second, on my analytic attestment to the way in which the concern with xenomania, which arose within the ideological processes of the historical constitution of modern Greek national identity, informs the rhetorical articulation of stereotypes of "organisation" and "disorganisation" within my participants' talk. Briefly put, my argument has been that historically specific discourses on the content of European and modern Greek identity have provided the resources that have been flexibly mobilised while my participants' talk was structured around their concern to claim a culturally specific type of motivational disinterestedness with regard to the objects of their descriptions.

Nevertheless, as I argued in the previous chapter, a discourse analysis may reach further than that. My suggestion here is that the discourse of modern Greek national identity may provide more than the resources that are flexibly mobilised by speakers in describing Greeks and European Others. It may also provide more than the specific ideological concern with motivational disinterestedness (as-non-xenomania), which in its rhetorical instantiation can be analytically attested to by means of the Discursive Action Model. As I want to suggest, it may also provide for the symbolic identity locations (or subject positions) from where arguments (criticisms or praises) of Greeks and Europeans are levelled by Greek speakers. Herzfeld's (1987; 1995) arguments that I considered in Chapter 1 suggest as much at least.
Notwithstanding the wording of one of the discussion topics, which explicitly prompted the participants to discuss their "Impressions of the the level of organisation of studies" in Lancaster University, as we saw in the extracts considered, some version of the theme of "organisation" was oriented to as relevant by my participants, while they were discussing a wide range of topics, from English public lavatories (!) to English national character. Of course, their orientation to "organisation" as a relevant issue has always been evaluatively tinged. "Organisation" was either used to sustain praises of England and criticisms of Greece for its "disorganisation", or to sustain criticisms of England, its institutions and its nationals and praises of the Greeks for their justifiable "disorganisation". My suggestion here is that by means of these evaluative stances towards England / English and Greece / Greeks, my (Greek) participants have been "taking positions" within the symbolic dichotomy that underlies the discourse of modern Greek national identity. Or, more accurately, that through my participants' agentic use of the cultural stereotype of organisation, the already constituted ideological ambivalence of modern Greek national identity is enacted.

The direct praise of English institutional organisation as standing in a stark contrast to the Greek "mess", that we saw unfolding in Extract 1 is a good case in point. By appreciating the (occidental) "organisation" of England, it could be argued that these participants are dissociating themselves from the (oriental) "mess" of modern Greece and that they are laying for themselves a symbolic claim to a rational occidental identity. For Herzfeld (1987; 1992; 1995), modern Greek complaints about the disorganisation of Greek institutions and bureaucracy are acts in a symbolic play, where Greek lay social actors orientalise (the imported and imposed as occidental) authority of Greek State structures and occidentalise their own (Greek) personal conduct. In that respect, it could be argued that what the participants are doing interactionally with their use of the cultural stereotype of "organisation" is a symbolic act, predicated upon the ambivalent discourse of modern Greek national identity.

Despite the fact that the clear cut evaluative thrust of the talk reported in Extract 1 provides for a convenient interactional terrain in order to test an argument about the symbolic dimensions of interactional uses of stereotypes, with other extracts of talk that I have considered things are more complicated. In extract 2, for example, we saw that a praise of English institutional organisation was levelled from a distant interactional footing. English airports, punctuality and "organisation in general" were recast as "typical" Greek praises of England. As I argued, with this rhetorical move the charge of personal "xenomania" was rhetorically warded off. What should be pointed out here
is that whereas discursive acts of appreciation of European order and organisation may be argued to sustain symbolic claims to an occidental identity for speakers, in the symbolic pragmatics of modern Greek culture xenomania is a very oriental attribute. As we saw in chapter 3, it denotes the inconsummable westernisation and the uncritical favouring of the West by the Greek "masses". In that respect, the praise of English organisation on the distant footing of the Greek Others that was rhetorically articulated in extract 2 could be argued that sustains a dual symbolic claim to occidental rationality. As long as the speaker is subscribing to the "typical" praise of English organisation that he relays, his is a symbolic stance of occidental rationality. As long, as he is merely relaying a "typical" Greek praise that may be countered as xenomaniac, he is distancing himself from an oriental Greek stance and claims a critical towards the West, albeit occidental identity.

A similar symbolic claim to an identity of occidental rationality may be argued that has been at work in extract 4 also. In that extract, Michalis' argument that "there is no organisation" was only possible to be interactionally sustained by his admission that compared to Greek, English organisation is superior. Criticising Greece for its oriental disorganisation, confers symbolic claims to an occidental perspective. On the other hand though, Michalis' assertion that "compared to how it should be, they don't have organisation" works further towards the establishment of an occidental perspective. His is a voice of a rational, occidental observer, who avoids the pitfalls of uncritical Greek exaltations of European order by drawing upon universal and ideal criteria for assessing the "organisation" of the Europeans. Let me now turn to consider what may be the symbolic ramifications of talk where English organisation was drawn upon not as a praiseworthy state of affairs (in comparison to the Greek "mess" or disorganisation) but as a complainable matter or an unfavourable characteristic compared to the way Greece and Greeks "are".

As I highlighted in my analyses, critical constructions of English organisation were made possible by my participants' recourse to some version of positively valued attributes of Greek national character. The latter included praises of Greek students as "mature" and full of "incentive", who in contrast to the English are not enslaved within "a system" and their personal excellence stands in contrast to the "chaos" that prevails in Greek universities (Extract 5). Greek national character was also favourably compared to the English organisation, when the metaphor of Greek "boiling blood" was contrasted to the passivity of English queuing behaviour (Extract 6). In the same extract we also saw a favourable juxtaposition of the Greek "not so rational system", which encourages flexibility and individual endeavours of "threading one's way around", to the English "rational
system" which "disciplines" people. In Extract 7, we also saw how some of my research participants, while criticising Greek disorganisation in "public life", disavowed with disgust the strict organisation of English mundane practices. In this extract, "disorganisation in personal life" was an indication of "healthy particularity" in contrast to the unfavourable uniformity of the English way of being. Most importantly, in the three last extracts that I considered (8-10), the politeness and "typical smiles" of English institutional functionaries were criticised as inauthentic behavioural manifestations of an underlying "indifferent" attitude. In contrast to that, the rudeness of Greek institutional functionaries was to be preferred as an authentic behavioural manifestation of a similar to the English "indifferent" attitude.

What I want to draw attention to here is Herzfeld's (1987) account of Greek national character that I considered in Chapter 1. As Herzfeld argues, in the nineteenth century European discourse of Hellenism and in the normative discourse of Greek nationalism, modern Greek individualism-as-insubordination has been elevated to a trademark of the occidental character of the Greeks, which differentiated them from the oriental Turks. The Greek individualism (as insubordination) has, allegedly, enabled them not only to survive the idle and corrupt political administration of the Turks but also to establish themselves as a financially strong community. Moreover, it was the driving force that led them to an unequal and sacrificial revolt against their "barbarous" masters. Nevertheless, as Herzfeld (1987; cf. Fermor, 1966) argues, after the independence in the discourse of the Greek State authorities, the individualism as insubordination of the Greeks was transformed to oriental self-interestness. As we saw though, according to Herzfeld, in the symbolic pragmatics of everyday life, lay Greek social actors make use of a symbolic inversion: their everyday struggles with national bureaucracy is rendered to be an occidental struggle against the oriental, "corrupt", "inefficient" and "oppressive" State administration.

What I want to suggest here is that the virtuous versions of Greek national character that my participants mobilised as normative counter resources to Greek institutional disorganisation (Extract 5) and to English institutional organisation draw upon the Hellenic discourse of individualism as insubordination. Personal "initiative", "boiling blood", non conformity to "systems", "flexibility" and authenticity of emotions are the qualities that have attested to the European "essence" of the Greek national character in the pre-independence period. They are also the qualities that after independence (in the discourse of Greek elites) attest to the oriental flaws of the Greeks. Of course, in the extracts that I have considered these qualities have been praised by my participants (mostly) in contrast to the English (European) organisation. Whether, in the manner
of Herzfeld, it could be argued that my participants have been symbolically orientalising the ostensibly occidental institutional structures of England should better remain an open question. Nevertheless, the normative interactional orientation to virtues of Greek national character in juxtaposition to "organisation" is inviting for a discourse analysis focusing exactly on that. In the next chapter, I will pursue such an analysis. Taking a more adventurous analytic turn though, I will try to integrate into the unfolding of my interactional / rhetorical analysis insights from the symbolic / rhetorical analytic framework of Herzfeld. I would think that in the light of the literature that I have so far considered such a turn is both theoretically and methodologically principled.

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8 Although modern Greeks, as "descendants" of the ultra European ancient Greeks, could be argued that are capable of doing so symbolically!
Chapter Six

TALKING ABOUT GREEK NATIONAL CHARACTER:
ORIENTAL SELF-INTERESTNESS OR OCCIDENTAL INDIVIDUALISM?

1. Introduction
   1.1. Participants and research procedure
   1.2. Backstage to the analysis proper
   1.3. The research frame and the course of the analysis

2. Criticising Greek self-interestness
   2.1. Criticising the Greek lack of civility
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   2.3. Criticising the Greek politics and politicians

3. Praising Greek individualism
   3.1. Greek institutional disorganisation vs. the virtues of Greek national character
   3.2. Greek politics / politicians vs. the virtues of Greek national character
   3.3. European Others' national character(s) vs. the virtues of Greek national character

4. Conversational and symbolic uses of cultural stereotypes of modern Greek character:
   Towards an analytic convergence?
1. Introduction

For my second empirical study, I opted to consider ways in which Greek employees working for the European Union account for their professional and more generally their living experiences in Brussels. Brussels, being the administrative capital of the European Union, and hosting the headquarters of other international organisations as well, offered the ideal cosmopolitan European scenery for my research. My hope was that inviting Greek employees to account for their working and living experiences in the multi-European environment of the E.U. institutions and of Brussels would provide me with a wealth of discursive material, where assumptions about what constitutes Europe and Greece would be played out. The number of Greek expatriates (diplomats and employees) working in various international organisations and Greek delegations in Brussels comes up to approximately 2,000. Most of them (800) are employed in the institutions of the European Union and more specifically in the executive body of the E.U., the European Commission.

1.1. Participants and research procedure

Before arriving in Brussels I had already established a contact with the General Secretary of the S.E.U.D.O. (Association of Greek Employees in International Organisations) through a common acquaintance of ours. He assured me that he was willing to assist me with my research by introducing me to a number of Greek employees. At this initial stage of planning the research, I also came in contact with a second Greek E.C. employee, who also assured me about his willingness to help me. On arriving in Brussels, I had the chance to meet those two persons and discuss the practicalities of my project. These (off the record) discussions helped me to modify my initial plan for the semi-structured interviews that I would conduct. Following the suggestions of these two "key informants", I decided to focus my research on the employees working for the European Commission. The E.C., with some 15,000 European officials working for it, is the E.U. body that employs the vast majority of "Eurocrats".

The administrative staff of the E.C. is distributed along four Grades. The upper two echelons of Grade A (Administrators; A1, A2) are occupied by persons politically appointed by the member States' political delegations in the E.C. There are very few Greeks occupying such positions in the range of the Directorates-General of the E.C. and I decided to leave them out of my sample. The lower Grade D of the E.C. employees involves auxiliary staff like drivers and cooks and I also
decided to leave them out of my sample. I decided to recruit my interviewees from the lower three positions of the Grade A of Administrators, from the Grade B (Assistant Administrators) and Grade C (Secretaries; Office Assistants). The personnel for all these positions is recruited on a quota basis from the E.U. member States, by means of entry examinations and interview assessments.

The procedure I followed in approaching my interviewees was as follows. Both my key informants provided me with a list of names and phone numbers of acquaintances of theirs. I would call my prospective interviewees at work, explain how I found their phone number, introduce myself as a research student in Lancaster University working on a project aiming to explore the living experiences of Greek residents in other European countries and ask them whether they would be interested in taking part in my research. Once they agreed, I would arrange for a convenient time for them to have the interview conducted. All of my interviews took place in the offices of my interviewees. Overall, 15 interviews were conducted. 8 of my interviewees were males and 7 females, their age ranged from 29 to 60 years and their working experience in the E.C. from 2 months to 18 years (for details, see Appendix E).

Before the start of the interview proper, I would give to my interviewees a handout with some background information about the research and indicative discussion topics. I would leave them enough time to read through the handout, ask any questions they would have, assure them about the confidentiality of the interviews and ask permission to audio record our talk. I would invariably start the interview with a question about the nature of their job and the tasks and duties it involves. After that, we would follow very loosely the order of the discussion topics as they appeared in my handout.

Typically, I would paraphrase one of the discussion topics in the form of a question, opening the space for my interviewees to elaborate on that. Often I would ask for clarifications but I hardly ever tried to rechannel the conversation to the parameters of the discussion topics. Usually, I would

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1 I made this decision because at the time my fieldwork in Brussels was conducted I was planning to have a third study conducted in an industrial city of Germany that would involve immigrant Greek blue collars. Having that in mind, I decided to focus in my Brussels study on Greek white collars. Nevertheless, funding for my third study was eventually not secured, so it was never conducted.

2 Although, as I was told, in the middle range of the A Grade a few positions are filled by means of more particularised recruiting procedures.

3 Although, for practical reasons, most of my interviewees were eventually drawn from the list of names that I was provided by my first key informant.
leave the conversation to flow in the directions that my participants would orientate to. Despite the fact that, as will become apparent from the extracts I shall consider, in the flow of the interaction I would provide agreement (or disagreement) tokens and signals of attention, I very rarely engaged in an explicit argument with my interviewees. This had nothing to do with any prior research decision. I would think that it is indicative of the type of the interactional setting we found ourselves in. My interviews have been designed to elicit accounts of living experiences and I suspect that my displayed unwillingness to engage in an argument with my interviewees, even when I would (strongly) disagree with views expressed, is a normative indication of politeness and respect towards my interviewees and their life stories.

1.2. Backstage to the analysis proper

The interviews recorded lasted variably from 40 to 80 minutes. They were fully transcribed resulting in approximately 500 pages of typescript. As it was the case with my first study as well, some interactional minutiae were noted during the initial transcriptions and these were later reworked in the more limited segments of talk that I decided to focus upon analytically. What should be noted here is that my study in Brussels was conducted immediately after my study in Lancaster and before any analysis for that first study was conducted. My analysis for the second study followed immediately after I had finished with the analysis of the first one. This is important because the course of my analysis for the second study was to a large extent predicated upon my previous analyses.

As it was the case with the pre-analytic stage of my first study, my initial and much broader focus was on the ways in which my interviewees spoke about Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others. Again, the coding process went through a number of stages and the emerging categories of talk were inclusive of borderline instances. My analytic findings from the previous study made me focus in particular on my interviewees' talk about Greece and Greeks. Of course, given the overall frame of my research, talk about Greece and Greeks unavoidably involved national comparisons. As it was the case with my pre-analytic practices for the previous study as well, I focused my attention on segments of talk where my interviewees seemed to be criticising and praising Greece and Greeks. Of course, I was only able to do so by a reading through the semantic content of their talk.
As far as critical constructions of Greece and Greece was concerned, my interviewees appeared to level their criticisms towards three broad topical areas: Greek lay behaviours; Greek attitude to work and Greek politics and politicians. As far as praising sequences were concerned, these appeared to be structured around contrasts: Greeks were praised in comparison to Greek institutions, to Greek politics and politicians and to European Others. A large number of extracts were identified for each sub-category. I translated most of them and a big part of these were analysed. Unavoidably, the analyses presented in this chapter are a small portion of these initial analyses.

1.3. The research frame and the course of the analysis

My critical consideration of the underlying assumptions of my previous study are by and large relevant for the present one as well. In the handout (Appendix F) that I gave to my interviewees prior to the commencement of the interviews, nationality and the national division of the world stand (again) as background and naturalised assumptions. In this study though, rather predictably, "European-ness" is much more emphasised. The political process of European unification is treated as a background context. The national borders between European States have been depicted as having been collapsed providing for unrestricted movement within the E.U. The research question appears to be the study of the subjective ways in which Greek citizens (as Europeans) understand their living experiences within the national context(s) of other members of the E.U. Most importantly, the (Greek) employees in the E.U. have been constructed as a group of focal importance for my research since the nature of their work brings them "at the centre -literal and metaphorical- of the process of the European unification".

What it could be argued is that in the discursive positioning of my research participants with my project, their "European-ness" has been their main (and taken for granted) relevant identity dimension. From the vantage point of a European, my participants have been invited to account for their life experiences in another European context and with other Europeans and, by implication, for their life experiences in Greece (as a European) country and with Greeks (as Europeans). With the political / institutional criteria of Europeanness implicitly informing the text of my handout there is no question whether Greece is a European country and whether Greeks are Europeans. As long as Greece is an E.U. member State and Greeks E.U. citizens, their Europeanness is guaranteed.
Nevertheless, as I shall try to show in my analyses, underlying my participant's discourse there are further assumptions about who may be European, what sort of attributes Europe and Europeans are or should be endowed with and, of course, whether Greece and Greeks are or ought to be European. Following the analytic "openning" I attempted at the end of the previous chapter, I shall try to integrate into my analyses insights about the symbolic identity implications of local, evaluatively tinged constructions of Greece and Greeks and of (Greek) attestments to the discrepancies and converges between Greece / Greeks and Europe / Europeans. In so doing though, of course, I shall keep up with my focal interest in the local management of my participants' accountability as nationally disinterested persons. As it was the case with my previous analysis as well, I shall try to highlight the ways in which my participants disavow the unfavourable moral identities of the prejudiced (as xenophobic and xenomaniac) in the face of talk that may render hearable such negative identity inferences.
2. Criticising the self-interestness of Greeks

Unfolding my analyses in the previous chapter, I highlighted my participants' orientation to (versions of) virtuous constructions of Greek national character as a normative, argumentative counter theme to English institutional and personal organisation. The discursive recourse to praiseworthy attributes of Greek national character was shown to be part and parcel of my participants' rhetorical efforts to accomplish a balanced, nationally disinterested moral profile. As I suggested at the end of the previous chapter, the virtuous cultural stereotypes of Greek national character that my participants mobilised may be seen as drawing upon the discourse of Greek individualism-as-insubordination. "Initiative", "flexibility" and non conformity to "systems" have been the ideological trademarks of the occidental "essence" of Greek national character. Nevertheless, as Herzfeld (1987) has argued Greek individualism is an ambivalent ideological construct. From an occidental virtue, and in accordance to the pragmatic context of its articulation, it can be transformed to an oriental flaw. In such cases, it takes the symbolic form of oriental "self-interestness".

Seeking to complement my previous analyses, in this first analytic part of the present chapter I shall consider extracts of talk in which my participants' rhetorical efforts to establish a nationally disinterested perspective involves some critical appraisal of Greek national character. As we shall see, these critical constructions target "self-interested" behaviours and social actions more generally, which are rhetorically oriented to as factual and normative aspects of Greek national character. Unfolding my analyses, I shall primarily try to highlight my interviewees' efforts to establish a nationally disinterested moral profile while criticising the (rhetorically constructed as) normative and factual self-interested flaws of Greek national character. In addition, I shall also contemplate on the symbolic identity implications of such Greek criticisms of Greek self-interestness.

2.1. Criticising the Greek lack of civility

In this first section of the analysis, I will take into consideration two extracts where the interviewees' rhetorical claim to national disinterestedness is accomplished by means of putting forward unfavourable constructions of self-interested Other-Greeks, which pertain to the argued Greek lack of civility. In the first extract, such behaviours and practices are explicitly named as
indications of a lack of civil culture in Greece. In the second one though, "lack of civility" is my gloss over their subject matter. I would like to believe though, that this gloss of mine bears upon commonly held occidental assumptions about what constitutes a "proper civil behaviour". And as such, the behaviours described would be easily recognised as "uncivilised" both by my interviewees and by my readers.

Extract 1

((The talk reported in this extract is part of a much longer topical sequence in which the interviewee is responding to my question on whether he sees any changes in Greece during the years he has been residing abroad. In his talk prior to this extract, Mr Klimis has mentioned that he can see positive, although slow developments, in the economic domain, which he describes as beneficial outcomes of the Greek participation in the E.U., but has also expressed his disappointment about the deterioration he can discern in the "social structures, conditions and relations" in Greece over the last fifteen years or so.))

1 Mr Klimis an example which I would like to mention (. ) I believe that: t ( .) more and more ( .) lhe:: ( .) in
2 Greece (. ) it's going very badly the concept ( .) that the French have ((the concept)) of civism*
3 (. ) if you like (. ) I don't know the Greek wo::rd (. )
4 N.B. μήθημα=
5 Mr Klimis =the:: ( .) the civic CULTURE5 ( .) as we used to be taught about it in the elementary school
6 ( .) I mean ( .) what I would like to tell you is that ( .) less and less Greeks at the moment (. )
7 it's [my
8 N.B. μήθημα
9 Mr Klimis impression ( .) are willing to make a few sacrifi::ces (. )
10 N.B. μήθημα=
11 Mr Klimis =for the sake of their country ( .) by sacrifices I mean ( .) to pay their ta::xes (. )
12 N.B. μήθημα (. )
13 Mr Klimis as we pay them by definition here ( .) to:: ( .) to work for all the hours in their dai::ly shift (. )
14 N.B. μήθημα (. )
15 Mr Klimis "do they want to have a second job" ( .) "why not?" ( .) "bu::t you should also WORK for the
16 first job" (. )
17 N.B. hhhm (. )
18 Mr Klimis THIS SORT ( .) of things ( .) simple ones ( .) to:: ( .) AND furthermore maybe after some time
19 even to do their military service hhe:: ( .) it's all right at the moment because we have this
20 patriotic fervour for a balance=
21 N.B. μήθημα=
22 Mr Klimis =bb- ( .) but even that may decline ( .) all these things I consider them as a sense of ( .)
23 declining ( .) declining civic CULTURE ( .) and I define it as a soc- ( .) as a social
24 phenomenon ( .) not as a financia::l issue ( .)

4 As it will become apparent, not all of my interviewees are appearing in my transcript with a title. This preferential discursive practice of mine rests upon the following rationale. In Greek as in other languages, addressing somebody with their title and in plural is a marker both of politeness as well as of the formality of the encounter. In my initial contact with all of my interviewees, I followed this mode of addressing them. Nevertheless, some of them almost immediately either explicitly asked me to abandon the plural and the title and adopt a less formal way of addressing them or implicitly directed me to do so. Therefore, when the title of an interviewee is given this implies that in our talk we addressed each other in the polite but formal plural, whereas when only the first name of my interviewees is given this implies that the interview was conducted in a more casual and informal tone.

5 I am translating here as "culture" the Greek word "ἀγωγή". According to the Oxford Greek-English Learner's Dictionary (1988) this word, apart from its other more disciplinary specific usages in physics, law and medicine, translates as: education, upbringing and culture. In the context of its first occurrence in this extract, the translation "education" may seem more appropriate, since the interviewee is referring to a course in the Greek elementary school curriculum. Nevertheless, I chose to use the term "culture" because subsequently the speaker uses the term in a much wider sense than the term "education" allows for. It should be borne in mind though, that a semantic slippage occurs in this case in the speaker's talk.
Mr Klimis' talk in this extract is part of his extensive response to my question on whether he sees any changes in Greece during the time that he has been residing abroad, first as a doctorate student in Germany and later as an E.U. employee in Brussels. This question of mine effectively castes him in the rhetorical position of an observer. Greece, distanced both in space and time, presumably has undergone changes worth to be noted and commented upon. Notwithstanding the distance and the time lag separating my interviewee from current living experiences in Greece though, he is treated in my questioning as somebody who is entitled to have views on that issue. Indeed, in the run of the interview and before the start of the talk reported in this extract, Mr Klimis had mentioned, on various occasions, his frequent trips to Greece, both for professional reasons and for holidays. Moreover, he had been very keen on emphasising his interest and emotional commitment to his homeland, manifested not only in his daily habit of reading Greek newspapers but also in his active involvement with ΣΕΥΔΟ and their collective efforts to contribute by any means to Greek national affairs.

All this rhetorical zeal of the interviewee to attest to his patriotic sentiments (a far too common feature in the vast majority of my interviews) may be seen as an indication of the dilemmatic situation in which my interviewees have been finding themselves in by taking part in my research: their choice to pursue a professional career in "Europe", may render them accountable for xenomania, in the eyes of a Greek social psychologist who took interest and is doing research on their "living experiences". Hence, when faced with a question about "changes in Greece", the rhetorical claim to a nationally disinterested perspective is what would be best suited.

Disavowing xenomania: A symmetrical account of Greece

In my gloss on the talk immediately prior to this extract, I mentioned Mr Klimis' reference to the improvements that the participation in the E.U. brought about in the domain of economy in Greece. Nevertheless, his reference to the economic improvements is counter balanced with a symmetrical reference to the "deterioration" that he discerns in the "social structures, conditions and relations" in
Greece over the last fifteen years or so⁶. In the talk reported in this extract, Mr Klimis elaborates on that issue. The target of his criticism is: the lack of "civil culture" in Greece, manifested in the unwillingness of the Greeks to "make a few sacrifices for the sake of their country" such as, to "pay their taxes", to work conscientiously, maybe "even to do their military service", and in general to exhibit signs of a "proper civil culture" in their "everyday" lives and affairs. This rhetorical symmetry of discerning and testifying both to positive and negative "developments" in Greece accomplishes for my interviewee the nationally disinterested perspective of the uncontaminated by xenomania observer. As I would like to argue though, xenomania is further warded off by means of rhetorical subtleties in the articulation of the lack of "civil culture" line of criticism.

Criticising Greeks on a close footing: Greek lack of civility

In the bulk of my analyses so far, I have sustained my argument about normative discursive resources by highlighting the participants' concern to externalise the subject matter of their evaluations, by rhetorically elevating them to "facts". In extracts previously considered, quite often the externalising devices deployed were accompanied by a distant footing which would minimise the participants' accountability for the positive / negative descriptions (evaluations) offered. As far as this particular extract is concerned though, my argument runs slightly different. As I would like to suggest, in Mr Klimis' talk the facticity of his "lack of civility" argument is, rather paradoxically, not accompanied by a distant footing, which would minimise his stake at the description offered. Instead, his criticism is delivered from a close footing, which rhetorically attests and enhances the subjective character of his evaluation. Let me elaborate a bit on that.

Mr Klimis' main target of criticism in this extract is the lack of civil culture in Greece manifested in the reluctance of the Greeks to "make a few sacrifices for the sake of their country" (lines 1-11). Given that the interviewee has chosen to migrate, live and work outside Greece, such a claim is potentially contentious: after all, someone who has "abandoned" Greece may not be entitled to criticise the Greeks living there for their reluctance to "make a few sacrifices for the sake of their country". My interviewee's subsequent orientation to explicate what he means by "sacrifices" can be seen as an attempt to ward off such an argumentative twist. The content of the "sacrifices" which the Greeks are not willing to make comes into a three-part list, which adds a sense of facticity to his talk and includes: tax payment, conscientious work and fulfilment of military obligations.

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⁶ I should notice though, that this "deterioration" has not been attributed by Mr Klimis to the participation of Greece in the E.U. It is just the case that the period of his absence from Greece coincides with the period of the Greek participation in the E.E.C./E.U.
Allegedly, all these "sacrifices" are a matter of course for my interviewee\(^7\). Finally, the externalising device of three part list is deployed once again at the closing part of this extract (lines, 31-32) to attest to the ordinariness and mundaneness of what constitutes a "proper civil culture" and which, at large, the Greeks are presumably lacking.

Let me now comment on the management of the speaker's accountability in this extract. Notwithstanding the factual discursive format within which the "lack of civility" criticism is articulated, the interviewee makes no effort to obscure his role in the production of his description. On the contrary, the subjective character of the evaluation made is rhetorically emphasised. In line 1, Mr Klimis prefaces his forthcoming criticism as being something he "believes". In lines 7 and 9, he recasts the unwillingness of the Greeks "to make a few sacrifices for the sake of their country" as an "impression" of his. And in line 22, in his (re)formulation of the lack of a sacrificial attitude of the Greeks, the upshot is that he "considers" all that as "a sense of declining civil culture". In the hierarchy of modalization of descriptions (Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Woolgar, 1988; see also, Potter, 1996a), Mr Klimis' account stands in the rather low end of the scale: its contingency upon the speaker's subjective judgement is made apparent and asserted.

As I would like to suggest, this tension between the facticity of the description offered and the assertion of its subjective character, accomplishes considerable rhetorical work. In this way, both the identity of the producer (observer) as well as the state of affairs he is reporting on are being normalised. Mr Klimis on the one hand asserts his position as an observer, which entitles him to have subjective views and, on the other, elevates the subject matter of what he is reporting on to a factual entity. In this particular rhetorical context, in which Mr Klimis has been explicitly positioned as an observer / description producer, a rhetorical course of action of the style "the facts are speaking for themselves" could have been contentious. By attempting to obscure the subjective character of his description, Mr Klimis could have invoked inferences about his stake in doing so. By asserting the subjectivity of his views though and, subsequently, constructing his description as factual, he accomplishes the disinterestness and "objectivity" of his perspective. The self-interestness of the Greeks is oriented to and brought into critical attention as a normative complainable matter, in the eyes of a disinterested Greek / observer. Notably, it is also ratified and

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\(^7\) At the initial stage of the interview and while responding to a biographical question of mine, the interviewee had informed me that after the completion of his Ph.D. in Germany he went back in Greece to do his military service.
treated as such by an equally disinterested Greek social psychologist, as my minimal tokens of agreement and recognition, which follow (and in cases complete) the interviewee's turns, indicate.

A Greek attestment to Greek lack of a "sacrificial" attitude: Symbolic identity implications

At the beginning of this extract, my interviewee invoked an explicitly named as "French" concept ("civism" or "civic culture") in order to designate the subject matter of his criticism that would follow. This is "a concept" that "the French have" and the Greeks "used to be taught about it in the elementary school". I would like to suggest that my interviewee's invocation of occidental "French concepts" and Greek (State provided) education confer to his criticism of the lay Greek "unwillingness to make a few sacrifices" credentials of an occidental identity. Generalised Greek Others are brought into critical attention for their self-interestness: they evade their obligations to their country by avoiding to pay taxes; they take an easy route to riches by getting a second job and loafing in their main one; and they will soon (probably) start evading the highest of civic duties, that is their military service.

What I want to draw attention to here is that in his criticism of the Greeks, my interviewee mobilises common themes that abound in the discourse(s) of Greek modernising ("εκσυγχρονιστές") politicians. From the late nineteenth century to the contemporary socialist government, the modernisation of Greek society has been the main political target. The obstacles hindering the achievement of modernisation have commonly thought to be "traditional" patterns of social organisation of Greek society, that trace their origins in the period of Ottoman rule (cf. Mouzelis, 1978; Tsoucalas, 1987). Tax evasion and black market labour are some of those "traditional social problems" that modernising Greek politicians seek to eradicate and the conduct of the stubborn Greek populace, allegedly, reiterates. My analytic suggestion here is that Mr Klimis' criticism echoes the orientalist rendering of Greek society that is to be found in the occidental discourse of rational State organisation. In so doing, his "rational" as nationally disinterested local identity claim converges with a symbolic identity claim to occidental "rationality". Greek Others are castigated for the oriental flaws that the Ottoman rule has inherited to Greece, from the standpoint of the occidental social actors that have been seeking to purge Greek society from those oriental inflictions.

Let me now turn to a second extract, where again the self-interestness of the Greeks in civil matters is oriented to by an interviewee as a normative discursive resource in order to sustain a criticism of the Greeks by warding off at the same time the moral accusation of xenomania.
Extract 2

(The talk reported in this extract comes from the initial part of the interview, where Ms Antypa was elaborating on a biographical account of hers. As she reported to me, after her studies in Athens she went to Bruges (Belgium) for a Master's course and that was followed by a second Master's course in London. After that she started her professional career working for a ministry in Greece. A few years later, as part of her career development, she went to Brussels for a short period of training and later she returned there to work for three years in the Permanent Greek Delegation. Nevertheless, after that period she went back to Greece for a few more years before getting her current job in the European Commission in 1990. Speaking about her most recent period of living and working in Greece, Ms Antypa mentioned that at that period she "reconsidered her views about Greece" and decided to apply for a permanent position in the European Commission in Brussels. This specific extract reports part of my interviewee's talk in response to my question why a few years ago she always wanted to return back to Greece after short periods of time that she would have spent abroad. In her reply, Ms Antypa said that she always did so both because of personal-family commitments and because of emotional ties with Greece. In the following extract, Ms Antypa elaborates on the latter reason.)

1 Ms Antypa hhe:: (.) hhe:: (.) yes it was the fact that I was feeling that there were things that one could
2 do:: (..) hhe: (.) and move thi::ngs (.) to the ext- (.) I mean to the minimal extent [that
3 N.B. [μημμμήμ]
4 Ms Antypa one could (.) make things move towards an impro::vement (.) to take part in a general effort
5 (.) in an overa:ll one (.) and that feeling little by little (.) faded away within me (.) because I
6 realised that only one person couldn't (.) hhe:: (.) bring about a change even a ((grinning))
7 small lit[tle one
8 N.B. [yea:h yea:h
9 Ms Antypa hmm (.) and after all (.) yes (.) there comes a disappointment
10 N.B. [hmm (.) I assume that this has to do (.) this conclusion of yours (.) with the experience you
11 had at work=
12 Ms Antypa =>yes<=
13 N.B. =during all those [years
14 Ms Antypa [yes
15 yes (.) yes of course (.) ALTHOUGH my job in the ministry of X was a very important o::ne
16 (.) and a very interesting one (.) and one of the few jobs in Greece whi::ch (.) tsch: (.) offers
17 all these opportunities (.) I mean I had the opportunity to tra::vel (.)
18 N.B. [hmm=
19 Ms Antypa =I used to have the opportunity to be for a month, say, in Washington (.) and to w[ork
20 N.B. [ye:s
21 Ms Antypa in the State Department (.) the opportunity to be in Geneva (.) the opportunity to
22 be in Luxembourg (.) hhe:: (.) AND the salary in the ministry of X is much better than in all
23 the other mini[stries
24 N.B. [hmm
25 Ms Antypa AND THE quality of the people I was working with was very good (.) hhe:: (.) NO (.) it had
26 only little to do with wo::rk (.) it was much more an issue of everyday li:fe (.) I mean I was
27 [terribly annoyed
28 N.B. ((inaudible))
29 Ms Antypa the fact that (.) tsch I would have to: hhe:: (..) going into a ba::nk=
30 N.B. [hmm=
31 Ms Antypa =having to fight in order to keep my place in the queue (.) hhe:: (.) the simplest things
32 become difficult (.) hhe:: (.) or the traffic (.) having said that I should mention that I was
33 living in the ce:ntre (.) in Kolonaki therefore I didn't ha::ve (.) hhe:: hhe:: I had only [a fe::w
34 N.B. [μημμήμ]
35 Ms Antypa hmm (.) tsch (.) difficulties (.)
36 N.B. ye:s=
37 Ms Antypa [hhe:: I could see a:: a:: (.) hhe:: (.) a kind of rudeness I could (.)(>maybe I shouldn't be
38 saying all that<)) (.) BUT it's (.) honestly: (.) I mean that's the way I was feeling=
39 N.B. =yes=
40 Ms Antypa =I could see a kind of rudeness towards fellow citizens I mea::n (.) tsch hhe: (.) they would
41 push you (.) they would shut at you (.) they would swear at you (.) they wou::ld hhe:: (.) you
42 would be walking in Omonia and they would spit on you (.) or they would spit on the ground
43 (.) there were things which were (.) hhe:: (.) signs of indifference towards one's fellow-being
44 N.B. HHmm=}
In the biographical talk preceding this extract, Ms Antypa sketched out a linear life narrative in which her long living and working experiences in Greece were coupled with her considerable experiences of studying, working and living abroad. Concerning her recent decision to apply for and eventually get her current job in the European Commission, Ms Antypa mentioned that this was the outcome of a "reconsideration of her views" about Greece. In this extract, responding to my question why she always wanted to go back to Greece after the periods that she would have spent abroad, my interviewee comes up with an account for both her motives in staying in Greece and for the trajectory of the changes in her views that were eventually culminated in her decision to seek a permanent job in Brussels.

Disavowing xenomania: Stake inoculation

Let me highlight how Ms Antypa's talk in this extract displays a rhetorical concern to disavow the identity of the xenomaniac. Admitting that her decision to apply for a permanent position in Brussels was the outcome of a "reconsideration of her views" about Greece and given that she had already referred to her experiences abroad, entails for my interviewee the risk of negative identity inferences. She could be thought of as being uncritically stunned by the lures of Europe and betraying, emotionally and practically, her homeland. The rhetorical organisation of Ms Antypa's talk is designed to disavow such inferences. Answering to my question why she always wanted to return to Greece after the periods that she had spent abroad (lines, 1-5), Ms Antypa attests to the patriotic motives that guided such decisions. As she states, she would see herself engaged in a collective effort to make a small, personal, albeit important contribution "towards an improvement" in Greece. Such a formulation of patriotic motives, could be seen analytically as a subtle rhetorical version of what Potter (1996a) has called stake inoculation. The potentially hearable as unpatriotic "reconsideration of views about Greece", is foregrounded by an explicit invocation of patriotic sentiments. Whatever the reasons for "reconsidering views about Greece" and deciding to reside abroad may have been, it was not the ill, unpatriotic motives of hers. Nevertheless, as Ms Antypa
states (lines 5-9), this patriotic motivation "faded away little by little" when she started realising the futility of her endeavours and the impossibility of "change" in Greece as a consequence of individual actions. Eventually, disappointment came to replace her patriotic motivation.

Greek lack of civility as a complainable matter

In lines (10-11, 13), I am offering a gist reformulation of Ms Antypa's prior talk, reading my interviewee's "disappointment" as a complaint about her experiences at work in Greece. My formulation could be seen analytically as orienting and testing the relevance of a "Greek institutional disorganisation" theme. Ms Antypa initially accepts my reading of her talk (lines, 12, 14-15) but subsequently (lines 15-25) denies its relevance by recounting the advantages of her former job in Greece and the excellent working conditions she enjoyed there. As she states, her disappointment had "only little to do with work"; it stemmed from her "everyday" experiences (lines, 25-26). In lines 26-43, Ms Antypa invokes a series of "everyday" issues, which she treats as normative complainable matters in order to sustain the assertion about her "disappointment" and the "fading away" of her patriotic motives. "Going to a bank" and "having to fight" in the queue is elevated to an exemplary case in point and problems with the traffic are recaste as typical. Furthermore, she asserts an overall impression of a generalised "rudeness" and "indifference towards one's fellow being" that she could discern. Walking in a central square of Athens entailed the danger of being pushed, shouted at, spat on or, at least, seeing people spitting on the ground. The use of the "universal you" here attests to the typicality and facticity of the activities described: these unpleasant experiences could have happened and witnessed by anyone on a normative basis. They are not just snapshots of unhappy, exceptional incidents.

Nevertheless, the rhetorical accomplishment of the normative and factual character of the experiences that led my interviewee to "reconsider her views about Greece" does not necessarily absolve her from the negative moral identity of the xenomaniac. It could still be counter argued that it is her gaze, which problematises all these "matters of fact" in Greece, unfavourably comparing them with the "matters of fact" in "developed" Europe, that renders her accountable for xenomania. Ms Antypa's subsequent turn (lines, 44-53) lucidly attests to such a rhetorical concern. My

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8 I understand that my gist reformulation of Ms Antypa's talk, which orients to a "Greek institutional disorganisation" theme, could be seen as a "research manipulation" directing the interviewee to a topic which is of my interest. Nevertheless, I would like to disavow such a reading! As I said before, at the time that the interview was conducted, I had not yet started working on the analysis presented in the previous chapter and therefore my research interest in the "Greek institutional disorganisation" theme had not yet emerged. I would rather see my orientation to that theme as an indication (and a reminder) of the cultural embeddedness of my own discursive resources and practices. Evidently, I share the same ideological dilemmas of Greek national identity as my research participants and interviewees do.
interviewee states and disclaims such a counter argument: her disappointment has nothing to do with her prior experiences abroad, which could have made her see the contrast with Greece. Active voicing grotesque xenomaniac Other-Greeks who would typically do so, she carefully distances herself from the sort of Greeks who would castigate Greece for its "backwardness", unfavourably comparing her with the "developed" West. Ms Antypa's "disappointment" stemmed from her personal "feeling" of being insulted with such behaviours and from her inability to be "understood" whenever she tried to "reverse" or "discuss" those issues. Hers is the dignified withdrawal from an unequal fight (the struggle to make a "small contribution towards an improvement in Greece) and not the mimetic and snobbish xenomania of occidental minded Greek-Others.

Disavowing xenomania and occidental symbolic credentials

Ms Antypa's explicit disavowal of an identity of a / any Greek who, after spending some years "abroad" and on return to Greece would say "look how we are; how far behind we have been left", and her insistence on her criticism of modern Greek phenomena of self-interestness is particularly interesting. As it was the case with Mr Klimis' talk before, but even more explicitly here, the "rationality" of criticisms of modern Greek phenomena that attest to a lack of civility in modern Greece is rhetorically established in a dual sense. In a local / interactional level this criticism has been rhetorically designed to ward off the identity of the "irrationally" prejudiced (xenomaniac). At a symbolic level, it could be argued that the criticism of the "irrational" social chaos of a society in which one has to "fight" to keep her place in the queue, in which one is subjected to the "rudeness" of fellow citizens and in which by walking in the street one runs the danger of being "spat on", confers to the person who voices the criticism credentials of an occidental, rational-as-civilised identity. My interviewee's rhetorical construction of her dignified withdrawal from the vein struggle to "change" Greece and Greeks and "civilise" them echoes the rhetoric of frustration of nineteenth century European philhellenes, who disappointed by the oriental state of affairs of Greece and Greeks returned to Europe broken hearted (St Clair, 1972).

2.2. Criticising the Greek attitude to work

In this second section of the analysis, I will take into consideration two extracts where the self-interestness of Greek Others brought into critical attention by my interviewees relates to a generalised and criticised Greek attitude to work. While paying due consideration to maintaining a nationally disinterested profile, a range of behaviours and actions at work are oriented to as
normatively Greek by my interviewees and in most of the cases are ratified as such by my own contributions to the unfolding of the interaction.

Extract 3

((The talk reported in this extract comes from the last part of my interview with Mr Anthos, where he is elaborating on a final question of mine: taking into consideration his eighteen years long working experience in the European Commission in Brussels what would be his advice to a younger person who would just start his career in there. In his response, Mr Anthos stressed that the most important thing according to him is one's "determination" to start a new life in Brussels. In what followed he referred to Greek colleagues of his who have been "destroyed psychologically" by their indecisiveness and their divided life between Brussels and Greece, where they are spending extended periods of time by faking health problems and claiming unwarranted sick leaves from their job. Mr Anthos' advisory talk ends up as follows.))

1 Mr Anthos I mean to avoid this sort of hhe:: (. ) pettiness (. ) which at the end of the day spoils the hhe::
2 the the:: (. ) our reputation and our name (. ) as Greeks (. ) abroad (. ) and more specifically as
3 Greek employees in the E.U. (. )
4 N.B. is there a bad reputation in ge:neral?
5 Mr Anthos HAVENT YOU seen the:: articles by Darratos (. ) I've thrown them away bu:t they are around
6 (. ) you can ask Pashalis to give them to you (. ) ask him to=
7 N.B. =hhmm

((20 lines omitted. In that part Mr Anthos explained how he came across these publications despite the fact that they did not appear in his usual Greek daily newspaper.))

8 Mr Anthos YE::S (. ) where (. ) anyway (. ) he was writing about hhe:: (. ) about how much BAD=
9 N.B. =hhmm=
10 Mr Anthos =are the Greek employees here (. ) and how much they take advantage of the flexible working
11 conditions=
12 N.B. =hhmm=
13 Mr Anthos =that exi::st he::re in Bru ssels (. ) in the Commission etcetera (.....)
14 N.B. μrightu ((μinaudibleμ)) (...) right (. ) I have more or less finished with my questions [...] (S2INT1: 1650-1657, 1678-1685)

Greeks' avoidance to work: A nationally accountable matter

This extract starts with Mr Anthos' gist formulation of his prior advisory talk, i.e. "I mean to avoid this sort of pettiness". Notably though, the faking of health problems and the claiming of sick leaves by Greek employees, which were previously relayed as signs of maladjustment and as indications of "psychological destruction", have now been cast in explicitly negative moral terms. They are "petty" behaviours, which ought to be avoided. By the same token, the persons who engage in such behaviours have been recast from individuals with personal problems to nationals, whose behaviour render morally accountable their national collectivity in the eyes of nationally Others. "Our reputation" and "our name abroad" are at stake.

Nevertheless, this transition from a morally neutral psychological frame of reference to a morally loaded national one entails a particular rhetorical "danger" for my interviewee. The translation of
what in the first place was offered as an indication of poor psychological health to a pattern of nationally accountable moral behaviour implicates my interviewee in a national disinterestness dilemma. It could always be counter-argued that he has an interest in elevating what could be seen as individual pathological behaviour to a national criticism. Unless of course, the behaviour he is recasting in national terms would be rhetorically caste as a normative Greek national trait and not as an individual attribute.

Self-interestness at work: A normative piece of knowledge

My question "is there a bad reputation in general" theoretically could be read in, at least, two different ways. On the one hand, as a "genuine" request for gaining knowledge on that issue, and on the other, as a "questioning" of my interviewee's previous assertion. I would like to suggest that Mr Anthos' reception of my question orients to the latter reading. My interviewee manifests surprise (i.e. increased volume in line 5) with my lack of familiarity with a series of recent articles highly critical of the Greek employees in the E.U., attesting to his claim about the bad "reputation" that they have. Nevertheless, despite the (allegedly) highly critical content of these articles, they are not treated by my interviewee as something exceptional, worthy say, to be extracted and preserved. As he is quick to note, he does not have them any more. He has thrown them away but "they are around". Moreover, he instructs me twice (line 6) on how I could get hold of them. It appears that the factual existence of "the bad reputation of the Greek employees" is not a contestable issue for him. An indicative piece of evidence could be found in those recent publications, which in themselves are not astonishing enough to be preserved but (or, since) they capture and convey the gist of the "bad reputation" that the Greek employees enjoy in the European Commission; something that "everybody" ought to be familiar with or, at least, have heard about.

In lines 10-11 and 13, Mr Anthos formulates the gist of these publications as coming down to "how much bad are the Greek employees here and how much they take advantage of the flexible working conditions that exist here in Brussels, in the Commission etcetera". Notably, in relaying the content of these publications, Mr Anthos does not treat them as controversial, as arguments putting forward a negative image of the Greek E.U. employees (himself being one of them) which should be contested. Rather, they are treated as factual descriptions of the state of affairs of the Greek employees in Brussels. Presumably, they just highlight what "everybody knows": that the Greek employees in Brussels are engaged in self-interested behaviour, by taking advantage of the flexible working conditions and by avoiding to fulfil the minimum obligations of their job; that is to work for it on a regular basis.
Notwithstanding my interviewee's orientation to the facticity and normativity of this "bad reputation" that the Greek employees enjoy in Brussels, we should be reminded that this "state of affairs" is not something that he claims to be neutral or indifferent to. Its facticity and normativity are accomplished within a rhetorical course of levelling a criticism towards other-Greek employees and at the same time, disavowing a nationally interested perspective. Differentiating himself from the "pettiness" of these self-interested behaviours and from the negatively loaded moral identity of the Other-Greeks who engage with them, my interviewee lays a claim to a morally integrated identity. Notably though, this morally superior identity is not strictly personal; it has a strong national bearing as well. The "pettiness" of faking health problems in order to accommodate personal interests is something that embarrasses "us" (the Greeks) in "their" (Europeans') eyes. It is something that despite its facticity and normativity does not suit "our" national image. For a similar case in point, let me now turn to the next extract.

Extract 4

1 N.B. hhe:: do you have good relations with your colleagues over here?=
2 Ms Maka =the Greeks or the foreigners? (.)
3 N.B. =((grinning)) either of them (.)
4 Ms Maka we::Il (.) hhe:: with the foreigners (.) me personally I don't have any problem whatsoever=
5 N.B. =hhmm=
6 Ms Maka =hhe:: (....) it's all right we have a lau::gh (.) we have fun (.) OKAY (.) the Belgians would
7 never invite you to their place (.) they are very closed as a people (.) they are completely
dl:fferen(...) hhe:: with the Greeks (.) hhe:: (...) there are many lazy ones (.)
9 N.B. hhmm=
10 Ms Maka =because the Commission (...) is incredibly flexible (....) it's not only the Greeks (.) there are
11 others ((who are like [that])
12 N.B. [hhmm
13 Ms Maka but I am speaking about the Greeks because that annoys me=
14 N.B. =yes yes=
15 Ms Maka =ri::ght? (.) I mean hhe:: (.) there is a colleague of mine who (.) over the three years that she
16 has been here I doubt if she has worked for more than seven months (.) or six (.) the rest of
17 the time she has been on sick-leaves (...) it's very easy to get a sick-leave here=
18 N.B. =uhlhmhu=
19 Ms Maka =much too easy (.) I mean you just have to go to the do::ctor (.) he doesn't have to wri::te a
diagnosis (...) and he just gives you the piece of paper=
20 N.B. =hhmm=
22 Ms Maka =and you just don't go to work for a month (...) it's very easy (.) it's something that I have
23 tried to avoid completely (.) I mean I consider it a::s dishonest [to::
24 N.B. [yyee:hum
25 Ms Maka I have such a well paid job over he:re (.) and so good working conditions (.) why should I
26 stay at home? to do what? (.)
27 N.B. uhhmmm ye::mu
28 Ms Maka what should I do? (.) it would be more expensive anyway because I would go out for shopping
29 in that case (((giggle)))
30 N.B. (((giggle)))

(S2INT15: 861-893)
Complainable matters: Belgian "closeness", Greek "laziness"

Ms Maka's response to my standard question about relations with other colleagues clearly manifests a concern with the establishment of a nationally disinterested perspective and, in so doing, mobilises certain discursive resources which are oriented to as normative. To start with, my interviewee establishes a distinction between her Greek and foreign colleagues (line 2) and subsequently treats them separately in a symmetrical manner. In line 4, any "personal problems" with "the foreigners" are disclaimed. Notably, the grounds for why "it's all right" with "them" are also exemplified: "we have a laugh", "we have fun". Presumably, those are exactly the grounds on which Other-Greek(s) (colleagues) may have problems in their encounters with "foreigners". Notwithstanding that though, certain grounds for potential tension are also acknowledged by my interviewee but are surpassed in a move indicative of inter-cultural tolerance and understanding: "OKAY; the Belgians would never invite you to their place; they are very closed as a people; they are completely different". In lines 8, 10-11 and 13, it is the turn of "Greek colleagues" to be appraised and the relevant characteristic oriented to by my interviewee is the laziness of "many" of them. Notably though, Ms Maka recognises that this is not only characteristic of Greeks but of certain "Others" as well. Nevertheless she clarifies that she is commenting on the Greeks because it is with them that she finds "laziness" annoying.

The first point I would like to draw attention to here is that the criteria on which my interviewee's relations with nationally Others have been previously appraised have not been oriented to as relevant in her appraisal of Greek colleagues. It is exactly on this absence that I would like to ground my argument that the "openness" of the Greeks and their "hospitality" are emerging as normative Greek national traits in Ms Maka's talk. Apparently, "having a laugh and fun" with, as well as "being invited" by Greek colleagues are matters of course for my interviewee, and is their normativity which makes them unworthy to be noted and commented upon. On the other hand, as far as "laziness" is concerned, despite the fact that is attributed to certain national Others as well, it is its association with the Greek colleagues that "annoys" my interviewee and makes her to criticise it.

Greek "laziness" as a national stigma

In the face of the dilemma of national disinterestness, it is interesting to question how it is rhetorically possible for my interviewee to sustain a criticism of her Greek colleagues on grounds that, as she admits, nationally Others share in common with them. To put it in another way: how is her one-sided "annoyance" with the "laziness" of the Greeks and not of the Others (however
implicitly) legitimated? I think that an answer to this question can be sought by contemplating on the terms that "laziness" is discursively constructed in Ms Maka's account.

If my interviewee's "annoyance" with the "laziness" of her colleagues (Greek or Others) was constructed in a "practical" frame of reference (i.e. one's avoidance to do her work consequently overloads a colleague's lot) then Ms Maka's one sidedness could be easily treated as nationally biased. Nevertheless, as I would like to suggest, Ms Maka's "annoyance" with "laziness" is discursively constructed within a moral frame of reference, invoking a concern with national accountability. The "laziness" of her colleagues "annoys" her not because of its practical consequences but because of the moral stigma it may (or does) confer to the national category of its perpetrators. As a "Greek", apparently, she would not mind if certain national Others would be stigmatised as "lazy". It could as well have been argued, as in the previous extract, that "our reputation and our name as Greeks" is at stake when "many" Greek employees in the European Commission are exhibiting a "lazy" attitude. Ms Maka's orientation to a moral discursive treatment of "laziness" is lucidly manifested in line 23, where she asserts that she never took advantage of the "flexibility of the Commission" by faking health problems in order to get a "sick leave"; she never did so because she "considers that as dishonest".

"Laziness" as a normatively Greek manifestation of self-interestness

Let me now turn for a while to the considerable rhetorical effort of my interviewee (lines 10, 15-22) to establish the "flexibility" of the working conditions in the European Commission and the "easiness" of getting a "sick leave", in unfolding her argument about the "laziness" of "many" of her Greek colleagues. Evidently, there are many ways in constructing discursively a criticism about "laziness". Amongst them, I would think prevailingly, would be "dispositional" constructions targeting individual "laid back" behaviours, unwillingness to invest effort and skills in ones job and so forth. Moreover, a sustained rhetorical effort to prove one's (or indeed "many's") laziness would rather be facilitated by an "against all the odds" argument, say, by depicting a strict and disciplined working environment, where despite that, "laziness" would still find ways to flourish. Why is it then that my interviewee focuses on the particular "sick leave" argument and constructs such a "flexible" profile of the working conditions in the Commission, where to get a "sick leave" is depicted as being so easy?

I think that an answer to such a question could be found if we expand the semantic field of the term "lazy" in order to accommodate its very specific pragmatic usage here. I suggest that Ms Maka uses
the term "lazy", when she refers to her Greek colleagues, in order to bring into critical attention what Herzfeld (1987) calls self-interestness: the manipulation of circumstances and persons in order to achieve one's own ends. A dispositional construction of laziness would be difficult to be sustained as a criticism for "many" Greek colleagues of hers because of the danger that her talk to be heard as a nationally biased generalisation, overlooking individual cases of "hard-working" Greeks. Whereas, a self-interestness construction of "laziness", particularly when the circumstances to be manipulated are depicted as being so loose and "flexible", mitigates the dispositional-individual culpability of her "many" Greek colleagues who engage with them and orients to an understanding of this sort of "laziness" as a culturally normative thing to do.

Notwithstanding its normativity though, this "laziness" is something which Ms Maka disassociates herself from. In her talk, it is treated as a morally blameworthy behaviour, characteristic of Other-Greeks, which renders "us" as Greek nationals accountable in the eyes of European Others. The castigation of this self-interested behaviour of Other-Greeks though appears in my interviewee's talk as conditional. In lines 25-30, Ms Maka justifies her assertion that she "considers it as dishonest" by laying bare the grounds why she does so. Notably, her justification is not an "in principle" one. She finds it "dishonest" because she has "such a well paid job over here; with so good working conditions" and because she does not find any good reasons to "stay at home". Interestingly, at her closing turn in this extract (lines 28-29), Ms Maka comes up with a joke where the self-interestness of getting "sick leaves" and avoiding work is mocked as not being self-interested enough: if she was to do so, it would end up being more "expensive" for her because she "would go out for shopping".

Greek castigations of Greek self-interestness at work and symbolic identity implications

In the two extracts that I have considered in this section of the analysis, the attribute of Greek national character that has been constructed in terms of self-interestness has been the Greek attitude towards work. Other Greek employees have been depicted as cunning social actors, who manipulate circumstances for their personal benefit. They have been criticised for avoiding to fulfil their professional obligations, for faking to be ill and, in this manner, for "spoiling" "our name abroad". There are two ways in which it could be potentially argued that such a Greek castigation of Greek Others may be treated as a symbolic act that orientalises the Greek Others and, by the same token, occidentalises the speakers' perspective.
First, attention could be drawn to the distinction that the discourse of Orientalism makes between the rational Occidentals, whose "progress" has come partly due to their developed work ethic and the "underdeveloped" Orientals, whose societal "stagnation" is (partly) attributed to their indolence and lack of achievement motivation (cf. Herzfeld, 1987; Said, 1995; Turner, 1994). The depicted Greek attitude of avoiding work, evidently does not denote a developed work ethic. On the other hand, attention could be drawn to the cunningness and the manipulation of situations with which criticised Greek Others instantiate their self-interestness. As we saw in chapter 1, allegedly this Greek ability to manipulate situations for their own ends has been a "weapon" that Greeks have inherited from the Turks and have used it against them during the centuries of Ottoman occupation. After independence though, when this "survival skill" was deployed against the occidental Greek State authorities, it was unavoidable that it was persecuted as an Oriental infliction. In the manner of Herzfeld then, it could be argued that lay Greek castigations of Greek Others that are unfolded along these lines have symbolic identity implications for the persons doing the criticism. Theirs it may be argued is an occidental critical perspective towards the oriental / Romeic rendering of Greek Others.

2.3. Criticising the Greek politics and politicians

In this section of the analysis, I shall take into consideration two extracts in which it is Greek politicians and politics that are brought into critical attention by my interviewees. As I shall highlight, the interviewees' (potentially hearable) stake in their criticism of Greek politicians / politics is disavowed and their claim to national disinterestedness accomplished by their orientation to certain political practices, behaviours and phenomena as factually and / or normatively Greek manifestations of self-interestness in the realm of politics.

Extract 5

((The talk reported in this extract is part of a longer sequence where Myrto has been complaining about the poor political treatment of Greece by the other member states of the European Union. As an example she referred to other countries (i.e. "Arabic countries", Tunisia, Turkey), which, despite the fact that they are "third world" countries, they are treated with political respect by the Europeans because they "have a certain diplomacy". Her talk continues as follows.))

1 Myrto [...] (.) whereas as soon as Greece stands up for something they go for its head (.) GDUP (.)
2 "stay down" (...)
3 N.B. why it is so? (.)
4 Myrto I don't kno::w (.) hhe:: (.) I believe we are lacking politi::cians (.) I am sorry to say that (.)
5 I am very sorry
6 N.B. neverthelessss (.) hhe:: (.) >well anyway ((giggle)) it's a bit irrelevant but it doesn't matter< (.)
it's interesting anyway (.) hhe:: (.) nevertheless we have politicians who have studied (.)

Mc

=it's ANOTHER thing being a politician with degrees (.) and it's another to have experience
of diplomacy (.) for me a politician (.) when he doesn't have any diplomacy:: (.) LET
more diplomats go abroad (.)

Myrto

hmm=

Myrto

=let each of them deal with different issues (.) but they- instead of doing their job (.) they do
networking (.)

N.B.

hmm=

Myrto

"let me oblige you" (.) or X or Z (.) sometimes in hhe:: (.) completely clean issues (.)
and sometimes in completely dirty ones (.)

N.B.

hmm=

Myrto

and they are up to he:re (.) bu::t (.) all of them are just trading impressions (.)

N.B.

hmm (....)

Myrto

whereas the poor Gree:::k (....)

N.B.

yeah all those well known ((guffaw)) problems μanyway (.) yea:h:

Myrto

=the poor Greek everyti::me (.) listens and thinks he understands (.) he thinks so (.) and
essentially hhhe::: (....) he is fooled (....)

N.B.

yes that's the way it is (.) tough but ((guffaw)) that's the way it is=

Myrto

"I AM SORRY for putting it so crudely but he is fooled (.) tha::: (.) "yes they are right
(.) we are in a difficult position (.) we have this problem (.) and that problem" (.) at
some point all those problems should disappear (.) it's not possible to be perpetuated for ever
why in all the other countries (.) there is a measure and a::: (.) weights and
meas::ures for ce::rtain things (...) it's been so many years now and we can't have a mea::sure
(.) something is about to happen nowadays but it remains to be seen what sort of thing they
will come up with (.)

N.B.

((μgiggleg)=)

Myrto

"and it remains to be seen what sort of thing they will come up with (....) we know very well
what is happening every time prior to the elections (.) a b:ridge (.) a ro:ad (.) and with the
fi::rst rainfall or I don't know (.) an earthquake or whatever (.) a landslide (.) people get
killed (.) buildings are collapsing (....) in Vassilissis Sophias avenue (....) there is this very
beautiful building just opposite of the:: (.) Me::garon (.) the:: (.) the Megaron Concert Hall (.)

N.B.

μhhmmμ=

Myrto

=that was hhe:: (.) shaken wasn't it (.) a::nd (.) it bent on the one side completely (.) and
the:: (.) the architect killed himself (.) he committed suicide (.)

N.B.

oh yea::h? (.)

Myrto

we::Il (.) why should all these things happen? (.) don't we care about anything? (.) we have so
many roots (.) so many lights we have (.) we gave so many things in order for Europe to be
what it is (.) it's because of us that it is so (....) what ARE WE DOING in order to maintain
at lea::st what we have (.) I have a picture of Acropolis in the:: (.) the:: (.) office (.) and
people tell me (.) "are those things still there? (.) because I have the impression that I saw
them in Louvre" (....) and whatever they sa::y (.) "yes of course you used to be ((like that)) (.)
but what is happening now (.) what are you doing now" (.)

N.B.

hhmmm (.) are all these things just because of the politicians Myrto:=

Myrto

="I believe yes (....) I believe yes (.) Spain (.) what was the situation in Spain (....) how it
used to be and how it is now (....) it took an assertive policy and it is now a forerunner (.)
and we were the ninth country to be admitted (.)

Greece "lacking" politicians

In the opening turn of the extract, Myrto voices a complaint about the political treatment of Greece
by its partners in the E.U. According to her, whenever Greece is asserting a political position, the
other members of the European Union "go for its head". Nevertheless, the reference to the negative
political treatment of Greece by the other European States is not enmeshed in a critical argument
against them, say, targeting their potential prejudice. Actually, European States have already been argued to be fair and respectful towards "third world" countries like Tunisia and Turkey, since these countries "have a certain diplomacy". Myrto's reference to the negative political treatment that Greece receives from other European States, is used to sustain a criticism of Greek politics. The national disinterestedness of Other Europeans seen against their harsh political treatment of Greece allows for the space for such a criticism to be voiced.

Prompted (line 3) to account for the reasons why the other member states of the E.U. adopt such a hard line against Greece, Myrto referred to "our" lack of "politicians". Let me focus for a while on Myrto's articulation of that criticism (lines 4-5). Her immediate response to my question is a display of uncertainty, i.e. "I don't know" (cf. Potter, 1996a). Subsequently, her assertion about "our" lack of "politicians" is prefaced by the qualifier "I believe" and, eventually, her assertion is followed by a twice stated formulaic expression of regret at finding herself in the position to make such an assertion. I would like to argue that Myrto's display of uncertainty, the assertion of the subjective character of her criticism and her expression of regret are all rhetorical features aiming at the establishment of the national disinterestedness of her perspective. Evidently, this is not a claim to national disinterestedness with regard to her treatment of national Others but a claim to a nationally disinterested perspective towards her own national collectivity.

Quite uncommonly for my interview etiquette, in lines 6-8, I challenge Myrto's assertion that "we are lacking politicians", albeit in a rhetorically very cautious way. Prefacing my questioning of her criticism with an assertion of genuine "interest" and a disavowal of any particular "research stake" in me doing so, I counter argued that "we" do "have politicians" with an appropriate level of education. Such a challenge to Myrto's assertion may be seen as a challenge to my interviewee's national disinterestedness in her criticism of "us". Myrto could be seen as being held accountable for an unwarranted and unfair criticism of "our" national collectivity. As I would like to argue, Myrto's subsequent talk can be seen as an attempt to (re)establish the national disinterestedness of her perspective by orienting to a criticism of Greek politics and the normativity of the Greek politicians' self-interestness. Let me try to explicate that.

Myrto's first reaction to my counter argument (lines 9-11, 13) is to draw a distinction between educational qualifications and diplomatic experience. According to her, solely the former do not constitute adequate entitlements for the identity of a "politician" proper and Myrto pleaded for a better training of Greek diplomats in site, i.e. "abroad". It could be argued that with this rhetorical
move of hers, Myrto is orienting to the relevance of a "Greek institutional disorganisation" theme. Her assertion that "we are lacking politicians" is being sustained, on the face of my challenge to it, by arguing for the inadequacy of the Greek diplomatic system in nourishing competent and experienced politicians / diplomats. Nevertheless, Myrto's orientation to that discursive theme is not persistent. Rather swiftly, she shifts her focus of criticism from the inadequacy of the Greek political system to the individual qualities of the Greek politicians. And here lies one of my main interests in this extract.

The Greek politicians' self-interestness as a normative complaint

In lines 13-14, Myrto criticises the Greek diplomats "abroad" for "instead of doing their job, they do networking". After my minimal agreement token (line 15), in lines 16-17 Myrto reformulates her criticism. This time, the practice of "networking" is substantiated by active voicing a/any Greek politician doing it: "let me oblige you". Along with the active voicing, the normativity of these "networking" practices is oriented to by stressing the ordinariness of the politicians' beneficiaries: "you" "or X or Z". Nevertheless, to depict all "obliging" practices of Greek politicians as self-interested networking may be amenable to hearable counter arguments stressing the propriety and even the duty of politicians to engage with some kind of them. Myrto's subsequent qualification, which distinguishes between "clean" and "dirty" "issues", can be seen as an effort to preempt such a counter argument.

The completion of her turn though is followed once more by a minimal agreement token (line 18) and Myrto, again, reformulates her criticism (line 19). This time her complaint about Greek politicians is sustained by two idiomatic Greek expression "they are up to here"\(^9\), but they are just "trading impressions"\(^{10}\). As Drew and Holt (1989) have shown idiomatic expressions in the construction of complaints serve some particular conversational functions. They emerge in conversational contexts where a recipient's alliance with a complaining sequence has been withheld, while their rhetorical robustness summarises the complaint by lending to its legitimacy and brings the complaining sequence to an end. The sequential positioning of Myrto's idiomatic

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\(^9\) I am translating as "they are up to here" the Greek expression used by Myrto "είναι όλοι τους μέχρι εδώ". This expression is usually followed by a gesture pointing at the speakers' neck and it implies that the ones that it refers to are metaphorically drawing themselves, be it in "debts", "work" or as I think it applies here, in "mud", a colloquial substitute for corruption.

\(^{10}\) I am translating as "trading impressions" the Greek colloquial expression used by Myrto "πουλώ βιτρίνα". Literally that would translate into something like "selling a shop-window / facade [impression to somebody]". The negative critical edge of this expression aims at both what is "sold", (i.e. the pretence, the fake) as well as at the act of "selling", (i.e. the conscious effort to deceive somebody).
expressions fits that pattern. Her complaint / criticism of Greek politicians has been met twice with my weak agreement tokens, which could be seen more as trafficking and attention signalling devices than actual indications of conversational alignment. Moreover, after using those expressions Myrto proceeds to slight topical shift (lines 21, 23-24) focusing (within a comparative structure, which attests to the facticity of her talk) to the "poor Greek(s)", who, by being gullible and naive, get fooled by the politicians.

What is worth to be noted here is that in line 21 and then again in 25, after a series of attributable silences, comes my much awaited for conversational alignment with Myrto's complain. In the first place, her criticism of the self interestness of Greek politicians is ratified and the components of her verberate complain are summarised into a gist formulation as being: "all those well known problems". Subsequently, the facticity of the Greek politicians' exploitation of the "poor Greeks"' gullibility is also confirmed. Overall, Myrto's orientation to the Greek politicians' self-interestness as a normative complainable matter (in her attempt to (re)establish the national disinterestedness of her perspective) is recognised and treated as such in my turns.

In the second part of this extract (lines 26-53) Myrto's criticism of the Greek politicians' self-interestness is further expanded and elaborated upon. In lines 26-32, she repeats her assertion about them "fooling" "the poor Greek" and her regret at find herself in the position to testify at that. Subsequently, by means of active voicing, a/any person of the "poor" Greek public, she distances herself from it, by depicting grotesque Greek Others being persuaded by the politicians' rhetoric of "problems" and "difficulties". Against their gullibility stands her own critical interrogation of the perpetuation of these "problems" and "difficulties". As I would like to argue, in so doing Myrto's rhetorical claim to the rationality of a nationally disinterested perspective takes a new twist. The national disinterestedness of her criticism of Greek politicians has been rhetorically grounded on the facticity and normativity of their self-interestness. Nevertheless, this criticism of hers has made hearable the gullibility or, even, naivete of the "poor" Greek public who allow themselves to be manipulated and "fooled" by the politicians. In contrast to that, stands Myrto's rational, critical appraisal of the Greek politicians' assumptions and diagnoses. Evidently, Myrto differentiates herself from the "poor Greek" public who get easily persuaded and "fooled" by the Greek politicians' self-interested rhetoric.

What I think is important to be noted here is that this rhetorical move is sustained by Myrto's invocation of a comparative national context. Greece is counter posed to "all the other [European]
countries" where, as she argues, there are "some weights and measures for certain things. Effectively, the comparison between the standards achieved by other European countries and the "problems" of Greece is argued to attest to the self-interestness of Greek politicians. Interestingly, even Myrto's reflexive move in mitigating her criticism by noting that "something is about to happen now", is followed by an articulation of reservations and suspicion. These improvements / developments are compared to what "we know very well [that] is happening every time prior to the elections". And what "we know" is that public works are scheduled and completed in a very short time resulting in catastrophe and human loss. Overall, again the self-interestness of Greek politicians, manifested in their vote-hunting practices, is oriented to by Myrto as Greek common knowledge. Not surprisingly, for the sake of this rhetorical move, Myrto (with her use of "we") realigns herself with the Greek public from which previously she had disassociated herself. Let me now turn to the closing part of this extract (lines 43-53), where Myrto's uses of the national "we" give a further spin to her criticism of Greek politicians.

The Greek national "we" in a historical perspective

In line 43, Myrto voices the rhetorical question "why should all these things happen?", closing off her complaint about the self-interestness of Greek politicians and its catastrophic consequences. Nevertheless, in her second rhetorical question "don't we care about anything?", the use of the pronoun "we" alludes to an impression of collective alliance of herself, the "poor" Greek public and the untrustworthy, self-interested Greek politicians under their common national affiliation. For "all these things" that have been happening there is, presumably, an issue at stake, that of responsibility, manifested in "our" ill care. Despite the fact, that Myrto's use of the pronoun "we" would suggest that this responsibility should be equally distributed amongst the constitutive elements of the Greek national collectivity that have appeared so far in her account, (i.e. Myrto as a Greek, the Greek public and Greek politicians), I think that there are good reasons to assume that Myrto's criticism about "our" lack of care is solely addressed to the Greek politicians. Or, more accurately, to the politicians in question as Greeks. And it is not only because of Myrto's assertion (lines, 51-53), which confirms that, that I suggest so. It is also because previously in her account, the focus of her criticism was exclusively placed on the politicians. But also, most importantly, because of Myrto's

11 I am translating as "weights and measures" the Greek expression "μέτρα και σταθμά". A less literal translation would be "standards".

12 For sociological / historical approaches to the issue of populism in Greek politics see Mouzelis et al. (1989) and Tsoucalas (1987).
recourse to a version of Greek classical heritage to sustain her complain about "our" lack of "care" (line, 44-49).

Orienting to the relevance of a historical perspective of Greek national affiliation, "we" are criticised for despite having "so many roots; so many lights" and having given "so many things in order for Europe to be what it is", "we" are doing nothing to "maintain at least what we have". And what "we are not doing" is exemplified by Myrto's allusion to the controversy over the Greek politicians' failure to achieve the return of the so called "Elgin marbles" by the British Museum to Greece. The exemplary, normative character of the unfavourable for modern Greeks comparison of them with their ancestors is substantiated by Myrto's active voicing of European Others questioning whether "all those things are still there", by her subsequent assertion of uncertainty: "and whatever they say", and finally, by an additional active voiced, derogatory criticism levelled by European Others at the modern Greeks: "yes of course you used to be like that; but what is happening now?; what are you doing now?"

"Our" ancestors vs. "us"
Whereas in the previous part of Myrto's account Greek politicians were castigated for failing to bring Greece in equal standards to Other European States, due to their pursuing of self-interested goals, in this last part of the extract, "we" are critically appraised for our standing in comparison to "our" classical heritage. The looking glass were the flaws of modern Greece are reflected upon shifted from modern Europe to ancient Greece. "Our" nation, in its earlier historical instantiation, has been credited with its contribution to Europe of the "lights" it needed to become what it currently is. The current state of affairs though of "our" nation is a far cry both from modern Europe and its own classical ancestry. And the ones who are to be blamed for this backwardness are the Greek politicians and their self-interestness.

In a strong sense, Myrto's invocation of the ancient Greek past and her juxtaposition of modern Greece both to its "past glories" and to modern Europe renders an analytic attestment to the symbolic identity implications of her talk easier to be sustained. The rhetorical appreciation of the "advanced" standards of modern Europe / ancient Greece constitutes both an identity claim and a

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13 Evidently there is an "inaccuracy" here in Myrto's account, as the parts of Acropolis currently "hosted" by a "foreign" museum are in the British Museum and not in Louvre. This "inaccuracy", and even more so the question whether it should be attributed to Myrto or to "any actual" person that may have done the "actual talking" that she has active voiced, I think is of little analytic importance. For an analysis of historical "inaccuracies" in discursive processes of national identification, see Diaz (1997).
disclaimer: Myrto aligns herself with the occidental state of affairs of modern Europe / ancient
Greece disclaiming, by the same token, an identification with the backwardness of modern Greece,
the self-interestness of its politicians and the gullibility of the "poor" Greek public.

Let me now turn to a last interview extract where the self-interestness of Greek politicians is again
enmeshed in an interviewee's claim to national disinterestness.

Extract 6

((Before the start of the talk reported in this extract, Nikiforos was complaining about the corruption and the
"networking" of Greek representatives in E.C. trade unions.))

1 Nikiforos (...) if we are trea- (.) treated as people who don't work and so fo::rth (.)
2 I think that this is because of the hhe:: (.) image that the external
3 policy refle::cts and the public administration and so fo::rth (.) AND all of them who come
4 he:re (.) they come in the way they come (.) I mean the minister changes and the man has to
5 leave (.) not because the go::vernment changes=
6 N.B. =hhmm=
7 Nikiforos =I mean he comes here to work in the:: (.) in the permanent Greek delegation and then the
8 minister changes and he has to leave (.) we::ll ( .) how do you expect from somebody who is
9 here for five or six months ( .) to get to learn his subject (.) and it is him who will consult the
10 minister when he'll come for a meeting he:re=
11 N.B. =yea:h=
12 Nikiforos =where impo::tant decisions are to be made (. ) tsch (. ) we::ll ( .) the others see those things
13 ( .) when they see a minister of external affairs who doesn't speak a foreign la::nguage ( .)
14 hhe:: what can be said ( .) do I need to explain anything mo::re?=
15 N.B. =hhmm=
16 Nikiforos =how is it possible not to have such an opi::nion ( .)
17 N.B. =right ( .) rightμ=
18 Nikiforos =how is it possible not to have such an opi::nion these people ( .) that is wh[a::t
19 N.B. [hhmm
20 Nikiforos is impo::rtant (. ) and I think this is the reason why they don't treat us we::ll [I don't
21 N.B. [μhhmmμ
22 Nikiforos think that the Greeks he:re ( .) the ones who are working for the community ( .) that they
23 are not productive=
24 N.B. =hhmm=
25 Nikiforos =if I was to compare the Greeks with the Belgians for example who are wo:rking here ( .) hhe::
26 okay we are (. ) INFINITELY ( .) more productive over he::re=
27 N.B. =hhmm (. )
28 Nikiforos maybe because we are trying to prove so::mething ( .) maybe because we have this this sense
29 of responsibility ( .) I don't kno:w ( .)
30 N.B. =hhmm=
31 Nikiforos =I am trying (. ) I am not trying to prove anything to anybody hhe:=
32 N.B. =yeye: ( .) (giggling)) and that's what you should do
33 Nikiforos bb- ( .) but what should I prove si::nce (. ) I ( .) I was working harder in Greece compared to
34 how I work he::re=
35 N.B. =hhmm=
36 Nikiforos =irrespectively from the fact that here I am working harder than o::thers do ( .) that's a different
37 thing ( .) and people say so (. ) [right?
38 N.B. [μyeye:μ

((S2INT7: 1182-1224))
Nikiforos' talk reported in this extract is embedded within an extended sequence where his claim to a nationally disinterested perspective towards Greeks involved him in arguing for the factual and normative Greek "flaws" against which the Other Europeans' "stereotypes" and "bad treatment" of Greeks should be seen. In his previous talk, Nikiforos had challenged Greek complaints attributed to other Greek E.C. employees that, allegedly, their professional development is hindered by the prejudice of European Others. Countering that, Nikiforos had argued that it is the self-interestness of Greek representatives in the trade unions that account for the poor Greek standing in the administrative hierarchy of the E.C. For him it is this type of Greek behaviour that accounts for the "bad image" of Greeks in Brussels. In the talk reported in this extract, my interviewee sets off to provide a second reason for "why they ((the Europeans)) don't treat us well".

Greek clientalism as a source of "bad reputation"

In lines 2-3, Nikiforos orients to the relevance of an institutional disorganisation theme. According to him "we are treated as people who don't work and so forth" because of the "image that the [Greek] external policy reflects and the public administration and so forth". Nevertheless, rather swiftly, this "structural" criticism of Greek politics is abandoned in favour of a more personalised criticism of Greek politicians and their self-interestness. At first, it is a subtle complaint about the procedures of personnel selection for the Permanent Greek Delegation in Brussels that can be discerned in Nikiforos' remark "they come in the way they come". Subsequently though, the critical edge of this remark does not aim at the individual persons who, allegedly, pull the strings in order to get a position in the Delegation. Rather, the focus of the criticism is placed upon the politicians who are to be found on the top of the clientalist ladder: "I mean the minister changes and the man has to leave". According to Nikiforos, it is the politicians' self-interestness (manifested in their endorsement of a personal clientele), which accounts for the frequent personnel changes in the Greek Delegation, and that results in poor political consultation and poor political performance on behalf of the Greek government ministers. And, of course, the ever watching Other Europeans "see those things" and all too reasonably "have such an opinion" and "don't treat us well" (lines 7-21).

Establishing a disinterested perspective in criticising Greek Others

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14 We should be reminded here that the employees of the Permanent national Delegations in Brussels are politically appointed by the governments of the member states of the E.U. In contrast to that, the employees working for E.U. administration in European Commission are selected by means of examinations and interviews conducted by the Commission and not by the national governments. Many of my interviewees and in various occasions have stressed this distinction, usually in order to argue for the meritocracy that prevails in the personnel selection procedures in the European Commission, in contrast to the role that clientalist relations play in the appointment of civil servants in Greece.
As far as the rhetorical organisation of this first part of the extract is concerned, what I would like to draw attention to is Nikiforos' recourse to a form of causal argument in his effort to rhetorically ground the national disinterestedness of his perspective. As Edwards and Potter (1992a) maintain, the rhetorical use of argument is one of the fact construction devices available to speakers for the accomplishment of externalising work (see also Schiffrin, 1985). In Nikiforos' talk nationally Others are absolved from hearable inferences about the potential prejudice of theirs towards the Greeks by being caste as observers in a causal sequence of events, which are unfolded without their interference. Paradoxically enough though, Nikiforos' rhetorical appropriation of the Other Europeans' gaze lends to the national disinterestedness of his own perspective. By accomplishing the facticity and rationality of Other Europeans' dismay at the Greek politics, the rationality of his own views is also rhetorically grounded. Nikiforos appears as backing (in a nationally disinterested manner) the rational high grounds of Other Europeans' judgment against the irrationality of the Greek politicians' self-interestness. The latter, according to Nikiforos, fosters a vicious circle of clientalist relations at the expense of the effectiveness of Greek politics.

In the second part of the extract (lines, 22-38), it is the turn of the Greek employees who are working for the European Commission to be evaluated by Nikiforos. Taking into consideration my interviewee's considerable rhetorical effort to establish the facticity of his criticism of the Greek politicians, his initial positive evaluation of the Greek E.C. employees stands in a sharp subjective contrast, as it is prefaced by his admission "I don't think". As Latour and Woolgar (1979; see also Potter, 1996a) have argued, descriptions of the "I think" kind stand rather low in the hierarchy of modalisation and their status as factual is deemed rather problematic.

Nevertheless, in this specific rhetorical context, if Nikiforos was to go about asserting in a strong factual sense the hard working/productive attitude of the Greek E.C. employees, in contrast to the self-interestness of Greek politicians, his assertion could be easily heard as being motivated. He could possibly be heard as being partial in his attribution of the "bad Greek" reputation in Brussels to the Greek politicians' self interestness, while exonerating the collectivity of Greek E.C. employees (in which himself belongs to) from any responsibility. The assertion of the subjective and provisional character of his positive evaluation though, disavows potential inferences about the partiality of his views. In a similar manner, Nikiforos' subsequent strong claim about the "infinitely" bigger productivity of the Greek employees in comparison to their Belgian colleagues is

15 Έρχονται όπως έρχονται" in the original Greek transcript.
also accounted for with formulations of rhetorical uncertainty. It could be because "we are trying to prove something" or "because we have this sense of responsibility; I don't know".

What should also be noted in passing here is that despite the fact that in the beginning of this extract (lines, 1-2) the Greeks in Brussels are described as being treated by Other Europeans "as people who don't work and so forth", in this latter part of the extract the grounds on which the Greek employees in the E.C. are exonerated lie specifically on their "productivity". As I would like to argue, whereas the construction "people who do not work" orients to the relevance of "laziness" (in terms of time and effort invested in one's job), the rhetorical nuances of "productivity" do not necessarily do so. It could be argued, as we shall see in the second part of this chapter, that "productivity" has only little to do with time and effort and is much more closely linked to personal qualities, ingenuity and individualism.

Symbolic identity implications of Greek castigations of Greek politicians' self-interestness
Overall in this section of the analysis I have considered some extracts where my interviewee's claims to national disinterestness have been accomplished by their recourse to the facticity and/or normativity of the Greek politicians' self-interestness. After constructions of self-interestness as an indication of a generalised "lack of civility" in Greece and the criticism of other Greek colleagues' self-interestness, manifested in their attitude to work, in this section the moral accusation of self-interestness has been levelled against Greek politicians. As it was the case in some of the extracts in the previous sections as well, the Greek politicians' self-interestness has been criticised for the alleged "bad name" that confers on the Greeks in Europe. Moreover, this self-interestness has been argued to be one of those embarrassingly distinguishing features, which not only differentiates "us" from the rational collectivity of Other Europeans, but also indicates the distance that separates "us" (as "modern Greeks") from the "glorious" achievements of "our" ancestors. The rhetorical implications though of this unfavourable comparison of Greek politicians' "irrationality" (manifested in their oriental type of clientalist practices (cf. Mouzelis, 1978)) to the contemporary Europeans' / ancient Greeks' rationality are consequential for the speakers' identity claims. Any identification with the former is disavowed and shares to the moral collectivity of occidental cultural perfection are sought. In the manner of Herzfeld (1987), it could be argued that these extracts manifest lay Greek symbolic practices, in which (the ostensibly occidental) Greek State authorities are orientalised from an occidental standpoint adopted by lay Greek social actors.
3. Praising Greek individualism

In the previous part of this chapter, (versions of) modern Greek national character that elucidated the individualism as self-interestness of modern Greeks have been oriented to as normative discursive resources to sustain criticisms. In their interactional / rhetorical deployment these criticisms manifested the interviewees' concern to establish a nationally disinterested profile. In a symbolic level, I suggested that these criticisms may be seen as identity claims to an occidental perspective and as symbolic acts that orientalise generalised Greek Others. In the following part of the analysis, I shall consider a number of extracts in which (versions of) modern Greek individualism are again drawn upon to sustain local activity sequences. This time though, they are drawn upon to sustain normative and factual praises of modern Greeks. Here virtuous constructions of Greek personal qualities are deployed within contrast structures, juxtaposing Greek individualism to Greek institutions, Greek politics and politicians and the character of European Others. As I shall suggest, apart form the local rhetorical concerns that these praises may exemplify, they may also be seen as having symbolic implications.

3.1. Greek institutional disorganisation vs. the virtues of Greek national character

In this section of the analysis, I will consider two extracts where the interviewees' accomplishment of the national disinterestedness of their perspectives implicates an explicit or implicit orientation to the theme of Greek institutional disorganisation as a normative complainable matter, counterbalanced by an explicit praising of a range of virtues of Greek national character. The rhetorical organisation and the discursive resources mobilised in these extracts are strongly reminiscent of extracts that I considered in the previous chapter.

Extract 7

((In the talk exchanged before the start of this extract, Mr Alexiou was responding to my initial interview question requesting a description of his job and the conditions under which he decided to apply for a job in the European Commission.))

1 N.B. hhmm (.....) what were your expectations (.) what exactly did you expect to find (.)
2 Mr Alexiou hhmm=
3 N.B. μ here in Brusselsμ=
4 Mr Alexiou =in BRUsse::ls (.) hhe:: (.) in the: in the: community to sta[rt with
5 N.B. [yes
6 Mr Alexiou what I was expecting to fi::nd (.) in the community I was expecting to fi::nd (.) hhe:: (.) a
7 good management (.)
8 N.B. hhmm=
Mr Alexiou =a management (.) an administration (.) he: (.) a PER one (.).
N.B.  =hhmm=
Mr Alexiou = one which he:: (.) which operates he:: in the way administrations operate
scientifically (..) he: (.) about Brussels I expected to find a European city:: (..) organised and
so forth (.).
N.B.  =μhhmmμ (..)
Mr Alexiou AS FAR AS the:: he:: (.) European ci::ty (.) YES (..) it's very:: (.) it's much better
organised compared to:::
[μhhmmμ]
Mr Alexiou what we have been accustomed to in Gree::ce (.)
N.B.  =hhmm=
Mr Alexiou =what we call services (..) banks he:: and so forth they are very well organi[sed
N.B.  =μhhmmμ
to:::
Mr Alexiou you don't have the:: (..) hhe:: (.) your life is much ea::sier=
N.B.  =hhmm (..)
Mr Alexiou as far as the administration is concerned (..) he:: (.) I belie::ve (..) after eleven years
the hhe: (.) in Greece we do have serious pro::blems (.) but we have a more humane profile in
here there are serious probl[ems
N.B.  =hhmm
Mr Alexiou with the:: (.) INHUmame profile of the administration (.) and these are community's words
right?
N.B.  =yeah

In the first part of his account (lines, 4-14), my interviewee orients to an "institutional organisation" theme to sustain the normativity of his prior expectations. In the "community" he expected to find "a good management"; "a management, a proper one, which operates in the way that administrations operate scientifically". In Brussels he "expected to find a European city, organised and so forth". I want to suggest that such a construction of prior expectations works in a number of ways towards normalising the identity of my interviewee as a rational person and disavowing the hearable identity of the xenomaniac. The key rhetorical device here is an implicit contrast of the subject matter of my interviewee's expectations against what is -implicitly- oriented to as being the factual state of affairs in Greece. Let me elaborate on that.

European organisation vs. Greek disorganisation: An implicit contrast

Although in this first part of the extract there is no explicit reference to a comparative national context, I want to argue that there are certain features in Mr Alexiou's account that implicitly hint towards a comparative rhetorical structure. First of all, it is my interviewee's contention that the "management" and the "administration" he expected to find in the "community" would be operating on scientific principles, that it would be "a proper one". I would like to suggest that such a rather modest and down to earth expectation could only be elevated to an expectation proper by the implicit invocation of comparative context where "management" and (public) "administration" are "not good" enough or "proper". In the second part of the extract (especially in lines, 24-26), of
course, it becomes apparent that the counter measure against which these modest expectations should be seen is the Greek public sector. Nevertheless, what is important to be noted here is how the very construction of the subject matter of prior expectations orients to the theme of Greek institutional disorganisation as a normatively complainable matter, against which the articulation of modest expectations by my interviewee grant a sense of rationality and national disinterestness to his talk.

Brussels as a "European" city: An inference rich category

A second feature that I would like to draw some attention to is my interviewee's use of the adjective "European" to describe his prior expectations about Brussels. Given that an understanding of Mr Alexiou's use of that term merely as a geographical specification would be redundant, I would like to suggest that the term "European" is oriented to as an inference rich category (cf. Antaki et al., 1996; Sacks, 1992: 40-48), partially exemplified in Mr Alexiou's subsequent reference to Brussels as "organised and so forth". Brussels, irrespectively of its geographical location in Europe, (where Athens, the hometown of my interviewee, is also located) is elevated to a "European" city due to a series of attributes, with "organisation" being the emblematic one.

The implicit assumption, of course, underlying Mr Alexiou's formulation of his expectations about Brussels is that Athens (and Greece more generally) are lacking all those features. More interestingly though, what the inclusion of the term Europe as an inference rich category, with all its connotations of occidental cultural perfection, accomplishes is the normalisation of my interviewee's identity as a rational and nationally disinterested person. Mr Alexiou's expectations about the "organisation" he would find in Brussels appear as originating not in his potentially hearable xenomania, but in the factual distance that separates the current state of affairs in Greece from the standards of "Europe". Most importantly, this distance appears to be legitimately problematic: Mr Alexiou as a national of a European state and employee of the European Commission appears as normatively entitled to expect "European" standards from his living environment. Therefore, his expectations are caste as not psychologically motivated by his personal prejudices/xenomania but as originating in his rational judgment about the factual backwardness of Greece.

European organisation vs. Greek disorganisation: An explicit contrast

In the second part of this extract (lines, 15-30) what has been largely implicit in the formulation of my interviewee's expectations is oriented to explicitly in his construction of what he found in
Brussels and in the European Commission. Brussels, according to Mr Alexiou, came up to meet his expectations that it would be a "European" city: "it's much better organised compared to what we have been accustomed to in Greece"; with the good organisation of "services", "banks and so forth" making "your life much easier". What should be noted here is the way in which, again, the direct comparison with Greece normalises the rationality of my interviewee's perspective, absolving potentially hearable attributions of xenomania. The "organisation" of Brussels is being appreciated not because it meets any xenomaniac/utopian criteria of occidental cultural perfection. Far from that, it is the facticity of "what we have been accustomed to in Greece" that makes its "organisation" distinguishable and notable in the gaze of my interviewee.

European administration: "Scientific" but "inhumane"

Maybe the most interesting rhetorical feature of this extract though comes when Mr Alexiou sets to refer to his experience of the administration of the European Commission. In the first part of this extract, Mr Alexiou stated that his expectation was to find a "proper administration", which would operate under "scientific" rules. Despite the fact that apparently his expectations were not belied, "after eleven years" he can attest to a certain disillusionment. It may be the case that "in Greece we do have serious problems" with the (public) administration but "we [also] have a more humane profile"; whereas, "over here there are serious problems with the inhumane profile of the administration". Notably, the authorship of the assertion about the "inhumane profile" of the E.U. administration is recast with a shift of footing to the "community". He appears to be a mere relayer of views originating, one would think, in one of the many internal research projects and surveys conducted by E.U. bodies to which my interviewee by virtue of his post is having direct access to. As a consequence, any potentially hearable inferences that my interviewee is unjustifiably redrawing the national balance of his perspective by levelling unfounded criticisms towards the E.U. administration is disavowed. In this second part of the extract, where prior expectations are matched against actual experiences, Mr Alexiou's claim to the national disinterestness of his perspective involves recourse to the theme of virtuous Greek qualities. The theme of Greek institutional disorganisation informed both the construction of his prior expectations, as well as his construction of his experiences in the European Commission and Brussels respectively. Nevertheless, in a by now quite familiar symmetrical format, the negative aspects of current experiences are also asserted, by counter posing the humanity of Greek disorganisation to the "inhumanity" of the European institutional organisation.

16 Information made available to me in the first part of the interview where Mr Alexiou was describing his job and his duties.
Attesting to "humane" Greek disorganisation: Symbolic implications

As Said (1995) has shown, the discourse of Orientalism encompasses a fundamental ambivalence. The "backward" and "underdeveloped" Oriental societies were not merely dismissed for their lack of "progress" and "civilisation". They also fascinated the European gaze for their "innocence" and their uncontaminated by modernity "humanity". Herzfeld (1987) has shown how this ambivalence of the discourse of Orientalism informs the ideological construct of the (ambivalent) modern Greek national identity. Modern Greek State institutions may have legitimated their authority on the grounds of an ever sought after vision of modernisation of Greek society. Interestingly, both for the "modern" European patrons of the Greek State as well as for its "pre-modern" subjects, the "corrupt" and "inefficient" Greek State institutions are typically oriental. Their symbolic orientalisation by European and lay Greek social actors, of course, is usually a charge and not an exoneration.

In the first part of this extract, Mr Alexiou's rhetorical management of a nationally disinterested praise of European organisation can be seen as a symbolic attestment to his "rational" occidental credentials. From an occidental perspective, European administration is appreciated and he distances himself from the Romeic disorganisation of Greek administration. Nevertheless, the "intimate" and "humane" profile of Romiossini is not to be easily dismissed. Particularly, when the occidental authorities of the E.U. admit that the "scientific" organisation of E.U. administration is "inhumane". In that case, the "backward" Romiossini, with its "corrupt" and "inefficient" State institutions may become appealing. Rhetorical attestments to its "humane" profile, may signify a symbolic exploitation of the potentialities of the ambivalence of the discourse of Orientalism. Greek lay social actors may be able to claim an occidental profile by appreciating the European organisation but may also be able to claim a dignified Romeic identity by pinpointing to what the oriental rendering of modern Greece may "rightfully" boast for itself: its uncontaminated by European modernity "humane" profile.

In the following extract, we will have the chance, again, to see how "humanity" or other virtuous qualities of Greek national character are drawn upon in order to counter balance criticisms or tacit acknowledgments of the disorganisation of the Greek public sector. As we shall see though, they will be attributed to human actors where they (commonsensically) mostly pertain (cf. though Michael, 1996) rather than to institutional actors as it was the case in this extract.
Extract 8

((In the talk prior to this extract, Mr Anthos was responding to a question of mine about his professional visits to Greece and about the kind of his contacts there with authorities and public services.))

1 N.B. hhe:: (. ) yes I am interested i:n (. ) if it's possible to::. (. ) discuss (. ) to tell me basically (. )
2 hhe:: (. ) what is exactly the image you get from:. (. ) the equivalent services in Greece or
3 from your professional contacts [μιν Ελληνες]
4 Mr Anthos [Λοκ Ι]
5 thi::nk that the:: [image
6 N.B. [from the
7 point of view of somebody who has been working [for a lifetime μιν Ελληνες]
8 Mr Anthos [yea::h the image is not that
9 bad as one would expect it to be (..) I mean hhe:: (. ) there are remarkable people=
10 N.B. =hhmm= 11 Mr Anthos =of course badly situated and in a bad organisational framework (..) but in any case there are
12 remarkable people in the- (. ) who (. ) I could assure you=
13 N.B. =hhmm=
14 Mr Anthos =they don't (.) they are not people who would say "who cares" (. ) I mean hhe:: (. ) they are
15 working with hhe:: (. ) of course they are not ALL of them like that=
16 N.B. =hhmm=
17 Mr Anthos =but it has happened to me to meet serious people (. ) who are working (.) both with zeal ((the
18 interviewee slaps his hand on the desk)) and with enthusiasm ((the interviewee slaps his hand
19 on the desk)) and with expertise ((the interviewee slaps his hand on the desk)) (..) on their
20 subject=
21 N.B. =yes (.) yes (.) therefore basic=
22 Mr Anthos =even if they get paid with the salaries we all know about (.) [Ι με::αν
23 N.B. [μιθμμμμμμ μ
24 Mr Anthos which are indeed ridiculous (..)

((S2INT1: 1252-1278))

Rather predictably, I would like to start off the analysis of this extract by considering my -shameless- positioning of the interviewee to an occident al "point of view". It is not merely the case that the first part of my question (lines, 1-3) problematises the issues of public services and professional encounters in Greece, by orienting to the relevance of evaluatively loaded impressions of my interviewee about them. Furthermore, my interviewee is asked to account for his professional encounters in Greece and the Greek public services "from the point of view of somebody who has been working for a lifetime in Europe". In line with my so far analyses, I would like to argue that this imposition and (the subsequent uptake) of the footing of "somebody who has been working for a lifetime in Europe" implicates my interviewee in a nationally disinterestness dilemma. A lifetime's of working experience in Europe may indeed provide the critical distance and the comparative framework for my interviewee's current experiences of Greek bureaucracy to be evaluatively assessed. Nevertheless, it also entails the danger for his account to be heard as being motivated by xenomania. As I would like to argue, the series of contrasts around which my interviewee's subsequent account (lines, 8-24) is organised attend to his rhetorical claim to a nationally disinterested perspective.
Three contrast structures

a) Images of Greek (dis)organisation and the identity of their holders

First, it is the contrast implicit in Mr Anthos' assertion: "the image is not that bad as one would expect it to be" (lines, 8-9) that I want to consider. I suggest that with this assertion my interviewee invokes and, at the same time differentiates himself from, the perspective of prejudiced / xenomaniac Other Greeks, who uncritically would "expect" to get a "bad image" from current encounters with Greek bureaucracy, after having had a long standing experience of the European administration. In contrast to this "image" that these straw men -xenomaniac Greek Others- would expect to get, stands my interviewee's claim to a balanced and critical perspective, manifested in his assertion about the "not that bad" image he discerns.

b) "Remarkable people", "badly situated"

The second contrast structure in Mr Anthos' talk comes when he sets himself to account for his previous assertion (lines, 9, 11): "I mean there are remarkable people [...] of course badly situated and in a bad organisational framework". As I have repeatedly argued over my analyses, laying a claim to a balanced and nationally disinterested perspective practically entails an active orientation of the speakers to the facticity and normativity of what is to be praised and criticised. Bearing that in mind, the first thing I would like to note here is Mr Anthos' orientation to his initial assertion as an accountable matter (note also the attributable silence, line 9, following my interviewee's completion of his turn). It may be the case that my interviewee's assertion "the image is not that bad" absolves him from the hearable identity of the xenomaniac Greek but, at the same time, it opens up the space for his assertion to be heard as an indication of uncritical favouritism towards his national collectivity. The symmetry evident in Mr Anthos' account attends to this dual rhetorical concern. On the one hand, xenomania is disavowed by invoking and disclaiming an alignment with Other-Greeks who would fail to identify the "remarkable" people, within the Greek public services; on the other, an uncritical positive bias towards Greece is disavowed by attending to the facticity of the disorganisation of the Greek public sector: "of course" these "remarkable" people are "badly situated and in a bad organisational framework". Greek institutional disorganisation and the virtues of Greek national character are oriented to and set side by side within a symmetrical rhetorical structure as factual state of affairs, with their facticity grounding my interviewee's claim to a rational, nationally disinterested perspective.

Greek civil servants: The "who cares" ones vs. the conscientious ones
There is an additional contrast structure though underlying my interviewee's subsequent talk on which I would like to draw some attention to. His praise of the Greek civil servants as being "remarkable" is substantiated by his reference to their attitude to work: "they are not people who would say "who cares"; and, moreover, "they are working with zeal, enthusiasm and expertise on their subject". Nevertheless, "of course they are not all of them like that". This rhetorical oscillation from a generalised construction of praise to a particularised assertion of exceptions lends again a sense of rationality and national disinterestness to Mr Anthos' talk (cf. Billig, 1985; Billig et al., 1988). What I would like to draw attention to though, are the discursive resources mobilised in this rhetorical oscillation from generalisation to particularisation.

Greek individualism at work: Self-interestness vs. disinterested motivation for excellence

What the Greek civil servants are absolved from is the kind of criticism levelled against them by my interviewees in the extracts I considered in the previous part of this chapter. Namely, the self-interestness and indifference, allegedly, characteristic of a Greek attitude to work. These attributes are oriented to by Mr Anthos as normative complainable matters pertaining to criticisms of Greek civil servants, to the extent that he "assures" me that they are not like that. In this "assurance" of my interviewee, the range of behaviours and attitudes invoked by the formulaic expression "who cares" is treated as common (albeit prejudiced) knowledge, available to me as well as, one would think, to other occidental minded Greeks. Against this prejudiced common knowledge, stands my interviewee's empirical testimony to the "zeal", "enthusiasm" and "expertise" of the Greek civil servants at work.

Most importantly, this exalted attitude to work is argued to be not reducible to the material pay off of their job: they are working like this, "even if they get paid with the salaries we all know about [...] which are indeed ridiculous". It seems that the occidental personal virtues of Greek civil servants, however rarely they are to be discerned, have an additional moral value attached to them. They are not merely part of a routine exchange pattern, where professional efficiency is rewarded with good salaries. Instead, they appear to be virtues originating in ones' own personal disinterestness and motivation for excellence, against the odds of institutional disorganisation and poor salaries. In Mr Anthos' account, it could be argued that the Hellenic "essence" of modern Greek national character is invoked. The disinterested heroism of individual Greeks, who are struggling with the oriental disorganisation and inefficiency of the Romeic bureaucracy and the

17 "Δε βαριέσαι" in the original Greek transcript.
oriental disposition of the ("who cares") Greek Others is brought to inform his account. A personal symbolic alignment with these occidental aspects of modern Greek national identity could be argued that is at work here.

In this section of the analysis I have highlighted ways in which the theme of Greek personal virtues was oriented to by my interviewees as a normative and factual praiseworthy resource set against the theme of Greek institutional disorganisation. The rhetorical accomplishment of the normativity and facticity of what was, respectively, to be praised and criticised lent to my interviewees' talk a sense of national balance and absolved them from hearable inferences about their potentially relevant prejudice or xenomania.

3.2. Greek politics / politicians vs. the virtues of Greek national character

In this section of the analysis, I shall consider two extracts where my interviewees' claim to the national disinterestness of their perspective is substantiated by contrasting unfavourable constructions of Greek politics / politicians to flattering accounts of (versions of) Greek personal qualities. In the course of doing so, themes and concerns already familiar from previous extracts are also oriented as relevant in my interviewees' accounts.

Extract 9

((In the talk before the start of this extract Mr Alexiou was referring to his future repatriation plans and to the kind of contacts that he has had in / with Greece during the years of his residence and employment in Brussels.))

1 N.B. what's the impression you get from Greece during these last few years? (...) from the point of view of somebody who has been working in Brussels (.) (.) it ranges from bad to very bad (.)
2 Mr Alexiou =bad (.) (laughter) (.)
3 N.B. µικρα(μ=)
4 Mr Alexiou =LISTEN though (.) when I say from bad to very bad I mean from (.) from what I mean is called THE AUTHORITIES (.)
5 N.B. =hmm= the authorities are just worthy of taking them all together and throw them into the bin=
6 Mr Alexiou =ON THE CONTRARY (.) the people who get their degree (.) who start their business who do the everyday struggle for living (.) the employees and so forth (.) I am surprised to say that I find people who are (.) of a different quality compared to what is presented as Greece in the newspapers (.) in the television (.) in the public* domain* as it's called
7 N.B. µικρα(μ=)
8 Mr Alexiou =yes yes yes
9 N.B. µικρα(μ=)
10 Mr Alexiou =AND (.) I am SORRY (.) because I believe that the newspapers (.) the employees (.) how can I say (.) completely differently (.) to what is presented as Greece in the newspapers (.) in the television (.)
11 Mr Alexiou in English (.) A::ND (.) hhe: (.) I AM SORRY (.) because I believe that (.)
the Greek people deserve a better leadership (.) [they deserve

[hhmm

a sort of better image (.) OF COURSE there are always the::: (....) how can I say the::: (.)

the THU:::GS the::: people tha:::t the spivs [this

[hhmm

Mr Alexiou a sort of better image (..) OF COURSE there are always the::: (....) how can I say the::: (.)

[hhmm

Mr Alexiou sort of people (..) tsch (.) I am surprised though to see that (.) whereas in the pa::st (.)

maybe because I was younger I don't kno:w (..) hhe:: (.) I had the impression that this

segment of spivs and so forth was (.) was bigger i::n in percentages=

[hhmm=

Mr Alexiou =I AM SURPRISED now to see that despite the fact that the pp- (.) the percentage of the

good stock is big (.) hhe:: (.) what is continually presented is the::: (.) the the bad one

[hhmm=

Mr Alexiou =I don't know how [to:::

[yes yes

you should do some re[search to find out why ((laughter))

[yeah yeah yeah ((laughter))

In the analysis of the previous extract, I had the chance to comment, on the one hand, on the way in
which my imposition of an occidental footing to my interviewee implicated him into a national
disinterestness dilemma, and on the other, on the way in which he managed the horns of that
dilemma by invoking and disassociating himself from Greek-Others, who would be amenable to the
moral charge of xenomania. In that case, the national disinterestness of my interviewee was
substantially grounded on his orientation to a "bad image" of Greece as a normative impression
reached from the standpoint of an occidental perspective and on his subsequent counter arguments
against the partiality and unfairness of such impressions. In this extract, my question about Mr
Alexiou's "impression(s) from Greece" is followed by a similar imposition of a an occidental
footing. He is requested to account for them "from the point of view of somebody who has been
working in Brussels for eleven years now". The apparent similarities though with the previous
extract end somewhere here. Mr Alexiou's establishment of the national disinterestness of his
perspective follows a rather different rhetorical path. Let me elaborate on that.

A reflexively "shocking" criticism of Greece

The first feature of my interviewee's account that I would like to draw some attention to is the
rhetorical displays of eagerness in his highly critical (albeit, also reflexively ironical) tone
concerning his impressions from Greece. His first assessment component, i.e. "bad" is latched to
my previous turn and stressed. Notably, in the transition relevance place an attributable silence
occurs, only to be followed by my interviewee's laughter and his double reassertion / reformulation
of his negative evaluation of Greece: "it ranges from bad to very bad; from bad to very bad". It is
only after this triple assertion of the "bad impressions" from Greece that a reception of my
interviewee's assessment follows (line 4), in the form of a weak agreement: "μήρι::ghθµ".
As I want to suggest, this rhetoric of eagerness orients to the normativity of "bad impressions from Greece", when those impressions are to be formed and accounted for from an occidental perspective. Apart from that though, I also want to suggest that this rhetoric of eagerness also bears a reflexive / ironical quality. It may be the case that from an occidental perspective impressions from Greece are meant to be normatively "bad" but attesting to them entails the danger of being heard as a nationally-biased xenomaniac, unless one recognises this danger and accounts for that. I suggest that the unmitigated manner in which Mr Alexiou's assertion of his "bad" impressions is delivered attests also to a rhetorical / reflexive understanding of that danger by him. The irony of his talk serves as a reflexive signifier, by means of which he flags his awareness that he is momentarily breaching the norm which demands for a nationally disinterested perspective to be espoused.

I feel tempted to say that Mr Alexiou is deploying here a "shock" strategy, which opens up the interactional space for him to account for his initial negative evaluation, and accomplish the rationality of his perspective on the face of an ostensibly controversial first assessment. The attributable silence following the completion of his first assessment turn (line 3) can be seen analytically as a conversational marker, prefacing a dispreferred second turn, or more simply, as an indication from me that "something is going wrong". Mr Alexiou's subsequent laughter, avails a reflexive / ironical recognition of that and his following double reformulation, -which upgrades his initial negative assessment-, orients to an understanding and an increase of the momentum of the norm breaching, in pursuit of a response that would open the space for him in order to account for that. This response finally comes in my weak form of agreement (line 4), which allows for my interviewee to embark on an account for what both of us have treated as an accountable matter.

Greek "authorities" vs. the Greek "people"

Mr Alexiou's next turn (lines 5-6) clearly orients to his first assessment as an accountable matter, as something that needs to be explicated in order for any hearable negative inferences to be warded off: note the increased volume of "listen" and the disavowal implied in his use of "though". Most importantly, the "bad impressions" he previously mentioned are qualified as stemming specifically

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18 Cf. lines, 8-9 in Extract 9: "the image is not that bad as one would expect it to be".
from his contacts with "the authorities". As far as they are concerned, Mr Alexiou is eager to go even more critical: "[they] are just worthy of taking them all together and throw them into the bin". Nevertheless, the "bad impressions" he gets from "the authorities" account only for half of his overall "impressions" from Greece. Against them, my interviewee counter poses his impressions from "the people"; for them he asserts that they are "of a different quality". This differentiation between aspects of modern Greece that are to be criticised and aspects to be praised constitutes a standard rhetorical move accomplishing the speakers' national disinterestedness and I have had the chance to comment upon similar cases in my analyses of previous extracts.

What, in addition, should be noted here is the way in which Mr Alexiou's praise of "the people" is constructed within his symmetrical account. In line 13, he prefaces his praise by stating that "I am surprised to say that I find [...]" and, subsequently, he contrasts this positive "impression" of his "to what is presented as Greece in the newspapers, in the television [and] in the public domain". I suggest that this orientation of my interviewee to the relevance of the obstacles that would potentially inhibit his appreciation of the "quality of the people" in Greece works as an additional claim to the rationality of his perspective. Since Mr Alexiou has already treated his initial highly critical "impressions" from Greece as an accountable matter, what would normatively come to be expected is a complementary positive evaluation, that would readdress the national balance and would establish the rationality of his perspective. Nevertheless, in such an argumentative context, an over-eagerness to attest to positive aspects of Greece could become hearable as being motivated by his desire to maintain face. I suggest that Mr Alexiou's construction of a suspicious previous self, which renders his current assertion to a "surprise", functions as what Potter (1996a) calls a *stake inoculation*, adding to the facticity of his positive "impressions" from the Greek people. This along with his construction of a mass media, public image of Greece that contrasts to his testimony constitutes a further move in his effort to establish the rationality of his perspective. His assertion about the "different quality" of the Greeks becomes hearable as the result of a rational reflexive process, against the odds of a skeptical previous self and of the misleading media / public images.

**Greek achievement motivation vs. Greek "spivs" and "thugs"**

Despite the fact that the contrast between Greek politics and the praiseworthy nature of Greek personal qualities constitutes an effective rhetorical move towards the accomplishment of the national disinterestedness of my interviewee's perspective, it also implicates him in another familiar

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19 The words originally used by Mr Alexiou are "Αι αρχαί". What I would like to note here is that since this expression is in katharevousa, it attaches an additional mocking / ironical quality to Mr Alexiou's talk (cf. Frangoudaki, 1997b).
dilemma. A generalised construction of praise for the Greek "people" may become hearable as evidence of the partiality and national interestness of my interviewee unless a particularised counter construction is also oriented to as relevant. Let me highlight briefly, how Mr Alexiou's talk orients to the relevance of this dilemma.

In lines 19-20, 22, my interviewee concludes his rhetorical juxtaposition of Greek politics vs people by asserting his belief that "the Greek people deserve a better leadership [...] a sort of better image". Immediately after that though, and following an attributable silence in the transition relevance place, comes a further qualification to this latest assessment of Greece by my interviewee. The occidental achievement motivation (cf. Spence, 1985) qualities praised in the Greek "people" are set against the (sub-)categories of Greeks who are described as "the thugs and the spivs". Most importantly, this criticism levelled against segments of "the Greeks" is oriented to as a normative criticism (note my interviewee's use of "of course") of certain characteristics of the Greek people, with the adjectives used oriented to as only indicative tapping into a wider range of complainable personal qualities (note my interviewee's qualification "this sort of people").

What should also be noted here is that in Mr Alexiou's talk, the ascription of attributes to be praised and attributes to be criticised to the "Greek people" bears the insignia of an evolutionary discourse. The achievement motivation praised was attributed to "young people, to people who get their degrees, who start their business". Whereas, according to my interviewee, "the segment of spivs and so forth was bigger in percentages" in older times when he himself was in his youth. It could be argued that Mr Alexiou is making a case for the gradual modernisation of Greece and its transformation to a "European" State in comparison to a relatively recent past when it was mostly populated by oriental types of political bigots ("thugs") and self-interested, non-civil minded "spivs". Let me now move to the next extract, where (again) a praise of Greek personal qualities is oriented to as normative and factual state of affairs against the odds manifested in Greek political culture.

**Extract 10**

(This extract is part of a long sequence of talk (approximately 6 pages of typescript) where Fanis has been responding to my question about his current impressions from Greece. In answering this question, one of the things that he mentioned was that in Greece "people are working hard" in contrast to what is being "circulated here". When I asked him what are these rumours circulating in Brussels about Greece and the Greeks, my interviewee started his account by

20 "Τραμπούκοι" and "αεριτζήδες" respectively in the original Greek transcript.)
saying "look we encouraged / allowed for" them to be generated in the beginning" and then he went on blaming the Greek politics for this bad reputation. More specifically he criticised the lack of meritocracy in the appointment of political personnel in the permanent Greek delegation in Brussels, the various financial scandals where Greek politicians were involved and the indecisiveness -due to hierarchical constraints- of Greek politicians, which, according to him, is to be blamed for the inefficiency of Greek politics both in the national and in the international level. According to my interviewee all these factors account for the bad reputation of Greeks in Brussels. His answer to my question proceeded as follows.))

1 Fanis [...] well (.) about Greece there are various rumours circulating here (.) basically let me tell you this (.) the Greek employees here in the commission (.) despite the fact that they don't get any help from the Greek state (.)
2 N.B.  μιλήματα
3 Fanis when I say they don't get any help (.) I mean in the:: in their career (.)
4 N.B.  hhmm=
5 Fanis =a:ll the other member states have a personnel po::licy (.) in the European communities
6 N.B.  hhmm=
7 Fanis =a personnel policy: (.) you know whom to promote and why to promote him and how to promote him (.) Greece doesn't have=
8 N.B.  hhmm (.)
9 Fanis or rather IT HAS (.) according to party criteria (.)
10 N.B.  μιλήματα (.....)
11 Fanis we:::ll (.) all the member states do ha::ve (.) a personnel policy (.) well (.) despite the fact that there is no such a thing (.) no help (.) I assure you that the Greek employees (.) they are some of the best (....) they are some of the best (.) and why they are some of the best? (.) because a Belgian or whoever e::lse anoth- (.) from another nationality (.) a Belgian (.) let's speak about a Belgian (.) they are people who:: (.) they are good in their job (.) but when they are confronted with a problem which (....) we'll (:.) he:: (.) they have to cope with a problem (.) right? (.) and they don't he:: (.) and they have a: (.) they try to solve it in a: (.) in a specific way let's say (.) they wouldn't be able to sidestep from this specific way (.)
12 N.B.  μιλήματα=
13 Fanis =to find solutions (.) I mean they would insist to solve it in this way (.) it may not be possible to be solved in this way though (.) it may be the case that there's another [solution
14 N.B.  [yes yes
15 Fanis well a Greek (.) will be able to find a solution (..) I mean what I want to sa::y (.) I am not saying that in order to take pride for ourselves ri:ght?= 16 N.B.  =yeah yeah=
17 Fanis =bu::t he:: (.) who::ever (.) I mean everybody says so I mean that the Greek employee::s (.) they have (.) not something special (.) they are just capable of finding solu::tions (.) and how come it is so?: (.) I mean where does it come from? that that a Greek employee :::s (.) a bit mo:re he:: (.) I wouldn't like to say more intelligent (.) a bit mo:re (....) he:: (.)
18 N.B.  [his mind
19 Fanis is rotating qu::cker (.) ri::ght? (.) a bi:::t (.) he:: (.) it's because in Greece he had to (.) to work in an opposite direction as well=
20 N.B.  =hhmm (.)
21 Fanis do you understand me?=
22 N.B.  =yes yes=
23 Fanis =on the ba:sis o::f (.) he:: (.) of the facts let's sa::y (.) he was obliged to work in an opposite direction (.) whereas a Belgian hasn't worked in an opposite direction (.) because he know::s (.) that when he goes into a public service (.) he needs something? (.) HE WILL ge::t it (.)
24 N.B.  [hhmm
25 Fanis chance he wouldn't (.) well (.) in Greece though (.) there could always be another way (.) a Belgian wouldn't know that or an English or I don't know who e:lse (.) [do you understand
26 N.B.  [hhmmm
27 Fanis what's happening? (.) that's the difference=
28 N.B.  =yes yes=
29 Fanis =that it may be:: (.) I mean it has happened to me many times (.) "c- colleagues let's do it this
I would like to start off the analysis of this extract by considering the opening turn in Fanis' account on the bad reputation that the Greeks enjoy in Brussels. As I have noted in my gloss over the talk prior to this extract, Fanis' reference to the bad reputation of Greeks in Brussels came within a comparative structure, where his personal testimony to the hardworking attitude of Greeks (in Greece) was juxtaposed to "what is circulated here" about Greeks and Greece. Fanis' initial response to my subsequent question, which interrogated the content of these rumours, was prefaced with the admission "look we encouraged / allowed for them to be generated in the beginning" and what followed was a listing of political and organisational problems and scandals which, according to Fanis, created a bad image of Greece in Brussels. I want to suggest that this initial admission of Fanis manifests his orientation to the dilemma of national disinterestedness. If these rumours were to be challenged by him as false prejudices of Other Europeans, then his argument could become hearable as motivated by favouritism towards his national group. His rhetorical admission though to the responsibility of "us" in encouraging / allowing for these rumours to be generated in the first place attach a sense of rationality to his talk. What I want to draw some attention to though is the way in which subsequently the national "we" used in Fanis' initial admission is split into two halves.

Greek politicians vs. the Greek people

Before the start of this extract, Fanis criticised the Greek politicians and the workings of Greek politics in general for the poor image of Greece and Greeks in Brussels. Whereas in his prior argument though, Greek politicians were encompassed in his use of the national "we", in this subsequent account of his, Greek politicians came to be referred as "they". "They" are to be blamed for the bad reputation that "we" (Greeks) have in Brussels. The undifferentiated national "we", by means of which Fanis' claim to the national disinterestedness of his perspective was substantiated, broke down and the first of its constituent parts oriented to as relevant is "they-Greek politicians",
criticised for issues already familiar from my analyses of previous extracts. Let me now turn to the second part of Fanis' account, reported in this extract, where a second "they", -constituent part of the national "we"-, is oriented to as relevant in Fanis' account on the rumours "circulating in Brussels".

After the long preceding sequence in which Fanis criticised the Greek politicians for being responsible for the all these rumours, without ever specifying though what is the content of them, at the start of this extract (line 1) my interviewee keeps the floor by signalling that he is about to tell a story (Antaki, 1994; Sacks, 1972) about their content: "well, about Greece there are various rumours circulating here". Nevertheless, subsequently Fanis once again is diverging from the task of giving an answer proper to my question (which interrogated the content of these rumours) and in which task he had just committed himself with his story-preface. Acknowledging that he is diverging from this task ("basically let me tell you this"), Fanis proceeds in telling a story about "the Greek employees here in the Commission". And the story that he has to tell about them is oriented to as being complementary to his previous story, where Greek politics and politicians were criticised. (Note the contrast structure substantiated with the use of "despite the fact" as the syntactical link between "Greek employees" and "Greek state").

In lines 2-14, some of the issues that Fanis has previously criticised on the workings of Greek politics in general are specified in his criticism of the attitude of the "Greek State" towards the Greek employees in the E.C. According to him, the "Greek State", in contrast to other European member States of the E.U., does not have any planning / "personnel policy" in the European communities. Or, even worst, the only policy it has obeys to "party criteria". In a manner reminiscent of my interviewees' talk I considered in 2.3, in Fanis' account both the disorganisation of Greek politics and the self-interestness manifested in the clientalistic relations on the basis of which it operates are brought into critical attention. Both disorganisation and clientalism are oriented to as factual and -normatively- complainable matters, within a contrast structure where the individual Greek employees in the E.C. are to be praised. Let me now turn to this rhetorical course of action as there lies my main analytic interest in this extract.

The first thing to be noted here is that Fanis disassociates himself from the population of Greek employees in the E.C. by means of his pronominal reference to them as "they" (line 15 onwards). Nevertheless, in contrast to his previous similar disassociation from the Greek politicians, which served to accomplish his criticism of them, this rhetorical disassociation is tailored to meet different
ends. "They", as he "assures" me, "are some of the best". Evidently, there is a concern of personal stake / interest attended to by this rhetorical move of my interviewee. Since he has been explicitly recruited for an interview on the basis of his situational identity as a "Greek employee in the European Commission", a "we" construction could always be hearable as motivated by a self-interest in the praise offered or as an indication of personal arrogance. By means of his "they" formulation though, the ephemeral footing of an objective, external observer is claimed. From a personally / nationally disinterested perspective, Fanis attests to the factual disorganisation / clientalism of Greek politics and "assures" me of the excellence of Greek employees. In his subsequent elaboration upon this assertion of his, Fanis' concern with the personal / national disinterestness of his perspective is further evidenced.

The difference between Greek and European employees

In line 16, Fanis sets himself to exemplify his assertion by means of national comparisons. Greek employees are contrasted to "a Belgian or whoever else" and despite the fact these Others are found to be "good at their job", they are also found to be lacking the ingenuity and creativity of the Greeks. Whenever these Others are faced with a problem, they are trying to solve it in a "specific", and one would think, predetermined way. Nevertheless, the problem at hand they are dealing with may not be solvable in this way. In that case they would be stuck with it, whereas a Greek would be "able to find a solution". Fanis' subsequent disclaimer "I am not saying that in order to take pride for ourselves" orients to and disavows the relevance of a personal / national motivation underpinning his assertion. The Greeks' capacity in "finding solutions" is recast as a factual state of affairs by means of an extreme case formulation: "I mean everybody says so".

In what follows (lines, 31-62), Fanis sets himself to account for the provenance of this -factual but exceptional- Greek personal quality of being able to "find solutions". Notably though, before doing so he reformulates his praise of the Greek employees' capacity to "find solutions" as not being an indication of superior "intelligence" but just an indication that their "mind [is] rotating quicker". This reformulation sets the scene for Fanis' subsequent disavowal of any biological / racial nuances that his praise may invoke and his argument for the situational / social factors that underlie and cause the Greeks' "mind to rotate quicker". Let me consider them in some detail.

To start with, the Greek employees' ability to "find solutions" is attributed to their past experiences in Greece, where they were "obliged to work in an opposite direction as well". "On the basis of the facts", Greek employees in Greece could not rely on what for Others (i.e. "Belgians, English or I
don't who else") is deemed self evident and normative expectation: i.e. "[going] into a civil service" and getting what they need. In order to get what is needed "there could always be another way", another course of action, that these Others could not have been acquainted with. What they have been "accustomed to in [their lives]", what they have been "taught in the school" is that there are specific, normative routines / courses of action in dealing with "a specific problem with a public service or I don't know what else". Therefore, they "wouldn't even think" that there could be other ways of solving problems. In contrast to this socialisation to the rational principles on the basis of which public life is organised for these Europeans Others stands the socialisation to the disorganisation and irrationality of Greek public services (note my gist reformulation, line 61) that the Greek employees have undergone. Their ability to "solve problems" is just a coping strategy, a normative side effect of their adaption to their social environment, and "has nothing to do with the Greek genius or whatever". In Fanis' talk, the facticity of Greek institutional disorganisation accounts for certain factual Greek personal qualities but there is nothing to be celebrated there. They are just matters of fact, attested to by a personally and nationally disinterested observer.

Symbolic implications of Greek attestments to the "speed" in which the "Greek mind rotates"

In my analysis of this extract, I had the chance to highlight the ways in which an explicit praise of Greeks and a derogatory depiction of European Others was possible to be sustained as a cultural fact uncontaminated by the potentially hearable prejudices of my interviewee. At this point I want to suggest that my interviewee's depiction of cunning Greek employees, who are able to "find solutions" in problems which European Others get stuck with due to their "rationally trained mind", draws upon the discourse of Romiossini. In Fanis' account, Greek employees are able to cope with problems which demand unorthodox solutions due to their "social training". In dealing with the "irrational", oriental Greek administration, modern Greeks develop certain skills. Presumably, these are the skills that, in earlier times when the administration they had to cope with was the oriental Turkish one, enabled them to "outwit their oppressors" (cf. Fermor, 1966). Moreover, my suggestion here is that Fanis' negative appraisal of European Others and positive appraisal of modern Greeks exploits the symbolic tension of the modern Greek national identity dilemma. As a (presumably) competent E.C. employee, Fanis knows how to do things in the occidental way. As a Romios though, he knows more than that. He knows how to deal with situations in which occidental rationality is not a sufficient endowment. The "irrationality" of Romiossini is not to be easily dismissed. It may confer symbolic credentials of personal competence that are beyond the reach of the Hellenic / occidental "rational" outlook.
3.3. European Others' national character(s) vs. the virtues of Greek national character

In this last section of the analysis, I shall consider two extracts where my interviewees' claim to national disinterestedness is accomplished by means of their orientation to (versions of) Greek personal qualities as praiseworthy matters. In the process, unfavourable constructions of European Others are explicitly or implicitly mobilised to sustain that praise. Despite the fact that the range of Greek characteristics praised is fairly wide, it could be argued that their common denominator is their reliance upon images and representations of what constitutes an oriental / Romeic type of "humane and easy going" personality (Herzfeld, 1987; Said, 1995).

Extract 11

((This extract is taken out from a long topical sequence where Mr Alexiou was complaining that in the E.C. administration, the Greek employees who want to "maintain their Greekness" and do not side with the political circles of other European member States in Brussels encounter serious problems in the development of their careers. This formulation of his "maintain their Greekness" triggered my question about what this "preservation / defence of Greekness" consists of. In the talk immediately prior to this extract, Mr Anthos jokingly noticed that there are not many things differentiating "us" from "the rest of the Europeans" , as "we" do not wear anymore chlamyses or white kilts and rustic shoes with pompons, neither have "we" any distinguishing features in physical appearance as the Hassidic Jews do with their long hair. My interviewee's talk carries on as follows.]

1 Mr Alexiou [...] I BELIEVE that the elements we are left with (.) in order to differentiate ourselves is the
2 la::nguage (.)
3 N.B. hhmm=
4 Mr Alexiou =obviously (.) hhe:: (.) certain cu::stoms and certain::n (..) if you li::ke (..) a a custom is the:
5 the manifestation [the
6 N.B. [hhmm
7 Mr Alexiou the most important thing is the: (.) the way of thinking (.)
8 N.B. hhmm=
9 Mr Alexiou =when you encounter a Greek (.) if you talk to a:: Wa- (.) a Fl:emish (.) to a Walloon to a
10 French to a German and to a Greek (.) you will see that the Greek has some values (.) which
11 he has them (.) in a di::fferent (.) he ha::s mm- (..) a humane disp[osition
12 N.B. [hhmm
13 Mr Alexiou a:: (.) a wa::rmth (.) he would invite you [at his ho
14 N.B. [hhmm
15 Mr Alexiou me (.) a Belgian wouldn't invite you (.) he wouldn't invite you easily at his home (.) he
16 wou::ldn't (.) >knocking on a Belgian's door and getting in with out an invitation?< (.) no
17 way there should be a special invitation and so forth (.) not like in Greece (.) neither like the
18 way it happens here with the Greeks who want to maintain the:::=
19 N.B. =hhmm (.)
20 Mr Alexiou a:: a Belgian if he raises the tone of his voi::ce that would be a:: a:: (.) how can I say (.) a
21 subject o::f (.) a CHRONIC dispute (.) [the Gr
22 N.B. [hhmm
23 Mr Alexiou eek he may shout and after a while he doesn't hhe:=
24 N.B. =yeah=
25 Mr Alexiou =he doesn't think of it he doe::sn't (.) µwhateverµ (..) hhe:: AND SO FORTH (.) or the
26 way of coping with stress* (.) a Flemish or a Belgian or a German who would be stressed they
27 would go to a bar and they would come out pissed (.) a GREEK who would be stressed would
28 sociali::se (.) he would go ou::t (.) he would ta::lk (.) he wou::ld=  
29 N.B. =hhmm=
30 Mr Alexiou =do whatever (.) he would SWING THE LEAD maybe (.) tsch=  

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Throughout my analyses for this chapter, I have tried to highlight ways in which my interviewees have mobilised (versions of) Greek personal qualities (either criticising or praising them), while the national disinterestedness of their perspective was oriented to as a relevant rhetorical concern. My analytic story for this extract is slightly different though. I shall argue that my interviewee's construction of praiseworthy Greek personal qualities does not implicate him in a dilemmatic situation where the national disinterestedness of his perspective ought to be accomplished. The reason for that is rather simple: my interviewee's mobilisation of Greek personal qualities as praiseworthy matters occurs within a rhetorical context where national Others have already been charged with national interestedness and Greek personal qualities are oriented to as the threatened kernel of "Greekness" under siege. Let me elaborate on that for a moment.

As I have mentioned in my gloss over the talk preceding this extract, Mr Alexiou had previously complained that Greek employees in the European Commission are marginalised and discriminated
against, to the extent that their career development depends on their taking sides with political
circles of other E.U. member States. Using his words, they have to "pass as Germans, French or
whatever" in order to secure a fair treatment in job allocations, and promotions. Instead, the ones
who insist on "maintaining their Greekness" encounter serious problems with their career
development. This comment triggered my question in what this "preservation" or "defence" of
Greekness consists of. After a bantering sequence, where Mr Alexiou ironically noted that the
(national / cultural) elements that differentiate "us" from "them" are not to be found in the level of
physical appearances, comes the talk reported in this extract.

The "persecution" and the "essence" of Greekness

What I want to argue provisionally is that my interviewee's complaint about the marginalisation of
Greek employees in the E.C. and the persecution of "Greekness" draws upon, and constitutes an
instance of, the Greek discourse of the "persecuted nation". The deployment of this discursive
theme, in this particular junction of the interview, allows for praiseworthy constructions of Greek
personal qualities to be put forward without my interviewee being caught on the horns of the
dilemma of national disinterestedness. The assertion of, and the argument for, the preservation of
distinguishable Greek personal qualities is elevated to a dignified, defensive course of action
against those forces that seek to eliminate cultural differences and persecute or simply
"misunderstand" what is rendered to be the essence of Greekness. Let me take a close look at the
extract now.

Having previouslyironically referred to the areas in which "our" differences from "them" would
not be found (i.e. dressing code, physical appearance), in lines 1-3 my interviewee argues that "the
elements we are left with in order to differentiate ourselves" are to be found in our "language" and
"customs". Evidently, such a construction of cultural / national differentiation is oriented to as a
natural and undisputable state of affairs bearing no evaluative nuances. Greeks (and presumably
other Europeans as well) have "their own" distinctive language and customs. Nevertheless, this
evaluatively neutral construction of national differences is subverted in Mr Alexiou's subsequent
talk. Picking up on his reference to "customs", my interviewee reformulates his previous assertion
of what differentiates "us" from "them" by noting that the "most important thing is the way of
thinking" (lines 3-4, 5). "Customs" are thus rendered a mere "manifestation" of (cultural)
differences which reside within a national people. Then commences a rather long turn, in which Mr
Alexiou is only minimally interrupted by my agreement / attention tokens, in which he sets the
personal qualities of Greeks against constructions of European Others.
The difference between Greeks and Europeans

In lines 9-36 my interviewee explicates his rather vague assertion of different "way(s) of thinking". Greeks are endowed with "a humane disposition" and "a warmth", which is not to be found in encounters with "Flemish, Walloons, French and German" people. This "humane disposition" and "warmth" of the Greeks is demonstrated in their hospitality. In contrast, say, to the Belgians' formality and fixation with their privacy, Greeks are hospitable people and one does not need a "special invitation" in order to "knock on a Greek's door" (lines 9-19).

Another exemplary difference between "the way(s) of thinking" is the impulsiveness of the Greeks as opposed to the behavioural restraints of the Belgians (lines 20-25). Whereas Greeks can momentarily fall prey to their impulses and "shout" at someone, only to forget about it "after a while", if a Belgian "raises the tone of his voice that would be [...] a subject of a chronic dispute". In addition, the introversion of other Europeans is contrasted to the social orientation of the Greeks, as manifested in their respective "stress coping strategies" (lines, 25-32): "a Flemish or a Belgian or a German who would be stressed they would go to a bar and they would come out pissed; a Greek who would be stressed would socialise, he would go out, he would talk, he would do whatever, he would [even] swing the lead maybe". Finally (lines, 32-36), the emotional attachment of Greeks to their homeland is contrasted to the indifferent attitude of the Europeans towards theirs: the Greeks have a "different sort of bonding" with their homeland, whereas "you would never hear of a German weeping for leaving Germany".

In lines 36-37, this extended comparative reference to the Greek personal qualities is concluded with a gist formulation: "I think these are three or four characteristics which differentiate us and which are usually misunderstood". What I should like to draw attention to is the way in which with this reformulation, my interviewee specifies how his preceding elaboration on Greek personal qualities should be understood. These are "characteristics which differentiate us" from the bulk of (the rest of) the Europeans and they have only been elaborated upon by my interviewee in order to substantiate his argument about the persecution of "Greekness" in the circles of the E.C. According to him, this persecution is taking place because Other Europeans are "misunderstanding" them. In other words, my interviewee is disavowing a celebration of "Greekness" or Greek national character by means of derogatory constructions of national Others. These are factual Greek "characteristics" constituting the very essence of Greekness. However, they are being "misunderstood" and, therefore, "Greeks who want to maintain their Greekness" are discriminated
against. Let us now take a look at how he represents these "characteristics" as misunderstood (lines, 36-62).

According to Mr Alexiou, "being open and all that is misunderstood as being extravagant [...] and lavish". "Our" emotional attachment to "our" homeland is misunderstood as a sign of nationalism and negation of a common European identity. And finally, "our getting together", which is simply an anti-stress strategy, a catharsis for personal problems via their sharing, is misunderstood as a sign of "mafia phenomena". Notably, Mr Alexiou's unfolding of how the "characteristics" at the heart of what is meant to be "Greekness" are misunderstood is delivered in a rhetorical format which accomplishes the facticity and normativity of the "misunderstanding". The "misunderstanding" about "our openness" is formulated with an explicit orientation towards a list construction (lines 40); the charge against "our" emotional attachment to homeland comes also as an active voiced list construction (lines, 43-44); and, finally, the elevation of "our getting together" to an anti-stress coping strategy is backed up by an invocation of "research that has been published in the Eurostat".

Overall in this extract, the facticity and normativity of Greek personal qualities has been rhetorically oriented to as a relevant matter for slightly different ends, compared to extracts I have previously considered. It is not my interviewee's national disinterestedness which has been at stake here. Instead, the assertion of and the argument for the preservation of "characteristics", which have been constructed as being the differentiating features of "Greekness", has been put forward as a dignified, defensive course of action. While European Others have been charged with persecuting "Greekness", the task that my interviewee has set for himself is to clear up the "misunderstanding". What is being persecuted is what is not understood because it is "different"; and in what "we" are "different" is in "our" "humane disposition", "warmth", "openness", sociability and emotional attachment to "our" homeland. Let us have a look at the next extract, where again qualities of Greek national character are favourably compared to the ones of European others.

Extract 12

((In the part of the interview prior to this extract Mr Karras was responding to my question about his current "impressions" of Greece, after working for twelve years in Brussels for the European Commission. Nevertheless, that far his response was rather vague and impersonal as he was basically comparing statistics of Greek economy to statistics of other member states of the E.U., supporting his argument that these statistics are rather misleading and that the quality of life in Greece is considerably higher not only compared to what is officially estimated but also compared to the quality of life in other European countries. The start of this extract marks an unprompted topical shift in my interviewee's talk.))
Mr Karras: what matters is that it is interesting being a Greek and living abroad of course I mean interesting because we the Greeks have a certain concept stemming from the fact that we are Greeks.

Mr Karras: NOT because we are descendants of the ancient Greeks we think that that we know how to live better.

Mr Karras: OF COURSE I always believed that the Greek who has a proper education and a fairly decent income in Europe is indeed one of the best Europeans.

Mr Karras: BECAUSE he hasn't got other complexes as other people do of course we do have problems we also have flaws but they are not that.

Mr Karras: OF COURSE I mean everybody's aim is the personal improvement financially in life apart from his personal improvement.

Mr Karras: well-being to succeed financially in life their financial ascent or their social ascent their life DOESN'T change though I mean when they achieve this ascent.

Mr Karras: IN word we have a different way of thinking we also like the nice car and a nice house but we only minimally invest in shares as they do.
Following his previous argument that the quality of life in Greece is higher than the official statistics indicate, at the start of this extract Mr Karras asserts that "it is interesting being a Greek and living abroad" due to the "certain conceit we have", by virtue of the fact that "we are Greeks". The evaluative work carried out by this formulation is rather vague. On the face of it, Mr Karras' admission "that it is interesting being a Greek and living abroad" orients to the relevance of an explanatory, positive evaluation for the Greeks that would be followed. What follows though is the rather evaluatively ambiguous explanatory assertion about "[our] conceit stemming from the fact that we are Greeks".

On modern Greek "conceit": Classical ancestry vs. joy of life

The evaluative ambiguity of this assertion does not reside in the semantics of the term "conceit", which make it for me as an analyst difficult to sustain a clear cut argument about its evaluative force. The ambiguity comes also from my interviewee's subsequent treatment of this assertion as an accountable matter. In lines 5-6, Mr Karras seeks to account for that assertion by disavowing the candidate reading of "our" ancient Greek ancestry as a source of pride and attributes "our" "conceit" to "our" belief that "we know how to live better". In so doing though, as his subsequent turn illustrates, he becomes implicated in a dilemma of national disinterestedness. He has found himself arguing that "it is interesting being a Greek and living abroad" because "we think that we know how to live better". Picking up on the potentially relevant national interestedness of such a thing for "us" to "think", (i.e. "of course everybody could think like that"), Mr Karras attends to his national disinterestedness. Acknowledging the subjective bias of such a Greek belief (and of his elevation of that belief to explanatory grounds for his assertion that "it is interesting being a Greek and living abroad") my interviewee inoculates the national interestedness of his perspective.

In his subsequent turn (lines, 10-11), the subjectivity and potential bias of "our" grounds for "think[ing] that we know how to live better" are also established: "since we are exceptionally noisy and active socially this comes to be confirmed, at least to our own view". Nevertheless, despite the fact that Mr Karras' qualification "at least to our own view" orients to "our" potential (national) bias in thinking that being "exceptionally noisy and active socially" constitutes proof that "we know how to live better", what emerges as uncontrovertially factual in his account is that "we are [indeed] exceptionally noisy and active socially". Evidently, the implicit rhetorical counter theme of such a (factual) discursive construction of "us" is a counter construction of Other Europeans as, say, exceptionally quiet and withdrawn socially. In Mr Karras' subsequent talk the contrast between the fun loving Greeks and the quiet Europeans is further elaborated upon.
Modern Greeks as the "best" Europeans

In lines 13-14, in stark contrast to the cautiousness of his previous assertion about the potential (national) bias underpinning "our view" that "we know how to live better", Mr Karras asserts that "of course [he] always believed that the Greek who has a proper education and a fairly decent income in Europe is indeed one of the best Europeans". Nevertheless, in my interviewee's subsequent turn (lines, 16-17) national disinterestedness emerges again as a relevant rhetorical concern, substantiated in a rather different manner. Whereas previously, Mr Karras' claim to the national disinterestedness of his (personal) perspective was substantiated by his acknowledgment of the potentially biased character of what "we" (as Greeks) think of ourselves, in this subsequent turn, what my interviewee personally thinks (or more accurately "believes") is not oriented to as potentially contaminated by (national) bias. Instead, his "belief" that "the Greek [...] is indeed one of the best Europeans" is backed up with a causal argument, which attests to the facticity of what he "believes": "because [the Greek] hasn't got other complexes as other people do". The national disinterestedness of his (personal) perspective is oriented to as a relevant concern by means of his symmetrical formulation that "of course we do have problems, we also have flaws". These "problems - flaws" though "are not that important" to overturn the facticity of his "belief". Or, indeed, it is the recognition of them that grants his talk the sense of facticity which disavows any hearable inferences about the national interestness underpinning his "belief".

The criteria for being a "good European"

Mr Karras' assertion about the Greeks being some "of the best of Europeans" triggered my follow up question about "the characteristics, qualities" that make up "a good European" (lines, 20, 22-23). It is in my intervieweew's response to that question that his comparative construction of "us" (Greeks) and "them" (Other Europeans) is more elaborately mobilised. Mr Karras' subsequent account starts with his delineation of universal criteria for what constitutes "a good European" (lines, 24-33). According to him, these universal values to be adhered are to be found in one's motivation for "personal improvement", which includes "education, internal / spiritual development, material wellbeing, financial success [and] good health". "The difference" though between "us" and "them" comes when our respective attitude towards these universal values is to be considered (lines, 35-42). For "us", the accomplishment of all these "aims" is just a necessary precondition in order "to enjoy life; to live life; to cherish life". For "them", all these are ends in themselves.
It is worth noting here the way in which this unfavourable comparison of "them" to "us" is oriented to as a factual state of affairs and not biased by national interest. His formulation of the Greeks' attitude towards these life goals is delivered in a three-part list, with the items of the list marked either with raised intonation (i.e. "ENJOY" and "LIVE") or by being emphatically stressed (i.e. "cherish"). As I want to argue, the rather overlapping semantics of the verbs of my interviewee's list construction, i.e. "enjoy, live and cherish" as well as their marked mode of delivery attend to an identity claim by my interviewee: it is the identity of somebody who has a knowledge from within about the state of affairs he is describing. Mr Karras speaks about the Greeks from the privileged rhetorical position of being a Greek himself. Besides, his concern with the establishment of the identity of a first-hand-experience-narrator can also be discerned in his symmetrical (unfavourable) construction of European Others. In lines 39-40, and only halfway in his description of the "view[s] of a German or of a Dutch", he gives the source or basis of how he knows about them: "[...] on the basis of my experiences all these years here; I am living here for fifteen years now". The facticity of my interviewee's respective constructions of "us" and "them" is attended to by his dual identity entitlements: as a Greek he is entitled to an inner knowledge of the workings of Greek psyche; as a years long resident in cosmopolitan Brussels, he is entitled to an authoritative knowledge about the "views" of European Others.

In the remaining of the extract (lines, 42-54), Mr Karras elaborates further upon "them" having all "these aims as ends in themselves". European Others' "social and financial" ascent does not "change their life". Despite the fact that "they" share with "us" an appreciation of some life quality "standards", like "a nice car and a nice house", "we have a different way of thinking". Whereas "they" "invest in shares" in vein quest for further enrichment, "we squander our money". "Our way of thinking", as he has argued before, entails a desire to "enjoy, live and cherish life" and "our financial and social ascent" is used to that end. "Their financial and social ascent" is "an end in itself", and does not materialise in a process of sampling and making the most out of one's life experiences. "We" are the lovers of life, "they" are its domesticated partners.

This extract started with my interviewee's evaluatively ambiguous assertion of "our conceit" as a distinguishing feature of "ours", that renders a Greek's experience of living in Europe to an "interesting" phenomenon. Notably, what has been subsequently disclaimed is that "our conceit" stems from "our" ancient Greek ancestry, a (cultural) lineage that the Other Europeans have a claim to as well (cf. Herzfeld, 1987). "Our conceit", as it has been factually argued throughout the extract, originates in "our" different (compared to the Europeans') weltanschaung. "We" are the ones who
are here to "enjoy, live and cherish" life, a perspective which either has never occurred to "them" or "they" could never subscribe to. In any case, the "Greek way of thinking" or the Greek national character emerges factually triumphant from the comparison with the respective European one.

In the two extracts I have considered in this last section of the analysis, (versions of) Greek personal qualities have been oriented to as factual and / or normative praiseworthy matters in a series of direct or indirect comparisons with constructions of European Others. What may be noted here though is that, in contrast to most of the extracts I have considered in previous sections, what has been praised are not occidental virtues looming large when seen against the factual oriental flaws of Greek institutional disorganisation and the workings of Greek politics. The counter measure has been a series of constructions of, ostensibly, occidental personal qualities which have been discredited in favour of oriental / Romeic type of Greek national characteristics. In both Mr Alexiou's as well as Mr Karras' talk the profile of modern Greek national identity that has emerged triumphant from the comparison with European Others' national character(s) is a celebratory profile of the Romios. The oriental self-interestness of this, ostensibly, historical image of Greek national identity has been silenced. What has been oriented as relevant for a favourable comparison with the Europeans is the other side of the Romeic profile. The one that encompasses the "humane" and "intimate" aspects of modern Greek identity, the one that oscillates between existential grief and vibrant exhilaration. In my interviewees' accounts, Kazantzakis' archetype of Romios, Zorba the Greek, emerges triumphant from his comparison with modern European Others.
4. Conversational and symbolic uses of cultural stereotypes of modern Greek character: Towards an analytic convergence?

In the analyses presented in the previous chapter, I showed how constructions of Greek national character were normatively oriented to by my participants as counter argumentative themes to constructions of English institutional organisation. Picking upon that, in the analysis presented in the present chapter, my aim has been to explore the dilemmatic tensions of Greek national character in their rhetorical articulation. As I have showed, Greek national character does not constitute an unconditionally praiseworthy theme in my participants' discourse.

Following Herzfeld's (1987) elaboration on the dilemmatic ideological construct of modern Greek "individualism", I structured my analysis along two axes. First, I drew attention to critical activity sequences towards Greek national character. Considering relevant extracts of talk, I highlighted the ways in which my interviewees (often with my interactional backing) oriented to critical constructions of Greek national character, blueprinting its "self-interested" dimensions. In these extracts, the Greek lack of civility, the Greek attitude to work and phenomena of Greek political culture were castigated by my interviewees for the self-interestness of the Greek social actors involved. Second, I drew attention to local activity sequences in which Greek national character was positively appraised by my interviewees. In the relevant extracts, virtuous versions of Greek personal qualities, largely bearing upon the theme of Greek "individualism", emerged within contrast structures. Greek public administration was criticised for its disorganisation but praised for its humanity; and against the background of disorganised Greek institutions "heroic" images of Greek civil servants emerged triumphant. Also, Greek political authorities and politicians were castigated but lay Greek people were praised for personal qualities ranging from moral integrity to their superior (to the Europeans') craftiness and ingenuity. And, when the contrast involved the juxtaposition of European characteristics to the Greek ones, the Greeks were praised for a range of favourable "mentalities" and for their joyful attitude towards life.

As it was the case with my previous chapter as well, while unfolding my analyses, my primary concern was to highlight the ways in which the rhetorical organisation of my participants' talk was designed to disavow any national interest in the evaluatively tinged descriptions provided. In their rhetorical instantiation, prejudice as both xenophobia and xenomania was shown to be relevant concern for my participants. By means of a range of rhetorical devices and procedures the subject matter of their descriptions was articulated as a normative and / or factual state of affairs. In the
light of my literature review of Greek national identity unfolded in Chapter 1 and of the methodological accounts I considered in chapter 4, it could be argued that the facticity of my interviewees' constructions of Greek national character has been partly a result of the historical familiarity of the themes mobilised and partly a result of the devices and procedures by means of which they were locally articulated. Given also the cultural specificity (see chapter 3) of the ideological concern with the establishment of a non-xenomaniac identity, it could be argued that the ideologically dilemmatic construct of modern Greek national identity has been reproduced within my interviewees' discourse by informing the specific type of disinterestedness that was sought to be rhetorically accomplished.

Diverging slightly from my previous analytic practices, in this Chapter I attempted to incorporate within the unfolding of my analysis some insights from critical ethnographic arguments on the symbolic reiteration of the modern Greek national identity dilemma within discursive practices. In that respect, considering the specific conversational uses of cultural stereotypes of Greek national character, I speculated on their potential symbolic implications. In so doing, the question that I have been posing to myself and that I was seeking to answer was: from what already ideologically constituted subject positions have my Greek interviewees' criticisms and praises of Greek Others and Greece been levelled? Their rhetorically highlighted ideological concern to disavow xenomania was placing them already in the occidental side of the ideological dichotomy of Greek national identity. In addition to that my analytic concern was to speculate on what may be the symbolic implications of evaluatively tinged (but rhetorically balanced) arguments for and against Greece and Greeks.

My guiding assumption has been that what may be seen as already constituted within an ambivalent discourse (like the one of modern Greek national identity) is not merely its semantic content that may vary in its evaluatively tinged interactional instantiation but also the type of argumentative practices that this semantic content may come interactionally to inform. This would have theoretical consequences for analytic arguments about the type of moral / symbolic identities that are claimed when these arguments are locally (and however much flexibly) unfolded.

It may be worth noting here that however flexibly the theme of English or European institutional organisation may have been conversationally deployed, throughout my corpus of data there was no instance in which my research participants seemed to praise Greek institutions for their (occidental) rational organisation. In the previous chapter, we saw that the Greek students in Lancaster may
indeed have a lot of "objections" about the "organisation of the English". In this chapter, we also saw that one of my participants expressed his concern for the "inhumane" character of the European administration and appraised positively the "humane" profile of the Greek public sector. Nevertheless, however "flexible" and "humane" Greek institutions may have been argued to be, they were never found to be as organised, or indeed, "inflexible" and "inhumane" as the European ones.

Moreover, when I focused my analysis on the rhetorical articulation of modern Greek national character a similar pattern seemed to emerge. Greek national character has been criticised and praised for a range of oriental / Romeic dimensions. Similarly, European Others have been praised and criticised for a range of occidental attributes of their respective national character(s). Nevertheless, there was no instance in my corpus of data in which, say, the English were criticised for their "loafing" at work or the Greeks for their "polite but distant" social attitude; or, similarly, the Belgians praised for the "speed" with which "their mind rotate" and the Greeks criticised for their inhospitality. Why not? Are these meant to be "real" differences that reflect some sort of cognitive consistence in the way that modern Greeks "perceive" themselves and their European Others? From the perspectives of the discourse analyses that I reviewed in Chapter 4, the answer would be "no" and I take it for granted that so it is. Nevertheless, the strand of discourse analysis within social psychology, whose postulates I have largely adopted throughout my analyses does not seem to have a convincing alternative answer.

Over-stressing the flexibility of discursive resources drawn upon within interactional exchanges leaves no room for a conceptualisation of some "stiff" ideological assumptions that persist when discursive resources are flexibly mobilised. Wetherell and Potter's (1992) argument, which I considered in chapter 4, concerning the ideological effects of local argumentative practices does not seem to me to offer a sufficient answer. For them "arguments become ideological at the moment of mobilisation". Therefore, as they maintain, "it does not seem particularly useful [...] to describe particular types of arguments as inherently ideological, that is, as inherently orientated towards the maintenance of unequal power relations" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 186). Are the argumentative practices of my research participants then ideological or not? How would it be possible to sustain an analytic argument that an argumentative construction of the type "the English" (but not "the Greeks") "are polite but distant" is becoming ideological at the moment of its mobilisation? It seems to me that an analytic emphasis on the ideological assumptions and not effects is much more fruitful for discourse analyses aiming to highlight the mundane rhetorical reproduction of
ideological dilemmas. Of course, noting the dangers of over-stressing discursive flexibility and variability, Wetherell and Potter (1992: 173) have argued that

"Due to historical precedent, some practices of argumentation and some interpretative resources do seem inexorably directed to some agendas, and that in that sense become almost (but not quite) inherently ideological".

To what and whose "agendas" could the argumentative practices of my research participants be seen analytically as directed? Should we assume that some malevolent social actors ("the West", maybe) have "blinded" the consciousness of my lay Greek research participants and their argumentative practices unwittingly work for "hidden agendas"? If not anything else, then in that case, why they should be seen as "almost but not quite" inherently ideological?

I suggest that discourse analytic thinking in that direction distracts attention from, on the one hand, the assumptions which may be reproduced when speakers flexibly draw upon historically and ideologically constituted discourses and, on the other, from the symbolic identity practices that ideological discourses inform in their rhetorical deployment. Taking aboard Herzfeld's (1987; see also contributors in Carrier, 1995) argument about the reiteration of the hegemonic assumptions of Orientalism through discursive (or otherwise) acts of practical orientalism / occidentalism, I should like to suggest that a discourse analytic provision for the symbolic identity implications of conversational deployments of cultural stereotypes may prove fruitful for future research in the field. Moreover, such an analytic orientation may provide a further empirical grounding for critical ethnographic arguments. An analytic consideration of conversational pragmatics may come to complement ethnographic analyses of identity work that stereotypes accomplish at the level of symbolic cultural pragmatics.
REFLECTIONS ON GREEK NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TALK

Throughout the work reported in this thesis, my aim has been to set the grounds and to support a discourse analytic argument about the reiteration of the ideological assumptions of modern Greek national identity within talk in interaction. In this concluding part of my thesis, I shall reconsider the flow of my argument, I shall reflect on some of the main assumptions and findings of my work and I shall suggest potential areas for expansion and future research.

Recounting my discourse analytic story
In the narrative line that I adopted, the impetus for my study was attributed to a consideration of social theoretical treatments of modern Greek national identity. As we saw in Chapter 1, the historical conditions of emergence of the modern Greek nation are often seen to account for the fundamental cultural dichotomy of the ideological construct of Greek national identity. Most importantly, as we saw, the tension between (what have been historically constructed as) the oriental / Romeic and occidental / Hellenic aspects of modern Greek national identity has been argued to be an indication of hegemonic politics of cultural distinction. The oriental Othering of modern Greece in the nineteenth century European gaze predicated equivalent moves within the context of modern Greece.

For the occidental-minded nineteenth century Greek elites, the state of affairs of modern Greek culture was deemed to be oriental Other. Those Greek social actors who were orientalised / Othered and, most importantly, those Greek social actors that spoke on behalf of those that had been Othered, adopted a counter (cultural politics) strategy. In their discourse, the occidental- minded nineteenth century elites were rendered oriental by default: they were mimicking the West, which in its turn was mimicking ancient Hellas. The resulting (unmediated by the West) direct genealogical claim to the symbolic capital of ancient Hellas has fed recurrent anti-Western intellectual and political movements throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. Most interestingly, it popularised and gave a name to the orientalist charge of mimicry (cf. Bhabha, 1984): xenomania.

Herzfeld (1995), advocating the concept of practical occidentalism in favour of mimicry has argued that the choice over which one should be used in social theoretical analyses is ultimately a political
one. The notion of mimicry reiterates an ideological stance of Western tutelage over modern Greece and modern Greek social actors. The notion of practical occidentalism highlights the active claim by Greek social actors that they share a cultural capital which was simultaneously granted and refused to them: the ideal of ancient Hellenic / occidental cultural perfection. According to his analyses, Greek social actors (from nineteenth century nation builders to contemporary Cretan sheep-thieves) routinely engage in symbolic acts of practical occidentalism. These sustain rhetorical claims to a morally accountable social identity: Greek-Others are symbolically orientalised and this very act of symbolic orientalisation confers occidental credentials to the social actors engaged in it.

Notwithstanding the fact that the analytical impetus of my story was gained from a consideration of critical ethnographic accounts, my own disciplinary affiliation to social psychology / discourse analysis accounts for my turn to what was for me a more familiar theoretical and methodological terrain. The ethnographic argument about symbolic cultural practices and uses of cultural stereotypes was stored for later use in my kit of analytic concepts and tools, and I suggested that work within critical social psychology and discourse analysis may provide further empirical grounding to Herzfeld's analyses. Opting to explicate how this may happen, I turned to the conceptual and analytic perspective of the ideological dilemmas.

Billig's (1995) thesis of Banal Nationalism was my entry point into this perspective. This work presents an elaborate account of the naturalisation (or the inhabitation) of national identity within mundane life practices (including discursive ones). This seemed to take me some way in my pursuit of an approach that would enable me to tackle my research question. Most of the necessary ingredients were there: an emphasis on ideological assumptions, an elaborate account on the dilemmatic quality of national ideology and an emphasis on the active uses of cultural stereotypes in pursuit of moral accountability (in its interactional / rhetorical negotiation). By considering Billig et al.'s (1988) account of the ideological dilemma of prejudice, a further (more concrete) step was taken in the direction of configuring my theoretical frame of reference. The twin themes of national ideology (its international and national profiles) were shown to inform the arguing and thinking of modern citizens. Running the danger of simplifying matters, a gist (re-)formulation of this account could be something like this: rhetorical flaggings of a commitment to the universalist / internationalist themes of national ideology warrant a rational moral profile and open the way for the expression of national(-ist), xenophobic views.
Nevertheless, I needed more than that. First, I suggested that some theoretical and analytic provision should be made about the terms used when national "us" and "them" are talked about in discursive contexts in which the moral identity of the prejudiced / xenophobic may be rhetorically at stake. Since my research question focused on the ideological assumptions that sustain and perpetuate the cultural ambivalence of modern Greek national identity in particular, such a theoretical and analytic provision was necessary. After all, critical social psychologists (e.g. Condor, 1996; 1997a,b,d) have highlighted the subtle management of moral identities in talk in which culturally specific national (auto-) stereotypes are mobilised. Second, my acquaintance with critical social theoretical work on the ideological constitution of the modern Greek nation alerted me to the fact that international sentiments may be morally problematic in the context of modern Greek culture. At least as long as the "international" translates into European or Western. At this point, the relevance of my previous consideration of Herzfeld's work for my own research project started to become apparent.

In Chapter 3, I took into consideration a number of social theoretical accounts that highlighted the relevance of the moral charge of xenomania within the context of modern Greek culture. Greek intellectuals from different schools of thought and with different "national visions" were shown to level the charge of (oriental) mimicry to each other and both to the modern Greeks. Accounts from urban Greek ethnography were also presented, showing the relevance and the deployment of this ideological charge within the discursive practices of Athenian sociocultural elites. Moreover, ethnographic accounts were drawn upon to highlight the changes in urban lifestyles and the oscillations in symbolic value of occidental(-ised) and oriental(-ised) cultural prototypes and leisure services in popular culture.

Briefly put, both the theoretical as well as the empirical (ethnographic) evidence were presented for the substantiation of an argument about an uncharted within the ideological dilemmas approach ideological dilemma. What remained to be shown was whether this ideological dilemma could be shown analytically to inform concrete rhetorical / interactional exchanges. What should be noted here is that despite my recourse to ethnographic studies for the theoretical substantiation of this ideological dilemma, the ethnographic arguments about the symbolic dimensions of the ideological charge of xenomania could be easily bracketed. As long as an interactional / rhetorical orientation to the relevance of this ideological concern could be (discourse) analytically highlighted, a persuasive case could be made about the reiteration of the modern Greek national identity dilemma in talk.
Having made a case for the relevance of the (ideological) content of cultural stereotypes of modern Greek national identity and of the (ideological) identity concerns that these stereotypes may come to instantiate in their rhetorical deployment, in Chapter 4, I embarked on a consideration of the various strands of discourse analysis within social psychology. My aim was to construct an analytic framework which would help me to deal in a methodologically principled manner with my two analytic interests: my interest in the content of cultural stereotypes mobilised in talk and my interest in the local identity concerns that these may inform in their rhetorical deployment. In addition to these analytic interests, I also opted for an analytic framework that would help me to accommodate an interest in the symbolic implications of certain argumentative practices. Bearing in mind all these analytic concerns, my recourse to the discursive turn was meant to be heavily eclectic.

From Parker's (1992) approach, I decided to keep his genealogical understanding of discourses and his concept of subject positioning. The latter seemed to me to tap into the ethnographic concept of symbolic identity, insofar as both refer to identity locations already constituted within discourses. From Potter and Wetherell's (1987) and Wetherell and Potter's (1992) approach, I decided to keep their conceptualisation of the content components of talk in interaction as "abstractions from practices in context". Edwards and Potter's (1992) and Potter's (1996a) elaborations on the the dilemma of stake or interest that arises when speakers embark on evaluatively tinged descriptions was also deemed to fit with my analytic concerns. Armed with these conceptual and analytic tools, I embarked on the analysis of my first study.

My participants' normative orientation to the relevance of organisation / disorganisation as a differentiating characteristic between Greece / Greeks and England / English was deemed to be theoretically important. This was a theme that tapped into the cultural content of the ideological construct of the dilemmatic Greek national identity. In the manner of Wetherell and Potter (1992), I "abstracted" sub-themes of this stereotype "from practices in context". Its flexible deployment was highlighted: different versions of this stereotype were oriented to as relevant in the course of my participants' evaluatively tinged mobilisations of it. Most importantly, xenomania was shown to be a relevant negative identity inference that my participants sought to disavow from themselves personally. Interestingly, in so doing, the charge of xenomania was redirected to Greek Others. Towards the end of the Chapter, I also drew some attention to the potential symbolic implications of my participants' argumentative practices. As I suggested, on the basis of my participants' evaluatively tinged arguments and on the basis of their displayed rhetorical efforts to ward off
inferences of personal xenomania by redirecting it to Greek Others, it could be argued that they were engaged in symbolic acts of practical occidentalism.

In my analysis for the second study, taking a more adventurous methodological turn, I decided to incorporate analytic speculations about the potential symbolic implications of my participants' argumentative practices within the unfolding of my discourse analyses. In that analysis, my overall emphasis was placed on my participants' elaborations on (versions of) Greek national character. Following Herzfeld's (1987) analyses of the shifting cultural semantics of the ideological construct of Greek individualism, I decided to structure my analysis in two parts. In the first one, extracts of talk were presented in which my participants criticised Greek individualism-as-self-interestness. In the second part, a number of extracts were presented, in which virtuous constructions of Greek national character emerged as interactionally relevant. I suggested that within them the Romeic individualism-as-insubordination was celebrated. Of course, as it was the case with my previous study as well, my main analytical emphasis was placed again on the elucidation of the rhetorical subtleties by means of which prejudice as xenophobia and xenomania was disavowed.

On the basis of my overall analyses, towards the end of the chapter, I suggested that a social psychological / discourse analytic study on rhetorical / interactional uses of stereotypes may be fruitfully combined with insights from ethnographic analyses on their rhetorical / symbolic uses. Such a convergence, may both expand the horizon of the discursive turn in social psychology in a methodologically principled manner as well as provide further empirical grounding to ethnographic analyses.

Cultural stereotypes and their (argued) genealogical provenance: A reflexive move
Unfolding my argument on the ways in which the dilemma of Greek national identity is reproduced within interactional / rhetorical practices, my first analytic warrant was the genealogical provenance of the cultural stereotypes on Greece / Greeks and Europe / Europeans that my participants were analytically shown to orient to as relevant matters in their accounts. In Chapter 1, I explicated the profiles of the dual cultural images of the ambivalent ideological construct of modern Greek national identity. As it has been argued, Hellenism and Romiossini are the local transmutations of the wider ideological profiles of the occident and the orient. Unfolding my analyses, I did not hesitate to argue that the stereotypical themes oriented to as normative and factual representations of Greece / Greeks and Europe / European Others in my participants' talk...
trace their origin in the ideological constructs of Hellenism and Romiossini and, consequently, in representations of the occident and of the orient.

I understand that such an analytic move may be a controversial one. Obviously, it rests upon an interpretative reading of mine (cf. Parker, 1992) and is, ostensibly, an indication of my scholar inclination (cf. Billig, 1988a) to place my participants' talk in a historical perspective. As such, it constitutes an argument of mine, which for rhetorical reasons I preferred not to problematise. Evidently, any sustained effort to establish the genealogical lineage of the specific terms in which Greece and Europe were talked about by my participants would involve extensive archive and literary research that goes beyond both my disciplinary training as well as the limitations and aims of my current research project.

Nevertheless, opting to preempt any potential counter-argument, I should stress (again) that my interpretative / genealogical reading of the cultural stereotypes mobilised within my participants' talk was only one part of my analytic warrants for the overall argument I have been seeking to substantiate. The other part was my analytic emphasis on the interactional practices that cultural stereotypes in their transmutations came to inform. As I have shown, one of these rhetorical practices was the concern to establish a rhetorical profile of motivational disinterestedness which, as the social theoretical accounts that I consider suggest, traces its origin in the ideological processes of the constitution of the modern Greek nation. Moreover, my final (albeit provisional) suggestions about the symbolic implications of my research participants' argumentative practices may provide for an additional warrant for my argument about the reiteration of the ideological assumptions of modern Greek national identity within talk. To the best of my knowledge, these analytic warrants in their combination are as much as one should expect from a discourse analytic project.

**Xenomania: A nationally or culturally located ideological charge?**

In the light of my literature review unfolded in Chapters 1 and 2, in Chapter 3, I suggested that the thesis of Banal Nationalism, if it was to provide for a study of the banal reproduction of modern Greek national identity, needed to be expanded. I argued that attention needs to be paid to the international (or cosmopolitan) theme of national ideology and its dilemmatic quality. As I have shown, in the context of modern Greek culture international sentiments, as long as they refer to pro-Western ones, are ideologically problematic. They invoke the charge of mimicry and xenomania. As I have argued, analytic attestments to the rhetorical relevance of this charge should be seen as
indications of an underlying ideological assumption about the natural division of the world into nations of the West and of the Rest. As I suggested, the fact that the ideological tension between the occident and the orient is a constituent feature of the construct of modern Greek national identity should not lead us to assume that the ideological charge of xenomania is specifically relevant only for the context of modern Greek culture. Other (national) cultures have also been amenable to a simultaneous inclusion in and exclusion from the community of "the civilised West". Nation States that emerged out of the political processes of decolonisation come easily to mind.

Homi Bhabha (1984; see also 1990a,b) has argued that the discourse of mimicry, which in the case of modern Greek culture gave rise to and sustains the moral charge of xenomania, is a typical feature of the ambivalent colonial discourse in the "narration of the nation". On the basis of his argument, it is reasonable to assume that a moral concern similar to the modern Greeks' one with xenomania may be relevant for citizens of ex-colonial countries as well. Particularly at this historical moment when, as Brennan (1997) argues, a growing anti-Western, anti-cosmopolitan trend is increasing both within and outside the confines of the core of the West. As Brennan points out, whereas in the 1960s the target of anti-Western movements was the colonial political order, in the late 1990s the emergent targets are the cultural legacies of colonisation. Future research in the field then may come to substantiate the relevance of an ideological concern equivalent to xenomania in the context of other national cultures. Nevertheless, the question that may emerge here is whether discourse analysts would (or, maybe, should) take an interest in research in that direction, say, in countries which have a history of colonial subjugation. Let me explicate that.

Anti-Westernism, anti-colonialism and the moral highground of discourse analysis

As we saw in Chapters 1 and 3, in the context of modern Greek culture the charge of mimicry and xenomania has historically involved a hegemonic gate keeping of the symbolic capital of ancient Hellas. Nineteenth century European commentators have levelled this charge at the Greek elites castigating them for their inconsummate Westernisation. The Greek elites redirected the charge to the Greek "masses". And, counter-hegemonic nationalist critics redirected the charge back to the Greek elites castigating their Westernisation and laying an "authentic" Greek (and, therefore, anti-Western) claim to the symbolic capital of ancient Hellas. As I have noted before, in the context of modern Greece the battles for national hegemony have been fought over the question of "Westernisation". In that sense, using Billig's (1995) terminology, I have argued, that the ideological concern over xenomania should be seen as indicative of the modern Greek nationalist consciousness. Therefore, in the spirit of the thesis of Banal Nationalism, I have argued that it
reiterates the assumption of the natural and hierarchical division of the world into nations of the West and of the Rest.

Nevertheless, in the historical and political context of the ex-colonies things are rather different. Anti-Westernism has not necessarily been associated with battles over national hegemony. Typically, it has been associated with national struggles against foreign colonial rule. A consequence of that association is that for the typically "progressive" or "radical" social theorists and discourse analysts it would be difficult to question the ideological assumptions that are reiterated in "anti-Western" discourses and practices. Brennan (1997) for example, celebrates contemporary anti-Western political and cultural movements for their opposition to American cultural imperialism. Of course, in so doing, he does not question the national(-ist) assumptions that often underpin their discourse. Closer to my interests, a similar trend is manifested in Wetherell and Potter's (1992) account of racist discourse in New Zealand.

Drawing upon Bhabha's (1984) analysis, Wetherell and Potter (1992: 142-143) have testified to the workings of the mimicry charge in the context of New Zealand. As they have argued, charges of mimicry levelled in the first place from metropolitan Britain towards the "provincial" Pakeha New Zealanders are redirected by the latter to the Maoris in the form of a "bemoaning [of] the incompleteness of their imitation of British institutions and mores" (p. 142). This situation is reminiscent of the history of cultural politics in the context of modern Greece. Nevertheless, in this case, the ultimate recipients of the charge of mimicry (the Maoris) (or rather their political representatives that may speak on behalf of them) evidently are not able to redirect the charge of mimicry to the Pakeha, laying a direct claim for themselves to the civilisational capital of metropolitan Britain. Instead, as Wetherell and Potter note, they take up the alternative option to mimicry resisting and refusing altogether to participate in the Pakeha political institutions, and in so doing, resurrect and propagate the concept of an independent Maori nation.

In such a historical and political context, it is morally difficult for social theorists to start questioning the nationalist political aspirations of the Maoris. Such an anti-Western political project is synonymous to anti-colonialism or, maybe, anti-racism and as such maybe it should not be challenged for its nationalist underpinnings. In the case of modern Greece though, things are rather different. Despite the fact that anti-Westernism obviously informs the anti-imperialist rhetoric of (segments of) the Left, it also informs the rhetoric of irredentist nationalist agencies that are still captivated by fictions of an imperial Greek revival. A recent example is a good case in point. In a
speech that he delivered on the 15th of August of 1998, the newly elected Archbishop of the Church of Greece declared that Greece has nothing to be afraid neither of "the civilised West" nor of the "barbarous East". In his speech, he also conjured up the lost "Great Idea" and the "authentic Greeks of the past" and envisaged the day that one of his predecessors would set to lead a mass in one of the Greek Orthodox Churches still in the "unredeemed" territories of Turkey (Margomenou, 1998).

Despite the fact that this is an extreme instance of political rhetoric, it is still indicative of the ways in which the ideological assumptions of the discourse of orientalism and of modern Greece's ambivalent position between "the civilised West" and "the barbarous East" inform "hot" nationalist discourses in Greece. In the Archbishop's words, the "danger" of Greece mimicking the West is a visible one and, therefore, he exhorts "us" not to be "afraid" of "them"; instead, "our" task is to spread the "lights" of Graeco-Christian civilisation to the "barbarous East". Evidently, the banal (Greek) nationalist assumptions that I have sought to highlight in the mundane discourse of my research participants are also evident in "hot" Greek nationalist discourses. Whether or not my research may open the grounds for a morally / politically principled research agenda on the nationalist underpinnings of anti-Western discourses more generally is a question that of course cannot be answered here. Nevertheless, the grounds for discourse analytic research on Greek "hot" nationalist discourse may have been opened without the moral / political highgrounds of discourse analysts to be at stake.

On the generalisability of my discourse analytic claims

It is customary for research reports to finish with a reflexive consideration of the generalisability of their research findings. Following the tradition, I would also like to contemplate on this question. Unfolding my analysis, my main concern has been to highlight the interactional / rhetorical uses of the cultural stereotypes of modern Greek national identity within my participants' talk. As I have shown, these stereotypes have been flexibly deployed to sustain different interactional / rhetorical courses of action. With regard to the rhetorical organisation of my participants' argumentative practices, I have argued that this illustrates my participants' ideological concern to establish a national disinterested moral profile. Prejudice as both xenophobia and as xenomania was disavowed. On the face of previous research findings, my participants' rhetorical efforts to ward off inferences about their potential prejudice-as-xenophobia should not come as a surprise. As has been shown, at least within Western societies, this is a discursive norm. As far as my participants' rhetorical effort to ward off inferences about personal xenomania is concerned, there is no previous
discourse analytic precedent to back up and compare my findings with. In my literature review
though, I have tried to substantiate the historical / ideological relevance of this moral charge in the
context of modern Greek culture. Future research may come to further substantiate my argument.

Nevertheless, there is an aspect of my overall research practices that needs to be critically
considered here. The question that may arise is the extent to which my analytic attestment to my
participants' efforts to ward off potential inferences about xenomania has more to do with the
particularities of my research than with the ideological themes of modern Greek national identity in
general. First, critical attention needs to be paid to my participants' social and cultural background.
Despite the fact that details of their social and economic background are not available to me, their
(broadly speaking) middle class and urban upbringing is rather clear. It could be argued then, that
their rhetorical concern to ward off xenomania may relate to their social positioning. After all, it is
the middle class, urban Greek social strata that have been historically the recipients of charges of
mimicry and xenomania by the Greek sociocultural elites. While Faubion's (1993) ethnographic
study of Athenian sociocultural elites has attested to the relevance of the moral charge of
xenomania for them, research may need to be conducted with participants from lower Greek
socioeconomic strata. For Herzfeld (1987; 1995), social actors throughout the Greek social
spectrum make use of the occidental and oriental stereotypes in their pursuit of moral (symbolic)
accountability. As far as the interactional / conversational management of social accountability is
concerned, Herzfeld's argument remains to be tested.

There is another aspect of the particularities of my project though that needs to be critically
considered. I have repeatedly stressed that by opting to study Greeks who voluntarily decided to
reside, study and work in Europe, the very parameters of my research frame may be seen as
consequential for the type of moral identities that my participants would claim and disclaim. In the
symbolic pragmatics of modern Greek culture they are by default accountable for their stance of
"cosmopolitan openness" towards the West. When a Greek social psychologist started questioning
them about their "living experiences", then the charge of xenomania started to become
interactionally / rhetorically relevant. It goes without saying, that in other argumentative contexts in
which European Others may be talked about by Greek speakers, the moral taint of xenomania may
not be interactionally oriented to as a relevant to be disavowed moral charge. Nevertheless, the fact
that, as my analyses highlight, this moral charge was interactionally oriented to as a \textit{normative}
identity concern is an indication of its cultural relevance and intelligibility.
Future research may come to highlight the local rhetorical procedures by means of which the charge of xenomania may be oriented to as interactionally relevant in argumentative contexts in which speakers are not by (symbolic) default morally accountable for it. From the perspective of a politically aware social psychologist, I am loath to attest to the reiteration of ideological assumptions about the natural hierarchical division of the world into nations of the West and of the Rest in my research participants' (as well as my own) discourse. From the perspective of a discourse analyst, I am looking forward to witnessing further surprises about the ways in which the "stiff" ideological ambivalence of modern Greek national identity may be creatively drawn upon by future participants in my researches.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

The Helleno-Romeic Dilemma: Fermor's (1966: 106-113) parallel list of characteristics, allegiances and symbols.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE ROMIOS</th>
<th>THE HELLENE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Practice</td>
<td>Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The Concrete</td>
<td>The Abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The real</td>
<td>The ideal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Private ambition</td>
<td>Wider aspiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Argument</td>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Concentration</td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Instinct</td>
<td>Principle and logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Improvisation</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Empiricism</td>
<td>Dogma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Love for the recent past</td>
<td>Love for the remote past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10a Admiration for Western material progress, distrust of Western theories</td>
<td>Admiration for European civilization, rooted in ancient Greek liberal ideas. Some distrust of Western materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Retention of Romaic customs</td>
<td>Adoption of western customs, abhorrence of Romaic orientalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Distrust of the law. Readiness to bypass it by manoeuvre, favouritism or by any of the bad old short-cuts</td>
<td>Respect for the law. Hesitation, on principle, to bypass it by the means opposite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Self-reproach about Greece's material limitations</td>
<td>Self-reproach about Greece's Romaic blemishes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a Respect for learning as a means to advancement</td>
<td>Respect for learning for its own sake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b Belief in quick returns</td>
<td>Reliance on the long view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Reliance on inherited precedent and proverb</td>
<td>Search for analogy in the ancient world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Seeing the outside world as a field to be exploited</td>
<td>Travel in search of knowledge or legitimate commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Evaluation of things in terms of money</td>
<td>Admission of other values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Reluctance to admit ignorance</td>
<td>Admission that there are things beyond his range of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Compulsive labelling of everything, whether accurate or not</td>
<td>Compulsion to define, explain and classify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Looking on Greece as outside Europe</td>
<td>Looking at Greece as part of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Seeing Europe as the region of alien &quot;Franks&quot;</td>
<td>Europe the region of fellow-Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20a Reaching agreement by bargaining</td>
<td>Settlement by negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Belief in the sacredness and indestructibility of Romiosyne</td>
<td>Belief in the destiny of Hellas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Strong regional loyalty, distrust of people from different provinces, e.g. Crete v. Mani</td>
<td>Centripetal tendency towards Athens. Contempt for provincial rivalries and limitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Certainty of every Romios of his own suitability for the office of Prime Minister</td>
<td>Decent self-confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Shrewdness, impaired by (a) credulity and (b) needless suspicion</td>
<td>Circumspect acumen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Tendency to resolve political difficulties by revolution</td>
<td>Belief in constitutional method, with revolution only as a last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Lack of scruple to gain personal ends</td>
<td>The soul of honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Fatalism</td>
<td>Philosophic doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Quick wits</td>
<td>Lively intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Marriage wholly determined by dowries and parental bargaining</td>
<td>Milder version of the same, modified by romantic and aesthetic factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Blind tribal allegiance to a political party, based on regional bias or personal allegiance to a figurehead</td>
<td>Strong political partisanship with a greater chance of its being based on private deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 A passion for newspapers, especially the political</td>
<td>A passion for newspapers, especially the political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
32 Unquestioned belief in the printed, as opposed to the written or spoken, word. This is corrected reconciliation of opposites intermittently, by the remark: "Nothing but lies in the newspapers". The attitudes are often reconciled by the paradoxical ability to believe two contradictory statements simultaneously.

33 Abhorrence of a naked fact, and haste to cloth, amplify and elaborate: 'The mythopoetic faculty'.

34 Daemonic capacity for exertion under stimulus of enthusiasm, interest, patriotism, friendship ambition.

35 Tendency to flag if stimulus and urgency are removed. Dread of boredom.

36 Procrastination due to 34, and lack of sense of time. Dislike of routine.

37 Trust in improvisation (8) and the tendency to allow things to fall into decay through feeling of impermanency of human affairs.

38 Sensitiveness to insult, which leads to rash, violent and self-destructive acts, or enduring and implacable feud.

39 Despair and melancholia (stenachoria) if things go wrong. May be mitigated in time by fatalism, proverbs and saving resilience.

40 Fondness for leventeia, i.e. the dash and fire of youth, a cheerful temperament, courage, speed, quick reactions, good looks, skill in singing, dancing, marksmanship, capacity for wine drinking and fun, often accompanied by meraklidiliki, its sartorial expression.

41 Importance of philotimo, 'honour-love', i.e. honourable conduct between humans, in chaos of Romiosyne, and, above all, private amour propre, like the Spanish pundonor, or personal dignity. It is wounds to this -'he touched my philotimo'- which must often lead to 37.

42 Bessa: a word of Albanian origin, meaning the inviolability of an oath, especially in guerrilla warfare. The opposite of treachery.

43. Settling the world's problems over endless cups of Turkish coffee in cafes.

44 Fondness for cards, backgammon etc.

45 Sobriety and frugality relieved by dionysiac interludes.

46 Addiction to aman, songs, i.e. wailing, nasal rather melancholy melopees in oriental minor mode.

47 Urban addiction to rebetica songs and dances: i.e. Athenian low-life, fatalistic, near-apaché hard luck stories, accompanied by specially stringed instruments. Supposed to have originated in hashish dens. Complex, solitary dances, perhaps from Asia Minor. The choreographic expression of the songs.

48 Rustic devotion to mountain, island and country dances (usually a chain of dancers led by a solo performance).

A stricter approach, and a reduced capacity for the reconciliation of opposites.

Comparative absence of this bias.

The same, tempered by 7,8,9.

The same, corrected or mitigated by 7,8,9.

Climatic influences, corrected or mitigated by 7,8,9.

Belief in maintenance and upkeep, due to greater hope for establishment and security.

Some sensitiveness, but reaction less violent and calling for milder sanctions.

Same tendencies considerably reduced, corrected by comforts of philosophy.

An acknowledgement of the characteristic with a distinctly more restrained and sober approach.

Honour regarded as a precious legacy from the ancient Greeks.

Probably the same as above.

Settling the world's problems over endless cups of Turkish coffee in cafes.

The same.

Interludes likely to be less dionysiac.

Violent abhorrence of aman, as alien and barbaric survivals.

Distaste, based roughly on the same reasons as the foregoing. Tendency towards Western music.

Toleration of these as 'wholesome' and as part of heroic tradition and folklore and for their possible descent from the ancient Pyrrhic dance.
49 Rustic devotion to klephtica or klepht songs: long, fierce and semi-oriental in style, celebrating mountain warriors' feats of arms

50 Outward disapproval, but secret sympathy, in the distant past, for brigandage and piracy; survivals of a lively and anarchic life

51 Fondness, among the old, for smoking narghil's

52 Addiction to komboloi: amber beads strung together like a rosary, and clicked rhythmically as a nerve-settler, like chain-smoking

53 Fondness of a small, raffish minority (urban low life rebetika world, see 47) for occasional hashish smoking, as accompaniment to singing and dancing

54 Belief in miraculous properties of certain icons

55 Resort, among isolated rustic communities, to magical remedies administered by old women. Retention of many pagan superstitions, practices and beliefs

56 Indifference to ethical and mystical content of religion, but semi-pagan attachment to the Orthodox Church as the unifying guardian of Romiosyne in times of trouble

57 Strict observance of religious fasts and feast days and instinctive, tribal retentions of many of the external signs of Orthodoxy

58 Patriotism based on 21 (R), and inspired, in wartime, by the memory of the Klephts

59 War seen in terms of guerrilla

60 Rule of thumb

61 In general, impulsive readiness for anything that is not vetoed by some hallowed taboo

62 Homesickness for Byzantine Empire

63 Demotic

64 The Dome of St Sophia

Toleration of the same in theory if not in practice, as humble mementoes of Hellenism's triumph over barbarian occupation: 'Wholesome': unlike aman, and rebetica

Understandable condemnation of these as stumbling blocks to government and the functioning of a European state: 'Romaikes doulies' at their worst

Disapproval, for obvious reasons

Faint disapproval, even if addicted

Proper abhorrence of this oriental survival

Enlightened disbelief

Scorn of obscurantism, even though magical practices and superstitions are of ancient descent. Trust in medical science

Comparative indifference to ethical and mystical content of religion, but tolerance of Orthodox Church as symbol of Hellenism

A tendency to disregard these, except at holidays of Christmas and Easter

Patriotism based on 21 (H), and inspired, in wartime, by the heroes of the ancient world

Military science

Text book

More restraint and a more cerebral approach to the problems of life

Nostalgia for the age of Pericles

Katharevousa

The columns of the Parthenon
APPENDIX B

TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION

The transcription notation system used is a simplified version of the one presented in Atkinson and Heritage (1984).

= Equal signs at the end of a speaker's utterance and at the beginning of the next one are used to designate that there is no discernible time gap between them

((text)) Double brackets indicate that what comes within them is my explanatory or additional information

CAPITALS Words in capitals are uttered louder than the surrounding talk

[ Square brackets indicate the beginning of overlapping speech

text Underlying signals emphasis

μtextμ Degree signs indicate quieter speech

"text" Inverted commas indicate reported speech / active voicing

textr Colons indicate an extension of the preceding vowel; the more the colons, the longer the extension

(.) One full stop in brackets indicates a short but discernible pause

(...) Each additional full stop indicates a pause of approximately half a second

>text< "More than" and "less than" signs enclose speech discernibly speeded-up

? The question mark is used in its grammatical sense

- A hyphen indicates a cut off of the preceding sound

text* An asterisk on a word indicates that this is the original term used by the speaker and not my translation

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APPENDIX C

PARTICIPANTS - STUDY ONE

The names used are pseudonyms. "M" and "F" indicate male and female respectively and the following number the participant's age. The city names indicate the place where the participants have spent the biggest period of their lives in Greece.

DG1
Michalis, M, 25, Masters in Business Administration, Athens
Dimitra, F, 24, Masters in Business Administration, Athens
Antonis, M, 27, Masters in Business Administration, Thessaloniki
Ermi, F, 24, Masters in Business Administration, Athens

DG2
Vana, F, 25, PhD in English Literature (1st year), Athens
Aliki, F, 23, Diploma in Psychology, Athens
Katerina, F, 21, Law (1st year), Thessaloniki
Zeta, F, 24, MSc in Psychological Research Methods, Larissa

DG3
Antigoni, F, 27, MSc in Finance, Athens
Grigoris, M, 24, MSc in Finance, Athens
Irini, F, 24, MSc in Finance, Athens
Sophia, F, 24, MSc in Finance, Athens

DG4
Michalis, M, 22, Mechanical Engineering (3rd year), Athens
Nina, F, 23, Management Science (3rd year), Athens
Yianna, F, 21, Behaviour in Organisations (1st year), Piraeus
Takis, M, 21, Management Science, (3rd year), Patras

DG5
Maria, F, 23, MA in Language Studies, Athens
Sakis, M, 23, MA in Language Studies, Patras
Tania, F, 24, MA in English Language Teaching, Athens

DG6
Nikitas, M, 23, MA in International Relations, Athens
Themis, M, 20, Operational Management (2nd year), Athens
Andreas, M, 20, Operational Management (2nd year), Athens
Stelios, M, 23, MA in International Relations, Athens
Kleanthis, M, 23, Management Science, Athens

DG7
Dinos, M, 28, PhD in Management Science (1st year), Thessaloniki
Anna, F, 23, MA in Behaviour in Organisations, Athens
Nassos, M, 26, MSc in Trade and Finance, Serres
DG8
Tania, F, 19, Combined Science (1st year), Athens
Yiorgos, M, 20, Mechanical Engineering (1st year), Athens
Spyros, M, 19, Mechanical Engineering (1st year), Athens

DG9
Christos, M, 24, Physical Electronic Engineering (3rd year), Athens
Nontas, M, 22, MSc in Electronic Engineering, Athens
Tassos, M, 23, Computing Science (3rd year), Athens

DG10
Yiorgos, M, 23, Law (1st year), Grevena
Vlassis, M, 20, Law (1st year), Xanthi
Panos, M, 22, Operational Research (2nd year), Kozani
Viki, F, 21, Classical Greek Literature (2nd year, University of Liverpool), Xanthi

DG11
Kostas, M, 21, Management Science (3rd year), Athens
Ilias, M, 19, Operational Research (1st year), Athens
Dimitris, M, 21, Computing Science (3rd year), Athens

DG12
Chronis, M, 24, Politics (3rd year), Thessaloniki
Elpida, F, 24, Marketing (2nd year), Athens
Fotis, M, 21, Computing Science (2nd year), Thessaloniki
Stella, F, 21, Economics and Operational Research (2nd year), Athens
"DAYS AND WORKS" OF GREEK STUDENTS IN LANCASTER

As you probably know, during the last few years, the number of Greek students studying abroad and particularly in England has been increasing rapidly. This fact alone, urges us the social psychologists (!!) (anyway, us who study Social Psychology) to think a little bit seriously about the issue of adjustment of these people in the environment of the country or of the place where they study.

The aim of this research, in which you are participating is to study the adjustment of students who are coming from another European country, in this case from Greece, in the environment of an English University and in this country in general. Of course the most common way in which such projects are conducted is by means of questionnaires. (You probably have seen questionnaires asking to tick "how much you agree" and "how much you disagree" with a statement which might be completely irrelevant!)

In order to avoid such a "plain" recounting of "agreements and disagreements" with views which may be out of your concerns, we have chosen to ask you to discuss among yourselves issues that have to do with your everyday experiences in this University and in this country. In the following page there are some indicative themes that we would like you to discuss. You could talk about them in the order you choose, to expand as much as you want and to focus more on some of them than on others.

I understand that your spare time is limited and precious and, therefore,

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU SINCERELY

for your participation in this project.
DISCUSSION TOPICS

* Expectations of what you would find, before coming to England

* Initial positive or / and negative experiences in this country or in this University.

* Impressions from the level of the organisation of the studies and from your relationship with the academic staff.

* Impressions from social associations with Greek and non-Greek colleagues

* Socialisation, leisure time

* Impressions from the operation and the organisation of the Hellenic Society

* Have you thought of the possibility to stay in this country for work after the completion of your studies?

*Finally, if you do miss something from Greece, what is it?
APPENDIX E

INTERVIEWEES - STUDY TWO

The names used are pseudonyms. When a title is not given the following "M" and "F" indicate "male" and "female" respectively. The city names indicate the place where the participants have spent the biggest period of their lives in Greece.

INT 1
Mr Anthos; 49 years old; 18 years in the E.C; Grade A; Thessaloniki

INT 2
Mr Drakos; 60 years old; 13 years in the E.C.; Grade B; Athens

INT 3
Fanis (M); 33 years old; 12 years in the E.C.; Grade B; Athens

INT 4
Mr Klimis; 37 years old; 4 years in the E.C.; Grade A; Athens

INT 5
Myrto (F); 32 years old; 6 years in the E.C.; Grade C; Athens

INT 6
Mr Alexiou; 45 years old; 12 years in the E.C.; Grade A; Athens

INT 7
Nikiforos (M); 32 years old; 1 year in the E.C.; Grade C; Piraeus

INT 8
Mr Timos; 32 years old; 6 years in the E.C.; Grade A; Athens

INT 9
Aliki (F); 31 years old; 2 months in the E.C.; Grade A; Athens

INT 10
Mr Karras, 59 years old; 13 years in the E.C.; Grade B; Athens

INT 11
Ms Antypa; 47 years old; 5 years in the E.C.; Grade A; Athens

INT 12
Kleio (F); 35 years old; 10 years in the E.C.; Grade C; Thessaloniki
INT 13
Ms Kosma; 42 years old; 13 years in the E.C.; Grade C; Athens

INT 14
Kiki (F); 29 years old; 5 years in the E.C.; Grade A; Athens

INT 15
Ms Maka; 37 years old; 2 years in the E.C.; Grade C; Athens
APPENDIX F

DISCUSSION SHEET FOR STUDY TWO
[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE RESEARCH...

As you very well know, one of the most important parameters of the process of the European unification is the provision for unrestricted movement, settlement and employment within the boundaries of the Union. To the extend that this happens, everyday life and employment in the environment of another country is an important source for novel experiences, positive or negative ones, for those persons who have decided to live and work in such a new environment. Unavoidably, the study of the subjective ways of understanding those novel living experiences, is a primary social psychological concern.

In its wider frame, the present research, in which I am asking you to participate, aims to study the way in which various social groups of Greeks understand and talk about the living experiences they gain by living in different member states of the European Union. The Greek employees working for the E.U., constitute a particularly focal reference for the present research, since the nature of their work brings them at the centre -literal and metaphorical- of the process of the European unification.

The main topics that I would like us to discuss in the interview, which for practical reasons I would like to audio record, are given in the next page. Nevertheless, since the research focuses on your personal experiences from your life in Brussels, we could discuss in addition whatever else you would consider as important. I would like to assure you that nobody else will have access to the content of the interview and that all the extracts that will be used in the final written report, will be cited anonymously. In addition, I assure you than if during the course of the interview you would feel uncomfortable, or for any other reason, you could ask for the interview to be terminated without the need for any further explanation.

I understand that your spare time is limited and precious and therefore

I SINCERELY THANK YOU FOR YOUR COLLABORATION
DISCUSSION TOPICS

* Concerning your decision to work in Brussels for the European Union:

- When and how did you first think of the possibility to work in Brussels for the E.U.?
- The reasons why you chose this job.
- Your initial expectations, before leaving from Greece.
- Your initial impressions from your life and employment here.

* Concerning your job:

- Previous professional experiences.
- Years of working for the E.U.
- Positions held, duties.
- Persons or bodies you are working or dealing with.
- Working conditions, possible problems

* Concerning your social life in Brussels:

- Spare time
- Social relations with the rest of the Greek employees.
- Social relations with non-Greek colleagues.
- Social, cultural activities.

* Contacts with Greece:
  e.g. family, travels, friends, etc

* Plans for the future.